



THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

A CONCISE HISTORY OF ITS
CAUSES, PROGRESS, AND RESULTS

BY JOHN FORMBY

WITH SIXTY-SIX MAPS AND PLANS



NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
153-157 FIFTH AVENUE

1910

PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, L.D.,
LONDON AND AYLESBURY,
ENGLAND.

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PREFACE

THE present work was first planned because I found that after a careful study of all the main campaigns, and many of the minor ones, in the American Civil War, during a period of ten years or more, I knew little or nothing of the War as a whole; of the interdependence of the campaigns, or of the effects of contemporary military and political occurrences, which were often so marked that the campaigns cannot be properly understood without them.

I could get no book of convenient size dealing with the whole War by land and sea, nor any work in which contemporary events were sufficiently kept together, so as to explain the varying phases of the War, or had maps of satisfactory size, on standardized scales. None set forth the real causes of the War, or a summary of its results, or gave sufficient attention to the distracting effect of the operations of Napoleon III. in Mexico.

Almost all works on the subject are full either of military technicalities or personal details, and it seemed that there was room for a condensed history of the War rather than of the fighting, with the chapters arranged in parallel columns, as it were, and furnished with cross-references, and careful summaries of the general position at each stage.

The chronology is based on Phisterer's "Statistical

PREFACE

Records," without which it could not have been attempted. Many of the conclusions arrived at are deductions from the close study of the maps which was requisite to bring them within one scheme of scales. A great difficulty was to find out what railways were in existence at the time of the War, for the maps of different authorities do not agree; but Sherman's great War Map has been taken as a basis, and it is hoped that the result has been to secure accuracy as nearly as possible. Another difficulty was the variation in the spelling of names, and even in differences in the names assigned to the same places. The accounts of the two sides have been compared throughout, and the author has known personally some of the actors in these great events. The War unquestionably contains many lessons for the Mother Nation of England, and I hope that I have fairly and impartially carried out, within reasonable limits of size, the somewhat ambitious problem which I have attempted to solve.

J. F.

April 1910.

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ERRATA

Page v, line 2 in Contents of Chapter I. *Instead of* Slavery a Pretext, not a Cause, *read* The Slavery Question.

Page 88, line 14. *For* great *read* Great.

Page 89, line 3. *For* Fort, *read* Port.

Page 89, lines 6 and 7, *delete* "the brother of the more famous W. T. Sherman."

Page 181, last three lines. *For* Major-General . . . West Point, *read* Major-General John Pope served on General Scott's Staff in the Mexican War, and afterwards in the Cavalry on the Indian frontier.

Page 267, line 11. *For* the XXth, *read* the XIth and XIIth. (Cf. p. 302.)

and of the events which led up to it, the lack of which seems to have acted as a deterrent to the study of a most useful and interesting episode of history.

Though it may appear superfluous to mention so many minor operations, yet it will be seen on examination that almost all of them had a direct effect on the main phase of the War in the district for the time being, due partly to the abnormal influence of political and public opinion in this War, partly to the length of the communications of the armies, or to the question of supply.





THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

INTRODUCTION

THE American Civil War seems at first such a tangle of disconnected details, spread over so vast an extent of country, that the reader soon gets bewildered and is apt to study one part to the neglect of another: moreover, the accounts of it are too long for ordinary use. It seems therefore that there is room for a short Synopsis, from which details of battles, especially, will be carefully eliminated. For the military student there are many works dealing with the whole, or with separate campaigns or battles; but the majority of people are not specialists, and might like to have a short and connected account of this great struggle, and of the events which led up to it, the lack of which seems to have acted as a deterrent to the study of a most useful and interesting episode of history.

Though it may appear superfluous to mention so many minor operations, yet it will be seen on examination that almost all of them had a direct effect on the main phase of the War in the district for the time being, due partly to the abnormal influence of political and public opinion in this War, partly to the length of the communications of the armies, or to the question of supply.

Another very great difficulty to the student of the American Civil War is that the principal men on the two sides belonged to the same nation, often to the same families, so that it is sometimes difficult to remember to which side a given person belongs: the names of the different leaders and warships on the Confederate side are therefore printed in italics, and of battles also, where called by them differently from the Union name. Owing to the fact that the tactical details of battles are avoided as far as possible, few names will be found of lower rank than that of General of Division.

The War had been brewing for a long time, but practically the history of it includes the three administrations of Buchanan, Lincoln, and Johnson, of the first and last of which short sketches are given. The War itself proceeded by regular well-defined steps throughout in the really vital part, between the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi River, where a successful blow by either side could strike at the heart of the other, in a military and practical sense. It was indecisive in Virginia till the latter part of the time, and swayed backwards and forwards, owing to the disastrous manner in which military considerations were overridden by political and sentimental ones. Attention has been unduly concentrated on the eastern theatre of war, on account of the political importance of the capitals, and because the best commanders and armies were there: for tactical study this is correct enough, but by such limitations the real history and general grasp of the War as a whole are apt to be lost sight of, since only secondary notice would be given to the regular stages by which it progressed in the central district, or, as it was then called, in the West.

To summarize: after the fall of Fort Sumter, the rest of the year 1861 was employed in raising the armies, and in attempts to gain control of doubtful districts, in which the battle of Bull Run, or, as the

Confederates called it, *Manassas*, was an isolated incident. The North was the gainer on the whole by these operations.

In the first half of 1862 the War began in earnest, and during this time the North gained ground in the West, or centre, but lost in the East.

In the second half of this year the Confederates failed to gain control of Maryland and Kentucky, but made head strongly, and at the end of it were at the height of their power, with the North badly defeated at all points save one. The writer considers that the battle of Stone's River, or *Murfreesboro*, on December 31st, was the military turning-point of the War, though the Confederates made various strokes at different times, for political purposes, which, had they succeeded, might have attained their end, the chief of which was the campaign of Gettysburg. From a purely military point of view, however, nothing could save the Confederacy unless the results of Stone's River were undone.

The year 1863 opened with the Confederates fought out: they had made their effort, but could not maintain it, and had failed to secure the centre of the strategical line, which was vital for both sides. During the first half of this year the North improved their position generally, but were driven back in the East.

In the second half of 1863 the North gained decisive victories all along the line, and at the end of the year held a winning position.

The first part of 1864 was spent by the North in strengthening their position everywhere, and in preparing for the final campaigns.

The latter part of this year was the beginning of the end, and, especially, the first permanent move forward in Virginia was then made by the North. At the end of the year the Confederate power was completely broken.

The first half of 1865 saw the last despairing

struggles of the Confederacy, the surrender of all its armies in the field, and the assassination of the great President Lincoln.

It is unavoidable that the account of such a war should be written mainly from the point of view of one side, but as its object was the maintenance or disruption of a great nation, it should be generally considered from the Nationalist or Union standpoint, though some early stages of the quarrel, and the rights of and reasons for Secession, are perhaps better studied from the other side.

There were faults, many faults, on both sides, which aggravated the early quarrels till war resulted, and however much one may sympathize with the gallant struggle of the Confederates in defence of what they believed to be their inalienable rights which were in jeopardy, still the answer that was often given in the Northern States to the writer, during Grant's Presidency, on the vexed question of States Rights and Secession, appears to be the right and logical view to take—viz. that the existence of the Nation is of more importance than the Wording of its Constitution (cf. p. 39).

Further, events were happening in the neighbouring country of Mexico, the result of the jealousy of the growing power of the United States on the part of Napoleon III., who tried to set up a countervailing influence, or take advantage of the weakness caused by disruption; but, fortunately for the United States, their statesmen were aware of it, and also Napoleon was a little too late, and when he could perhaps have given trouble, they were ready to counteract him with an overwhelming force of veteran soldiers. Had the Confederates won, the situation would have been very different, and they themselves saw the danger, at a time when they had to strain every nerve against their Northern opponents.

Great attention has been paid to the maps, especially to the standardizing of the scales, which is done in

only one work which the writer has consulted, and the lack of which is most puzzling. For instance, no words will explain the magnitude of *Lee's* task in holding the lines of Richmond and Petersburg so well as a comparison of the maps, *on the same scale*, of these lines, and of those of *Johnston* before Marietta, and of *Hood* at Atlanta, remembering that *Johnston's* and *Hood's* armies were much larger than *Lee's* at this time.

With the exceptions of the Maps of the Progress of the War, of the War at Sea, and of Mexico, all are on one of two standard scales, or on factors or multiples of them, the campaign maps being based on Philip's Atlas scale of about 60 miles to an inch, A, those of the battles on the French military scale of $\frac{1}{80000}$, $1\frac{1}{4}$ mile, or 2 kilomètres, to an inch, B, the only scale which expresses both miles and kilomètres in terms of an inch, with an error of less than 1 per cent., in yards. The scale of B is approximately forty-eight times that of A. As it is hoped that this Short History may be found useful as a reference, the maps—those of the campaigns especially—contain the names of all places mentioned in much more special and detailed descriptions than are given here. In no other work with which the writer is acquainted are some important campaigns given in a map of useful size as a whole—e.g. that of Gettysburg, and the lines of Richmond and Petersburg.

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARREL

To get to the origin of the quarrel between the two great parties and interests in America which culminated in the great Civil War, we must go back to the early days of the Republic. The trouble started about 1790, and had become serious in 1803. An attempt was then made at a compromise, which satisfied no one, and which itself became the subject of dispute. It was a mere struggle for political power, which took the form that it did from the peculiarity of the system of State voting and State representation in the Senate, from the great part that the individual States, as such, without reference to size or importance, had in the choice of President, and the consequent settling of the policy of the country for the next four years, which carried with it the patronage at the disposal of the winning party; it was only in the last few years before the outbreak that the quarrel crystallized round the slavery question.

The cause of the War was the resistance of the Southern States to what they held to be unconstitutional and unjustifiable coercion on the part of the North, the differences regarding the admission of new States being the proximate, the open threats of the Abolitionists, and the political victory of the Republican or Union party at the Presidential Election of 1860, the deciding cause, of Secession and War. Former quarrels and crises had arisen, which had

brought up the questions of State Rights and the Right of Secession: these will be shortly dealt with later on.

The two great interests in the nation were the traders and manufacturers on the one side, and the planters on the other, and these became the two political parties which fought for supremacy. The peculiar position which the individual States had under the Constitution, and their political power as States, intensified this, and slavery came into the quarrel merely as the supposed backbone of the planter party, which the other side attacked for that reason.

Slavery was one of the greatest difficulties in drafting the Constitution, being then universal, except in Massachusetts, where it had just been given up; it was supposed to be a declining institution, which might be acknowledged by a compromise, and left to fade away of itself. In the Northern States it did decline, not from the growth of humanitarian feeling, but simply because it was not profitable financially, the climate and industrial conditions being unsuitable to it. In the South, however, the invention of the cotton gin in 1793 gave a great stimulus to cotton production in those States which had a suitable climate, which climate also made coloured labour almost a necessity for the work.

It is rather curious to compare the different attitudes of the North and South to slavery in early days. The slave trade was in the hands of the Northern traders, but was prohibited by the State Constitution of Georgia and by the laws of several Southern States. The Constitution of the United States, however, protected it from interference by Congress till 1808, and when Congress did abolish it, as soon as it could, the dissentients came from both North and South. Virginia and Maryland began to allow emancipation by law, and showed a desire to be rid of it, as discreditable, and of doubtful utility (cf. p. 10).

It was never pretended that the basis of the difficulty was other than the struggle for political power at first. When, in 1803, it was proposed that Louisiana be made into a State, out of part of the territory just bought from France, the jealousy of the New England section was such that there were threats of dissolving the Union; but slavery was not mentioned as a point in the objection, though it existed in Louisiana. A Massachusetts statesman gave the reason frankly in a letter: "That the influence of our part of the Union must (i.e. certainly will) be diminished by the acquisition of more weight at the other extremity." Moderate men began to look for some *modus vivendi*, which should check these interminable quarrels, and an understanding grew up that there should be a balance kept in the admission of new States, by making slave and free States alternately. At first they went on all right, thus:

Free State.

Indiana, 1816.

Illinois, 1818.

Maine, 1820.

Slave State.

Mississippi, 1817.

Alabama, 1819.

Missouri then applied, 1821, to come in as a slave State, but this was bitterly opposed by the North, which was beginning to demand that there should be no more slave States. The South, on the other hand, demanded the preservation of the tradition of the balance of States, and the quarrel waxed hot, when Clay saved an absolute rupture by proposing what was known as the Missouri Compromise, that Missouri should be admitted as a slave State, but that in future there should be no slavery north of the parallel $36^{\circ} 30'$, while to the south of this line any new States were to be allowed to choose whether they came in as slave States or not. This of course was only an armistice, a staving off for a time of the evil day, which was sure to come sooner or later. It was accepted by Congress, but many Southerners voted against it, holding that Missouri was

entitled to decide the matter for herself. As *Jefferson Davis* puts it, "the right or wrong of the institution of slavery was in no wise involved in these earlier controversies. They were essentially struggles for sectional equality or ascendancy."

For the next twenty-nine years the new States came in on both sides in equal numbers, though not quite alternately, the line of demarcation being duly observed; but in 1850 the Northern party opposed its being carried across the Continent to the Pacific, when the great territory of New Mexico and California was acquired from Spain. They had not objected to its being taken through the new State of Texas in 1845, paying an indemnity to that State for the partition, but, to quote *Jefferson Davis* again, they had then everything to gain and nothing to lose by keeping the compact; when the conditions changed, so did their conduct. Practically, though, the climate of California was suited for white labour, that of Texas was not, or, at all events, was much less so.

The quarrel blazed up again as hotly as ever, and another compromise or sop to the South was effected, which, as before, only put off the evil day, but it was such a one as made the difference worse. This was the passing of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850 (cf. p. 28), by which the owners of slaves were allowed to recapture their slaves in any part of the free States, and to carry them back without trial by jury. *Jefferson Davis* and other prominent Southerners opposed it, not only because it merely gave them what they had before by the Constitution, but because they held it to be a bad thing to lay the obligations of the individual States on the General Government, and their feeling that this must do more harm than good was soon seen to be correct.

This Act first made slavery, as such, a prominent plank in the political platform, and strengthened the hands of the Abolitionists immensely. Up to now, though their language had been violent, like that of all

extremists—to such an extent that even in 1831 the State of Georgia had offered five thousand dollars for the head of William Lloyd Garrison, who had started a paper called “The Liberator”—yet the nation at large had not taken them seriously, nor interested itself much about the moral side of the question as distinct from the purely political. Now, however, things were changed. As McCarthy says: “States are like human beings, they resent being interfered with and preached at. The more the Abolitionists of the North thundered against slavery and inveighed against the South, the more doggedly the South resolved to stand by its slavery system.” A little moderation might perhaps have weakened the Southern coalition when the split did come; for, as we have seen, slavery might have been dropped or modified in many States, since in early days Virginia and Maryland were quite willing to let it go, though it was probably otherwise with the Cotton States, the leaders in Secession (cf. p. 7). Virginia was on the verge of a law of State Emancipation in 1832, but it was rendered impossible by the excesses of the newly founded New England Anti-Slavery Society. The great evil of the inflaming of popular passions is the fact that the decision passes out of the hands of moderate men, who are best able to advise wisely and steer through the trouble, into those of demagogues and those swayed by their violence, who always form the numerical majority. For instance, many of the best men in the South would not have lifted a finger to preserve slavery; they considered it an unmitigated evil, even for the white population, and hoped that it would be gradually eliminated. Of such opinions, notably, was *General Lee*. What they did contend for, though, was their State Rights, and many were driven to take up the defence of slavery *quâ* slavery by the tactics of their opponents, among whom was *Alexander Stephens*, afterwards the *Vice-President* of the Confederacy, who was at first quite a moderate man.

Just at this time the South suffered an irreparable loss in the death of their great States Rights leader, John Calhoun (March 31st, 1850).

Many of the Northern States answered the passing of the Fugitive Slave Act by State laws which forbade their officials to take any part in the carrying out of its provisions, which were termed "personal liberty laws," thus nullifying the action of Congress and logically imposing on the General Government the duty of enforcing its own laws; but the remedy would have been worse than the disease. This nullification was an old trick, as we shall soon see.

In 1852 Franklin Pierce, Democrat, was elected President, taking office in the following year, and *Jefferson Davis* became his War Secretary. Soon after *Davis* took office a curious point arose, which must have been of use to him later when preparing for Secession—that in going through the list of officers for promotion, on the raising of several new regiments, it was seen that, on their military record, the number of those of Southern birth would be much larger than that of Northerners, and it was deemed advisable to maintain a geographical equality for political reasons. Thus one of the great elements of strength in the Confederacy was apparent long before the War, and, curiously enough, the Adjutant-General of this time, *Colonel Cooper*, was *Jefferson Davis'* Adjutant-General in the Confederate Government (cf. p. 66).

Though the question of slavery, pure and simple, was now coming to the front by leaps and bounds, the next great move in the campaign was the Kansas-Nebraska Bill of 1854. This dealt with the organization of the Territorial Governments of Kansas and Nebraska, and the Missouri Compromise having been upset by the events of 1850, the purpose of this Bill was declared to be "to carry into practical operation the propositions and principles established by the compromise measures of 1850." It was added that "the true intent and meaning" of the Act was "not

to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, or to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." The repeal of the Missouri Compromise had been worked by Mr. Douglas of Illinois, and he set to work to convince the Northern Democrats of its value, and of his substitute, the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. The arguments used against the Bill were more and more those of opposition to slavery in itself, on both moral and logical grounds, as incompatible with carrying on a Republic which affirmed as its fundamental proposition the equality of men and their inherent right of self-government: it was in this connection that Abraham Lincoln first came to the front, as Douglas' great opponent in his own State of Illinois. Douglas was reputed to be the ablest debater and parliamentary hand in the country; but Lincoln challenged him to a public argument, and got decidedly the best of it, his speeches contributed much towards the result of the Illinois State elections, which split up Douglas' party.

The result of the Bill in Kansas Territory was sheer anarchy. Kansas lay to the west of Missouri, a strong slave State, whose settlers were imbued with the wild, lawless life of the West, and believed in deeds rather than words for enforcing their ideas. The President sent, as Governor, Mr. Reeder of Pennsylvania, a strong Democrat, with no objection to slavery; but, when the first elections were announced, the Missourians mustered along the border, well armed, and swamped the polling with illegal votes. Trouble had been expected, but nothing to what actually took place. The first election, however, showed a majority of good votes for the slavery candidate, and he was declared duly elected; but Governor Reeder, a just and honourable man, set himself to put a stop to the scandals wrought by men avowedly of his own party, which

were making government impossible. The invasion was met by a counter-invasion, each side of course accusing the other of starting the disturbance. There seems nothing to choose between the Southern Border Ruffians and their opponents, who were led by the notorious fanatic, John Brown. Between them they kept up a state of civil guerilla war during the whole of Pierce's term of office. Bogus elections were carried out by the two sides, who set up the rival draft Constitutions of Leecompton and Topeka. The former, recognizing slavery, was strictly legal, now that the Missouri Compromise was repealed, and slavery could only have been defeated by the anti-slavery party gaining a majority at the Leecompton Convention, not by keeping away from it. Governor Reeder vainly tried to keep order, but got to loggerheads with his Legislature, who passed laws over his veto and petitioned the Government to remove him, which the President had already seen to be necessary. His duties now devolved on one of the extreme slavery party, the Acting Governor, Woodson, and this party had it all their own way ; they adopted a Constitution copied from that of Missouri, and passed the most extreme slavery measures.

This reign of the Border Ruffians caused the formation of the Free-Soil party, mostly Democrat supporters of the President, who were roused by their misdeeds to combine against them and form an opposition State Constitution, called the Topeka Constitution. Kansas could not come in as a State with this, though backed by the newly formed Republican party, because the President and the decision of the Supreme Court were against it. Congress was hopelessly divided, the Republicans controlled the Lower House, the Democrats (the President's party) the Upper, and they barred the claim. Strengthened by this, those in power in Kansas became more and more outrageous, and passed laws to make the holding of Free-Soil principles, or rather of any principles in opposition to

their own, a sort of treason. The Free-Soilers had had the worst of the civil war which had been going on for some time, and finally Woodson, with United States troops at his back, dispersed one of their meetings on July 4th, 1856. All passed off quietly, but the Topeka Constitution and its framers played a great part in the history of the State for all that. Nebraska, the State which was connected with Kansas in the Bill, was not troubled, for it was not only surrounded by anti-slavery States, but its climate was not suited to negro labour.

In the country generally the feelings and passions of the more extreme men on both sides had risen to boiling point, and matters could hardly be worse : this was emphasized by the assault on Mr. Sumner of Massachusetts by Preston Brooks of South Carolina, in revenge for a caustic speech attacking his uncle, Mr. Butler of South Carolina, in a debate which became very bitter on both sides. Brooks was a member of Congress for South Carolina, and his party was powerful enough to limit his punishment to severe censure. Sumner was badly hurt, and unable to take his place again for months. There were several cases of personal violence in Congress, all coming from the same side, and the flame of sectional hatred was fanned on both sides by indignation meetings, etc., in the country. The assault on Sumner took place in May, 1856, and few things did more to rouse and unite the Northern side.

In the last year of President Pierce's administration, at the time for the election of his successor, the two sides were so violently estranged that, had the Democrats not won the election, the War would have broken out then, four years before it really did. The political parties had lately been remodelled a good deal. The old Federalist party of early Republican days inclined to Nationalism rather than Federation of the States : on the other hand, the Republican, afterwards called the Democratic party, went in for State

Rights, the assertion of State Sovereignty, and the strictly Federal nature of the Union. To the old Federal party succeeded that of the Whigs, which, though not identical, favoured a strong central Government. The Whigs were a good deal broken up at the time of the Election of 1856, and the Know-Nothings, or American party, who opposed the overgrowth of the political influence of naturalized foreigners, and of the Roman Catholics, arose, but after this election declined. The Free-Soil party, largely composed of dissident Democrats, disgusted with the pro-slavery men in Kansas, united with some of the dissidents of the old Whig party to form the new Republicans, and soon became very powerful. The issue was principally between them and the Pro-Slavery Democrats—that is, slavery took the principal place for the first time. Few outside things contributed so much to bring this about as the publication in 1850 of Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe's novel, "Uncle Tom's Cabin," which is probably the most effective political pamphlet on record.

CHAPTER II

FROM THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT BUCHANAN TO HIS
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, DECEMBER 3RD, 1860

EVEN at this time, in 1856, the question of peace or war hung on the personalities, policies, and leadership of the two candidates for the Presidency—Buchanan and Frémont; and it was fortunate for the United States as a nation that war did not break out under Frémont. It may be as well to give some slight sketch of them here.

James Buchanan was born in a log cabin in 1791, on the then outskirts of civilization, in Western Pennsylvania. His father was an Irish farmer, who emigrated from Co. Donegal, and seems to have done pretty well, for he was able to educate his son as a lawyer. The young man rose rapidly in his profession, and took to politics at the age of thirty, when he was elected to Congress; in Jackson's Presidency he was sent as Minister to Russia, in 1833 became Senator for Pennsylvania, was Secretary of State under President Polk, and Minister to England in Pierce's time. Thus no man could have ascended the ladder more regularly. He was a typical Democrat of the old school, who believed in the minimum of interference by the central Government with the rights and institutions of the individual States. Though not a particularly strong man, he was able and honest, courteous, sensible, and conciliatory, and, as has been shewn above, of great and varied experience.

At the time of his election he was sixty-five years of age, and not able to bear the strain of the difficult times through which he had to steer the nation, so that he was broken down and infirm before he laid down his office at the age of seventy. Still, it is doubtful whether a stronger policy at this time would have succeeded better than did his efforts to heal the breach by conciliation, for any attempt at force would only have made bad worse: things had gone too far. When all hope of saving the Union had departed, he still went on doing his best to minimize Secession and avert war, feebly, perhaps, but still honestly and gallantly, according to his lights, in the teeth of unpopularity, and even of personal danger, until he broke down under the strain.

Of all the characters who appear on the stage of the great American Civil War, the most extraordinary is John C. Frémont, of Georgia, the Abolitionist candidate for the Presidency in 1856. Vain, frothy, unstable, the exponent of extreme opinions, he yet imposed on many sensible men, on account of the sentiment to which he appealed, and made a strong bid for victory; but the success of such a man would have been a national calamity.

He had been a mathematical professor in the navy, but threw up this appointment to go exploring, and met with the wildest adventures. Governor of California in 1846, he was court-martialled for insubordination to a superior officer, and dismissed, when he went back to exploring and Indian fighting. He next appears as a candidate for the Presidency. On the outbreak of the War he was appointed one of the four new Major-Generals of the army and Governor of Missouri, but failed as a commander, and was dismissed for taking on himself to proclaim the freedom of the slaves without consulting his Government, thereby embarrassing them at a critical time. He was once more given an independent military command, in Western Virginia, but resigned his commission on being placed

under Pope in June, 1862, and was not employed again. He went into retirement till put in nomination for President against Lincoln in 1864 (cf. p. 326), but he had no chance, and his party withdrew him. After this he was only heard of as a wild speculator, alternately millionaire and pauper, and he died in obscurity a few years later.

Only his work as an explorer appears to have been of value, for, though brave to a fault, he was useless as a soldier, because he could neither command nor obey. Though he had had great experience of troubled times and places, he was useless as Governor of a district, either in peace or war, for he had no administrative ability, he was easily got at, owing to his overweening vanity, and he winked at corrupt practices. With all his drive and cleverness, he was useless as a politician, for he was shifty, headstrong, and treacherous, and did not hesitate to advertise himself at the expense of his party. A man of brilliant genius, he was without ballast, and so made next to no use of his abilities.

The essential difference between Buchanan and Frémont was this—that Buchanan never played to the gallery, while Frémont did little else.

The sketch of the events of Buchanan's Administration is of course limited to the stages in the great quarrel between the North and South, but the President had no easy time in other ways: amongst other things, the troubles with Brigham Young and the Mormons in Utah became so acute as to require the despatch of a military expedition—a real difficulty in so distant a place.

The election of such a thorough-going States Rights Democrat as Buchanan, who, though not an extremist, was probably a stronger one than his predecessor, Pierce, was an assurance that these claims would have full sympathy and recognition in the policy of the next four years, and removed the immediate danger of Secession, and of one party declar-

ing war against the Government; but the intensity of the hatred between the two factions was not abated in the least, and steadily increased till the election of Lincoln. It seems best to consider the period between elections, rather than that between the assumption and laying down of office by each President, because the election is the declaration of coming policy, and a President could not affect matters much in the last months of his term, in the sense of initiating anything, but simply carried on the Government till relieved.

Directly after Buchanan's election an event occurred which added fuel to the fire and strengthened the hands of the Abolitionists immensely—viz. the final decision in the notorious Dred Scott case. This had been going on for years, and was the suit of a negro called Dred Scott, who claimed the freedom of himself and his family on the ground that his master, a Missourian army doctor, had taken him to a free State, where, with his master's consent, he had married a coloured woman, who had also been brought as a slave from Missouri. The master, Dr. Emerson, died in Iowa, a free State, in 1844; and, when the widow returned with them to St. Louis, Scott claimed his freedom in St. Louis courts and won his case, but the judgment was reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Missouri. As being property under the trust created by her husband's will, Mrs. Emerson's power of emancipating them was doubtful, though she was willing to do so, and transferring them to her brother and trustee, Mr. Sanford, of New York, did not alter matters. Scott tried again in the United States Court at St. Louis, and again lost, on which he appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. It was argued there in the spring of 1856, but the decision was deferred. There was great excitement among the politicians of the Democratic side, who hoped to get a definition of the words "subject to the Constitution" in favour of limiting the control of the central courts over those of individual States. On March 6th, 1857, Chief

Justice Taney delivered the decision to the effect that "The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States do not include or refer to negroes otherwise than as property; that they cannot become citizens of the United States nor sue in the Federal Courts. That Dred Scott's claim to freedom by reason of his residence in Illinois was a Missouri question, which Missouri law had decided against him. That the Constitution of the United States recognizes slaves as property, and pledges the Federal Government to protect it, and that the Missouri Compromise Act and like prohibitory laws are unconstitutional. That the Circuit Court of the United States had no jurisdiction in the case and could give no judgment in it, and must be directed to dismiss the suit."

Mr. Buchanan's inaugural speech had prepared people for a decision "that would dispose of a vexed and dangerous topic by the highest judicial authority in the land," but this was doing it with a vengeance—as the North said, on party political lines, for political reasons, and that it was a revolutionary exposition of the Constitution. But most especially offensive to them was the pitiless logic which would reduce the status of a negro, in the eye of the law, to that of a dog, or a bale of dry-goods. Though he lost his case at law, and the North and South went on quarrelling over it, Scott did not lose really, for Mr. Sanford transferred him and his family to Mr. Taylor Blow, the son of his old Virginian master, on whose estate he was born, who had been backing him in his fight for freedom, and who set them free in May, 1857, two months after the decision. This case brought Lincoln again into prominence as the opponent of Douglas in Illinois, where he spoke with the greatest effect and power.

The militant Southern section of the Democratic party must have been well satisfied with the composition of the Cabinet and the War Department, for they had a great advantage there. The Vice-President was *John C. Breckinridge*, of Kentucky, afterwards a

Major-General in the Confederate service; the Secretary of War, *John B. Floyd*, afterwards a Confederate *Major-General*; the Secretary of the Treasury, *Howell Cobb*, an active Confederate; the Secretary of the Interior, *Jacob Thompson*, another. The Adjutant-General of the Army, *Colonel Cooper*, took the same post under the Confederate Government, with the rank of *General*, and the Quarter-Master-General, *Brigadier-General Joseph Johnston*, became a Confederate *General*. He was not in the War Office at the beginning of Buchanan's term, but joined it later. For a party which would have seceded, and gone to war, had they lost the late election, and fully intended to do so if they lost the next, this was pretty good representation, in most important places. Out of the nine seats in the Cabinet, the Southern States had five: Vice-President, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of the Interior, Postmaster-General. Besides this, *Jefferson Davis* had been Secretary of War under President Pierce.

The civil war still went on in Kansas, during most of Buchanan's term, for the district was so given over to riot and bloodshed that at last a strong military force had to be used, which soon ended the disturbances, dispersed the political factions, and forced their leaders to flee from the Territory. Kansas was not admitted as a State till 1861. In the interval between Buchanan's and Lincoln's elections the Anti-Slavery party had increased rapidly, for their nominee, Frémont, had not been beaten by a large majority, and they had good hopes of success next time. In Congress their attacks on slavery, and all who upheld, or even did not condemn it, grew more and more bitter, arousing equal bitterness in return, till in March, 1858, Mr. Hammond of Virginia, in replying to a more virulent attack than usual, made a most uncompromising and powerful speech, in which he impressed on his hearers that the Southern States were well able to guard their own rights and interests, and would assuredly do so,

going on to deal with their prospects of separate existence in case of Secession. There was no mistaking language like this, and it created a profound impression. In the autumn of that year the antagonism was intensified by the agitation incidental to the approaching Presidential campaign. These encounters did not by any means always end where they began, in words, as we have seen, but in these cases the aggressors seem always to have been the more fiery spirits among the younger Southerners.

In 1859 occurred the "John Brown Raid," which raised excitement to a dangerous pitch. John Brown, the fanatical Abolitionist and exponent of Free-Soil ideas, who, with his sons, had played a prominent part in the Kansas difficulties, had been, since the suppression of the trouble there, secretly engaged in organizing a plan to bring about a rising of the slaves in the South. In October, 1859, with the aid of a party of sixteen whites and five blacks, into whom he had infused his own reckless disdain of consequences, he actually invaded Virginia, and seized the Government Arsenal and other buildings at Harper's Ferry. *Colonel Lee*, as he then was, was ordered to take a battalion of marines and some militia, and capture the insurgents. He found that Brown had failed to stir up a rising of the slaves in the neighbourhood, and took the buildings, which were defended to the last, after a sharp fight. Five escaped, but Brown and six of his companions were tried and hanged for insurrection and murder, justly enough; but the extreme Abolitionist party made a martyr of him, and used the occurrence, however discreditable to their own side, to increase the sectional hatred to the utmost, with great effect. John Brown came from the wild country to the west of Lake Champlain, which is still known as "John Brown's Tract," so that his death touched the greatest of the Northern States, New York, and, what was perhaps more to the purpose, one which was usually Democratic in policy, thus weakening

the support from the Northern Democrats to their Southern allies. After this, and the civil war in Kansas, the breach widened beyond repair, and the bond between the two sections was found to be intolerable, by the South at any rate. The North raved of coercion ; the South denied either the right or the power of the Federal Government to apply anything of the sort, and said plainly that Secession was the lesser evil, and must come. In the then temper of the North, it was clear that if it did come it meant war, for though many of the statesmen of both parties thought and hoped that this would not be a necessary consequence, even if Secession could not be averted, the two sides were so embittered against each other that they were passing quite beyond the control of politicians. At all events, they waited to see what result the coming Presidential Election would bring forth, though it is difficult to believe that matters would have turned out differently, whoever had won.

The North accuse *Floyd*, a militant Southerner, the Secretary of War, of using his official position to prepare for it, and put the Southern States in the best possible position before he resigned. He is said to have designedly scattered the small army along the Indian frontier, which was much disturbed, and in distant places, so that troops could not be collected when wanted, and Washington, especially, was left defenceless : but no distribution of the army could have stopped the rising, for to have strengthened, the garrisons all round would have precipitated war, and lost the garrisons, a serious deduction from the strength of the small United States army. The South say that when they seized the arsenals in their States, but few muskets, and these obsolete, and little powder, were found therein : most of the muskets had gone to be converted from flint to percussion action, perhaps in the hope that they would be back when wanted ; but *Floyd* did his best to buy better ones, and seems

to have used Government money freely. In December, 1860, just before his resignation, he proposed Secessionists for commissions in the forces being raised for the defence of Washington, and issued arms lavishly to their commands; but he was out of power, and in Confederate service, when they made their great haul of the heavy guns which the United States forces abandoned at Norfolk Navy Yard.

Thus the nation drifted toward war, and poor old President Buchanan could not stop it, for Congress, divided against itself, would do nothing. As the time for the Presidential Election of 1860 drew near, the political excitement increased, but there was a split in the Democratic party, while that of their opponents was consolidated. This split arose over what was called the "Squatter Sovereignty doctrine," which was largely worked out by Mr. Douglas of Illinois: the Southern Democrats, headed by *Jefferson Davis*, vehemently opposed it. It was a development of the old struggle for political power, by gaining control of new or rising States by one party or the other. The Missouri Compromise had been broken by the refusal to carry the line through the Continent at the time of the admission of California as a State, and the Kansas-Nebraska Bill was engineered to restore to the Democrats the position they had lost by this occurrence, ostensibly for the purpose of leaving the people of any Territory or State free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, within the Constitution. Douglas and others, however, expanded this into a claim that the first settlers of a Territory, in however crude and unformed a condition it might be, had a right to determine the character of its institutions. This was a very different thing, in reality, from the intention of the Bill, and *Jefferson Davis*, who before everything was a stickler for constitutional procedure, opposed it, partly for this reason, partly because he saw what an extremely dangerous two-edged weapon it was. The constitutional rule

was that Congress looked after and governed the Territories, which were considered to be United States land not yet formed into States, laid them off by boundaries which would be convenient for the formation of States in the future, and when, by reason of the number of their inhabitants, they were ready to be formed into States, it was from Congress that the authorization was derived for "the inhabitants to elect representatives for a convention to form a State Constitution, which was then submitted to it for approval and ratification." But, "logically carried out, this new theory of popular sovereignty would apply to the first adventurous pioneers settling in the wilderness before the organization of any Territorial Government by Congress, as well as afterward." That is, the whole thing would be an unseemly scramble in future, perhaps worse than the late events in Kansas. Though it is fair to say that the authors of this doctrine "disavowed any claim to its application prior to the organization of a Territorial Government," it by no means follows that their successors would have recognized any such limitation.

Douglas was the ablest and most powerful man of the Democratic party in the Northern States, so the quarrel was extremely serious. In April, 1860, the Democratic Convention met at Charleston to select party candidates for President and Vice-President, but disagreed as to the policy to be adopted, and separated without doing anything. It is interesting to notice that Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts (General Butler) proposed *Jefferson Davis* as the party candidate for President, and was one of the first to command in action against his troops in the field fourteen months later. This convention was broken up by the action of some of the more rabid Secessionists, led by Yancey of Alabama: before it met they tried privately to persuade the representatives of some other Southern States, principally those on the Gulf, to take common

action, but this fell through. Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana tried to keep the peace, and restore unity in the party and country by all honourable means, but were opposed by the hotter spirits from Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas, those from the first-named State having come with directions, obtained by Yancey's influence, to withdraw if the convention did not accept the most extreme views with regard to the rights of citizens in the Territories. They were not accepted, and Alabama and others withdrew: the convention was then adjourned. One part met again at Baltimore, another at Richmond, and the Democratic party was thus hopelessly split up, different sections of it making different nominations for President and Vice-President. Douglas' party, the Northern Democratic National Convention, nominated him and Fitzpatrick of Alabama; but Fitzpatrick declined to stand, and the name of Johnson of Georgia was substituted. The old, or States Rights section, the Southern Democratic National Convention, put forward *Breckinridge* of Kentucky, the then Vice-President, and Lane of Oregon; some of the old "Whigs" and "Americans" fused into the Convention of the Constitutional Union Party, and nominated Bell of Tennessee and Everett of Massachusetts; while the new Republicans sent in the names of Lincoln of Illinois and Hamlin of Maine. The tenets of the first two parties have already been dealt with; the Whig-Americans ignored the whole territorial controversy, and simply proclaimed the non-committal policy of adherence to the Constitution, the Union, and the enforcement of the laws; while the Republicans declared that "slavery can exist only by virtue of municipal law," that there was "no law for it in the Territories, and no power to enact one," and that Congress was "bound to prohibit it in, and exclude it from, any and every Federal Territory." That is, the first three

of these parties were on one side, more or less, the last on the other—a divided party against a consolidated one: the latter had been gaining ground while in opposition, and was straining every nerve to improve on its position at the last election, when it had made so good a bid for victory. Though its policy was decidedly anti-slavery, it was not, as last time, rabid Abolitionist, and there was no comparison between the ability and strength of its champions, then and now, for “Lincoln’s cautious action with regard to the slave question undoubtedly held many factions together for Union, which would otherwise have held aloof, or have drifted into Secession. The cause of the Union first was Lincoln’s policy, and its wisdom was justified by its success.”

Lincoln did not poll a majority of all the personal votes, the three opponents combined outnumbering him in the proportion of three to two, and it must be remembered that all three represented sections of the old Democratic party. This emboldened the Southerners to represent themselves as embodying the real feelings of the majority of the nation, and to set to work to take steps to carry their threatened secession into fact.

The next occurrence after the election was the meeting of Congress on December 3rd, and it may fairly be said that the last act of President Buchanan’s Administration was his Message to Congress on this occasion, for after it chaos reigned supreme, and no administration was possible for the country at large. So far as it related to the internal troubles of the country, his speech was to this effect. He lamented the decay of the prosperity of the Union, and its threatened destruction, which he attributed to “the long-continued and intemperate interference of the Northern people with the question of slavery.” He said that they had been agitating in every way since 1835, and causing quarrels in Congress. The whole matter could have been settled by leaving the

slave States to manage their own institutions, for they as sovereign States were alone responsible for them, and the North had nothing to do with the matter. He relied on the good sense and patriotic forbearance of the people, because the election of a particular person did not afford just cause for dissolving the Union, especially when the result appeared to be due to temporary causes which might never recur. (This seems to refer to the fact that there was not an absolute majority of personal votes for Lincoln.) He thought that revolution was not justified except to resist "a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of power not granted by the Constitution," and that mere apprehension of contingent danger was not sufficient. He denied that Congress had refused the Southern States their rights in the common territory, and held that the prohibition of slavery in Kansas was an unconstitutional act, which would, he trusted, soon be put right by the judiciary (cf. p. 9). The Fugitive Slave Act was a valid law, and the efforts to defeat it unconstitutional, for he reminded his hearers that not only was the principle of it an integral part of the Constitution, but that, had it not been made so, the Constitution would never have existed at all. Consequently, if the demand of the Southern States that the Acts passed to nullify it be repealed, were refused, this refusal would be a wilful violation of the Constitution, to which all the States were parties, and the injured States, after having first used all peaceable and constitutional means to obtain redress, would be justified in revolutionary resistance to the Government of the Union. He denied the doctrine that, as each State had assented to the Union, it was equally at liberty to dissent from and leave it, instancing South Carolina, whose Federal officers had resigned and left chaos, but gave it as his opinion that the power to coerce any State into submission was not one of those delegated to the Central Government, and therefore

could not be used, for, as a matter of history, it was proposed to, and expressly refused by, the Convention which drafted the Constitution. Such conduct would provoke war, not avert it, and he suggested some amendments to the Constitution on the question of slavery. Finally, he earnestly besought his hearers to weigh well what they were doing, and to consider what civil war would mean to the country and its prosperity.

Though this speech took a strong party line of argument, still, coming from a Northern statesman, it was an honest last attempt to keep the Union together; but the passions of both sides were now so thoroughly roused that the solemn warning of their venerable President was unheeded.

CHAPTER III

THE RIGHT OF SECESSION

THE election of Lincoln broke the last link with the Union for the Cotton States, which determined to secede, and immediately proceeded to do so in December, the election having taken place on November 6th. Their object was to assert their own right of managing their own affairs, so far as domestic institutions were concerned, and to resist pressure or coercion of any kind from the Central Government, on the ground that the Union was but a compact of Sovereign and Independent States, from which any of them could retire at will: they thus claim that they were acting constitutionally throughout. The question of slavery was the pretext for this particular struggle for political power, but that of Federal control was the actual reason for Secession. How far were they right in their action?

The point had been a moot one during the whole history of the Republic, to such a degree as to supply the issue which formed the dividing line between the two great parties in politics: it had reached an acute stage on several occasions, and dissatisfied States had often threatened to secede. It will be as well to describe shortly these early threats of Secession and their causes.

1. In 1797 the arrogance of the French Directory, which, after France had helped the United States to gain their independence, treated them almost as a subject country, became so intolerable that war broke

out the next year, and Congress, to meet the emergency, passed an Aliens Act, to deal with immigration and suspicious aliens, and a Sedition Act, to check disloyalty among American citizens. Although the operation of these Acts was limited to the current Presidential term, they were declared to be unconstitutional invasions of State rights; and Kentucky, largely under the guidance and advice of Jefferson, the leading opponent of the Federalist party, who became President three years later, passed resolutions denouncing them, and State laws to nullify their operation. Virginia did the same, and called on other States to follow suit, and then Virginia and North Carolina went further, and actually consulted Jefferson as to their prospects of success if they left the Union and set up a state of their own.

2. When the proposition to admit Louisiana into the Union first came up, in 1803 (though it was not admitted till 1812), the question of the balance of power caused such friction that Secession was freely mooted by some of the Northern States, especially by Massachusetts, and no one seems to have considered it unconstitutional or treasonable. It was prophesied that severance between the free and the slave States must come at no distant date, and that the best conditions under which they could exist would be those of separation and subsequent alliance as two nations. It was held then, as by the Confederate statesmen in 1860-1, that this could be done quite peaceably by mutual arrangement. In 1811, Mr. Quincy of Massachusetts said openly in Congress that if the Bill to admit Louisiana were passed it "would break up the Union, and that it would be the right of all, and the duty of some, definitely to prepare for a separation—amicably if they can, violently if they must." These expressions were ruled out of order, but the ruling was appealed against *and reversed*—a significant fact, when we consider the free use of the word "Rebellion" in 1861.

3. The next case was caused by President Madison's Embargo Act of 1808, which, in attempting to deal with the difficulties caused by Great Britain and France each trying to prevent the United States from trading with the other, almost prevented the Americans from trading at all, and precipitated the War of 1812, which was most unpopular in the North, in New England especially. The South, on the contrary, the home of the Loyalists in the War of Independence, was the warlike side, so much so as to cause a serious risk of a split between the two parts of the United States. The New England traders obstructed the Act by every means in their power, and in 1814 the famous Hartford Convention met, of regularly appointed delegates from the Legislatures of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, with one or two from New Hampshire and Vermont, to consider grievances connected with the War, and this brought up the question of leaving the Union. They did not think it expedient at that time, but drew up a report dealing with the conditions under which Secession might become so, in which they complained of the combination of individuals or of States to monopolize power and trample on their rights and commercial interests. The report ended thus: "Whenever it shall appear that the causes are radical and permanent, a separation by equitable arrangement will be preferable to an alliance by constraint among nominal friends, but real enemies." These New Englanders were much blamed for disloyalty, not because they thought of seceding, but for embarrassing their Government in war time, and thus indirectly aiding the enemy; but the sudden end of the war put an end to their agitation, and the Embargo Act was soon taken off. Thus we see that, in the space of a very few years, Massachusetts and several other New England States had two quarrels with the United States, each of which was so acute as to make them consider the question of Secession.

4. In 1828-30 Georgia refused to obey an Act of

Congress, or respect the treaties which the United States had made with some Indian tribes (cf. p. 41), and its Legislature passed State Acts in contravention of the Federal authority, and acted on them; but President Jackson did not interfere. The crisis, however, was acute, and his abstention probably saved the situation, for force would have been met by force.

5. In 1832 South Carolina, by her State Convention, and then by her Legislature, refused to recognize a tariff imposed by Congress, and prepared for Secession and war. By her original Constitution this State, as a sovereign commonwealth, reserved the right of making war and peace, and was the only one which did so, which may have had something to do with her warlike attitude. Congress passed an Enforcing Act to compel her obedience, and matters came to a deadlock; but the quarrel was soon settled by a compromise, the tariff being altered. But it must be remembered that an Act, conferring special powers on the President, the "Force Bill," as it was called, was passed on the same day as the Compromise Act (cf. p. 38).

6. In 1844 the measures for the annexation of Texas caused the greatest friction, and the North-Eastern States again threatened to leave the Union. The Legislature of Massachusetts adopted a resolution condemning the use by Congress of powers which had never been delegated to it, and adding, that the annexation of Texas might drive objecting States out of the Union. In 1845 they sent up another resolution, to the effect that the admission of a foreign State by legislation was unconstitutional, and that such an act would not be binding upon the people of Massachusetts.

7. In 1856 the Cotton States were quite prepared to secede, had Frémont beaten Buchanan, and said so plainly.

Here we have seven direct preparations for Secession, extending over the period from 1798 to 1856, none of

which were called treasonable at the time. Three of these, in 1803, 1844, and 1856, were on the main issue, the fight for political power by State votes, in the formation of new States, and of these the first two were from New England. From the first the line of demarcation was clearly defined as that of the traders and manufacturers against the planters of the slave States. Only threats of actual Secession are dealt with here, but the struggle for political power by the admission of new States dates back to 1790. The other cases turned on the question of Federal control, the secondary element in the quarrel.

Thus there was, throughout, a strong feeling that a State which came into the Union by agreement could leave it in the same way. This applies to new as well as to old States. How far was it justified?

The claim that the Union was a compact, into which the various Sovereign and Independent States had entered for their own mutual benefit and convenience, retaining their full rights of sovereignty unimpaired, was certainly true of the original Articles of Confederation of 1778, and was not *specifically* abolished by the Constitution of 1787.

THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

Article II runs thus :

“Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.”

It must be remembered that each State has its own Constitution, and laws made under it, and that in this original Confederation there was no provision for national courts and laws, but the only law was State law, it being simply provided that the States recognized each other's laws, and gave protection to people from other States. These State Constitutions were thus

superior to the Articles of Confederation, so that probably the claim of South Carolina to decide questions of peace and war for herself could have been upheld, though contrary to them. They provide for the management of Foreign Affairs by the Central Government of the nation, keeping up an Army and Navy (without prejudice to the right of each State to maintain and manage its own Militia), dealing with questions of Trade and Customs, fixing Weights and Measures, National Finance, Coining Money, acting as Court of Final Appeal in disputes between States, etc., etc.; but United States legal jurisdiction and courts were not constituted. A Committee of States, or any nine of them, might carry on the functions of Congress under certain circumstances.

And Article XIII, the last, runs thus :

“ Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual ; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State.”

It was provided that Canada might come in at any time, but that any other new States applying for admission be agreed to by at least nine States ; and the States which agreed to these Articles were New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. These Articles were drawn up in 1778, and passed by many of the States in that year ; but the last, Maryland, did not do so till 1781.

This Confederation was crude, being both too lax

and too rigid, and was soon found to be quite inadequate, especially in the matter of trade and dealings with outside nations. Foreign traders found the State courts too local in their prejudices, and this injured trade; while, with regard to the making of treaties, Washington truly said: "We are one nation to-day, and thirteen to-morrow: who will treat with us on those terms?" That is, that with all their republican impatience of control, they found that they were too much divided, and that some real national control was a necessity, though they would not use the word "national."

Under these circumstances a Convention was called at Philadelphia in 1787 to draft something better, to which all the States except Rhode Island sent delegates, and they evolved the Constitution, which was agreed to by the different States. It opens with the words:

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

This is a very different document from the Articles of Confederation. The Sovereignty of the States, as individuals, which was so markedly affirmed in them, is here nowhere mentioned; but their rights of representation in Congress, including that of equal representation in the Senate, the security which they specially claimed at the time, were guaranteed, and Article IV defines their proper place as component parts of the nation, guaranteeing their individual, but not sovereign, rights. The great difference between the old and the new was the introduction of Federal jurisdiction, Article III establishing National courts and judges, and giving them precedence over the State courts and judges.

Article VII, the last, runs as follows :

“ The ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.”

The draft was said to have been agreed to unanimously by the States present, by those of their delegates who signed it (but all did not do so), on September 17th, 1787: with the exception of Rhode Island, not represented, they are those which signed the original Articles. Delaware led off by ratifying the new Constitution that December, and the ninth State was New Hampshire, in June, 1788, Rhode Island coming in in May, 1790. Though in many States there was little or no opposition, the new Constitution was hotly debated in others: Massachusetts only passed it by a small majority; while Virginia, Rhode Island, and New York set forth, in the wording of their ratifications, that they retained the liberty of taking back the powers thus granted to the Federal Government, whenever they might find it to be necessary, thus expressly reserving the Right of Secession.

A great controversy has been made of the opening words, “ We, the people of the United States,” the extreme States Rights men affirming that they mean the people of the several States, not of the nation at large; but the evidence is clear that the original was drafted in the names of the several States, and altered by the Convention. The Nationalists say that the new Constitution “ appealed directly to the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures, to invest them with the citizenship of the entire Union.” The question at issue between the partisans and the opponents of the new Constitution was not the Freedom of the People, but the Sovereignty of the State Legislatures, between centralized and local Government.

In a debate in Congress in 1830, Webster described

the difference between the Confederation and the Constitution thus :

“ The Confederation was, in strictness, a compact : the States, as States, were parties to it. But that was found insufficient and inadequate to the public exigencies. The people were not satisfied with it, and undertook to establish a better. They undertook to form a General Government, which should stand on a new basis—not a Confederacy, not a League, not a Compact between States, but a Constitution.”

Jefferson Davis, in an argument more specious than sound, traverses this, quoting well-known Federalists to show that State Sovereignty remained unimpaired ; but they used the words to apply to it as strictly *within the Union*, which, in its form of equal representation in the Senate, the right most stoutly claimed at the time, was not altered. He also claims that, if any States retained the right of Secession, the same must be admitted for all, which by no means follows, looking to the different conditions under which they accepted the Constitution, and also that, in no case is there any right of coercing a State to remain within the Union if it wishes to leave it. This seems correct enough legally ; but before the Civil War there was a precedent (cf. p. 33).

The fact remains that many States remodelled their State Constitutions, in view of the altered conditions, and this was no empty form ; for a State commands the allegiance of its citizens, and may punish them for treason to it, which had a great effect in making men, who did not agree with the action of their States, follow them into Secession, of whom the most notable was *General Lee*, who hated war as heartily as he hated slavery, and, though a Virginian, did not believe in the right of Secession, but was devotedly loyal to his State. State Constitutions are generally antagonistic to, or at least very jealous of, the Federal Government, and this is so far recognized, that the

Government has always had the greatest reluctance to interfere with them (cf. p. 469), or to pass laws necessary to bring them into line, although the Constitution has been from time to time amended.

Washington and Hamilton had been the great exponents of Federalism, and people saw its use during the troublous times of the War of Independence and the next few years ; but when the national danger was succeeded by political quarrels, great men by smaller fry, national interests by local jealousies, the pendulum swung over to the other side, even such a man as Jefferson being the exponent, if not the author, of the doctrine of "Nullification," or State resistance to the central authority, the State constituting itself the sole arbiter in the matter. This was based on the theory that there was no power of coercion, which would make the passing of Enforcing Acts, as against South Carolina in 1832, a pure farce, the whole difficulty being a striking example of the fallacies of those amiable visionaries who preach moral suasion only, when men's passions are thoroughly roused, a course which often brings war, but seldom, if ever, averts it. President Jackson, a really strong man, missed a great chance of settling the question on the occasion quoted, had he obtained the "Force Bill" to carry them out, before dealing with the Compromise.

Taking it all round, the best legal exposition seems to be that of President Buchanan, quoted above ; but there is a higher view than that of mere legality, which Bryce sums up in four words (cf. p. 4):

"SALUS REIPUBLICÆ SUPREMA LEX."

CHAPTER IV

SECESSION : FROM *GOVERNOR GIST'S* CIRCULAR TO THE SECESSION OF NORTH CAROLINA

As Secession actually took place, it is necessary to go back a little, and overlap the end of Chapter II, for active preparations were in progress before the Presidential Election of 1860. So early as the February of that year, Alabama voted 200,000 dollars for military contingencies, in case Lincoln got in, in the autumn. In October, Mississippi bought a large number of small arms, and *Floyd*, the United States Secretary of War, had them properly inspected; in the same month Georgia voted 1,000,000 dollars for military contingencies, and South Carolina 100,000.

On October 5th, *Governor Gist*, of South Carolina, sent a circular-letter re Secession to the Governors of the other Cotton States, in case Lincoln were elected: the answers were not very encouraging, but he followed it up by calling the Legislature of his State together "to appoint electors of President and Vice-President, and also that they may, if advisable, take action for the safety and protection of the State." On the 25th a secret conference was held at Senator Hammond's house, and when the Legislature met on November 5th, the day before the Presidential Election, the *Governor*, in his opening message, directly advocated armed Secession, and the meeting of force by force. Preparations were made for calling a State Convention for the purpose of Secession.

On the other side, at the end of October, the Commander-in-Chief, General Scott, a loyal Virginian, sent his views in writing to the Secretary of War, in which he dealt more with the political than the military situation, and expressed the opinions that Secession was justifiable, and the right of coercion very limited, that disruption was preferable to internecine war, and that the country would probably split up peaceably into four new Republics, on lines which he defined; but, as a Southerner, he advised the South not to secede, and hoped that they would not do so; in any case, however, he deprecated the invasion of a seceded State. The contents of this most indiscreet paper soon leaked out, and distinctly encouraged the malcontents; but Scott followed it up with the incredible folly, or worse, of publishing it in the papers, without the knowledge or consent of the President, in January, 1861 (cf. p. 70).

From *Floyd's* private diary, which was found, it is plain that the Southern members of the Cabinet at Washington were in active correspondence with the Committee at Charleston, even to the length of arranging for the immediate purchase and delivery of muskets, and that this was done before any of the members of the Cabinet resigned. Mr. Buchanan's Message to Congress on December 3rd was a great blow to the North, for they had hoped that he, a Northern statesman, would have taken the opportunity to proclaim the right of coercion of the State by the Nation (cf. p. 33). The original draft did inculcate submission to the facts created by Lincoln's election, and the use of force to compel it; but on second thoughts, the lawyer got the better of the statesman, Buchanan's growing feebleness of purpose did not make for a vigorous policy, and the Message, as read, took entirely the opposite view. Even now, efforts were made in Congress to bring about a *modus vivendi*, but to no purpose. On December 14th about half the Senators and Representatives from the

Southern States issued a Manifesto to their constituents, from Washington, which may be called the official beginning of the Confederacy. It says that "argument is exhausted," though, only the day before, the Special Committee appointed to deal with the difficulty had offered to the Southern people "any reasonable, proper, and constitutional remedies, and effectual guarantees." The Democratic Government was still in power, and had practically yielded to all the Southern demands; plainly, therefore, the North were not the side which refused to reason.

In South Carolina the State elections had replaced *Gist* by *Pickens* as *Governor*, but this caused no change in policy, for the new *Governor* immediately sent a letter to the President, dated December 17th, complaining that Charleston was threatened by the guns of the forts, that they were being strengthened, and, further, requesting permission to send a small State force to take possession of Fort Sumter, the Charleston Arsenal having already been handed over to the State authorities. As early as December 8th some of the South Carolina Representatives had warned the President that any attempt by the United States authorities to reinforce the forts would probably result in an attack on them; and perhaps this was the reason why Buchanan did not take the advice of General Scott, who urged reinforcement, for he wished to avoid bloodshed, which must bring war, while Secession alone, he thought, need not do so. It would hardly be too much to say that on the answer to this claim of the Seceding States, to take over United States property within their borders at a valuation, as a constitutional right, turned the question of whether Secession was to be peaceable or not.

In Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States, the section which specially defines the powers of the Nation, as against the individual

jurisdiction of the several States, the wording runs thus :

“The Congress shall have power . . . to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever . . . over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, etc., etc.”

This gives absolute power “in all cases whatsoever,” but only mentions those of tenure by purchase, whereas the Confederates describe some of these tenures as leases. *Jefferson Davis* maintains that the various States ceded land for forts, etc., on condition, expressed or implied, that they should be used only for the purpose for which the grant was made ; that this was sometimes National, sometimes State, Defence, and that, in the case of Fort Monroe, it was to revert to Virginia, if abandoned or put to other than National use. The whole point lies in the *Right of Secession*, which the Republicans did not acknowledge, but it certainly existed, legally, for the State of Virginia. Douglas acknowledged the right of the State to the land, if it seceded, and Buchanan was willing to consider it ; but it must be remembered that they were the leaders of the other party. The cases cited, however, were of places ceded by the various State Legislatures for a definite purpose, not sold. In any event, the Confederates held that the right of the Nation would be annulled by the Secession of the State in which the property in question stood, such Secession being perfectly lawful, since it would be manifestly impossible for a Sovereign Nation to tolerate the maintenance by another Nation, possibly hostile to it, of fortified places within its borders. They contended that the Right of Secession provided for the solution of the difficulty, which was a mere

matter of arrangement or valuation, on the termination of the contract between the seceding State and its former Nation.

Mr. Buchanan's answer was again that of the cautious lawyer, rather than of the President of the United States, for he treated the question as open to argument, saying that it was for Congress, not for him, to decide the relations between the Government and the State of South Carolina, so that he could not surrender the forts, but that he had declined to reinforce them, trusting to the honour of South Carolina not to attack them pending settlement, and also hoping "that Commissioners will be sent by the Convention to treat with Congress on the subject." This was not only a direct recognition of the valuation theory, but of South Carolina as a Sovereign State outside the Union: still, however mistaken, it was all a consistent part of his policy to avert war, and, if he could not stop Secession, to disarm rancour, and part friends. He went on, however, to warn South Carolina that if she made war on the United States, the war resulting therefrom would not be a case of a Nation using force to keep a State within the Union, which he condemned, but merely of taking up the gauntlet which the State had thrown down—a perfectly legitimate ground for war. He added that no permission had been given to surrender the Arsenal to the State authorities, and that he was amazed at the demand for the surrender of Fort Sumter. The Secessionists at Washington saw at once the blunder that *Pickens* had committed in giving Buchanan a loophole for action, which it was their business to prevent, and persuaded him to ask the President to allow him to withdraw his letter: this consent was gladly given, and they were relieved from a most dangerous situation.

The President made one more effort, and wrote to *Governor Pickens* in the most conciliatory tone, to see

if even now it might be possible to avert Secession; but the *Governor* merely informed the bearer that there was no hope of doing so—in fact, South Carolina passed the Ordinance of Secession that very day, December 20th, and on the 24th issued an “Address to the Slave-holding States.” On December 27th, the Commissioners from South Carolina came to see the President, re the transfer of the forts at Charleston; but, the very night before, Major Anderson, who was in command, then at Fort Moultrie, on the mainland, was alarmed at the preparations made by the Confederates to attack him, and moved his command into the sea fort of Sumter for greater safety, spiking the guns at Fort Moultrie before he left. This alteration of the status quo made the Commissioners’ task almost impossible, for the people at Charleston were furious, describing Anderson’s move as an act of war, and demanding that he be ordered back again, etc., etc. Anderson was, in fact, conforming to his orders most strictly, for he was in charge of several forts, without enough men to garrison any one of them, and had been told to use his discretion with regard to his position, and the manner in which they were held. Instead of negotiating, the Commissioners tried to bully; but this was childish, for even Buchanan, in his present temper, could not order that United States forts be evacuated at their demand. Buchanan carefully stated that he only met the Commissioners as private gentlemen, and did not recognize them officially; but surely, in trying to save face on one point, he put himself in a false position on the other, by meeting them as the President.

All this time *Floyd*, who even now did not resign his office as Secretary of War, was gaining time for his side, and keeping the President quiet by his advice; but large sums of Government money were found to be missing, and his name was connected with the matter. *Cobb*, the Secretary of the Treasury, had resigned a fortnight before; he found the Treasury

full, and left it empty. Cass, the Secretary of State, resigned also ; but this was from disgust at Buchanan's weakness in declining to advise a stronger policy in dealing with Secession, in his Message to Congress. *Thomas*, another Secessionist, replaced *Cobb* ; but Black, the Attorney-General, a strong Union man, took Cass's place, and soon made his presence felt. He was succeeded as Attorney-General by Stanton, the strongest Unionist of all. In the last days of December, Stanton accused *Floyd* to his face, before the President, of embezzlement and treason, and forced him to resign on the 29th. The poor old President had quite broken down, and Black was so angry when he saw the weakness of his draft reply to the Commissioners from South Carolina, that he threatened to resign, but consented to stay on being allowed to re-write it in the President's name. In its new form it was a very different document, short and sharp, and ended their mission abruptly.

The year 1861 thus opened with a stronger guidance of the National business, which caused the retirement from the Cabinet of the last two Secessionist members : their game was up. Before they went, though, a meeting of Southern Members was held in the Capitol itself, on January 5th, which arranged to hold a Convention for the purpose of Secession at Montgomery, Alabama, in the first half of February, and also that the Southern Representatives should not resign for the present, in order to obstruct the business of Congress as long as possible. Even so late as March 16th President Lincoln, speaking in the Senate, acknowledged no division of the United States, and Mr. Mason of Virginia was present.

While the North were vacillating on the question of reinforcing Fort Sumter, in which discussions General Scott did not shew to advantage, *Pickens* set about making new works to threaten it, and at last the small steamer "Star of the West" was sent there with supplies, but she was fired on and turned back :

these were the first shots fired in the War. Anderson, however, in Fort Sumter, received his mails and supplies regularly from Charleston, and was not molested, as the Confederates still thought that a peaceful solution would be reached and that force would be unnecessary, but they were determined to have the fort by some means or other: another reason why they troubled Anderson so little was that he was a Southerner, and they had hopes that he would think that his duty lay in Secession.

The Southern States now took active measures: Mississippi left the Union on January 9th, Florida on the 10th, Alabama on the 11th, Georgia on the 19th, Louisiana on the 26th, and Texas on February 2nd. (It seems, however, that Georgia did not secede with a view of continuing her existence outside the Union, but in order to revise the conditions under which she accepted the Constitution, and come back on better terms.) They then claimed the United States forts, arsenals, etc., as belonging to those States on whose land they stood, subject to valuation, and, with two exceptions, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Fort Pickens, off Pensacola, Florida, the State Militia took possession of them. Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina, did not secede till Lincoln called for their quota of troops after the fall of Sumter, and Kentucky remained neutral till the War had fairly started; it was then divided, and did not go, as a State, to either side. Missouri also did not secede, being nearly equally divided, both in feelings and territory. Maryland, too, although strongly Southern in sympathy, did not secede, one reason being that her State troops would be called out rather for the defence of Washington than for the attack or coercion of the Seceded States. The Southern States, which formed the Confederacy, were thus divided into two batches: the first seceded on the question of States Rights, the second on that of Coercion. North Carolina was attacked by the North before she actually

seceded, but after seizing the United States forts, etc. Thus these seizures were by no means simultaneous over the Southern States. The new Virginia Legislature, indeed, elected on February 4th, was strongly against Secession, as was also that of Tennessee.

Here we must go back a little. The suggestions in the President's Message of December 3rd were referred to a small representative Committee of Thirteen, to which Mr. Crittenden of Kentucky proposed, as a working Compromise, that the South surrender the right of taking slaves into all the Territories, which was given to them by the Supreme Court, if the North would recognize it south of the old Compromise line of $36^{\circ} 30'$; but that a Territory, on becoming a State, might do so with or without slavery, within any limits which Congress might fix. The Southerners accepted this, and the Northern Democrats pressed its acceptance, as the only chance of minimizing Secession; but the Republicans, though they had fought for the Missouri Compromise, would have none of it. Crittenden brought it before the Senate for reference to the people direct, but was beaten: the President, in a special Message to Congress of January 8th, 1861, pressed it most earnestly, but in vain, and Crittenden's repeated efforts met the same fate. Then Virginia proposed a Peace Conference, which was called together at Washington on February 4th, and represented twenty States: this also took Crittenden's Compromise as the best working basis, but the business was delayed, and this Compromise, and all modifications of it, were either shelved or defeated. At the end of February the House adopted an Amendment to the Constitution proposed by the Conference, forbidding any interference with slavery, but, though it also passed the Senate, it fell through, not being adopted by the requisite number of States. This was practically all that Congress did in the whole session to meet the danger, and was not done till after Secession had taken place, for they had steadily

refused to vote either men or money, or give the President special powers, as had been given to President Jackson to meet a smaller crisis.

The first Confederate *Congress* met at Montgomery, Alabama, on February 4th, formed a provisional *Government* and drafted a *Constitution*, which was adopted on March 11th. *Jefferson Davis* of Mississippi was elected *President*, *Alexander Stephens* of Georgia *Vice-President*. This was done on February 9th, Lincoln and Hamlin being officially elected to the same posts in the United States, respectively, on the 13th. On the 15th, the Confederate *Congress* passed a resolution to appoint Commissioners to the Government of the United States, to avert war, if possible, and help the work of the Peace Conference, but events moved so rapidly that nothing came of this.

Since the middle of the preceding year the *Governors* of the Southern States had been increasing the strength of their State Militia, drilling it, and appointing to commands officers whom they could trust. Also, since December, the seizure of United States property in Southern States had been going on ; but, with two exceptions, the Southern officers in the old service loyally handed over their charges to their successors, before resigning their commissions, where a successor could be appointed, or until turned out by force. These exceptions were *Major-General Twiggs*, a veteran of the Mexican War, and *Captain G. Magruder*, of the Navy : the former surrendered the military posts in Texas, where he was in command ; the latter, property in his charge at Norfolk, Virginia. *Twiggs* was made a *Major-General* in the Confederate service, and commanded at New Orleans, till succeeded by *Lovell* at the end of the year ; *Captain Magruder* is not mentioned again.

The Confederates took the initiative in preparing for war, and passed an *Act* to organize a General Staff for their Army, on February 26th ; another *Act*, on March 6th, provided for an Army, for twelve months'

service, not to exceed 100,000 men. On March 15th they authorized the construction or purchase of ten gunboats. Already the *President, Jefferson Davis*, an educated soldier, who had served with credit in Mexico and elsewhere, had assumed the general control of military affairs in the Confederacy, as it then existed, *General Beauregard* had taken command at Charleston, and *General Bragg* in Florida. At the beginning of April, *Beauregard* heard that a Northern fleet was on its way to relieve Sumter, so on the 11th he called on Anderson to march out, for conveyance to a Northern port, not as a surrender. Anderson refused, and the bombardment opened on the 12th, the fort surrendering the next day, just as the small relieving fleet came off the harbour.

Then the North awoke in earnest, and rallied to the flag which had been fired on, without distinction of political party. President Lincoln, who had assumed office on March 4th, issued a call for 75,000 militia for three months' service, which was answered by *Davis* by a call for 32,000 men, who also threatened to issue letters of marque at sea. The North sent an expedition from Fort Monroe to destroy the abandoned Navy Yard at Norfolk, on April 20th.

Both sides began to assign commanders to various places, and to concentrate men under them, mostly State Militia, and the Northern Government offered the command of its armies in the field to two Southern officers, *Generals Sidney Johnston* and *R. E. Lee*, between April 15th and 21st. Both returned the same answer, that they hoped that there would be no war, but that they would follow the fortunes of their respective States. Both immediately resigned their commissions, and joined the Confederate service.

On April 23rd two important events occurred: *General Lee* was put in command of the Virginia State Militia, and Captain Lyon practically given the command of the Department of the West (Missouri). On April 19th the North proclaimed a blockade of the

Southern ports from South Carolina to Texas inclusive, and, on the 27th, after Virginia had decided to secede, and North Carolina had seized the National forts on her territory, extended it to those of these two States also. In the next few days President Lincoln called for men to serve for three years instead of three months. Western Virginia was occupied by *State* troops, as it was strongly Union in feeling, though still an integral part of Virginia. On May 6th the Confederate *Congress* passed an *Act* recognizing the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States, and, a day or so afterwards, *General Lee* was given the command of the Confederate forces in Virginia, having before been but the nominee of the *Governor* of the State. At several places in Virginia a few shots were exchanged between Union vessels and Confederate batteries, but the War began first in a connected form in Missouri.

The *Governor* of this State was *Jackson*, a thorough Secessionist, who tried to carry the State to the Confederate side in the February elections; but the energy of F. P. Blair rallied the Union men and defeated him, the result being that a body of men were elected, none of whom would vote for Secession. Blair was a very able politician, who had been of the greatest use to the Republicans at the late Presidential Election, and had a brother in Lincoln's Cabinet. As soon as South Carolina seceded, he got his adherents together, and drilled them carefully as Home Guards, but was very short of arms. Though there were plenty in the St. Louis Arsenal, they were not to be had during Buchanan's Administration; but the local elections had so discouraged the Secessionist party that no attempt was made on the Arsenal till the beginning of April, when the *Governor* had at disposal a small volunteer brigade under *General Frost*. It was arranged that the State Militia should be called out and put under *Frost's* command, who was then to

camp in a position where he would have the Arsenal at his mercy : having no artillery, they sent for some to Baton Rouge. The Arsenal, however, was commanded by a most capable man, Captain Lyon, who worked with Blair for the Union cause ; and they had exact information of their opponents' plans. Blair had reported to Washington that General Harney, commanding the District, was of doubtful loyalty, so he was set aside, and Lyon put in his place for the time. Lyon then sent away some of the arms to Illinois, armed Blair's men with the rest, and took military command, making his camp on the very ground that *Frost* was to have occupied, and forcing him into a worse position, which he called Camp Jackson. Here he meant to wait for his guns, and then move ; but, as soon as the guns arrived, Lyon and Blair suddenly surrounded the camp with a very superior force, and took it, and everything in it, on May 10th. On their return there was a riot in the streets of St. Louis, in which some people were shot, which, as Coercion, had the effect of causing the ex-Governor, Mr. Price, an honourable and very influential man, to offer his services to the *Governor* as a Confederate, though he had refused to vote for Secession. He had had military experience in the Mexican War, and was a fair commander in the field, so his defection was very important ; but the prompt action of Blair and Lyon in the next few days saved Missouri for the Union. These were not desultory operations as elsewhere, but the first beginnings of a regular stage of the War. (Continued on p. 92.)

On May 20th, North Carolina, the last State to secede, left the Union for the Confederacy.

This chapter takes us through the period of uncertainty and defection which lasted about seven months, from October to May, though no State actually seceded till December. Many clear-sighted men in the North saw that, in the then temper of the people, Secession spelt War ; but this opinion was by

no means general, especially in the South, where Secession was looked upon as an absolutely constitutional proceeding, which no reasonable man could question, and they therefore thought that, though there might be much irritation and some military preparation, this latter was rather the creation of the new military forces of the two new nations, with a little bluff thrown in, than a genuine intention of going to war, and that the then burning question of the National military property in the Southern States, when looked at, as they doubted not that it soon would be, clearly and without passion, was a mere matter of valuation. There was, however, another view of this point. Some of the more rabid Secessionists, looking at the lack of preparation in the North in the first quarter of the year, said that there would be no war because "the Yanks dared not fight," and thus did much to bring it about.

The first blow to the peaceful separation opinion was Mr. Black's dismissal of the Charleston Commissioners at the end of December; but still few thought that war would really come. At the Confederate *Convention* in February at Montgomery, the general opinion was plainly expressed that there would be no war; later in the same month *Lee* said that the position did not justify war, and both he and *Sidney Johnston*, when offered Union command in April, said that they still hoped that war might be averted. These opinions, though, show that hope was steadily declining. After the fall of Sumter men's passions were roused to white-heat, both sides called out men in haste, doubtful and powerful States seceded, and when more hostile acts followed, such as the proclamations of blockade of April 19th and 27th by the North, and taking the United States officers at San Antonio, Texas, prisoners of war, by the South, on April 23rd, war was inevitable, and was formally recognized by the Confederates on May 6th. A fortnight afterwards the accession of North Carolina

completed their side, more distinct acts of war had taken place in the meantime, and the two enemies stood facing each other.

What were their positions, prospects, and plans respectively?

FOR DISTRICT AREAS IN CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE, SEE
BEGINNING OF CHAPTER VI, p. 74.

1861	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH
EAST	<p>5. Expedition to relieve Fort Sumter leaves New York.</p> <p>18. Publication of General Scott's "Views" in the "National Intelligencer."</p>	<p>4. Peace Conference at Washington, at the request of the State of Virginia.</p> <p>28. Amendment passed by Congress to forbid interference with slavery. (Never ratified.)</p>	
SOUTH-EAST	<p>3. Georgia State seizes Fort Pulaski.</p> <p>9. The first shots of the War. The "Star of the West," for Fort Sumter, turned back.</p> <p>10. The State of Florida secedes.</p> <p>19. The State of Georgia secedes.</p>		<p>3. General Beauregard takes command at Charleston.</p> <p>11. General Bragg takes command in Florida.</p>
WEST			
SOUTH	<p>5. Alabama State seizes forts on Mobile Bay.</p> <p>9. The State of Mississippi secedes.</p> <p>11. Louisiana State seizes forts below New Orleans.</p> <p>11. The State of Alabama secedes.</p> <p>12. Florida State seizes land forts at Pensacola.</p> <p>26. The State of Louisiana secedes.</p>	<p>4. Confederate Convention meets at Montgomery.</p> <p>8. Confederate Constitution adopted.</p> <p>9. Jefferson Davis elected President.</p> <p>18. Confederate Act of Congress to provide munitions of war, and—</p> <p>26. to organize a General Staff for the Army, and—</p> <p>28. to raise provisional forces.</p>	<p>6. Confederate Act for establishment of an Army, not exceeding 100,000 men, for twelve months' service.</p> <p>11. Formal adoption of Confederate Constitution.</p> <p>15. Confederate Act, to build or buy ten gunboats.</p>
SOUTH-WEST AND NAVAL		<p>2. The State of Texas secedes.</p> <p>18. Surrender of U.S. Army posts in Texas by Maj.-Gen. Twiggs.</p>	

1861	APRIL	MAY 1-20
EAST	<p>7 and 10. Reinforcements sail from New York for Forts Pickens and Sumter.</p> <p>15. President Lincoln calls for 75,000 men, for three months' service.</p> <p>17. The Virginia Convention secedes, subject to popular vote.</p> <p>19. Lincoln proclaims blockade of Southern ports, from South Carolina to Texas.</p> <p>19. General Patterson takes command round Washington.</p> <p>20. Expedition to destroy Navy Yard at Norfolk.</p> <p>23. <i>General Lee</i> takes command of Virginian State troops.</p> <p>27. Blockade of Virginia and North Carolina ports proclaimed.</p>	<p>1-3. Virginia calls for more men.</p> <p>3. Lincoln calls for volunteers for three years, and increases the Army and Navy of the United States.</p> <p>7. Virginia admitted into the Confederacy.</p> <p>18. Naval attack on Confederate batteries at Sewell's Point.</p>
SOUTH-EAST	<p>12. Bombardment of Fort Sumter.</p> <p>13. Surrender of Fort Sumter.</p> <p>15, 16. Coast forts in North Carolina seized by State authorities.</p>	<p>20. The State of North Carolina secedes.</p>
WEST	<p>20. U.S. Arsenal at Liberty, Missouri, seized by Secessionists.</p> <p>23. Captain Lyon takes temporary command of the Department of the West.</p>	<p>7. The State of Tennessee enters into a military league with the Confederacy.</p> <p>10. Lyon captures Camp Jackson.</p> <p>11. Riot at St. Louis.</p>
SOUTH	<p>17. <i>Jefferson Davis</i> calls for 32,000 men, and offers to issue letters of marque to privateers.</p>	<p>6. The Confederate <i>Congress</i> recognizes the existence of war between the Confederacy and the United States.</p> <p>17. The Confederate <i>Congress</i> passes an <i>Act</i> to admit Tennessee and North Carolina into the Confederacy, under certain conditions.</p>
SOUTH-WEST AND NAVAL	<p>23. U.S. troops at San Antonio, Texas, made prisoners of war.</p>	<p>6. The State of Arkansas secedes.</p>

CHAPTER V

THE TWO SIDES : THEIR POSITIONS, PROSPECTS, AND PLANS

¹ THE dividing line between the two sides, early in 1861, may be said to start at Fort Monroe, in Virginia, to follow the line of the Potomac River to its most northerly bend, thence to strike away south-west across Western Virginia and Kentucky, almost in a straight line to the Ohio River at the most southerly point of Ohio State, and thence to Paducah at the mouth of the Cumberland. Thence it followed the Ohio to Cairo, the Mississippi to St. Louis, and the Missouri to Kansas City, thence along the east and south borders of Kansas State to the present north-east corner of New Mexico, down the western border of Texas to the 34th parallel, and along that line westward to the Colorado River, following the river to Fort Yuma. It may be as well to explain here that the Western States were very different from what they now are, only California and Oregon having the same boundaries. That is to say, on the Union side were ranged Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland (most unwillingly, at this time), West Virginia (not a State, officially, till 1863), Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, part of Kentucky, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, part of Missouri, Kansas, Oregon, California, with Nebraska, Washington, and Utah Territories, and

¹ Map 2.

part of New Mexico Territory. The southern parts of West Virginia and Kentucky were at first either neutral or neutralized. On the Confederate side were Virginia (minus West Virginia), North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, parts of Kentucky and Missouri, all Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas (including part of Indian Territory), and part of New Mexico Territory.

The great northern and western Territories were rather a source of weakness than strength to the Union side, for troops had to be kept there to deal with the hostile Indians, and also with the Mormons. But Indians were organized on both sides in the neighbourhood of Indian Territory: though they did not seem to have done much good to either, it was, perhaps, the best way of keeping them occupied. On the Confederate side, the country west of the Mississippi did not produce many men in proportion to its size, though better settled than that on the north; but the supplies from thence were almost inexhaustible, and it was the stoppage of their supplies which was the principal damage to the Confederate cause by the Union conquest of the Mississippi.

In the North the population was, for the greater part, manufacturing and trading, with lumbermen and pioneers from Wisconsin and Michigan: only a small proportion were hunters or accustomed to the use of firearms; while those used to riding were very few indeed, and this deficiency was most serious at first. The population was about three or four times as great as that of the Confederacy. The Southerners were principally planters and hunters, with a good proportion of Western men—men who were always on horseback, carried arms habitually, and lived a hardy out-of-doors life, the best possible material for soldiers: as a set-off to this, they were less amenable to discipline. They had many more men of position and breeding as leaders—another great advantage. In numbers, however, they were very deficient, and, even

before the War, did not increase by means of immigration, like their opponents.

In resources the South were even more inferior to the North than in population, for they had next to no manufacturing power, and their people did not take to this work. Their railway repair shops, etc., were mostly worked by Northerners, who went back before war broke out, so that the South were even worse off than they seemed to be, and could not use to the best advantage the works that they had, to keep their railways in repair during the War. At the beginning of it there were no works in the country which could roll a 2½-inch plate, cast a gun, or make a marine engine, except the Tredegar Works at Richmond; and, when the Confederacy started, Virginia had not seceded. There were also works at Atlanta (Georgia), at Selma (Alabama), and at New Orleans; but when this latter city was taken, their difficulties, especially of railroad repair, increased very much. In Virginia there were lead works at Wytheville, salt works at Saltville, and a good leather industry at Lynchburg.

The Confederates were in need of everything for the equipment of an army and navy, having, as the agricultural section of the community, left all manufactures to the North. Even in the State Armouries there were very few efficient arms, for most of the muskets had been sent away to be converted from flint to percussion action, and had not returned; there was, besides, but little powder. Powder mills there were none, nor raw material with which to make powder: all these things were done in the North, and the South had to provide them in haste, when war was imminent. It was said of *General Gorgas*, the chief Ordnance Officer, that he created an Ordnance Department out of nothing. They had hardly any iron to repair bridges or build ships, and wood could not be seasoned in time, but had to be used green, which was one cause of the badness of Southern gunboats. The worst drawback, though, was the inability to build a

marine engine. It is hardly too much to say that on this alone the whole War may have turned, in the matter of breaking the blockade, with a probable recognition by foreign nations as a result, and a certain simplifying of the question of supply from abroad, by being able to send cotton, the real wealth of the South, to European markets: they might then have been able to finance the War; but the price of supplies killed them. With two exceptions, all the vessels that they built or armoured failed through want of engine-power, and one of these did so from bad armour.

The difficulty of supply dogged the footsteps of all Confederate generals. It has been well said that they were often unjustly blamed for not following up a success, since people did not consider that every battle pretty well exhausted their stock of ammunition, the replenishing of which was most difficult: in the matter of supplies they had to live from hand to mouth. Another reason was the deficiency in numbers, which generally obliged them to use up their reserves to hold their own. Attempts were made during the War to import iron, and men to work it in the shops, but to little purpose, because everything passed the blockade by dribblets, and, besides the lack of iron, there was not enough coal for manufacturing purposes. Yet the South, with all these disadvantages, stood up to its great opponent for four long years. It is needless to specify the manufacturing resources of the North, for they had everything.

Looking at the military geography of the country, the North was bounded by the Potomac and Ohio Rivers, both excellent bases of invasion, and practically under its control, but was cut in two by the Alleghany Mountains. Though the country was well populated on both sides, the lateral communications were bad, especially near the frontier, where most important. The principal one was the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, which was awkwardly placed, as it ran through Western Virginia, and was exposed to Confederate

raids : there was a roundabout line through Pittsburg, and that was all. Only one line ran from Washington northwards, which passed through Baltimore, a town most hostile to the North at first. A very important consideration was the lukewarmness of Kentucky : its neutrality delayed operations there till 1862, by which time the Union side were ready ; but their position would have been critical in the extreme had Kentucky been enthusiastic for the South, for a Confederate army could have been massed opposite the weak spot where the North was only one State deep, and have cut it in two, while these troops, as things were, had to be kept far to the southward.

The striking line of the South was through the middle of this State, that of the North along the Tennessee River, in the western part of it, not only taking the former line in flank and rear, but attacking the Confederacy directly. Thus the valleys of the Cumberland and Tennessee, and the country between them, were the strategical key of the War, in the pure military sense, for the sturdy Middle States were the backbone of both sides, and in this district the most important point was Nashville, on the Cumberland. The Union base on the great rivers was Cairo, at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee, being a most important strategical point in front of it. The Mississippi was vital to the Confederacy in the long run, but not immediately, for the South-Western States sent supplies rather than men, and it was an invaluable waterway to the side which had command on the water. It has been said that it was a danger to the Confederate States on the east bank, when the Union fleet got control, as affording means of flank attack, but it was really rather a protection than otherwise, for the country in Tennessee was not favourable, and, south of Memphis, the regions of swamp and forest were impenetrable to troops for hundreds of miles, the only good bases of invasion being Memphis and Vicksburg,

and the land in their vicinity. South of the Ohio, no great navigable rivers came in on this side. On the west, however, these conditions were reversed, for here came in two great affluents, the Arkansas and Red River, navigable, and invaluable sources of supply to the South, while a landing could be made almost anywhere. Here the possession of the Mississippi gave a valuable line of attack, which the Unionists utilized to the full, first separating, then cutting up in detail, the South-Western States. The river line, therefore, which it was of most importance to the Confederates to deny to their opponents, was from some point covering Memphis on the north, to below the confluence of the Red River, which should be considered independently of New Orleans, a most important place in itself. It was vitally necessary to close the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, the latter especially, to the Union gunboats, the more so when the Confederate weakness in boatbuilding is remembered. The Confederacy was also divided by the Alleghany Mountains, as far south as Northern Georgia : but its railway system, had it been kept in fair working order, was the better arranged of the two. From Chattanooga, Tennessee, railways ran through the mountains to Richmond, via Knoxville and Lynchburg, to Charleston and Savannah, and to Memphis, on the Mississippi, an invaluable trunk system, which was almost entirely south of the Tennessee River, and from which several lines useful for attack ran north, uniting at Bowling Green, Kentucky, and thence running to Louisville on the Ohio, the great Union base : farther south, a line ran most of the way between Charleston and Savannah, and Vicksburg, with a gap between Montgomery and Selma, but these towns were joined by the navigable Alabama River : lines ran to the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, to Columbus and Paducah, from Mobile and New Orleans, and from Richmond south to Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah : there were

only a few short lines on the west of the Mississippi, for either side. The Confederate requirements for a covering line, a strong defence to their country, and base for attack of their opponents, could have been found in a short line from the Mississippi, by New Madrid or Hickman, via Forts Henry and Donelson, on the Tennessee and Cumberland respectively, to some point farther east, perhaps the important railway junction of Bowling Green; but this required to be planned properly, in order to economize power as much as possible, not at haphazard, and here the want of good central control, and a well-thought-out plan from the outset, was sadly lacking. It was not till September, 1861, that this district was brought under one strong and able commander, *Sidney Johnston*, and he then found that different generals had been carrying out their own notions independently. On the Mississippi alone there were half a dozen heavily armed positions, of which only one proved of the smallest use, the others falling easily; more than one of them mounted over a hundred heavy guns, which the Confederates could not afford to lose. Less than half of the garrison, armament, labour, and time, wasted on these, would have made one strong river-flank position to the strategic line practically impregnable. Of course all this work was not done by May 20th, but the consideration of it seems not out of place here. The Confederates having no navy, their whole coast-line was open to attack, but the peculiar conformation of the Atlantic coast, from the north border of North Carolina to that of Florida, was advantageous to them, for it consists of a long, low barrier of sandy islands, behind which is a narrow inland sea, forming a perfect maze of creeks and islands, which give lateral communication for great distances, without the necessity of going into the open sea at all. In many of these narrow places the Confederates had erected defensive works. As we have seen, the Confederates had taken Fort Sumter at Charleston, and had gained a great prize in

the large stock of heavy guns at Norfolk Navy Yard, which they were able to remove after it was abandoned before the expedition came which destroyed what was left. With two exceptions, they had taken all the old sea forts, mostly old brick erections of antiquated pattern, quite unable to withstand the heavier guns which had come in since they were built, and thus no accession of defensive strength; they had also fortified other places, but, in their unwillingness to surrender a foot of ground, they fell into the same error as on the Mississippi, of trying to hold too much, were thus not able to stand against combined attacks by land and water, and lost heavily. They had the Government Navy Yards of Norfolk and Pensacola, but made little or no use of them, since neither had free access to the sea, one being in Chesapeake Bay, the other in the Gulf of Mexico. They succeeded, however, in converting the heavy smooth-bores which they had taken, to rifled guns, on the system of *Brooke*, an ex-lieutenant of the U.S. Navy, who put a heavy band on the breech and rifled them; these guns did excellent service.

Washington, the Northern Capital, was about as bad a place for the purpose as could have been found, but the North took it as it stood, being the Capital. Besides the badness of its communications, it was actually on the frontier, commanded from the Virginian side of the Potomac. The District of Columbia had been carved out of Maryland, a slave-holding State, and was, like it, in great part Southern in feeling, so much so that at first Washington was the great centre of Confederate Intelligence: *Beauregard*, just before Bull Run, was kept exactly informed of McDowell's movements by Southerners there. When local volunteers were organized to protect the Capital, many units were composed of known Secessionists, and *Floyd*, before his resignation, armed and equipped them well; this was luckily discovered in time, and these disloyal troops were disarmed and dispersed, but the danger was extreme. The Northern Govern-

ment was, metaphorically, living over a powder magazine. The great sources of weakness were the liability of the Capital to attack, and the timidity and selfishness of the politicians, who understood nothing whatever about war, and increased their own danger by the way in which they hampered the conduct of it. The ground in front and rear was taken and fortified, till it was very strong, so much so that it has been called an ideal capital because it was so good a military base; but surely its value as a military base was almost nullified by its being the political capital. The politicians should have moved well inland, where they would not have been liable to be terrified out of their wits by every Confederate raid, because, whenever they were so, they interfered with the military conduct of the War. On the other side, the Confederate choice of Richmond as a capital, soon after the War began, seems more unfortunate, because they were in no way bound to go there. The fact of its being in the great State of Virginia did not counterbalance its disadvantages. Montgomery may not have been the best place, but it was, at all events, well removed from any possible attack. Instead of taking warning by the bad position of the Northern Capital, the Confederates copied the mistake. Looking to the fact that they had no sea power, and could not raise the blockade, Richmond was at the mercy of the sea power of the North, being on a navigable river within the heads of Chesapeake Bay, which was landlocked, and could be used by vessels which were not sea-going. Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, stood on its upper waters, and Fort Monroe, which was never out of Union hands, was opposite the entrance. Richmond was thus exposed to attack, and had no direct communication with the outer world. Also, its being the Capital made the railways connecting it with the South more important, and they all had to pass through the narrow gap between the mountains

and the sea: this apparent strategical danger was, however, neutralized by the very swampy nature of the country for some distance back from the coast. Another fault was that the position of Richmond confined the best Confederate general and army to one line of operations; *Lee* called it a millstone, dragging the army down.

The United States had only kept up a very small army before the War, hardly enough to keep the Indians and Mormons in order, and garrison a few posts, so the necessary expansion to large armies was a national matter with both sides, but with this difference—that on the Union side the old regiments kept together, losing officers, but hardly any men, because the latter were principally Irish and German emigrants, the native American not taking to the Service much. Thus many good officers remained with their old rank and commands till after General Scott's retirement, for he kept the army together, refusing to allow young officers to take volunteer commissions. Grant thought this a great mistake, and that, when the manhood of the nation had to be called to arms, the army should be broken up, and the trained officers and men distributed through the new units, with a step in rank, keeping only the Staff on its old footing. He thought that the South had a great advantage in having no army, but only a number of excellent officers, to create one. On both sides, however, the Staff was quite untrained for the work which was suddenly entrusted to it, and the regular army was so small, that only 3,000 men could be withdrawn from the West for the War.

The South had a larger proportion of good officers to its population than the North had, and it will be remembered that, in President's Pierce's time, *Jefferson Davis* and *Colonel Cooper*, then Secretary of War and Adjutant-General respectively, had found this out on going over the lists for promotion by selection on the military record (cf. p. 11); we may be quite

sure that when the same two men were again co-operating, in raising the Confederate army, they did not forget it. The South, not being encumbered with alteration or addition, but raising an army *de novo*, and their leaders being men who understood army requirements much better than those of the North, made several wise variations. They first formed a General Staff, then raised their Army, and this was for twelve months' service, not as in the North, for three; they gave full rank to their senior officers, corresponding to the size of their army, making Generals, Lieutenant-Generals, and Major-Generals, with well-defined seniority. This may sound a small matter, but it was not really so; the generals were not, as in the North, all of the same rank, one being put to command the others, regardless of seniority, a distinction without a difference, which was a most disastrous source of jealousy and intrigue. Another advantage was that each Southern general was entitled by virtue of his rank to the proper staff for working his command, which was not the case in the North.

At first, on both sides, the insane practice prevailed of the election of officers by those whom they were to command, but it did most harm in the North, since a much stronger governance was maintained in the South. The new volunteer forces were outside of the State Militia; but in the early days of the War, when this was the only armed force, the political power of the Governors of States was most important, for they could deal with the State force as a whole, and appoint officers to it, up to a Major-General as State Commander-in-Chief. This enabled the Southern States to overpower small garrisons and seize army stores. In many States, though, the military value of the Militia was almost nil. The South made the great mistake of not appointing a Commander-in-Chief till their cause was hopeless; and the North, after the retirement of General Scott,

who was old and infirm, were unfortunate in their selection till the arrival of Grant. McClellan would probably have done much better than Halleck, had he not made himself impossible.

On the naval side matters were more in favour of the Union, because, though the Navy was at its lowest ebb, the Confederates had neither ships nor the means of building them, and the blockade increased their difficulties enormously. Both sides set to work at once: the North to rake in anything that would float and carry guns, to start the blockade till something better could be had; the South to try to buy what they could abroad, though they set aside money to build or buy gunboats, probably at home. At first they could only find one steamer fit for a sea-going cruiser, which was commissioned as the "*Sumter*." Their home-built boats were poor things, what with green timber and very inferior power of making either engines or armour. To remedy these deficiencies, they sent an officer to England in May with very free powers to buy or build. They had more officers than they could find command for, but few men. The North was very short of both officers, men, and ships; though there had been plenty of warning, the Navy Department had made no preparations for war, and had only twenty-four available steamers when it broke out, scattered all over the world. Their heavy smooth-bores were very effective against wooden ships, but only the smaller patterns of rifled guns were reliable. New types of vessels were wanted for the peculiar coast and river work, for which the fine heavy frigates were quite unfit, but the sloop-of-war class was most useful. Ironclads were started at once.

As to finances, little need be said of those of the North, which were strong and in full working order; nothing had to be created in a hurry. The South, however, was very poor: her wealth consisted in her raw products, and if she could not realize these she was helpless; the Northern manufacturers supplied

her with everything, even tools. The principal security on which money could be raised abroad was cotton, but the difficulty was to get it there, for she had neither mercantile marine nor navy to protect it, or cover its formation, and open the Union blockade, which at first was weak. *Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm, & Co.*, of Liverpool and Charleston, financed the Confederacy in Europe, and were in close touch with the Confederate agents. Though taxes were levied on other things, cotton was the basis of Confederate finance; but a sounder one could have been made by taking more advantage of the resources of the country generally and establishing direct taxation (cf. pp. 96, 249). That this was not done was probably due to the fact that the Cotton States seceded in a body, and may have settled their financial arrangements before the others joined them: the consequence was that, though they got through the first year well, the Confederates had to resort to inflation to supply the calls on the *Treasury* as the War went on, without making provisions for a corresponding return. The new currency was, of course, in paper redeemable in a given time in specie, which time was extended by the issue of new bonds at high nominal interest; each new issue, therefore, brought depreciation. Internal taxation was tried, but was so unpopular that it was almost universally dropped, and the *States* paid their quota of taxation by borrowing on their own credit, which only increased the total public debt.

Politically, Lincoln's Cabinet was not over-strong at first, for he had to adapt an old-fashioned form of government to a new use, the exigencies of Civil War, the prospects of War at all having dropped out of sight in its methods of working; and he himself was almost untried as a statesman, having risen to fame as the great debater who had beaten Douglas. Those, however, who knew Lincoln believed in his shrewd sense, and trusted him for his uncompromising honesty; otherwise he was little known, and the

outlook was not promising. The weakness of the end of Buchanan's Administration had produced distrust and distraction in the North, and the new Cabinet had not settled to its work when the storm burst. The new Ministers were: Vice-President, Mr. Hamlin; Secretary of State, Mr. Seward; War, Mr. Cameron; Navy, Mr. Welles; Treasury, Mr. Chase; Interior, Mr. Smith; Attorney-General, Mr. Bates; Postmaster-General, Mr. Blair. At first it was suggested that it would be a good thing to have a bona fide Southerner in the Cabinet, and offers were made to several who belonged to seceded States; but the scheme fell through, and no wonder. A curious appointment was that of Mr. Cameron, of Pennsylvania, to be Secretary of War, for he was an old man, a pure politician, who knew nothing of military matters, put in to give his important State a seat in the Cabinet; but this could surely have been done without assigning the most important place in it to an unfit man, when the Nation was about to fight for its life. Lincoln did not begin vigorously, except in his prompt proclamation of the blockade, and in his wise action in Kentucky (cf. p. 77). His call for men for three months was almost childish, in the face of General Scott's strong warnings, and there was great delay and vacillation about the building of ships, especially ironclads, which were wanted immediately. General Scott, the Commander-in-Chief, was a source of weakness, as he was apt to mingle political with military advice (cf. p. 41). Though thoroughly loyal to the Union, he was a Virginian, and dealt with the possibility of political compromises; but he was an experienced soldier, who had fought against England in 1812, and commanded in Mexico, and saw clearly the magnitude of the task, both as to time and force. None of the politicians did so, and, it seems, only Sherman among the soldiers. Lincoln's experience of war was confined to guerilla Indian warfare, and was perhaps harmful, as giving false notions.

On the Southern side, although the *Cabinet* was not particularly strong, the *President*, *Jefferson Davis*, was an able and moderate man and a well-trained statesman, on "public form," a much better man than Lincoln: he and his *Vice-President*, *Alexander Stephens*, were thought too slow by the extreme Secessionists, for they had both opposed Secession as long as possible. It was an open secret that *Davis*, with his military training and experience, hoped for a command in the field rather than a seat in the *Cabinet*, but he accepted the choice of the Confederacy as his duty. He was practically his own *War Secretary*, and to a great extent the adviser on the military conduct of the War. *Cooper*, his senior general, is only mentioned as a purely departmental officer. *Davis* was thus overburdened by undertaking too much, and seems to have been unable to give sufficient attention to his primary duty of politics, especially to his relations with foreign countries. His *Cabinet* consisted of: *Secretary of State*, *Mr. Toombs*; *War*, *General Walker*; *Navy*, *Mr. Mallory*; *Treasury*, *Mr. Memminger*; *Attorney-General*, *Mr. Benjamin*; *Postmaster-General*, *Mr. Reagan*. The *President* of the Confederate Congress was *Mr. Cobb*, who had been Secretary of the Treasury under Buchanan: why he could not have been kept to his own work seems curious; but *Davis'* enemies—for, like all strong men, he had plenty—accused him of appointing non-entities to his *Cabinet*, so that he might have no rival. This is not quite so, for *Mallory* had been Chairman of the U.S. Committee of Naval Affairs, and knew his work; and *Benjamin* was a man of conspicuous ability, who settled in England after the War, and rose to eminence at the Bar there, in spite of his late start.

It is curious that *Davis*, the champion of State Sovereignty and Non-intervention, should have brooked no State independence, but ruled the Confederacy as a whole with a strong hand. Grant often refers in terms of admiration to the way in which all

were kept in line in the South, and any croaking or disloyalty sternly repressed, as of great advantage to their cause. Late in the War, *Governor Brown* of Georgia tried to assert State independence, but the result was only comic, and, personally, *Lee* was always a Virginian first, a Confederate after: his intense loyalty to his own State, to the exclusion of almost all other considerations, was not only a weak point in the conduct of the War as a whole, but even in the administration of his own army (cf. p. 196). *Lee's* provincialism was the one minor point in a very great character.

Politically, the first object of the North was to prevent recognition of the Confederates as belligerents by foreign nations, as much as it was that of the South to gain it, as a de facto Government, at any rate. When the blockade was first established, the North took the line that it was merely a piece of internal control, which was no affair of outsiders; but, though they never took this back in so many words, they had to abandon it in practice from the first, and carry on war as war, treating prisoners as prisoners of war, not as rebels, whatever they might call them.

The military plan of the North was, first, to use their sea power to isolate the South, and then, in conjunction with the army, to work up and down the Mississippi from New Orleans and Cairo respectively, to meet and cut the Confederacy in two. There were thus two theatres of war, East and West, of which the latter was the more important in a military sense, the former in a political one.

Davis saw as clearly as *Lincoln* that the question of sea power was vital to the South, and that he must not only try to break the blockade, but get ships to prey on the Northern commerce, which was both important and vulnerable, while the South had no commerce to attack. In answer to *Lincoln's* call for men, he offered letters of marque at sea, and this was answered by the blockade (cf. p. 98). The North were

furious, and raved about piracy, etc., which did little harm. Only a few letters of marque were issued, to small vessels along the coast; the Confederate cruisers on the high seas were all regularly commissioned ships of war.

The South had several courses open to them in the War:

1. To try to win their independence directly by force of arms. It was necessary, however, that this be done fairly soon, if at all, unless they were able to raise the blockade. Their chance of doing this ended at Stone's River, or *Murfreesboro*, on December 31st, 1862.

2. To win recognition from foreign powers, so that they could accredit emissaries to them directly with a recognized diplomatic standing, and be able to conclude treaties, raise loans, and perhaps form alliances, which might mean the co-operation of a naval force able to break the blockade and let in supplies, or even of allied troops. In the East the War was mainly political, and this was specially the business of *Lee's* army. Their real chance of this issue ended at Gettysburg, July 3rd, 1863, but a sort of chance occurred when the emissaries of the French (cf. p. 247), who were in Mexico, professed unbounded friendship; but the object of it was too transparent, and, though they were then fighting with their backs to the wall, they would have none of it.

3. Their third and last chance was to tire the North out, for, as General Grant clearly shows, the North, being much more democratic in their Government, were thus much more susceptible to popular feeling, which was getting so thoroughly weary, that if the War had been protracted for another year, or even, perhaps, if *Lee* had won a great victory in 1864, they would probably have let the South go. He thinks that the chance of this ended when *Johnston* was replaced by *Hood*, before Atlanta, July 18th, 1864.

CHAPTER VI

PREPARING FOR WAR, AND SPARRING FOR POSITION.

MAY 20TH TO DECEMBER 31ST, 1861

THE American Civil War embraced such an enormous area that several distinct campaigns were generally going on at the same time in the different theatres of war, and the best way to deal with the difficulty appears to be to divide up the whole area into several smaller ones, counting the sea as one of them, and taking them seriatim, in the various periods into which the narration naturally falls, with cross-references chronologically: they are taken for the purpose of systematic description, and do not exactly correspond with any of the maps.¹ They are: (1) East, (2) South-East, (3) West, (4) South, (5) South-West, (6) The Sea. The States between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi are generally called the Middle States now, but in the 'sixties they were called Western, and to retain this nomenclature will avoid confusion. The western border of No. 1 is that of the States of West Virginia and Virginia; of No. 2, a line drawn north and south through Knoxville, Tennessee; and that of Nos. 3 and 4 a north and south line, running slightly to the west of Little Rock, Arkansas; No. 5 is to the west of this line.

Their northern borders are:

1. The latitude of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
2. The northern boundary of North Carolina.
3. The latitude of Cincinnati, Ohio, to the longitude of Knoxville, Tennessee, thence north to the latitude of Harrisburg, and east to the Ohio.

¹ Map I.

4. The latitude of Guntersville, Alabama.

5. The northern boundary of Arkansas.

The southern border of Nos. 2, 4, and 5, is the Gulf of Mexico, No. 2 just taking in the north of Florida. There were no operations in the south of Florida.

The business of providing ships, especially river gunboats, was immediately taken in hand, and the Union Government sent for Eads, the great engineer, from St. Louis, and in August gave him an order to build seven gunboats for service on the Mississippi in two months, and also convert a big snagboat into an ironclad, all of which were most efficient vessels; but in the matter of sea-going ironclads the Government hesitated for months, finally ordering three of different designs, of which only the "Monitor" class was repeated.

The South began work on the half-burnt hull of the "*Merrimac*" in the summer, on *Brooke's* designs, and also got possession of a number of steamers on the Mississippi, some of which were protected, others more heavily armoured as "rams," for river service, but only the mail-steamer "Habana" was found fit for a sea-going cruiser; she was soon commissioned as the C.S.S. "*Sumter*." The Confederate agents sent to Liverpool, *Major Huse* of the army and *Captain Bulloch* of the navy, began purchasing stores and munitions of war at once, in co-operation with their financiers there, *Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm & Co.* By the end of June, *Bulloch* had laid the keel of the cruiser afterwards known as the "*Florida*," and on August 1st he signed the contract for the building of the "*Alabama*." Both, especially *Bulloch*, found great difficulty in keeping outside the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act, so as to give no pretext to the British Government for seizing either ships, armament, or stores. He therefore consulted a Liverpool lawyer, the late Mr. Hull, who got the best opinions on this most difficult Act, and steered him through his legal troubles. The position, in short,

amounted to this: That it was no offence under the Act to equip a ship without the realm, or for any one to do so within it, provided that it was not to attack a friendly state. Any one might have a ship built within the kingdom, provided that she was not equipped there: *equipping* was the offence, not *building*.¹ A shipbuilder had nothing to do with the use to which the ship he built was to be put, or with the transactions of his principals with other parties. In fine, "The Act was not intended to protect one belligerent from another, but to prevent prejudice to Great Britain herself by acts done within the kingdom which would endanger its peace and welfare." It has since been much altered (cf. pp. 478, 485). The Union side freely bought arms, etc., in England, and shipped them over (cf. p. 472), and also *persuaded many men to emigrate*, but did not enlist them till they reached New York, all of which they were perfectly entitled to do. The Confederates' difficulty was that they had no *recognized diplomatic agents*, as had the North, who could put pressure on the British Government. The British Proclamation of Neutrality was issued on May 14th, and caused great resentment among the more extreme politicians of the North, who looked on it as an unfriendly act, because it recognized the Confederates as *de facto* belligerents. This was curious, since President Jackson had issued a Proclamation of Neutrality when the Canadian rebellion of 1837 broke out (cf. p. 472).

At home, the Confederacy began with some 15,000 rifles and 150,000 old muskets, many of them useless, and hardly any powder or cartridges; they took the machinery from the Armoury at Harper's Ferry to safer places. Some States had a few serviceable batteries, but there were none in the Arsenal. Richmond could make field guns at the Tredegar Iron Works, and other works soon began to learn how to do so, and to rifle existing smooth-bores.

¹ Cf. pp. 471, 486.

When started, the process of manufacture was steady, of guns and powder, mills being set up in various places, but the latter was not of uniform quality; the best arms and powder were imported. Eight arsenals and four depots were established and fitted with machinery in 1861, but the troops were very badly equipped, for arms did not really begin to come in till the end of the year. A Mining Department was organized to work the lead mines at Wytheville and provide raw material generally. The North, as we have seen, had plenty of matériel, and their manufacturing powers were ample.

Both sides were now converted into armed camps, men being raised and drilled everywhere. The first steps in higher organization in the North were taken by the State Governors, Captain McClellan being given the command of the State troops in Ohio by Governor Dennison, but General Scott soon put him in charge of the Military Department of the Ohio, the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, to which was added West Virginia, for the protection of the vital Baltimore and Ohio line. McClellan had served with credit in the army, and was afterwards superintendent of a railway, which had brought out his great organizing ability. In April, Secretary Cameron telegraphed to the Governor of Illinois to secure Cairo, the key of the western river system, which was promptly done, and instant measures were taken to crush the Secession movement in Maryland, Baltimore being occupied by an armed force in May. This State required the closest supervision during 1861. Washington was protected by seizing the Arlington Heights just across the Potomac, on May 24th, which were strongly fortified, completing the ring round the Capital. In Kentucky, *Governor Magoffin* tried to carry the State into Secession, and, failing in this, issued a proclamation of neutrality. Lincoln, however, acted promptly and wisely, and sent good officers there (cf. pp. 70, 481), who took military steps,

established a training camp, and created a feeling of security amongst Unionists, while *Magoffin* was still dabbling with politics, the time for which had gone by. In many places both sides were actively recruiting and drilling, but sensibly agreed not to molest each other at this stage. In Missouri, Blair and Lyon, having prevented the Secession of the State, were preparing to follow up their success.

Lincoln soon saw the mistake of three months' service, and on May 13th called for 42,000 Volunteers, 22,000 Regulars, and 18,000 Sailors, for three years or the duration of the War. General Scott said plainly that the short-service men would only be fit for garrison duty, lines of communication, and the defence of the military frontier close to Washington, while larger schemes such as the opening of the Mississippi must wait till a better-trained Army was ready, and a Navy to act with it. The Union side were merely raising men, and gave little thought to adequate provision for the command of their armies when raised, for they put officers over the various bodies of troops as formed. Soon, however, they made four Major-Generals, next in rank to General Scott—McClellan, Frémont, Banks, and Halleck. Much more thought was given to this in the South, who set to work to form a Regular Army throughout, with proper seniority among its higher officers. These were told that the seniority of the old Service would still hold good, and five full Generals were gazetted on August 31st, with seniority as follows: *Samuel Cooper*, May 16th; *Sidney Johnston*, May 28th; *R. E. Lee*, June 14th; *Joseph Johnston*, July 4th; *G. T. Beauregard*, July 21st. This caused serious friction, for, though none of them had held substantive rank above Colonel in the old Service, both the *Johnstons* had been Brigadier-Generals in a way, *Sidney Johnston* acting with troops without nominal rank, *Joseph Johnston* ranking as temporary Brigadier-General while holding the Staff appointment of

Quarter-Master-General in Buchanan's Government. He claimed that by virtue of this temporary rank he was senior officer, accused *Jefferson Davis* of intentionally slighting him, and attacked him bitterly. *General Taylor*, a great friend of both, tried vainly to heal the breach, but says that *Johnston* was in the wrong, for it was the rule of the old Service that Staff rank did not count as seniority for promotion, only substantive rank, and that this rule had been strictly kept. Others also had grievances: *Bragg* had left the Army owing to a quarrel with *Davis* in 1856, which still rankled, and *Beauregard* was also said to be dissatisfied. All this looks as if the charge of vindictiveness made against *Davis* had some truth; but *Bragg* was a notoriously quarrelsome man. These differences are only mentioned here on account of their very serious effect on the conduct of the whole War. It is very curious that the senior officer on the Northern side was a Virginian; on the Southern, a New Yorker.

On the Northern side, McClellan was appointed Commander-in-Chief on October 31st, on the retirement of General Scott. The District commands were held by the following:

Department of the Ohio, General Buell.

Department of Missouri, General Halleck.

At Port Royal, General T. W. Sherman.

In the South-West, General Butler.

McClellan's plans were to strike at Richmond and Nashville, with some secondary moves. He himself would march into Virginia; Buell, in eastern Kentucky, was to secure that district, relieve eastern Tennessee, and then turn on Nashville; Halleck to look after the troublesome State of Missouri, western Kentucky, and Tennessee; Burnside to occupy the coast of South Carolina; T. W. Sherman to seize Savannah, and prepare to regain Charleston; Butler to attempt the recovery of New Orleans and the

lower Mississippi. These strokes were to be delivered simultaneously; but McClellan delayed too long, and in the meanwhile the Confederates had won the action of Ball's Bluff on the Potomac, a little above Washington, and had blocked the lower river with batteries. Lincoln wanted to move against Richmond via Centreville and Occoquan Creek, and a Joint Committee of Congress was appointed to inquire into the conduct of the War.

In the middle of 1861 occurred the first signs of the interference of Napoleon III in Mexico, in the communications with Mr. Seward about joint interference in that country (cf. p. 245). (Continued on p. 104.)

THE EAST

During May,¹ the Confederates had erected some batteries on the coast, and in the creeks and river mouths, which occasionally exchanged shots with the Union gunboats, since *Lee's* policy, as commander in Virginia, was rather to block the Potomac than take Baltimore, as the wilder spirits urged, and to hold Manassas Junction against the base which the North had seized at Alexandria. The commander there also drew his attention to the strategical importance of the junction with the railway from the Shenandoah Valley, which was at this time thought to be of primary importance, being a great food-producing district not worked by slave labour, with a large white population enthusiastically Southern in feeling. It was bounded by mountain ranges, and of a size which could be held by a medium force; it lay between the main portion of Virginia and West Virginia, just across the mountains; but West Virginia was strongly Unionist, and had formed itself into a provisional State, repudiating the authority of the *Governor* of Virginia. If therefore the North could control the Valley, not only would the Con-

¹ W. Camp Jackson, Mo., May 10th.

federates be deprived of a district from which they drew large supplies of both men and food, but of an excellent line of attack, and, further, West Virginia would be cut off, which would be a first step in General Scott's policy of severing from the Confederacy one district after another, till it fell.¹ Harper's Ferry, at the mouth of the Shenandoah, was supposed to be of immense strength and great strategical importance, and even *Lee*, who knew it well, seems to have shared this view; but when, after being seized by the Confederates in April, *Joseph Johnston* was ordered to hold it against any attempt at recapture by a force under Patterson, his trained judgment instantly apprised it at its true value, and he reported to *Davis* that to make it safe would take many more men than it was worth, with the certainty of heavy loss if attacked, and obtained permission to retire up the Valley to Winchester.

Johnston's opponent, Patterson, was a veteran of the Mexican War, with a creditable record, but too old for active service. He was ordered to guard Washington from an attack via Harper's Ferry and cover the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, to which was afterwards added the duty of holding *Johnston* fast in the Valley. McDowell was appointed to command the force for the defence of the Capital, and hold fast troops which might go to strengthen *Johnston*, at this time, a rôle secondary to Patterson's. Other forces on both sides were a small one under Butler, based on Fort Monroe in the Peninsula of Virginia, opposed by *Magruder*, who, with smaller numbers, ably handled, beat him in a skirmish at Big Bethel on June 10th,² and a Confederate force under *Huger* (pronounced *Hugee*), guarding the south bank of the James, by Norfolk Navy Yard. A Union train under Schenck was ambushed at Vienna on June 17th.³

When Richmond became the Confederate *Capital*,

¹ Cf. p. 87.

² E. Philippi, W. Va., June 3rd.

³ W. Boonville, Mo., June 17th.

however, on June 1st, the strategical balance changed entirely; Manassas became of primary importance as the approach to it, and was reinforced, *Beauregard* being sent to take command, while McDowell's rôle was changed from defensive to offensive. He told General Scott that he could manage *Beauregard* if *Johnston* were held off, and was promised that this should be done, Patterson being ordered to hold the latter fast, or at all events to neutralize any move he might make, by following close on his heels. The small Confederate successes had been made the most of, and they were confident, while the North were rather depressed, and badly wanted a success on their side to counterbalance them.

On the Confederate side, the military operations were directed by *Davis*, with advice from *Cooper* and *Lee*, not an ideal arrangement—any one of them could have done better. *Beauregard* was kept well informed of McDowell's movements by his agents in Washington, so bided his time confidently; and *Johnston*, who had retired to Winchester before Patterson's much stronger force, was watching him closely, and covering the Manassas Gap Railway. With *Davis*' consent, *Beauregard* had arranged a plan of joint action with *Johnston*, that the latter should join him on the field if McDowell advanced. As the time for the move drew nearer,¹ Scott reiterated his orders to Patterson to act vigorously, and hold his opponent fast by an attack, but he kept asking for reinforcements to enable him to do so (though he had 18,000 men to *Johnston*'s 9,000 or 10,000), hesitating, and calling councils of war. A Southern lady living in Washington informed *Beauregard* the moment McDowell moved, and he warned *Johnston*. This army at Manassas was the only one that the Confederates ever called the *Army of the Potomac*, and was some 22,000 strong, with 27 guns. *Johnston* brought with him 8,000 or 9,000 men of his *Army of the Shenandoah*, with 20 guns, and McDowell's

¹ E. Rich Mountain, W. Va., July 11th.

command was from 30,000 to 33,000 strong, with 49 guns. It seems that reinforcements were sent to Patterson at the last minute, which, had they gone to McDowell, would have turned the scale, and that, when *Johnston* slipped away, he left 22,000 Union troops idle, "observing" the 1,000 or 1,500 Confederates remaining to bluff them under the brilliant *Magruder*, who carried out his task to perfection. This large force was no danger to the Confederacy, and had to retreat as the result of the battle of Bull Run. It is but fair to Patterson to say that the loss of men from the termination of their three months' service was a very serious difficulty, which also affected McDowell to a less extent, in the very presence of the enemy.

McDowell's plan of battle was to turn the enemy's left, force him from his position, and break the Manassas Gap Railway—that is, cut him off from Gainesville on his left rear, which would prevent *Johnston's* troops from joining; but the Confederates made haste, while he delayed, wasted several days, and made a useless reconnaissance in force against the Confederate left at Blackburn's Ford, which brought on a bigger action than he intended, and, before the main battle was fought, *Johnston* had arrived with half his army. This action unduly depressed the one side and elated the other, but, while it made *Beauregard* expect a frontal attack, it showed McDowell that this would not do, for his adversary was well posted behind a small stream, which had difficult banks in places. Two Union divisions were to make a wide turning movement round the Confederate left, with Tyler's strong division to threaten this part of their line in front and hold it fast, at first by a demonstration only. A sufficient force was left to hold the Confederates to their main position along the stream, and was to try to prevent them from sending help to their left, when turned.

On the other side, *Johnston* took command as senior

officer, but adopted *Beauregard's* plan, to make a converging attack on Centreville, McDowell's base, and crush him before Patterson could come up. McDowell, however, spoilt their plan by attacking first. Their left was very weak, and, when the turning movement was discovered, the danger was imminent, for half of *Johnston's* army was not up, and the attack was aimed at the most vulnerable point; but the officer commanding the extreme left, *Colonel Evans*, was an able man, and took perhaps the boldest and most effective step of the whole War to meet the danger. He soon recognized that Tyler, with all his strength, would not use it at this time (though his orders were to make a *strong* demonstration), while the stopping of the turning column *at a distance* was of vital importance, to let the expected reinforcements come up and give them room to act. Although he commanded but two battalions (of ten companies each) and two guns, he left four companies only to face Tyler, and moved away with the rest to strike at the coming column, sending word of what he was doing to the senior officer commanding the left of the line. Of course he could not, with his tiny force, stop the enemy, but he delayed them seriously on Matthews Hill, while a strong Confederate line was being formed on the Henry Hill, about a mile in rear. To gain a little more time, a brigade and a battery were sent to his support, but at last this weak line was forced back, and Tyler also began to move, on the flank. The new line on Henry Hill was not ready when the Union batteries opened fire from Matthews Hill, and the bringing back of the troops from that advanced position caused much confusion; but all were rallied, and the line formed, under cover of the inflexible steadiness of *Jackson's* brigade, which earned him his nickname of "*Stonewall*."

During the morning, the Confederate generals had had several pieces of information: first, that their own attack on Centreville was late in starting; next,

that McDowell had been too quick for them, and was attacking; and then, when they essayed to change their plan, and turn his left, holding on with their own, that the Union attack was so serious that they would want every man they had to stop it. They instantly took up the new conditions so as to bring every available man to the critical point, where *Beauregard* took charge, *Johnston* directing the whole battle. Some fresh men came up from Richmond to strengthen the line on the front of Henry Hill, but after a while it was forced back to the rear crest: it had now become evident that McDowell was throwing his whole weight in here, and that nothing was to be feared from his left, so the right and centre were denuded to the utmost, only making a small demonstration, while every man who could be spared went to the left. McDowell's task became more difficult, for, having before had the advantage of thick ground, he now had to attack across the open at close quarters, which was not in favour of his rifled guns, as against smooth-bores. Two of his batteries were pushed forward, and wrecked by the Confederate fire, a furious fight took place round them, the Confederate reserves came up from their right, and *Kirby Smith's* brigade, from the railway, attacked the Union flank: this turned the scale, and the Union troops were driven off the hill. McDowell formed a new line on the other side of Young's Branch, but now to stave off defeat, no longer to win: the Confederates advanced against it in front, while *Early's* brigade, from reserve, which had marched round, struck it in flank: the battle was won, and McDowell's men finally broke and retreated. At first they moved in good order, followed only by artillery fire, but on reaching Cub Run the retreat degenerated into panic, and they never stopped till they reached Washington, twenty miles away. The officer commanding the Union left had been able to stop the Confederate demonstration there, but troops were sent back to

the base at Centreville in error, where the reserve lay idle, under a worse than incompetent commander, while the battle was being lost for want of it.

Each side had about 18,000 men engaged, the Unionists 24 guns, the Confederates 21. Union loss, 460 killed, 1,124 wounded, 1,312 missing—total 2,896. Confederate loss, 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, 13 missing, total 1,982.

There was no general pursuit, for the winners were as much demoralized by victory as the losers by defeat, both sides being composed of raw troops with little discipline. But for this, McDowell's plan, which was good, might have succeeded; some think that *Johnston*, with a brigade of regulars, could have marched to Washington, which was panic-stricken.

The action of the commanders on both sides is worth noting: Major-General McDowell, a major in the old army, remembered the Major, but forgot the General, and went forward into the thick of the fight, where he was only in the way of his subordinates, and could not control the battle or look after his reserves, of which he had plenty idle; while the *Johnston-Beauregard* combination was most happy, for they took their places so as to direct the battle to the best advantage: their correct insight into the dispositions of the enemy, and free use of reserves, are extremely instructive.

Thus ended the first great collision. The North settled down for a long war, the three months' service, just expiring, was changed to three years' service, and Congress took powers to raise half a million men: military operations practically ceased for a time. McClellan was sent for from West Virginia to take command, and commanded the Union Army of the Potomac from July 27th to October 31st,¹ during which time he raised its strength to 134,000 men. Patterson

¹ W. Wilson's Creek, Mo., August 10th.

S.E. Fort Hatteras, N.C., August 28th, 29th.

S. Head of the Passes, October 12th.

was not employed again. On the Confederate side, *Johnston* established himself at Manassas, but the people thought the War over, and crowds left his army. In answer to his appeals for reinforcements, to cross into Maryland in rear of Washington, *President Davis* replied that men were wanted everywhere, and he could not send any.¹

WEST VIRGINIA

(Continued from p. 81.) West Virginia lies mostly in the watershed of the Ohio, and gravitated generally to the State of that name in feeling, except on the lower Shenandoah. The first operations after the declaration of war took place here, where the people had formed a provisional Union State. This was a most important fact for the North, for their great strategical railway ran through it, special points of which, such as bridges and tunnels, might easily be broken. *Lee* had said that the destruction of Cheat River bridge would be worth an army to his side. Another main line of transit was the valley of the Great Kanawha River.

Both sides sent officers into this district, to gain control and raise men, Colonel Kelley at Wheeling, and *Colonel Porterfield* at Beverly. The latter promptly attacked the railway, to protect which, McClellan, in whose district West Virginia had been placed, sent a small force, and *Porterfield* retired to Philippi, where he was surprised and routed on June 3rd :² this action had the greatest political value, for it reassured the waverers in the district which the Confederates had overrun, more than three-quarters of West Virginia. The Union force was strengthened to protect Unionists better, and put down Secession; the Confederates sent *Generals Garnett* and *Wise* to repair

¹ W. Belmont, Mo., November 7th.

The "Trent" affair, November 8th.

S.E. Port Royal, S.C., November 7th.

² W. Boonville, Mo., June 17th.

their loss, on which McClellan took the command himself, and drove them from the mountain passes which they were holding at Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain, on July 10th and 11th. Part of their force surrendered, while *Garnett* fought a rear-guard action at Carrick's Ford, on the Cheat River, in which he was killed and his trains lost. These little campaigns had great military and political results, that of Rich Mountain being decisive, for, though operations went on for some time longer under Rosecrans, after McClellan went to Washington, the Confederates, even under *Lee*, never regained the ground lost, and the year ended with their being forced out of the Great Kanawha Valley, leaving the new State controlled by the Union side. (Continued on p. 105.)

THE SOUTH-EAST

It will be as well to deal here with the combined military and naval operations in the district, on the coast, and the inland waters, leaving purely naval matters, such as the Blockade, to a separate division.

¹The first was the expedition against the coast of North Carolina, under General Butler and Admiral Stringham, at the end of August, which took and occupied Forts Hatteras and Clark, at Cape Hatteras, and gained the command of the best sea entrance to North Carolina waters. In September, the officer left in command found that the Confederates were fortifying positions in his front, asked for reinforcements, and was able to hold his own. To improve the advantage, and drive back the Confederates, who were still threatening, General Burnside and Admiral Goldsborough were ordered to get ready another combined expedition, and were ready to sail at the end of the year with three brigades and over twenty gunboats and armed steamers.

On the Atlantic coast, the Blockade was in the

¹ Map 59, p. 390.

difficult position of having no good harbour for a base, and Captain Dupont suggested a combined expedition to seize one, preferably the excellent harbour of Port¹ Royal in South Carolina, between Charleston and Savannah, which commanded the inner waters connecting them. General T. W. Sherman, ~~the brother of the more famous W. T. Sherman~~, was directed, with Dupont, to organize an expedition of 12,000 men, and keep its destination a strict secret. They sailed from Hampton Roads on October 29th,² but their fleet was caught in a gale and suffered severely, not reaching the blockading fleet off Charleston till November 3rd.³ Here definite orders were received but the Confederates had got wind of the expedition, and were ready for it. Port Royal Heads were guarded by two forts and by a few small gunboats under the gallant old *Commodore Tattnall*. The Union fleet consisted of two steam frigates, four sloops, three steam, one sailing, and three gunboats in the main line, and five gunboats in the flanking line, specially detailed to watch *Tattnall* and protect the transports. The fleet passed slowly, firing on both forts, while the flankers kept off the enemy's gunboats; then the main line turned, coming round again close to the larger fort, Walker, and silencing it. The Confederates evacuated it, and a landing-party ran up the Stars and Stripes. Soon after, the other fort was found to be empty. Fort Walker was very well constructed, and the two mounted 52 guns, some very heavy. As the expedition advanced inland up the rivers, the Confederates burnt and abandoned everything, and Port Royal Harbour, the best on the coast, was taken. This made it possible to maintain an effective blockage within the entrances of the whole coast from Charleston to Cape Florida, except at

¹ Map 33, p. 232.

² S. Head of the Passes, October 12th.

³ W. Belmont, Mo., November 7th.

The "Trent" affair, November 8th.

Fernandina, besides making a base for the sea-going squadron. The army made a strong camp at Fort Walker, and secured the country round the harbour, which the Confederates planned to retake; but Sherman heard of it, and asked Dupont for a naval contingent to act with him, with which he drove them in on January 1st, 1862.

Lec was put in command of the *Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida*, in November, and set to work vigorously to plan and erect coast defences, to shut in Port Royal, and protect Charleston and Savannah (cf. p. 125). Speaking generally, this line from Winyaw Bay, S.C., to St. Mary's River, protected the most valuable agricultural section of the South, and the principal line of communication between the Mississippi and the Potomac, till Sherman's March to the Sea took it in rear, and broke the back of the Confederacy. (Continued on p. 123.)

THE WEST

(Continued from p. 52.) As soon as General Harney was disposed of in Missouri, Lyon and Blair acted vigorously. Some amiable people, who dreamed of neutrality for the State, sought to make a truce between Lyon and *Price*, now commanding the Confederates; but Lyon ended the meeting by an unqualified assertion of the authority of the United States, and immediately moved against *Price* and *Governor Jackson*, who fled via Jefferson City to Boonville, where, on June 17th,¹ he attacked and dispersed their troops.² Though but a skirmish in magnitude, this action was most important, for it dealt a blow at the power of Secession in the State from which it never recovered, and secured the Union men in northern Missouri. *Price* retreated to the southwest, and joined *McCulloch*, from Arkansas; he also hoped to have had the help of *Hardee*, in northern Arkansas, but this was not given. Sigel, one of

¹ E. Philippi, W. Va., June 3rd.

² Map 22, p. 166.

Lyon's lieutenants, attacked *Price* at Carthage, but was driven in, on which Lyon moved on Springfield. On July 9th,¹ Major-General Frémont was put in command of the Department, and approved of Lyon's plans. Meanwhile, on the other side, *McCulloch*, a brave but insubordinate man, not the equal of *Price* as a soldier, refused to serve under him, and *Price*, to save friction, let him take command. They had some 10,000 men, and Lyon moved against them from Springfield with about 6,000, but better organized: he adopted the extremely risky plan of trying to surprise them with simultaneous attacks in front and rear, but these were badly timed; Sigel's in rear was beaten, and Lyon's in front hard pressed, Lyon himself being killed while bringing up his reserves. This was the battle of Wilson's Creek, on August 10th. General Sturgis took command, and retreated to the north of the State, while *Price*, who resumed command of the Confederates, reoccupied Springfield, and took Lexington on September 20th.

On the Mississippi, *Pillow* had warned *President Davis* in June of the danger of the Union forces opening up the river, and wanted to move forward to seize Columbus, Kentucky; but *Davis* did not wish "to force Kentucky's neutrality," and refused permission. When *Polk*, however, took command, on July 4th, he seized and fortified Columbus, Hickman, and other places, rather at random, and also planned and began Forts Henry and Donelson. Kentucky answered by appointing General Anderson, of Sumter fame, to command her militia, thus, at last, taking the Union side as a State. *Polk* had *Pillow*, *Hardee*, and *Thompson* under him, whose commands amounted to over 12,000 men, and he planned to seize Cape Girardeau, between St. Louis and Cairo, then take Cairo, and sweep southern Missouri, but Frémont was warned in time, and sent Grant from Jefferson

¹ E. Rich Mountain, W. Va., July 11th.

E. Bull Run, Va., July 21st.

City to take it, and assume command of south-eastern Missouri and southern Illinois, with headquarters at Cairo. He carried out his orders, but heard on reaching Cairo¹ that *Polk* was moving to seize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee, marched at once, and forestalled him again ; he then seized the ground at the mouth of the Cumberland, and that opposite Cairo, fortifying all three positions during September.²

At St. Louis, the Confederates, elated by the success of Bull Run, made head so much that Frémont felt that he must take strong measures, and at the end of August issued the famous proclamation that the property of "persons in rebellion against the United States" would be confiscated, and their slaves set free. He never consulted his Government before doing this, and embarrassed them very much (cf. p. 147), since they were elected on a Union, not an Abolitionist, platform, the result being that he was recalled on November 2nd, and Hunter sent to succeed him. Frémont had been collecting a force of 40,000 men to disperse *Price's* army, and then turn on the Confederates all along the river, and roll them up, an ambitious programme. With this force he was on the point of bringing *Price* to action near Wilson's Creek, when Hunter arrived, took command, and retreated without fighting. A week later, General Halleck came to take command of the Department, Missouri and Illinois, to which was now added Kentucky as far as the Cumberland River.

Previous to this, Grant, who was ordered to prevent the Confederates detaching troops to help *Price*, took a brigade, with two guns and a few cavalry, and moved from Cairo to Belmont, opposite Columbus, making a strong reconnaissance, which drew all attention to himself. He drove *Pillow* in, but when *Polk* came up was almost surrounded, but succeeded in getting back to his boats. He had also sent a small

¹ S.E. Fort Hatteras, N.C., August 28th, 29th.

² S. Head of the Passes, October 12th.

expedition along the west bank, which was protected by this action ; he took two guns and some prisoners, and brought 3,000 men into action against 7,000. The Confederates lost heavily in this sharp fight, which gave great confidence to Grant's command, and was fought on November 7th.¹

On the Confederate side, *General Sidney Johnston* had been put in command of *Department No. 2*, the States of Tennessee, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, the country to the west, and the western half of Mississippi, on September 15th, and at once set to work to deal with the situation as a whole. Since Grant had seized the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, it was more than ever urgent to close these vital avenues against the Union side, and so the construction of Forts Henry and Donelson was hurried on, and that of Fort Heiman, opposite Fort Henry, begun. Here the rivers are within twelve miles of each other, giving a very short defensive line. *Buckner*, in middle, and *Zollicoffer*, in eastern Tennessee, had, before this, been collecting troops to advance into Kentucky, by *Johnston's* orders, the former seizing and fortifying Bowling Green, the latter Cumberland Gap, the gate of eastern Kentucky. *Johnston's* line thus extended from the Mississippi to the Cumberland Mountains, *Polk's* command being on the river, *Buckner's* in the centre, *Zollicoffer's* in the mountains, on the right. Both of the two latter had advanced farther, but had to fall back, but in November *Zollicoffer* advanced to Mill Springs and entrenched himself there.

The dispositions on *Johnston's* right seem feeble, for Cumberland Gap was not only the base for this flank, covering that of his main attacking position at Bowling Green, but was in itself a most important strategical position commanding east Kentucky and West Virginia, and covering the Confederate com-

¹ S.E. Port Royal, S.C., November 7th.

The "Trent" affair, November 8th.

munications between Richmond and Chattanooga also. Being the gate of the mountains, it enabled troops to be transferred from one side to the other. This district therefore should have been entrusted to a good force, not too local in composition, under a carefully selected officer, instead of to two small local ones of inferior quality, commanded by inferior men, for *Zollicoffer*, though brave and active, was a pure civilian, appointed for local reasons, and the position of *Crittenden*, his military adviser, a false one, while *Marshall*, the other, a good soldier theoretically, was physically unfit for active service, and so extremely democratic in his notions that he could maintain no discipline. He was not even under *Johnston's* orders, but had been sent from Richmond, and was based on Virginia. This position was a striking instance of the way in which the Confederate cause suffered by the lack of a *Commander-in-Chief*, to bring all forces properly into combination.

The Union Departments were re-organized on November 9th, Halleck succeeding Frémont at St. Louis, his command reaching to the Cumberland River, and Buell taking Kentucky to the east of it, with Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Tennessee. *Price's* troops in central Missouri were much scattered, so Halleck sent Pope against him, who broke up a number of these detachments, on which *Price* retired. At the end of the year, General Curtis came to command the Army of the South-West.

Buell was *Johnston's* immediate opponent, and his instructions were to strike at Knoxville, behind Cumberland Gap, and at the important Confederate communications there; but he submitted an alternative to McClellan, to move the main column up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, at Nashville join another moving by the east of Bowling Green, occupy the Confederates there and at Columbus with demonstrations, till their positions were turned, and not concentrate or give a sign till all was ready. He rightly

laughed at the idea of any danger from an advance of *Buckner* or *Zollicoffer*, for they were not the men, and had not the means, to make one; but had *Johnston* been able to concentrate a good striking force in *Buckner's* rear, things would have been very different. Sherman thought this danger very real indeed, and says that in October the Confederates could have walked into Louisville, the Union base. Buell's plan seems faulty because the North had not at that time enough men so placed as to make it feasible, and it would have required a re-arrangement of the commands; he also wasted time in arguing by letter. McClellan's looks better adapted to the circumstances, for Sherman was quite able to watch *Buckner* and *Hardee*, in his front; while Buell, by concentrating to the left, could probably have swept *Zollicoffer* away, and seized Knoxville.

The actual operations were: Schoepf was opposing *Zollicoffer*, and Buell ordered Thomas to join him, take command, and drive *Zollicoffer* out of the State; Nelson had been on the Big Sandy River with a small force, and had had some success, but when he was moved, the Confederate force there was put under *Marshall* and strengthened; Buell ordered Garfield to drive *Marshall* away, and he moved forward on December 23rd. Several campaigns were thus starting at the end of the year, here and in Missouri.

On the Mississippi some gunboats were improvised before the end of the year, and some Union iron-clads delivered; but they were hardly used before the beginning of 1862. (Continued on p. 125.)

THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-WEST

In the South the only action was naval. On October 12th the Union fleet attempted to enter the Mississippi, but were attacked by a Confederate ram at the Head of the Passes and driven down to sea again; the ram also was injured, and broke down.

Nothing definite was done here till Farragut came. Besides this, there were a few minor attacks and landings in various places.¹ (Continued on p. 135.)

In the South-West only a few skirmishes took place, and the evacuation of the United States posts in New Mexico and Arizona, in consequence of the "*Twiggs* surrender," was completed, under pressure from the Confederate local forces. In July, *Davis* ordered *General Sibley* to organize an expedition, to be self-supporting, and to secure the forts, etc., in that district, as a base from which to seize California and treat with Juarez, then in great straits, for the purchase of the northern provinces of Mexico (cf. pp. 60, 249). *Sibley*, who knew the country, informed him that this proposition would be favourably considered. With the control of this great gold and silver-producing district, the Confederate finances might be put on a sound basis. At the end of the year *Sibley* was ready to start from Texas. On the other side, General Canby was appointed to command the New Mexico district in November, with orders to recover it. (Continued on p. 138.)

NAVAL

The two main plans of the Union Government for the conduct of the War involved the co-operation of the Navy. The first was the opening up of the Mississippi by the combined military and naval forces, so as to cut the Confederacy in two; the second to close all the Confederate ports by blockade, and starve out the enemy. After the reverse of October 12th a naval expedition was organized against New Orleans and its forts, a number of mortar-boats being especially built for it.

¹ S.E. Port Royal, S.C., November 7th.

W. Belmont, Mo., November 7th.

The "Trent" affair, November 8th.

THE BLOCKADE

The task of blockading some 3,000 miles of coast with only thirty-five ships—all that were then available—was impracticable, in the sense that a blockade, to be binding, must be effective. It was kept up in a few places at first, being only formal in others, till there was force at disposal to make it real. Wherever practicable a lodgment was effected on land, which greatly relieved the blockading squadrons.

The liability of neutral vessels depends on their knowledge of the blockade; so that, while formal warning was given at first, and the first captures released, knowledge was presumed later on. Liability begins with the act of sailing for a port known to be blockaded, therefore an intermediate one was soon used; but this device, as also those of transference of cargo, etc., where the intention was plain, was found out and frustrated. Still, many vessels got through, and the trade of Nassau, Bermuda, and Matamoros (Mexico) increased enormously. (Continued on p. 139.)

THE WAR AT SEA

At sea the principal operations were those of the C.S.S. "*Sumter*," which was altered from mail steamer to cruiser at New Orleans in April and May, and sailed from the Mississippi early in July, under the command of *Captain Semmes*.¹ She was chased by the U.S.S. "*Brooklyn*," but escaped, and raided the West Indian and Atlantic waters for six months, took fifteen prizes, and reached Gibraltar in January, 1862. Here, being closely watched by the Northern navy, and unable to refit, she was laid up, and finally sold. Her career, therefore, belongs entirely to the year 1861. A few small vessels took out *Davis'* letters of marque

¹ E. Bull Run, Va., July 21st.

(cf. p. 72), and some were taken, their officers and men being sent to New York for trial as pirates. On this, *Davis* wrote to Lincoln, on July 6th, saying that, if they were treated in this way, he should be compelled to do the same to a similar number of Union prisoners, and renewed a proposition which he had before made for an exchange. Getting no reply, he made the Union prisoners draw lots, to be treated in the same way as the crew of the *Savannah*, who were not treated as pirates. The question of exchange was not properly settled for another year between the two Governments (cf. p. 149).

In October, the U.S.S. "San Jacinto" (Captain Wilkes) was looking for the "*Sumter*" in Cuban waters, when the captain heard that *Messrs. Slidell and Mason*, the Confederate *Commissioners* to Europe, were at Havana, intending to sail to England in the British mail steamer "Trent." He therefore lay in wait for her, hove her to, and seized the *Commissioners*, on November 8th. His action nearly brought on war with England—the Guards were ordered to Canada, and the situation was critical in the extreme, but Lincoln and his Government kept their heads. They saw what Wilkes' action meant, and that it could not be defended, but the great difficulty was the popular excitement in both countries: the last act of the Prince Consort was to tone down the angry letters. Mr. Seward wrote a manly and sensible despatch, acknowledging that the act was the error of an officer, for which England had a right to expect reparation, and added that "the prisoners will be cheerfully liberated." Later on we shall see Captain Wilkes' high-handed ways carried to the verge of insubordination, and hampering his superior officers (cf. pp. 178, 234).

On October 26th the "*Nashville*," a fast paddle steamer, armed as a cruiser, left Charleston and cruised in the North Atlantic, putting in at Southampton on November 21st for repairs, and remaining there till the end of the year. (Continued on p. 140.)

SUMMARY

Union Gains.—Several lasting steps were gained during the year. In West Virginia the skirmish of Philippi confirmed the political, the campaign of Rich Mountain the military, situation. In Missouri the seizure of Camp Jackson prevented the *Governor* from establishing Secession rule, and the action of Boonville secured northern Missouri for the Union. The country at the confluence of the four great rivers, Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, and Cumberland, was also secured—an invaluable base for opening the Mississippi and for striking at the heart of the Confederacy. The Navy seized Cape Hatteras and Port Royal, the latter base being practically a necessity for the effective maintenance of the Blockade.

Union Loss.—Major-General Nathaniel Lyon, killed in action.

Confederate Gain.—The northern half of New Mexico and Arizona, a possible base for extension westward. (Continued on p. 141.)

MAJOR-GENERAL LYON

A very great man passes from the scene thus early in the War, who, had he been spared, bade fair to become the greatest commander of all. He made and carried out his plans quickly and surely, so that every move, no matter how small his force, had decisive results, with the sole exception of the action in which he lost his life.

Here is a generous appreciation of him by a Confederate officer, *Colonel Sneed*: "Rarely have I met so extraordinary a man as Lyon, or one that has interested me so deeply. Coming to St. Louis from Kansas on the 6th of February, this little, rough-visaged, red-bearded, weather-beaten Connecticut captain, by his intelligence, his ability, his energy, and his zeal, had at once secured the confidence of all the Union

men in Missouri, and had made himself respected, if not feared, by his enemies. In less than five months he had risen to the command of the Union armies in Missouri, had dispersed the *State Government*, had driven the *Governor* and his adherents into the extremest corner of the State, had almost conquered the State, and would have completely conquered it had he been supported by his Government; and now he had given his life willingly for the Union which he revered, and to the cause of Human Freedom, to which he was fanatically devoted." (Continued on p. 142.)

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

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1861	MAY 21-31	JUNE
EAST	<p>21. <i>Magruder</i> takes command at Yorktown.</p> <p>22. <i>Butler</i> takes command at Fort Monroe.</p> <p>28. <i>McDowell</i> takes command in North-East Virginia.</p> <p>31. Naval Attack on Confederate batteries at Acquia Creek.</p>	<p>6. Virginian forces transferred to the Confederate States.</p> <p>10. <i>Magruder</i> beats <i>Butler</i> at Big Bethel.</p> <p>17. Action at Vienna.</p> <p>McClellan's Campaign in West Virginia.</p> <p>3. Philippi.</p>
SOUTH-EAST		
WEST	<p>Lyon's Campaign in Missouri.</p> <p>Guerilla Warfare in Missouri.</p> <p>24. Resolutions of mediation and neutrality adopted by Kentucky.</p>	<p>17. Battle of Boonville.</p>
SOUTH		
SOUTH-WEST AND NAVAL		<p>Capture of the "<i>Savannah</i>," letter of marque, at end of month.</p>

1861	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER
EAST	<p>Patterson and <i>Joseph Johnston</i> in the Valley, <i>Beauregard</i> and <i>McDowell</i> in front of Washington.</p> <p>16. <i>McDowell</i> moves on Manassas.</p> <p>21. Battle of Bull Run. Campaign in West Virginia.</p> <p>10. Laurel Hill. 11. Rich Mountain. 13. Carrick's Ford; <i>Pegram</i> surrenders.</p>		Rosecrans v. <i>Lee</i> in West Virginia.
SOUTH-EAST		28, 29. Fort Hatteras taken by Union troops.	
WEST	<p>Lyon's Campaign in Missouri, to</p> <p>5. Action near Carthage, Missouri.</p> <p>13. <i>Polk</i> takes command of <i>Department No. 2</i>—Headquarters, Memphis.</p>	<p>10. Wilson's Creek.</p> <p>Guerilla Warfare in Missouri.</p> <p>At end of month Grant seizes Paducah, and the mouths of the Cumberland and Tennessee, and fortifies them . .</p>	<p><i>Sidney Johnston</i> forms a Defensive line in Kentucky.</p> <p>during September.</p>
SOUTH			
SOUTH-WEST AND NAVAL	<p>United States posts, in Arizona and New Mexico, evacuated by the army.</p> <p>8. <i>Sibley</i> ordered to raise a force in Texas to expel U.S. forces from New Mexico.</p> <p>6. <i>Jefferson Davis</i> writes to Lincoln about the prisoners taken on the "<i>Savannah</i>."</p> <p>The "<i>Sumter</i>" puts to sea.</p>	<p>The "<i>Sumter</i>" at sea, in West Indian waters.</p>	

1861	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
EAST	Rosecrans v. <i>Lee</i> in West Virginia.	The Confederates abandon West Virginia.	
SOUTH-EAST		7. Port Royal taken. <i>Lee</i> assigned to command the <i>Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.</i>	
WEST	<i>Sidney Johnston</i> forms a Defensive line in Kentucky.	2. Frémont superseded by Hunter. 7. Battle of Belmont. 9. Halleck appointed to command the Department.	
SOUTH	12. Union Naval defeat at the Head of the Passes of the Mississippi.		
SOUTH-WEST AND NAVAL	The " <i>Sumter</i> " at sea, 21. The " <i>Nashville</i> " sails. At sea in	9. General Canby appointed to command the Department of New Mexico. 8. The "Trent" affair, in West Indian waters. 21. The " <i>Nashville</i> " puts into Southampton.	to Gibraltar at end of year. The " <i>Nashville</i> " at Southampton.

CHAPTER VII

WAR IN EARNEST: THE FIRST HALF OF 1862

GENERAL

(Continued from p. 80.) A most important event occurred in January, 1862—viz. the retirement of Cameron, Lincoln's Secretary of War, and the appointment of Stanton to succeed him. Except that both were loyal to the Union, a greater contrast than were these two men to each other could not have been found, for Cameron was a mild, courteous, and conciliatory old gentleman, utterly unwarlike, and, in any case, too old for such a post; while Stanton was masterful and domineering, combative to the last degree, and so rude and mannerless that Lincoln, who knew him at the Bar, before the War, would not act in the same cases with him. He had joined President Buchanan's Cabinet in December, 1860, and forced the traitor *Floyd* to resign before he had been in it a week. He was loyal and honest to the core, and it is characteristic of both men, first that Lincoln should have offered the most important place in his Cabinet to a political opponent whom he personally detested, and that it should have been accepted, and secondly that the relations between them should soon have ripened into the most cordial mutual trust and esteem. Stanton soon gained great influence with the President, but, though honestly meant, it was by no means always wisely exercised, for he was the

greatest stickler for the absolute subordination of military to political control as a matter of principle, and continually reminded the President that he was the constitutional Commander-in-Chief, and could not divest himself of this responsibility, thereby often hampering the proper conduct of the War. Lincoln was essentially a politician and man of peace, but so clear-headed that he soon picked up the broad principles required, though he often issued bad military orders, especially in the early stages of the War. It is easy to blame him, but he had to consider the strength of public opinion, and some of those who should have taken military details off his shoulders were either not competent to do so, or ignored public opinion to an unreasonable extent, and he had to get out of the difficulty as best he could.

On the Confederate side, in March, *Lee* was "charged with the conduct of military operations in the Army of the Confederacy," but an *Act of Congress* to make him *Commander-in-Chief* was vetoed by *Davis* as unconstitutional, a fatal error. *Lee* soon resigned the useless position. (Continued on p. 147.)

THE EAST

(Continued from p. 88.) We left McClellan and *Joseph Johnston* facing each other, barely twenty miles apart, one at the lines of Washington, the other covering Manassas Junction at Centreville: here they remained a month or so longer,¹ organizing and training their armies, but making no hostile move, and seeming to regard the space between them as neutral ground. They were, however, very differently circumstanced,

- ¹ W. Paintsville, Ky., January 7th.
- W. Mill Springs, Ky., January 19th, 20th.
- S.E. Roanoke Island, N.C., February 8th.
- W. Fort Donelson, Ky., February 16th.
- S.W. Valverde, N.M., February 21st.
- W. Pea Ridge, Ark., March 5th-8th.
- W. Pound Gap, Ky., March 6th.

for while *Johnston*, thanks to his excellent "Intelligence Department" in Washington, knew all about the Army of the Potomac, McClellan's information about him, derived, oddly enough, from professional detectives, was quite wrong, for it made him out to be twice as strong as he really was. This affected the Union plans very much, for, except Patterson, McClellan was more influenced by the bogey of his enemy's imaginary strength than any general in the War.

The first real hostilities in the East broke out between the politicians of Lincoln's Cabinet and McClellan, who took the extreme civil and military views respectively of their positions and duties with regard to the conduct of the War. The Cabinet believed in debate in council, every member's opinion being equally good, while McClellan held his tongue, which in the then state of feeling at Washington was more than usually a military necessity; but he shewed a total lack of tact and temper, treated the politicians "de haut en bas," and made no concealment of his contempt for them and their opinions; he was also extremely rude to President Lincoln. The members of the Cabinet were much aggrieved, claiming that they had a right to be consulted in the affairs of the nation, and when McClellan wanted support he did not get it, essential points in his plans being countermanded, which caused them to fail. This trouble arose again when the same set made the same complaint against Halleck, and against Lincoln for allowing such a state of things. At this time Lincoln was so strongly pressed to remove McClellan from the Army, that it was decided to do so; but a plan of attack was settled, and he was kept in command of the Army of the Potomac, the Command-in-Chief being taken from him.

To go back a little, McClellan had wanted to recommence operations earlier all along the line, but organization was backward in the West, and the

complications with England over the "Trent" affair, of which he saw the full danger, made him keep concentrated in his own hands the largest force that he could, for use in any new direction, till the trouble had blown over. In December he was seized with typhoid fever, which delayed matters for weeks, after which so severe a spell of weather set in as to stop operations with any but the most seasoned soldiers. It was largely in consequence of the awful state of the roads that he planned to move by sea and take Richmond in flank and rear, in order to get to work sooner. All plans had to be explained to Committees, civil and military, and Government sanction obtained for them, while the President issued army orders also. One of these was to appoint commanders to the new Army Corps into which the Army of the Potomac was divided, which McClellan had specially asked should not be done till he could form a better opinion of the capacities of his lieutenants; another, on January 27th, was an order that all the armies of the Union should take the offensive on February 22nd, Washington's birthday, and the pretext for removing McClellan from the Command-in-Chief was his non-compliance with this, though, before it was issued, he had ordered Grant, in the West, where the climate was more open, to move against Fort Donelson.

Lincoln's original plan was to move by the Occoquan, through Virginia, driving *Johnston* back, and McClellan's idea of going by sea was bitterly opposed by the politicians as "a traitorous move to uncover Washington," which was well defended; but at last, after interminable explanations, they allowed it. It need hardly be said that secrecy could not be properly kept with all this discussion, and the plan probably came to *Johnston's* ears. McClellan's first idea was to move via Urbanna on the lower Rappahannock; but *Johnston's* able retreat from Centreville, at exactly the right time, to the south of that river, defeated this, and caused the base to be changed to Fort

Monroe on the Peninsula, another delay, which gave the Confederates time to forestall McClellan there, and make him fight his way. It was at first intended that the Navy should co-operate, but, incredible as it may seem, the military authorities did not communicate with those of the Navy, so the latter got no orders, and this part of the plan fell through. Admiral Goldsborough always maintained that the first move in this quarter should have been one to retake Norfolk Navy Yard and district, which would have been quite feasible, and that this would have given a good permanent base from the first, threatening Richmond on both banks of the River James, which Fort Monroe, owing to its cramped position, could not do. This counsel seems most correct, but unfortunately for the Union cause it was not followed; had it been, the co-operation of the Navy would have been ensured, and the "*Merrimac*" destroyed before she was ready. The Confederates abandoned Norfolk Navy Yard in May, to concentrate their forces, but they had had the use of it and its resources for over a year, which was of incalculable benefit to them. McClellan's main idea had always been to place the Capital beyond the danger of a sudden "coup de main" by creating a system of strong defensive lines, in which a sufficient garrison would give a feeling of political and civil security, leaving the whole of the mobile army free for offensive operations; but, unfortunately, there was no point on which the fears of the politicians hampered the conduct of the War more than on this, for no strength of lines or garrison could mitigate their panic terror whenever a raid was threatened, but they must insist on diverting an army from its proper work, even if the success of an important campaign were jeopardized thereby.

Here, perhaps, it may be convenient to refer once for all to a subject which is not sufficiently taken into consideration when the slowness of this

or that general is criticized—that is, that no one who did not know America at the time of the War, or within ten years or so after it, has the faintest conception of the meaning of the word MUD. The writer has stood up to his waist in mud, on one of the principal roads of the West, and has seen waggons down over axles, floating in it. The roads were, for the most part, what were expressively termed “dirt roads,” that is, passages between lines of fences, formed or metalled in no way whatever. Where anything more was done, it is nearly always specified, the road being described as a “pike,” short for turnpike, or a “plank” or “corduroy” road. A “pike” was often a good metalled road, while both “plank” and “corduroy” roads were made on the same principle, being based on three longitudinal lines of heavy timber, across which were laid lighter pieces, forming a continuous floor; in the first case the wood was squared and sawn, in the second it was merely rough logs. A good plank road gave very good going, and a new corduroy one was fair, but the latter sort was used principally in swampy and uninhabited places, and soon got rotten and out of repair: the experience of travelling over a road of this sort is not readily forgotten.

The Confederates had been hard at work at Norfolk Navy Yard, converting the hulk of the old frigate “*Merrimac*” into the ironclad “*Virginia*,” but no one ever calls her by this name. She had a central battery, with inclined sides amidships, the ends being awash; the battery was armoured with four inches of iron and armed with ten guns, two 7-inch rifled, one ahead, one astern, also able to be fought on either broadside, and eight broadside guns, two 8-inch rifled, and six 9-inch smooth-bores: she drew 22 feet, and was very clumsy and slow, the alterations having quite spoilt her handiness.

On March 8th,¹ the Union fleet—four frigates, a sloop,

¹ W. Pea Ridge, Ark., March 5th–8th.

and some gunboats—was lying in Hampton Roads, when the "*Merrimac*" came down from the yard, rammed and sank the sloop "Cumberland," and drove the "Congress" into shallow water, setting her on fire with shells. The other three frigates ran aground, but the "*Merrimac*" did no more, owing to the falling tide and failing light, intending to return and finish her work in the morning. She had been much knocked about outside her armour, having lost funnel, davits, etc. This success, like every other of the Confederates in Virginia, produced a panic among the valiant Northern politicians, who said that the "*Merrimac*" had Washington at her mercy. Next morning, however, a small, insignificant object was lying alongside the "Minnesota," of which there was hardly anything but a turret showing—the famous "Monitor," which promptly engaged the "*Merrimac*" when she came out: the latter was working very badly, being hardly able to keep steam, owing to the loss of her funnel. The "Monitor," with her light draught of 10 feet, had much greater choice of position in the narrow channels: the "*Merrimac*," finding that her shot took no effect, tried to ram, but was too clumsy, and was easily avoided. Captain Worden of the "Monitor" was badly wounded in the conning-tower, and the ship drew out of action for a time; when she came back, her opponent was retiring. A drawn battle, rather in favour of the "Monitor."

The latter was of a new type altogether, and has been described as a "cheesebox on a plank," for her funnel, when lowered for action, was flush with the deck, which was only a few inches above water; the single turret was armed with two 11-inch smooth-bores, and protected with six inches of armour, while the conning-tower, the only other thing shewing above deck, had 9-inch armour. She was handy, but not seaworthy, and was nearly lost in coming from New York. Two great advantages were that the guns could be trained in almost any direction without

turning the ship, and that the crew did not depend on the port-hole shutters for protection whilst loading, since the turret could be turned away for the purpose.

Had the "*Merrimac*" been seaworthy, this might have been the decisive action of the War, for the raising of the Blockade was a vital necessity for the Confederates. As it was, all that they would have gained by the defeat of the "Monitor" would have been to drive the Union fleet to sea, and perhaps force McClellan to use a land route. The "*Merrimac's*" captain, *Buchanan*, was wounded in the action, and *Tattnall* took his place. The ship was repaired at the beginning of April, but her draught had been increased, reducing her speed to four knots. She took station in the James River to protect the flank of *Magruder's* lines in the Peninsula, but, though she challenged the Union fleet more than once, they were not to be drawn into action, though the "Monitor" was there, it being Goldsborough's policy to cover McClellan's expedition and risk nothing. The "*Merrimac's*" engines were so wretched that it would have been useless to take her outside, even could she have got there, for she was not safe in an ordinary sea. When the Confederates evacuated Norfolk on May 9th, she lost her base: she was too clumsy to fight, depended on her draught for protection, and drew too much water to get away; *Tattnall* had therefore no option but to destroy her. The ship had been so much relied on for the protection of the James River that the lower reaches were not fortified, but batteries were thrown up when she was destroyed, which successfully resisted the Union ironclads, and a gunboat flotilla was also organized on the James.

On the Confederate side, *Johnston* had kept up his bluff at Centreville till the last possible moment, when, seeing that McClellan was moving, and that his 40,000 men could not stand against four times their number, and also that, being liable to be turned by sea, his position did not defend Richmond, he retired behind

the Rappahannock, which, as we have seen, upset the first Union plan, and gave the defence more time, but this entailed the dismantling of the Confederate batteries on the lower Potomac.

The Union expedition began to embark on March 17th,¹ and political interference with it began also, a division of 10,000 men being held back at Washington. When McClellan was deprived of the Command-in-Chief, just before sailing, he was not notified, and only saw it in the papers: on reaching Fort Monroe, he found that the Department of Virginia had also been taken from him, and heard from Admiral Goldsborough that the Navy would not co-operate; but Goldsborough did his best to help him. He had made his plans on the promise of 155,000 men, but found himself reduced to a nominal 92,000.² As soon as he began to advance after landing, he was confronted by *Magruder*, who, with about an eighth of his force, held him in the lower Peninsula and opposite Yorktown for a month, covered by the "*Merrimac*" on his right flank, and by batteries on both sides of the strait at Yorktown on his left. *Magruder's* operations are a model in their way, and there he waited till McClellan began to besiege his lines in form, when he slipped away exactly at the right time, falling back on ample reinforcements under *Longstreet*, who fought the rear-guard action of Williamsburg, and brought all away safely.³

This brings us to the beginning of May, and we must now turn back and look at the situation in the

¹ W. New Madrid, Mo., March 13th.

S.E. New Berne, N.C., March 14th.

E. Kernstown, Va., March 23rd.

² The "*Florida*" leaves England.

S.W. Apache Cañon, N.M., March 26th-28th.

³ W. Shiloh, Tenn., April 6th, 7th.

W. Island No. 10, Tenn., April 8th.

S.E. Fort Pulaski, Ga., April 10th.

France declares war on Mexico, April 17th.

S.W. New Orleans, La., April 18th-28th.

S.E. Fort Macon, N.C., April 29th.

Shenandoah Valley and round Washington, where McClellan, when he started, had left 35,000 and 42,000 men respectively. On January 1st, *Jackson* marched from Winchester against the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, to break it, cut the communications between Banks at Frederick and Rosecrans in West Virginia, and isolate Kelley at Romney. Kelley retired, but *Jackson* succeeded in the rest of his plan, and held Romney. He hoped to damage the railway more, but was foiled by the indiscipline of a subordinate, who complained direct to the *Secretary of War*, by whom *Jackson* was ordered to move him from that place. So gross an attack on military discipline was not to be borne, and *Jackson* sent in his resignation: *Johnston* and *Governor Letcher* backed him up, and the *Secretary* gave way. *Jackson's* judgment was soon vindicated, for the Union troops re-occupied Romney, and compelled *Johnson*, in the Alleghanies, to fall back. *Jackson* soon found himself opposed by a force 38,000 strong, made up from several small ones, under General Banks, which was at first spread out from Frederick to Romney, while he had but 4,600. At the end of February, *Johnston* was preparing to retreat from Centreville, and *Jackson* saw that he would sooner or later have to conform, sent his baggage to the rear, and began by advancing into close touch with the enemy. This was the opening move of the famous Valley Campaign in which he was the guiding factor, and which is best studied from the Confederate side.

The peculiar strategic feature of the Shenandoah Valley is the Massanutten range of mountains, which runs up the middle of it for forty miles, beginning at a point about forty-five miles from the Potomac. It is impassable to any armed force except by one road which crosses it near the middle. The main valley is on the west side, through which runs the North Fork of the Shenandoah, with Strasburg at the foot of it: the South Fork runs on the east side, through the Luray Valley, with Front Royal at the foot. At

the south end of the range, at the head of both valleys, is Cross Keys. The Luray Valley is separated from Virginia proper by the Blue Ridge, through which run several passes or "Gaps," while a little above Cross Keys is the important town of Staunton.

The keynote of the whole campaign is to be found in the fact that *Jackson* was the first who fully realized how very great was the influence which could be exerted on the politicians at Washington by even a small force within striking distance, though *Lee* soon found it out for himself.

When *Johnston* retired from Centreville,¹ *Jackson* was left isolated in front, with the simple orders to detain as many Union troops as possible in the Valley to prevent them from joining McClellan, without unduly jeopardizing his own command. When McClellan moved forward, he ordered Banks to occupy Winchester, which *Jackson's* small force could not prevent. His numbers had been magnified by rumour, but Banks soon heard how small they were, and sent away two of his three divisions, thinking one enough there; it was about 11,000 strong. On March 21st, *Jackson* heard that the enemy was retreating and advanced, but *Ashby*, his cavalry commander, who had had a skirmish with the enemy, quite underestimated their force, telling *Jackson* that he had only a brigade, with guns and cavalry, before him, probably a rear-guard. On the 23rd, *Jackson* came up, found the enemy at Kernstown, close to Winchester, and attacked at once, holding their front, on open ground, with one-third of his command, and attacking their somewhat exposed and weaker right flank through the woods with the rest. The woods, however, made his artillery useless; the Union force was twice as strong as he thought, and was well handled by General Kimball. *Jackson* was beaten, though the Confederate attack was so furious that at one time the issue was doubtful. Kimball lost more in killed and wounded, and was

¹ E. "Monitor" and "*Merrimac*," March 8th.

quite unable to follow. *Jackson*, though beaten, attained his object: the North was literally astounded at his skill and audacity, and the troops sent away were recalled in haste, for he had shewn that he could neither be brushed aside nor ignored. Banks, with 20,000 men, now observed him cautiously,¹ remaining in the same place for weeks together, continually harassed by *Ashby's* cavalry. *Johnston* now wanted *Jackson* to retire by the Luray Valley, to prevent Banks from seizing Front Royal, between them; but *Jackson* preferred the other valley, for if Banks would follow, which he did, he would be more isolated, while he himself would be able to watch Frémont's command, which threatened the Valley from the west, and support *Johnson* in the mountains. The Confederate *Secretary of War* now made another mistake in giving *Ashby* an independent cavalry command; but he and *Jackson* seem soon to have adjusted the difference between them, for we find them going on again as usual.

On the upper Rappahannock was *Ewell* with 8,000 men, not far from Swift Run Gap, but, as Banks could cut their communications if he moved on it across the Massanutts, *Jackson* suddenly marched and secured it, camping close by, in the Elk Run Valley. Banks followed to Harrisonburg, and *Johnson* came to Staunton, having Frémont, with a larger force, in front of him. *Jackson's* position held Banks fast, and Frémont's men were scattered across West Virginia. At this time McClellan was stuck fast in front of *Magruder's* lines, in rear of which *Johnston's* army was rapidly assembling, but McDowell had been moved from Washington to Fredericksburg, and the Northern prospects looked better. *Lee*, however, was given the charge of all operations in Virginia, and put *Ewell* under *Jackson*, who brought him near to Swift Run Gap, and then moved suddenly across Banks' front to attack Milroy, one of Frémont's lieutenants, in the mountains to the west, picking up *Johnson* as he went. To do this, he

¹ E. Siege of Yorktown, Va., April 5th-May 3rd.

began with a demonstration against Banks, to keep him quiet, and then moved on Staunton. Banks thought he had retreated, and that men might now be sent to McClellan, but on second thoughts this seemed too risky, for where was he? Banks, Frémont, and McDowell stood round, with 70,000 men to *Jackson's* 5,000, but *Ashby* was between them, blocking their communications, and they hardly dared to move, for WHERE WAS *JACKSON*? *Johnson's* command added some 2,500 men to *Jackson's* force, and they came up with Milroy at the village of McDowell, in a position difficult of approach, and halted close opposite. Milroy wanted to retreat, but thought that his best chance lay in making a strong attack first; this, however, was heavily beaten, but he made good his retreat. *Jackson* did not follow far, but returned to the Valley, where *Ewell* joined him; with some more men sent by *Lee*, this brought his little army up to 17,000 men. Banks, now with only 10,000, had fallen back to Strasburg, where he entrenched himself; *Jackson* cut him off from Frémont by blocking the roads through the passes, and retired to Harrisonburg. It was now the beginning of May, and Confederate prospects looked so bad that *Lee* urged *Jackson* to strike again, swiftly and hard.

The North now hoped that the Valley was at last secure; McDowell began to move away towards McClellan; while Banks thought his enemy safe at Harrisonburg for the time, and distributed his command from Strasburg to Winchester, with the cavalry watching the flank at Front Royal. Suddenly *Ashby* burst on the Union cavalry, driving it in in confusion, and hard on his heels down the Luray Valley followed the whole of *Jackson's* force, rolling up detachment after detachment, and driving the entire command through Winchester, and over the Potomac. Banks could only save the Strasburg detachment, no stand was possible, and had not *Ashby's* men got out of hand, and stayed to plunder, he would never have

reached that river; the Confederate infantry stopped just beyond Winchester from sheer exhaustion, and this saved him; a day or so after, the *Stonewall Brigade* struck at Harper's Ferry.¹ Another wild panic seized Washington: McDowell was stopped, and much of his command taken to defend the Capital; Frémont was called in; and McClellan was told that he must either attack Richmond at once, or come and defend Washington. The whole plan of the Unionists in the east was again broken up, but when they stopped to think, had not their enemy over-reached himself and fallen into a trap, for McDowell and Frémont, with more than double numbers, were nearer to a point of junction, on his line of retreat, than he was to that point. They were ordered to hurry and cut him off, but groped forward timidly, while *Jackson* marched and just brushed past, going on to Harrisonburg.² If he had failed to get through, he had intended to retreat *into Maryland*, but, had he done so, he would have found that Stanton, who expected this, was ready for him. Frémont followed in pursuit, Shields' division of McDowell's Corps watching the Luray Valley from Front Royal, and *Jackson* went on to Cross Keys, whence he could watch both valleys, reaching it on June 5th. Here fell *General Ashby*, in a cavalry skirmish, a great loss to the Confederates. *Jackson* went to Port Republic in the upper Luray Valley with most of his force, whence he could watch Shields, and keep touch with *Ewell* at Cross Keys. Shields advanced in isolated detachments, and Frémont attacked *Ewell* just as the first of these came in front of Port Republic: the situation at first looked critical; but *Jackson* soon saw that there was but a small force to deal with, and sent most of his men to help *Ewell*. Frémont attacked at Cross Keys by driblets, and *Ewell*, handling a smaller force ably, beat him handsomely, while *Jackson* held

¹ W. Confederates evacuate Corinth, Miss., May 30th.

² E. *Seven Pines*, Va., May 31st to June 1st.

his own. The next day the plan was reversed, *Jackson* turning on Shields with most of his force, and watching Frémont's beaten troops with the rest: he had calculated on settling Shields' men quickly, but the detachment, under Tyler, fought so stoutly that there was danger of Frémont coming up in force in rear before they were beaten; he therefore broke down the bridge by which Frémont must approach, who only interfered with a little artillery fire. Tyler was finally driven back on the rest of his division, which checked Shields, and *Jackson* concentrated his army at Brown's Gap. Frémont retired, followed hotly by the Confederate cavalry, now under *Munford*, to Strasburg. *Jackson* turned back into the Valley as if to follow, but was really making arrangements to go to Richmond, for McClellan had been checked at *Seven Pines*, and it was important to get up at once. He concealed his plans from every one but *Colonel Munford*, the army being ordered to know nothing and ask no questions.

Jackson moved first on Gordonsville, which might be either against Washington or McClellan's army, and rode forward, meeting *Lee* on the 23rd. *Munford* kept his cordon of scouts so well that not the least whisper of the march got out, *Jackson's* late opponents fearing instant attack, when he was actually fighting before Richmond. McDowell alone saw that the right thing was to reinforce McClellan and neglect *Jackson*; but the terrified politicians would have none of it, and when the march became known it was too late to do so. In thirty-eight days the *Army of the Valley* had marched four hundred miles and fought three battles and many minor actions, winning all. *Jackson* struck such terror into his opponents that they would hardly stand against him at the end of the campaign. His force never reached 18,000 men, yet with it he had paralysed the action of over 70,000, and had kept more than 50,000 from joining McClellan, whose plans depended on their support.

The main campaign in the Peninsula of Virginia

was the very opposite to the brilliant secondary one just described, for it principally consisted of about a week's heavy and continuous fighting between two large forces, in rather a small space. The features of the terrain were also quite different, the Peninsula of Virginia being for the most part low and flat, with sluggish streams, large swamps, and thick woods. Only on the north of the Chickahominy, and close to Richmond, was there any extent of fairly high, clear ground. Curiously enough, there were no good maps of it, and many mistakes were due to this. Both *Lee* and *Johnston* were blamed, but neither had been much on the spot since the War began, and then had had more urgent business. *Lee* made arrangements for a survey, but McClellan was already on them: he was well supplied with maps, for the officers of the 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry had been making sketches of the ground for some weeks, from which he got a far better map than any that the Confederates had. The Peninsula was bounded on the north by the estuary of the York (called the Pamunkey above tide water), and on the south by the James, was about seventy-five miles long, from Richmond to Fort Monroe, and twenty less to the Yorktown lines, while the scene of the main fighting was a space about twenty miles square, to the east and south-east of Richmond.

As soon as McClellan had passed the Yorktown lines and driven *Longstreet* back at Williamsburg,¹ his first care was to get his troops in hand, who were landing at different places, and to establish a proper base and lines of supply. He took West Point for his main depot and White House for his immediate base, by orders from Washington, for he himself preferred a base on the James. By May 24th² he was in possession of several bridges over the Chickahominy, and *Johnston's* army was all to the south of it. He heard on that day that McDowell would join him via

¹ E. McDowell, W. Va., May 8th.

² E. Front Royal and Winchester, Va., May 23rd-25th.

Fredericksburg in a few days, but later was informed of the changes due to *Jackson's* rout of Banks, and that the President thought that the main effort must be in front of Washington. While there was any chance of McDowell's co-operation, McClellan kept to his base on the Pamunkey, but when *Jackson* appeared on the scene, and this became impossible, the base was shifted to the James, for which all preparations had been made beforehand.

The Army of the Potomac consisted of the IInd, IIIrd, IVth, Vth, and VIth Corps, the cavalry being very weak, and its strength on June 20th was 105,000 men. The Confederate army was about 86,000 strong, including *Jackson's* command.

The Confederates had a force at Hanover Court House watching McDowell, which McClellan drove in. *Johnston* at first brought his army to the north of the Chickahominy, and McClellan's came up slowly, seizing some bridges, and moving a part of the army to the south side on May 24th. *Johnston* then crossed to the south of the river, because, in the first place, McDowell was not coming, and *Jackson* was, and also because the Confederate defence of the river James had been so much entrusted to the "*Merrimac*" that no proper batteries had been made on that side, and when she was destroyed it not only wanted more protection, but McClellan was more likely to try to use it. The Chickahominy has swampy banks and is often difficult to cross except at the bridges; on May 31st¹ it was swollen and unfordable, some of McClellan's bridges were destroyed, and half his army was on each side. *Johnston* promptly attacked the force on the south side, throwing twenty-three brigades against it, and watching the other half with only four. This was the battle of Fair Oaks or *Seven Pines*, which went on for two days, the Union army being driven back some distance. On the evening of June 1st, *Johnston* was severely wounded, and the next day *Lee* was appointed

¹ W. Confederates evacuate Corinth, Miss., May 30th.

to succeed him in the command of the army, while continuing to control all operations in Virginia.¹ For the next three weeks the weather was so bad that the roads were almost useless for the movement of troops, and McClellan fortified his position, but no more: he was also waiting for reinforcements, which has been bitterly said to have been his normal position.

When *Lec* took command, he was still uneasy about McDowell's Corps, which was watched by *Stuart's* cavalry, and thought it best to drive McClellan off his line of retreat by moving to the north of the Chickahominy and attacking the Union right. *Stuart* was ordered to make a reconnaissance in rear of the enemy's army,² and rode completely round it with a cavalry brigade and two guns, from Ashland, via the Pamunkey, round to the James, and back along that river to the Confederate lines: they had little fighting, but brought much information. The principal value of the ride was the confidence which it gave to the men, for McClellan's change of base foiled *Lec's* plan. *Lec* ostentatiously sent reinforcements for *Jackson* to Gordonsville, which, as was intended, had a great effect on Lincoln and Stanton, and thus indirectly hampered McClellan. He actually ordered *Jackson* to start for Richmond on the 20th, but this march had been discussed before between them.

With the arrival of *Jackson* begin what are called the Seven Days' Battles. On the 25th, McClellan moved to within five miles of Richmond, *Jackson* seemed lost, and McDowell was ordered up again, some of his troops reaching McClellan. But *Jackson* was then at Ashland, twelve miles away, and McClellan heard rumours which made him suspicious: his right was at Mechanicsville, and *Jackson*, with *A. P. Hill*, was to attack it in the morning; but *Jackson* was late,

¹ W. River battle of Memphis, Tenn., June 6th.

E. Cross Keys, Va., June 8th.

E. Port Republic, Va., June 9th.

² June 12th-15th.

so *Hill* went in alone on the 26th, and was badly beaten, but *Jackson's* presence was now revealed, and decided McClellan to change his base to the James at Harrison's Landing. On the 27th, *Jackson*, *A. P. Hill*, and *Longstreet*, attacked Porter's Vth Corps at Gaines' Mill, and drove it back, taking 22 guns, while *Magruder* manœuvred so ably on the south bank of the river, as to prevent any help being sent to Porter, who was quite overmatched. The Confederates, with a smaller army, had again succeeded in bringing greater numbers to the decisive point. *Ewell* was sent to break McClellan's communications with the York River, which he did, but the latter did not care, having changed his base to the James.

¹ We now enter on the second phase of the campaign, the retreat and escape of McClellan. On the 29th, the Confederates took the initiative, attacking in various places on the south of the Chickahominy, but McClellan had had the bridges broken, which kept *Jackson* back that day. *Lee* had now found out the change of base and retreat, and tried to cut it off. On this day Keyes, with the IVth Corps, was sent to occupy Malvern Hill, and get into touch with the gunboats. The Confederates were pressing forward on the Glendale, Williamsburg, and Newmarket roads, but luckily for McClellan *Stuart's* cavalry was following Stoneman's to White House, in a false direction. June 30th was the critical day, the battle of Glendale and Frayser's Farm, for had *Jackson*, who was checked at the White Oak Swamp, got up in time, nothing could have saved McClellan's army. As it was, the pursuit was checked with the loss of a few guns, and time gained for the position of Malvern Hill to be taken up, to cover the embarkation of the army, which was a very strong artillery position, with flanks resting on the James. The Confederates did not know the ground, and lost their way, throwing out *Lee's* plans. They could not get their guns through the thick,

¹ S. Naval attack on Vicksburg, Miss., June 26th-29th.

swampy country, the attack was disjointed, and failed, and the Union troops moved to Harrison's Landing on the night of July 1st, after the battle, getting away from Malvern Hill safely; but had *Lee's* troops been able to get through the mud round it, on the 2nd, McClellan's army might have been destroyed, for Malvern Hill did not protect the Landing, and the disorganization was so great that ground which did do so was not fortified till *Stuart*, following Stoneman, came up and foolishly opened fire from thence with some horse artillery guns. This roused the Union troops to their danger, *Stuart* was driven off, and the ground made safe, before the Confederate infantry could get up. There was no more fighting, or hindrance to the embarkation of the Union troops, but this did not take place for some weeks.

This Peninsular Campaign is the only one in which *Jackson* did not come up to his reputation; he was late at Mechanicsville, and not at his best at either Frayser's Farm or Malvern Hill, but the explanation is that he was down with fever during the whole of the week. McClellan, throughout, seems to have been oppressed with the "enormous forces" against him, and when he knew of *Jackson's* arrival from the Valley, to have given up all idea of taking Richmond, and thought only of saving his own army from destruction. His change of base was a most difficult operation, carried out with consummate skill.

On June 26th, President Lincoln ordered the Army of Virginia to be formed, composed of Banks', Frémont's, and McDowell's commands, each as an Army Corps, and placed General Pope in command. Frémont refused to serve in a subordinate capacity, resigned his commission, and was not employed again. (Continued on p. 150.)

THE SOUTH-EAST

(Continued from p. 90.) *General Lee* remained at his post, organizing the Atlantic coast defences of

the South till March, when he was recalled to Richmond. His lines were made for the combined action of infantry with artillery, both field and heavy, in carefully placed batteries, and they were wonderfully effective.

¹Burnside's and Goldsborough's expedition sailed for Cape Hatteras early in January, but met with such bad weather that they took a month to assemble in Pamlico Sound.² They took Roanoke Island, which gave the control of the inner waters of North Carolina, on February 8th, then seized Elizabeth City, and drove the enemy out of Winton.³ The Confederates had blocked the Neuse River at New Berne and made strong works there, but this position was taken on March 14th,⁴ with over 60 guns and many prisoners, and Burnside fortified it against any attempt at recapture. Lastly, he moved against Fort Macon, on Bogue Island, a strong old-fashioned fort, which had to be reduced by a regular siege, and fell on April 29th.⁵ The Confederates had fortified a position commanding the Dismal Swamp Canal, which they were said to be going to use, to pass rams, which they were building, through to the river James. An expedition seized this position, and sent a steamer through, to secure the waterway for the Union, a great shortening of communications. On paper this gave an excellent position, reaching from Roanoke Island to Norfolk, which directly flanked the vulnerable southern com-

¹ Map 59, p. 390.

² W. Paintsville, Ky., January 7th.

W. Mill Springs, Ky., January 19th, 20th.

³ W. Fort Donelson, Ky., February 16th.

S.W. Valverde, N.M., February 21st.

⁴ E. "Monitor" and "*Merrimac*," Hampton Roads, Va., March 8th.

W. Pound Gap, Ky., March 6th.

W. Pea Ridge, Ark., March 5th-8th.

W. New Madrid, Tenn., March 13th.

S.W. Apache Cañon, N.M., March 26th-28th.

⁵ E. Siege of Yorktown, Va., all April.

E. *Jackson* in the Valley, all April.

S. New Orleans, La., April 18th-28th.

munications of Richmond, passing through a narrow belt of country, but the ground was too swampy for it to be of any practical use.

¹ T. W. Sherman and Dupont defeated a Confederate attempt to retake Port Royal on January 1st, after which it was not molested. Its capture was followed by the abandonment of the coast south of Charleston by the Confederates, except Fort Pulaski, commanding the entrance to Savannah, one of the old brick forts. The surrounding land was so swampy that it was thought that the fort could not be invested, but Sherman sent an expedition under Gillmore, who managed to make batteries on the mud marshes, beginning on February 7th, and opened fire on April 10th, the fort surrendering the next day. The result was to close the Savannah River to blockade-runners (cf. p. 366), and set free some of the blockading vessels for service elsewhere. There were sundry other small actions up and down the coast. At the end of February, Dupont sent an expedition against Fernandina, Florida, but there was no resistance, for Port Royal took most of the back-waters in rear, and in this case the strong defences were abandoned by orders from *Lee* (cf. p. 90). St. Augustine was next occupied, also without fighting. The coast defences here were for the most part given up, and the Union gunboats patrolled the back-waters of this part of Florida. (Continued on p. 165.)

THE WEST

(Continued from p. 95.) In the extreme east of Kentucky, Garfield had been trying to get his command started through the mud against *Marshall* at Paintsville, and came close to it on January 6th.² Next day he attacked him, without result, in a position to which he had withdrawn: both sides retired, Garfield to the Big Sandy River, where he remained till

¹ Map 33, p. 232.

² Map 43, p. 308.

March. *Marshall* had great difficulty in supplying his men, and sent many back, south of the Cumberland Mountains. Garfield again advanced, and on March 6th drove him back from Pound Gap, freeing eastern Kentucky from the Confederates, and then went on to join Buell, leaving a force to watch his late opponents.

¹The next force in the line, under Thomas, was also delayed by mud: it had been ordered to move in December, Thomas started on January 1st, and on the 17th came to Logan's Cross Roads, within ten miles of *Zollicoffer's* fortified position at Mill Springs. He had not yet picked up Schoepf, so *Crittenden*, who had assumed command of the Confederate force, determined to attack before their junction, and did so on the 18th: after a severe fight in which *General Zollicoffer* was killed, the Confederates fell back beaten, and Thomas pursued to the Mill Spring lines, Schoepf joining him there. Each side had about 4,000 men in action. The next morning Thomas moved out to attack the lines, but found them empty: the Confederate retreat was an absolute rout. This was the first real Union success of the War, and broke down the right flank of *Sidney Johnston's* formidable line, from here to the Mississippi. The Confederates call this action *Fishing Creek*.

In January, McClellan directed Grant to make a reconnaissance to prevent the Confederates from sending reinforcements from Columbus, Fort Henry, or Fort Donelson, to *Buckner*, who was at Bowling Green, confronting Buell. He at once advanced in two columns between the Mississippi and the Tennessee, to threaten both sides, which effectually held the enemy to his position, and helped Thomas in his advance on Mill Springs. Finding that Fort Heiman on the Tennessee, opposite Fort Henry, was very weak, Grant asked Halleck's permission to take it, which was at first refused, but when Admiral Foote

¹ Map 43, p. 308.

joined in the application, it was granted, and they started on February 2nd. The rivers were very high, and Fort Henry, on low ground, was partly flooded: Fort Donelson on the Cumberland was very strong, and the lines of the two forts were only seven miles apart. This double position was so vital to the Confederates that Grant assumed that they would send every man they had to make it safe; but *Johnston* made two mistakes, first in dividing his disposable force and sending only half of it, secondly in sending this *into* Fort Donelson, not keeping it outside as a covering force: he should have gone himself, with every available man. *Tilghman*, commanding Fort Henry, in a bad position, sent most of his men to Fort Donelson, and soon surrendered;¹ a Union gunboat was then sent on to break the Memphis and Ohio railway bridge over the Tennessee. *Floyd*, *Pillow*, and *Buckner* were commanding at Fort Donelson. *Floyd* was merely a political general, *Pillow*, who had been in the Mexican War, had won more notoriety by intrigues than honour by fighting, but the junior, *Buckner*, was an able soldier. A reconnaissance shewed that the fort was only approachable on the west, the Cumberland River being on the east, and flooded streams on north and south: the Confederate lines on the west were strong, between the streams, with continuous abattis. Halleck sent all the reinforcements that he could, while Foote brought the gunboats round from the Tennessee. Grant at first had only 15,000 men, against 21,000 in an entrenched position, but more soon came. Remembering *Pillow's* incapacity (cf. p. 442), he began with one or two important moves, which he would never have dared to make against a competent man. Foote came the day after, the 13th, and next day they made a combined attack, without result. The weather was very cold, and the men suffered much. The gunboats were badly mauled and not available again at once,

¹ S.E. Roanoke Island, N.C., February 8th.

and the Confederates then attacked, with some success on the Union right: Grant, however, saw that they were trying to cut their way out, and at once attacked on the other flank, broke their lines, and took a winning position. After his treason in December, 1860, *Floyd* was very doubtful of his treatment if taken, so he and *Pillow* got away on a steamer, leaving *Buckner* to surrender the fort, the only thing to be done. *Forrest* with the cavalry cut his way out. It was here that Grant's famous letter, demanding immediate and unconditional surrender, was written, and on the 16th the fort surrendered, with some 15,000 men, about 4,000 having gone with *Floyd*, *Pillow*, and *Forrest*. Grant had about 27,000. *Floyd* and *Pillow* disappear from the War, for though *Johnston* gave them fresh commands, the appointments were not sanctioned.

This should have been, if followed up, the decisive battle of the War. *Johnston* saw its full importance, and it depressed the South more than any event till the surrender of *Lee*. Grant says in his "Memoirs," "My opinion was and is still that immediately after the fall of Fort Donelson the way was opened to the National forces all over the South-West without much resistance. If one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the Alleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis, and Vicksburg with the troops we then had."

¹ Grant moved on Clarksville, which he found evacuated, but had not then enough transport to attack Nashville. The fall of Fort Donelson broke *Johnston's* great line, and he fell back to a new one 200 miles to the south, along the Memphis and Charleston Railway. This made Nashville untenable, and Thomas occupied it early in March, by Buell's orders, who also had sent Mitchel against Bowling Green in February, to prevent help being sent to Fort Donelson,

¹ S.W. Valverde, N.M., February 21st.

which place he entered without resistance. *Johnston's* retreat left the Confederate position at New Madrid and Island No. 10, the left of their old line, uncovered, and Pope was sent against it, while Grant followed *Johnston* directly. The Memphis-Corinth-Chattanooga Railway was vital to the safety of the Confederacy, and *Beauregard*, who commanded near Corinth, wanted to collect 40,000 men, and attack Paducah, but *Johnston* disapproved, thinking it better to concentrate on the spot, take the offensive, and fight a decisive battle near the railway.

While these operations were going on in Kentucky, another attempt was made to drive the Confederates out of Missouri, and undo Hunter's aimless retreat when he took over the command from Frémont, which left much of Frémont's and Lyon's work to be done again. At the end of 1861 General Curtis had come to take command of the Army of the South-West, and marched against the enemy on February 10th. ¹*Johnston* had put the Confederate army under the command of *Van Dorn*, an able man, and a trained soldier, since *Price* and *McCulloch*, who were commanding separate detachments at the time of the Union advance, were never likely to pull together. *Price* retreated before Curtis into Arkansas, and joined *McCulloch*; *Van Dorn's* headquarters were at Pocahontas, whence he hastened to the army, and on March 6th tried to cut off a detachment under Sigel, but the latter got back to his main body. *Van Dorn* then moved in the night to get round Curtis' entrenched position, but was discovered; *McCulloch* made a furious attack on the 7th, but was beaten off and killed; *Van Dorn* and *Price*, however, on the other flank, drove the Union line in, but night put an end to the fighting. The battle was renewed next day, when the Union troops advanced and drove the Confederates off the field. This was the battle of Pea Ridge, or as the Confederates call it, *Elkhorn Tavern*.

¹ Map 22, p. 166.

With the exception of a raid in October, it gave peace to Central Missouri for two years. This battle was the converse of that at Wilson's Creek, for here the Union side were in position, and the Confederates attacked in two bodies, which lost touch, and were beaten in detail. The Union strength was 10,500, with 49 guns; loss, 1,384, including 201 missing. Confederate numbers, 16,200, including two Indian brigades, with 50 guns; loss, 800 to 1,300, including 200 to 300 prisoners. After this battle, the Confederate forces were sent to strengthen their army in Tennessee, and Curtis was unopposed, but the area of his control was his power of supply. (Continued in WEST, p. 165; SOUTH-WEST, p. 176.)

On February 14th, Halleck ordered Pope to go and reduce the position of New Madrid and Island No. 10, which the Confederates had fortified when they decided to leave Columbus. The position was a sharp bend, forming two well-defined peninsulas, and the island commanded the approach from Cairo. Tiptonville, which was almost cut off by swamps, was opposite New Madrid. Pope soon found that he must have some heavy siege guns, and till they came, set to work to block the river to the enemy. On March 12th, New Madrid was bombarded, and evacuated in the night, the Union troops going on to stop the river below by Tiptonville. The gunboats engaged the island, and there seemed no passing it: Pope tried to do so by cutting a canal, opposite, but this gave the Confederate engineer time to improve his works, and Foote was then asked if he could run past the batteries with some of his boats: this was done by night, and the batteries below were silenced. The Confederates retreated on Tiptonville, Pope pushed a strong force across the river, and cut them off, when three generals and 7,000 men surrendered, and 150 good guns were taken, on April 7th. Pope then went on against Fort Pillow, farther down, but was recalled by Halleck to Pittsburg Landing.

After the fall of Fort Donelson, *Johnston* and *Beauregard* were separated, one being in middle Tennessee, the other on the Mississippi : it was important to keep them apart, and Halleck sent Grant up the Tennessee to harass their communications. On March 11th,¹ Halleck's command was enlarged to include all Kentucky, which brought Buell under him, whom he ordered to move on Savannah, where his army was concentrating : this altered the whole position.

On the Confederate side, *Johnston* was bitterly attacked for the loss of Fort Donelson, but the *President* backed him up. When he retreated from Nashville, and was cut off from *Beauregard*, he gave up central Tennessee to effect a junction with him, and moved on Corinth via Murfreesboro and Decatur, to protect the railways, reaching it on March 24th, with 40,000 men. Grant was twenty-three miles away, Buell ninety ; it was plainly his best move to crush the one before the other could come up, but he waited for *Van Dorn*, coming from Missouri, and lost the chance, for Buell was marching all the time.

Halleck had put Grant's command under C. F. Smith, and sent it to Pittsburg Landing, to select a site for a depot, with a view to moving on Corinth, but the troops were camped on both sides of the river, not disposed to meet attack. Grant took command again on March 17th, and arranged to advance as soon as Buell came, but though he knew that the Confederates were concentrating at Corinth, twenty miles away, he seems not to have altered the scattered dispositions, his headquarters were at Savannah, the point on which Buell was moving, nine miles away, and he used to go to Pittsburg Landing in the day-time and back at night.²

¹ E. "Monitor" and "*Merrimac*," Hampton Roads, Va., March 8th.

W. Pound Gap, Ky., March 6th.

W. Pea Ridge, Ark., March 5th-8th.

S.E. New Berne, N.C., March 14th.

² E. Kernstown, Va., March 23rd.

S.W. Apaché Cañon, N.M., March 26th-28th.

Before starting to join Grant, Buell had sent G. W. Morgan to seize Cumberland Gap, which after some manœuvring against *Kirby Smith* he succeeded in doing, while Mitchel, in middle Tennessee, was to strike at Huntsville, Alabama, and occupy the Memphis-Charleston railway, which he did immediately after the battle of Shiloh, but he destroyed bridges, which was not wanted to be done. Mitchel was much bothered by a cavalry raid under *John Morgan*, who surprised some detachments, but was defeated at Lebanon, Tennessee. Though organized opposition was over, yet a good deal of guerilla warfare went on, which gave him much trouble in holding the main line for over a hundred miles, from Stevenson to Decatur and Tuscumbia.

On April 4th, Grant's outposts had a sharp skirmish with the Confederate cavalry, but even though it was now clear that *Johnston* was advancing, Grant neither concentrated his scattered force nor moved his own headquarters to the threatened point: he had been a good deal hurt by his horse falling with him, but this hardly seems to account for the neglect. *Johnston* had intended to attack on the 5th, but the formation of his army took so much time that a surprise that day was out of the question: he attacked, however, the next day, with three Army Corps, each in one line, a most cumbrous formation in such thick ground (cf. p. 160). He drove Grant's men steadily back from near Shiloh Church into a corner by Pittsburg Landing, between the Tennessee River and Owl Creek, but was killed about 2.30 p.m., and *Beauregard* took command. As the assailants got nearer the river they came under the fire of the gunboats, a deep ravine protected the Union flank, and the retreating guns formed a strong line, which checked them: just in the nick of time Buell's leading brigades came up, and the Confederates drew off for the night, the newcomers taking up the Union outposts: the battle was saved. The next morning, Grant, now strongly reinforced, attacked,

and by evening the Confederate army was in full retreat on Corinth. In this battle, commonly called Shiloh, from Shiloh Church, which was in the centre of the battlefield, the brunt of the fight fell on Sherman, who gained great credit, but Grant was much blamed for his action on and before the first day.

On the 9th, a force was sent forward in pursuit, but its cavalry was driven in by *Forrest*, who gained time for *Beauregard* to reach Corinth unmolested. Both sides had failed in their objects: the Union army had not marched to Corinth unopposed, and the Confederates had not beaten Grant and Buell in detail. Halleck came and took command on the 11th,¹ and when Pope's and other reinforcements came in he had over 100,000 men, but he waited too long for them. He divided the army into four Corps, with Grant as second in command, and felt his way to Corinth most timidly, entrenching at every halt, ordering his leading troops not to get into serious action, and allowing the enemy to delay him in every way.² *Beauregard* was reinforced, nominally to over 100,000 men, but sickness and absence reduced his effective force to 53,000. Though his position at Corinth was very strong, it was too large for his force, and he could not risk being shut up there. He therefore gained as much time as possible in order to remove his sick and stores, and so well did Halleck's over-caution play into his hands³ that Sherman did not get up to the main position, twenty miles from Pittsburg Landing, till May 17th, while it was the 27th before anything like a general movement was made. This was held off, and on the 29th and 30th⁴ *Beauregard* got clear away:

¹ S.E. Fort Pulaski, Ga., April 10th.

² S. New Orleans, La., April 18th-28th.

E. Siege of Yorktown, Va., all April.

E. *Jackson* in the Valley, Va., all April.

³ E. Williamsburg, Va., May 5th.

E. McDowell, W. Va., May 8th.

⁴ E. Front Royal and Winchester, Va., May 23rd-25th.

E. *Seven Pines*, Va., May 31st, June 1st.

on the 31st Halleck occupied Corinth. A few days later, *Beauregard* was found in a very strong position at Tupelo, but both sides separated without further fighting. The Confederate army was redistributed, and *Beauregard* went on sick-leave, being succeeded by *Bragg*. It was in the pursuit of *Beauregard* from Corinth that Sheridan came to the front. He, as a smart young professional soldier, was recommended for the command of a cavalry regiment, and did so well that he was soon given a brigade, after which he never looked back.

Halleck had been wonderfully successful in his command, or rather his lieutenants had, for the Confederates had been driven steadily back without a check, ever since he took command at St. Louis the November before. He now prepared to move East, with Chattanooga as his objective, and began by sending Buell back into middle Tennessee, to ensure the safety of the western part of that State. Buell's new orders were based on the fact that the Confederate concentration in Mississippi would nearly empty Kentucky and Tennessee of their troops, which would enable him to strike at Chattanooga, but his trouble was the long and vulnerable railway from his base, Louisville. Halleck ordered him to move on Huntsville, in June,¹ and repair the Memphis-Charleston railway for this attack and future use, and would not consent to his advancing via Nashville and McMinnville.

The possession of Corinth on the Memphis-Charleston line by the North, made Memphis untenable by the Confederates, and Forts Pillow and Randolph, built for its protection by water, were abandoned; but the Confederates had got together a strong gunboat flotilla, under *Hollins*, who did not wish to retire without trying conclusions with the Union boats, now

¹ E. Cross Keys, Va., June 8th.

E. Port Republic, Va., June 9th.

E. The Seven Days, Va., June 26th-July 1st.

S. Naval attack on Vicksburg, Miss., June 26th-29th.

commanded by Davis. *Hollins* was driven back in a small action on May 10th, though two Union boats were sunk, and Davis followed to Memphis, a decisive battle being fought on June 6th, in which the Confederate flotilla was destroyed. Memphis surrendered to Davis, who then went up the White River, to co-operate with General Curtis, after the battle of Pea Ridge, till the end of the month. The battle of Memphis decided the control of the Mississippi, for, though the great river was still blocked by strong works at Vicksburg and elsewhere, the Confederate gunboats were almost a negligible quantity thenceforward: here and there a few were got together, and there were some Union scares of armoured rams, but that was all. (Continued on p. 165.)

THE SOUTH

(Continued from p. 95.) In December, 1861, the urgent importance of fortifying Vicksburg had been pressed on *General Lovell*, commanding the Confederate *Department No. 1*, at New Orleans; but he was so short of both men and means that he could do nothing.¹ When Fort Donelson fell, however,² and the Union forces came South, the matter became vital; *Beauregard*, an excellent engineer, drew up plans, and the fortifications were put in hand early in April and pushed forward, so that they were ready before any attack came. During the second quarter of 1862, the work here was hard and continuous, but there was very little fighting. By the middle of June, the works were ready, and troops sent to garrison them, *Van Dorn* being sent to take command.

The command of the naval expedition against New Orleans was given to Captain Farragut, who sailed from New York on January 9th, and reached his

¹ W. Mill Springs, Ky., January 19th, 20th.

² S.E. Roanoke Island, N.C., February 8th.

S.W. Valverde, N.M., February 21st.

headquarters at Ship Island on the 20th. The fleet consisted of four screw sloops, of from 22 to 24 guns each, one paddle steamer, of 17, nine gunboats, a number of mortar-boats, and some armed merchant steamers. Bringing the heavy vessels over the bar was a difficult operation, as they had to be lightened a good deal, and it was April 7th¹ before all were over. The river was defended by two principal works, Forts Jackson and St. Philip, nearly opposite each other, some ninety miles below New Orleans: there were three armoured rams, the "*Manassas*," "*Louisiana*," and "*Mississippi*," the two last not quite finished, and several others, mostly armed river boats. Besides a number of fire-rafts for the attack of the Union wooden fleet, there were obstructions, and the river was blocked by a line of hulks chained together. The forts mounted over 100 guns, but only half of these were heavy: there were other works higher up, and an inner line close to New Orleans. The weak point of the defence was that all its forces were not under the same command, the naval command being divided between the Confederate Navy and that of the State, and independent of *Lovell*. The "*Louisiana*" was moored near the forts as a floating battery. Farragut reconnoitred carefully, and advanced on the 18th, the mortar-boats leading: they kept up a heavy fire on the forts for two days, as a preliminary, and then the line of hulks was broken by two of the gunboats. Farragut advanced in two columns on the night of the 23rd: the heavy ships covered the gunboats, and the mortar-boats kept down the fire of the forts with a continuous bombardment while the fleet was passing: one column passed within some fifty yards of the forts with little loss, being sheltered by the raised bank of the river. The Confederates sent down their fire-rafts, but

¹ E. Siege of Yorktown, Va., all April.

E. *Jackson* in the Valley, Va., all April.

W. Shiloh, Tenn., April 6th, 7th.

W. Island No. 10, Tenn., April 8th.

S.E. Fort Pulaski, Ga., April 10th.

managed them badly, allowing them to drift singly with the current, so that they were easily avoided; one, however, was brought down by a tug against the flagship "Hartford," setting her on fire when in close action with the forts, but she cast it adrift, sank the tug, and put the fire out, without slackening her own fire; a gallant performance. Had these rafts been lashed in line, sent down in big batches, or steered, they would have been very formidable. The ram "*Manassas*" charged the Union fleet, ramming the "Brooklyn," and doing damage which would have been serious at sea; she went on to attack the "Mississippi," but ran aground, and, being riddled with shot, was abandoned and blown up: the "*Louisiana*" hardly used her guns, and the undisciplined *State Defence* fleet behaved badly. Some of the Union fleet did not get past, but Farragut went on past the other lines and anchored at New Orleans. He first destroyed the ram "*Mississippi*," which would have been ready in a few days, and then summoned the forts to surrender on the 25th, shelling them till they did so on the 28th:¹ the "*Louisiana*" was set on fire and blown up. A few days afterwards the Confederates evacuated Pensacola, Florida, the Union forces took possession on May 10th, and it became the headquarters of the Gulf Squadron. It is said that Napoleon IIIrd, of whose intrigues we shall see more, had hinted that if New Orleans held out he might refuse to respect the blockade, or formally recognize the Confederacy. This would have been most serious for the Union cause, but Farragut's success averted it.

On May 1st, General Butler came and took military possession of New Orleans,² and Farragut went on up the river: he took one or two small places, but at Grand Gulf his gunboats were roughly handled, and, though he had the mortar fleet with him, he did not think that he could clear the river, without army

¹ S.E. Fort Macon, N.C., April 29th.

² E. *Jackson* in the Valley, Va., all May.

co-operation at Vicksburg, which, though not quite completed, was strong enough to resist him. He withdrew at the end of May,¹ for his crews were sickly, his ships were knocked about, and the river was getting very low. Late in June² he went up again, and brought his mortar-boats into action against Vicksburg, moving the fleet slowly past the batteries, whose fire they could keep down, but that was not taking the place or clearing a thoroughfare for steamer traffic. He communicated with Davis' flotilla, which had come down from the White River. (Continued on p. 175.)

THE SOUTH-WEST

³(Continued from p. 96.) At the beginning of January,⁴ *General Sibley* moved against Fort Craig, New Mexico, with about 2,000 men, his opponent, Canby, having 3,800, mostly regulars. A battle was fought at Valverde on February 21st,⁵ just across the Rio Grande from the fort, in which the Confederates had the best of it, taking some guns: Canby retreated into the fort. *Sibley* then moved on to Albuquerque and Santa Fé, but in March Colonel Slough came to Fort Union and took command of the northern section. He moved against *Colonel Scurry* and completely defeated him at Apache Cañon, or *Glorieta*, on March 28th.⁶ Soon after, Canby moved out to co-operate with him, and fought some indecisive actions: time was all in his favour, for when the United States troops had

¹ W. Confederates evacuate Corinth, Miss., May 30th.

E. *Seven Pines*, Va., May 31st, June 1st.

E. Cross Keys, Va., June 8th.

E. Port Republic, Va., June 9th.

² E. The Seven Days, Va., June 26th-July 1st.

³ Map 65, p. 420.

⁴ S.E. Confederate attack on Port Royal, S.C., January 1st.

W. Mill Springs, Ky., January 19th, 20th.

⁵ S.E. Roanoke Island, N.C., February 8th.

W. Fort Donelson, Ky., February 16th.

⁶ E. Kernstown, Va., March 23rd.

evacuated the territory, they had destroyed or removed their stores, and *Sibley* could not maintain his men, for, though he claimed the territory, Confederate paper-money did not circulate, Slough was quite able to cover Fort Union, and Fort Craig was too strong to attack; there was, therefore, nothing left for him but retreat. Canby let him go, being content with watching him out of the country, for he would have had to feed prisoners: he was, however, severely blamed for his inaction. *Sibley's* retreat was most disastrous: he reached Fort Bliss in May, but went on to San Antonio when he heard that a Californian force was coming against him. This campaign ended Confederate control west of Texas, and the country was taken over again and administered by the Union side. (Continued on p. 176.)

THE BLOCKADE

(Continued from p. 97.) The Blockade went on steadily, the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron under Goldsborough, the South under Dupont, mostly picking up small vessels in the inner waters: at this time, however, the regular blockade-runner began to come on the scene, a vessel built for the business, for speed rather than amount of cargo, for the profits were so great, as prices rose, that it paid to run ships of this sort. They mostly started from a port near to the blockaded one, Bermuda, Nassau, or Havana, the goods coming out in ordinary vessels, from which they were transhipped. The trade of Nassau, especially, increased enormously: without direct evidence it was most difficult to stop the traffic, and vessels bound for Matamoros, close to the Texan border, were generally ordered to be released if captured, on the ground that a neutral port could not be blockaded. Contraband of war was even sent via New York to

Nassau, but this trade increased so much as to arouse suspicion, and soon a most rigid scrutiny was instituted, which put a stop to it. There was no hesitation in condemning a vessel of the blockade-runner type if caught, but at this time most of them got through, for the blockade was not very close, and the risk of being hit was small at night, when they always approached the coast, where they had private signals to guide them in. This service was very well organized, coast troops being told off for it, with field artillery in some places, so that, even if a vessel had to be run ashore, the cargo was often saved.

Dupont made several attempts to seal up Charleston by sinking ships in the channel, but without success.

In the Gulf of Mexico the Blockading Squadron was divided, the eastern portion being based on Key West, the western at Pensacola. Farragut took command of this latter district in February. The principal ports were New Orleans and Mobile: the first was taken in April, but Mobile, though easy to blockade, was also easy to defend, being at the head of a large bay, with a narrow entrance guarded by strong forts: there were inner channels among the islands, which were most difficult to watch. Galveston, Texas, was easy to blockade, and not well defended. During the first half of the year, Farragut was up the Mississippi with the bulk of his command, leaving a few small vessels to maintain as good a blockade as they could. (Continued on p. 177.)

THE WAR AT SEA

(Continued from p. 98.) The "*Sumter's*" career as a cruiser ended in 1861, though she was not actually sold till December, 1862. The "*Nashville*" started back from Southampton in February, and took two prizes, after which she was not employed again as a sea-going

cruiser, not being strong enough, but was kept at Savannah for local defence.

In March,¹ the new cruiser "*Florida*," built on the Mersey, was ready for sea: she was called the "*Oreto*," and was ostensibly to trade to Palermo, but her destination was changed to Nassau just before sailing. Not an officer or man was enlisted for the Confederate service, and she carried no warlike stores, though in the United States case for the Geneva Arbitration it was stated that she had on board guns and carriages. It was difficult to get a commander and crew: *Bulloch* had wanted *Pegram* of the "*Nashville*," but he had gone, and as it was dangerous to keep her lying in the Mersey, *Captain Low*, an Englishman in Confederate service, was told to go as a passenger, and at Nassau to hand the ship over to *Captain Maffitt*; but, as he had not arrived when she got there, she was detained on suspicion, but released, nothing contraband being found on board, though *Captain Hickley*, R.N., who examined her, had reported that she was in every respect fitted as a man-of-war, with magazines, etc., complete, and could be armed and made fit to go into action in twenty-four hours (cf. p. 471). *Maffitt* arrived in May, and took charge, but these delays went on till August, for the Northern Navy had established a blockade of the channels outside Nassau. (Continued on p. 177.)

SUMMARY

(Continued from p. 99.) Union Gains.—Nothing in the East. In the South-East, the capture of Roanoke Island, and control of the inland waters of North Carolina, and of most of those of South Carolina and Florida. In the West, there were a number of distinct steps: Mill Springs, the taking of Fort Donelson, Shiloh, the occupation of Nashville, Corinth, Memphis,

¹ E. "Monitor" and "*Merrimac*," Hampton Roads, Va., March 8th.
The "*Florida*" sails from England in March.

and the Memphis-Charleston railway, and the naval battle of Memphis: in Missouri, the battle of Pea Ridge. In the South, the taking of New Orleans, opening the greater part of the Mississippi, and the occupation of Pensacola. In the South-West, the regaining of the territory west of Texas and Arkansas. At Sea, a steadily improving Blockade.

Confederate Losses.—*General Albert Sidney Johnston* and *Brigadier-General Turner Ashby*, both killed in action. (Continued on p. 179.)

NOTICES OF OFFICERS

(Continued from p. 100.) *Albert Sidney Johnston* was the hope of the Confederacy, senior to *Lee*, and better known at the beginning of the War. Born in Kentucky in 1803, he served in the Army from 1827 to 1834, but saw only Indian warfare: in 1836 he went to Texas, then an independent Republic, rose to command its Army, and was also Secretary of War. He served with credit under General Taylor in Mexico, and was given rank again in the United States Army after the annexation in 1849. In 1857 he commanded the remarkable expedition to Utah with conspicuous ability, and commanded in California from December, 1860, till the outbreak of the Civil War. In the War, it would have been well for the Confederates had he had the command of the Western States sooner. His strategy seemed feeble, in both the Fort Donelson and Shiloh campaigns, and his clumsy dispositions lost a day at Shiloh, which was important. Personally, he was a man of the most noble character, and the idol of the South.

Brigadier-General Turner Ashby, *Jackson's* Cavalry Commander, was rather a typical Southern gentleman than a great soldier. A magnificent rider, of reckless courage, and indefatigable activity, he preferred the excitement of war to its routine duties, and did not enforce discipline properly, by which *Jackson's* plans

suffered, at least once. Still, his strategic cavalry handling before the battle of McDowell remains a model of such work, and *Jackson* said that he had never known a better partisan officer. *Ashby* was a power in himself, and his death was a serious loss to the Southern cause. (Continued on p. 180.)

1862	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH
EAST			<p>8. The "Monitor" and "Merrimac" in Hampton Roads.</p> <p>17. McClellan starts for the Peninsula. Jackson in the Valley.</p> <p>23. Kernstown.</p>
SOUTH-EAST	<p>1. Confederate attack on Port Royal fails.</p>	<p>Operations of the under Burnside.</p> <p>8. Roanoke Island.</p>	<p>Coast Division, New Berne.</p> <p>14. New Berne.</p>
WEST	<p>7. Paintsville.</p> <p>19, 20. Mill Springs or Fishing Creek.</p>	<p>8. Fort Henry taken.</p> <p>16. Fort Donelson taken.</p>	<p>6. Pound Gap.</p> <p>5 8. Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern. Pope before New Madrid.</p> <p>13. New Madrid taken.</p>
SOUTH			
SOUTH-WEST AND NAVAL	<p>The "Nashville" at Southampton.</p>	<p>Sibley's Expedition to New Mexico and Arizona.</p> <p>21. Valverde.</p> <p>The "Nashville" in the North Atlantic.</p>	<p>to New Mexico and Arizona.</p> <p>26-28. Apache Cañon, or Glorieta. The "Florida" sails from England, unarmed.</p>

1862	APRIL	MAY	JUNE TO JULY 1
EAST	McClellan's Siege of Yorktown to 5.	5. Williamsburg.	
	<i>Jackson's Campaign</i>	31, June 1. Fair Oaks, or <i>Seven Pines</i> , in the Valley, to 15.	8. Cross Keys.
SOUTH-EAST		8. McDowell.	9. Port Republic.
	Gillmore's Coast Operations.	23-25. Front Royal, Winchester.	12-15. <i>Stuart's ride</i> .
WEST	10. Fort Pulaski taken.		26 to July 1. The Seven Days' Battles.
	Burnside's Coast Operations.		
SOUTH	29. Fort Macon taken.		
	The Shiloh Campaign.		
SOUTH-WEST, NAVAL, AND MEXICO	6, 7. Battle of Shiloh.		6. River battle of Memphis.
	Halleck's advance on Corinth.	17. Halleck before Corinth.	
	8. Pope takes Island No. 10.	<i>Beauregard</i> evacuates Corinth and retreats to Tupelo.	
	18-28. Farragut takes New Orleans.		26-29. Naval attack on Vicksburg.
	<i>Sibley's</i> retreat to Texas.		
	17. France declares War on Mexico.		

CHAPTER VIII

THE SECOND HALF OF 1862. THE CONFEDERATE RALLY

GENERAL

(Continued from p. 105.) In September, 1862, came Lincoln's Proclamation emancipating the slaves, the steps leading to which are better put here in a connected form than kept to their strict chronological order. It must be remembered that Lincoln was elected on Union, not Abolitionist, lines, and always acknowledged it, so that this Proclamation was a distinct change of policy.

In August, 1861, Congress passed what was called the Confiscation Act, providing that "any property used by any persons for the purpose of taking part in insurrection against the United States shall be lawful prize, and be condemned as such." This included slaves, such hostile employment vitiating any future claim of ownership. It was called unconstitutional, but Congress claimed that it had a perfect right to deal with the exceptional situation. The Act did not emancipate slaves as such, but only those directly employed in work for the furtherance of the War against the United States. At that time it was thought that an Emancipation Proclamation would have been dangerous to the Union, as it might have lost Kentucky and Missouri, and locked up many more troops in Maryland.

In March, 1862, Lincoln sent a Message to Congress,

advocating the gradual abolition of slavery, and inviting the co-operation of slave-holding States. Though adopted by Congress, no States responded, and the attempt fell through. In April, slavery was abolished in the District of Columbia.

General Frémont was removed from command in Missouri in November, 1861 (cf. p. 92), for what seems a similar step to the Confiscation Act, but the difference lay in this, that his proclamation confiscated the property of persons "in rebellion," and declared their slaves free, without the proviso that such property or slaves must have been used against the Union, and further, would have been dangerous in the hands of such a rabid Abolitionist. The North was not at this time strong enough to enforce the Act, and it remained a dead letter till July, 1862, when another Act was passed which declared forfeit to the United States the property of all persons taking part in, or aiding, rebellion, after sixty days from the giving of public warning by the President, and that all captured or escaped slaves "be deemed captives of war, and be forever free of servitude. That, except for some crime, no slave escaping, and being claimed, be delivered to his owner unless he shall prove that he had nothing to do with rebellion." This was practically Frémont's proclamation of the year before, the point lying in Congress treating Secession as treason and rebellion, under the section of the Constitution which authorized measures "to suppress insurrections." This could not be carried into practice in the conduct of the War, nor, in the case of at least one State, be legally maintained.

Slavery, though, could not be ignored any longer, because each Union general dealt with it in his own way, often politically. Sherman, for instance, who had been a lawyer before the War, instructed his officers to mete out plain, substantial justice, to have nothing to do with confiscation, and to restore the property of those who took the oath of allegiance, holding that "all

persons living in the lines are presumed to be good citizens, and are entitled to the protection of the laws of the United States so long as they conform to them," and that "every opportunity should be given to the wavering and disloyal to return to their allegiance." He disapproved of harsh measures, as likely to embitter and prolong the War, and it would have been well had his clear view of justice and common sense been generally acted on by the country.

In August, an Emancipation Proclamation by General Hunter was disallowed, on the ground that such matters were the prerogative of the Executive, and ultra vires in a subordinate; but, in the first half of September, *Lee's* victorious army was on Northern soil, at the very doors, *Bragg* was marching through Kentucky towards Louisville, a superior Confederate force advancing to take Corinth and the strategic railway, and Nashville in great straits, closely besieged: chaos reigned at Washington, Halleck was incapable, the politicians panic-stricken, and the strain on President Lincoln became insupportable. A deeply religious man, who viewed slavery from the moral standpoint, he became convinced that these continual defeats were the judgment of God on the nation which would not abolish it, and vowed to Heaven that he would do so, if a victory were vouchsafed to the Union arms. A day or so later, *Lee's* invasion had failed, the Proclamation of Emancipation was issued, and then followed, in quick succession, the failure of *Bragg's* stroke, the defeat of *Van Dorn* before Corinth, and the relief of Nashville. This new departure in principle made the War "before all the world, not only a war for a political union, but also a war against slavery," and had the greatest effect on European opinion, where it "created so commanding a sentiment in favour of our cause that our enemies there could not prevail against it." It did not cause the dissensions in the North which had been feared, and checked the alarming increase of

political power which the continual failures of 1862 had given to the Democrats.

An important matter in the conduct of the War was settled on July 22nd, when a regular Cartel of Exchange was arranged between the two Governments (cf. p. 98). Previous to this, the Union Government, though unable in practice to treat prisoners as rebels, had refused officially to recognize them as prisoners of war, but in 1862 the Confederates held the greater number of prisoners, and the obstinacy of the North was injuring their own people. Prisoners had been exchanged before this arrangement, but the negotiations were irregular and uncertain.

Both sides now began to feel the pinch of keeping up their armies to strength, and replacing the drain of war. Lincoln, in July, issued his famous call for 300,000 men, to serve for three years or the duration of the War, which inspired one of the most stirring calls to arms ever written, curiously enough by a Quaker, beginning, "We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more." The Confederates felt the difficulty worst, owing to their smaller population: though they had at first thought out the measures for making war better than their opponents, they had overlooked this vital matter. When enthusiasm was high, voluntary enlistment was enough, but when the novelty passed off, and the small pay was considered, conscription became necessary, as the only means that could be devised for the preservation of the army. Sherman says, "the progress of our Western armies had roused the rebel Government to the exercise of the most stupendous energy. Every man capable of bearing arms in the South was declared to be a soldier, and forced to act as such. All their armies were greatly reinforced, and the most despotic power was granted, to enforce discipline and supplies." The Confederate Conscript Law, passed in the previous April, rendered all men between eighteen and thirty-

five liable to service during the War, making them subject to the Confederacy, and annulling State control (cf. p. 330).

In the East, the Union object was clear, to cover Washington and the retreat of the Army of the Potomac, and stop *Lee*, measures of defence, pure and simple, though the politicians should have seen that their order of importance ought to have been inverted. The same course had to be adopted in the West, owing to the dispersion of Halleck's great army, which gave the Confederates a chance of invading Union soil here also; but both here and in the East they made the fatal mistake of mixing political and military objects, and expecting men to rise with help who would not do so without it (cf. p. 481). Chattanooga had now become a vital strategic point, in Missouri and Tennessee guerilla warfare was going on, and on the Mississippi things were in statu quo. (Continued on p. 187.)

THE EAST

(Continued from p. 123.) McClellan made his position at Harrison's Landing very strong, and there he remained for some six weeks. *Lee* watched him with a brigade of cavalry, and on the night of July 31st bombarded his camps: he concentrated the army nearer to Richmond, where it could act in any direction. Pope had taken up his new command just at the beginning of the Seven Days' battles before Richmond, and began with an able disposition, which covered the ground well, watching both the important junction at Gordonsville and the Shenandoah Valley. His line was along the Rappahannock, with a division at Fredericksburg to keep open the line to Acquia Creek, an isolated position, which was ordered from Washington against his wish. He objected to McClellan's change of base as giving the Confederates the chance of exchanging Capitals, which would be fatal to the North, but not to them, for *Lee* was thus put between

the two Union armies. Both in numbers and quality, the Army of Virginia was inferior to the *Army of Northern Virginia*, and Pope's chance was to act in concert with a diversion by McClellan, but though the latter planned to attack again, he was not allowed to do so. Here arose a dangerous impasse, two independent Army Commanders being at cross purposes, and Pope suggested that his old chief, Halleck, be placed in command of both, but the President went further, and made him Commander-in-Chief, without consulting Stanton, who was furious with what he called Pope's interference. Had McClellan been trusted, his army would have been kept to hold *Lee* fast at Richmond, but he was impossible, and was brought back in August.

When Pope took up his new command he quite lost his head, and issued a most unfortunate and bombastic order, which set every one against him, and his sneers at the Army of the Potomac did not mend matters. Sigel was put in command of his First Corps,¹ vice Frémont resigned. *Lee* had sent *Jackson* to secure Gordonsville, when first threatened, but soon Pope repeated the attempt in force, with Banks' Corps.² Banks' orders were vague, and he thought *Jackson* was to be attacked, but Pope only wanted him kept in check: the attack was made on August 9th at Cedar Mountain, and was severely beaten. Pope had begun well, and made *Lee* weaken his army by a large detachment, but when McClellan began to leave the Peninsula, *Lee's* hands were much freer, for he could either fall on the retreating army with his full

¹ There is much confusion in Corps nomenclature at this time. The original Corps of the Army of the Potomac were designated by Roman numerals, Pope's Corps by words. Thus McDowell's Corps was both the Ist and the Third, Sumner's the IInd, Banks' the Second, Heintzelman's the IIIrd. After this all Corps were numbered consecutively, but there were so many changes from amalgamation and new units, that it would be useless to try to follow them.

² S. The "*Arkansas*" in action, July 15th.

W. *Morgan's* Raid in Kentucky, July.

weight, or use part for this, watching Pope with the rest, or neglect McClellan and throw all his weight on Pope, who was rather in an exposed position.¹ He chose the last, and even before McClellan went, he was confronting Pope with 55,000 men, outnumbering him by 20,000. Pope's communications at Culpeper being rather exposed, he made a skilful retreat behind the Rappahannock, covered by his cavalry, and took up a line from Sulphur Springs to Kelly's Ford. Halleck, however, hampered him by making him keep open communications with Acquia Creek, by which McClellan was to advance to his support, and *Lee*, seeing the danger of this, resolved to strike at once: he concentrated his army on the 21st, and then began some skilful manœuvring on both sides. *Lee* tried several times to cross the river, and *Jackson* got a few men over, but they were cut off by a flood: *Longstreet* watched the river from Rappahannock Station to Kelly's Ford. *Lee* meant to turn Pope's right and move on Manassas via Warrenton, but Pope saw this, and formed the bold plan of crossing the river and attacking him in flank and rear, asking Halleck to move the reinforcements to conform (cf. p. 451). The plan was spoilt by a freshet on the night of the 22nd, when Pope, seeing that *Longstreet* could not cross, neglected him, broke the bridge at Rappahannock Station, and concentrated at Warrenton. *Stuart* made a raid and took a few prisoners, and *Jackson* retired from Sigel's front, *Longstreet* taking his place. *Lee* was now in a very bad position, for Pope had detained him far longer than he had expected, and McClellan's army was coming up; he therefore had recourse to the really desperate move of sending *Jackson* round by White Plains and Thoroughfare

¹ S. Baton Rouge, La., August 5th.

S. Farragut and Williams at Vicksburg, Miss., August.

The "*Florida*" and "*Alabama*" armed at sea, August.

W. Raids of *Forrest* and *Morgan*, middle of August.

W. *Bragg* invades Kentucky, August, September.

Gap on Manassas, two days' march ahead of *Longstreet*, who followed by the same road, thus dividing his army to make a flank march round an enemy of about equal strength, who held interior lines, and might defeat the operation in detail.

So far the manœuvring had been in Pope's favour, but he now trusted to Halleck to secure his rear, only sending one division to Manassas: he thought that *Jackson* was going for the Shenandoah Valley, but should have made Thoroughfare Gap safe. Between the 24th and 26th he was reinforced by some 23,000 men, four divisions of the Army of the Potomac and reserve troops, but he groped about slowly, while *Jackson* marched, and reached Bristoe Station undiscovered with 25,000 men, on the 26th. Pope was so positive that *Jackson* was going to the Valley that he sent no troops either to Thoroughfare Gap or Gainesville: he also trusted to Halleck, a fatal mistake. When he heard of *Jackson's* proximity, he thought it was a raid, and sent a small force to drive him away, ordering concentration at Gainesville, but the action showed him that *Jackson* was in force between him and Washington. Though the latter had destroyed the great Union depot at Manassas, he was in the greatest danger, for the Union army was closing in, *Lee* was not up, and he could neither stay where he was nor retreat: he therefore moved to the old battlefield of Bull Run on the 27th. Pope's dispositions were sound, and would have put him in the best position to deal with any developments, besides cutting off *Jackson*, but the Fog of War descended on him, and he got bewildered and excited. He saw that only a portion of *Lee's* army was before him, and without waiting for exact information, jumped at the idea of "bagging the crowd," and concentrated on Manassas, changing the positions of well-placed troops, and losing a day, which saved *Jackson*. McDowell, however, had kept his head, and sent Buford's cavalry to Gainesville, which met

Longstreet at White Plains, and disclosed the whole situation: he promptly ordered Sigel, who was under his command, to stop *Longstreet* at Haymarket, sending a division to flank him at Buckland Mills, and at the same time looking out for *Jackson*. On getting Pope's orders to move on Manassas, he left one division and the cavalry to hold *Longstreet*, which actually did so for a whole day, and brought the rest in. Sigel had found *Jackson*, whom Pope might have destroyed, but for the concentration. When this was done, *Jackson* had gone. Pope ordered a pursuit, *Jackson*, finding his enemies gone, did the same, and ordered *A. P. Hill* to pursue; but *Hill* had captured some despatches, knew Pope's plans, and joined the main body. Pope thought that King, whose division was holding *Jackson* at Gainesville, was pursuing him, and let things go on, but had he known it, *Jackson* was at his mercy. Both sides were entirely in the dark on the 28th. King and Ricketts, who had been fighting *Jackson* and *Longstreet* separately, knew nothing of Pope's plans, and retired to Bristoe Station. Pope intended to move in overwhelming force against *Jackson's* supposed flank and rear the next day, but his orders were badly worded, especially those to Porter (Vth Corps): even when he got the day's reports, and altered the orders, they were still unsuitable, for he refused to believe that *Longstreet* was up, and persisted that he could destroy *Jackson*; but his chance was gone, his supplies done, and his men worn out. He now forbade a general action, ordering a retreat behind Bull Run for supplies, if the enemy were in force, intending to take position at Centreville, pick up his reinforcements, and fight there, a good plan, had he stuck to it. These were the orders for the 29th. Porter and McDowell were to go to Gainesville, but as they went they saw the battle at Groveton, and heard that *Longstreet* was close at hand. On this morning, *Jackson*, behind Bull Run, did not know whether *Longstreet* could get through,

for he was quite cut off, and thought best to take a position at Groveton, where he could hold on, and gain time for the Confederate concentration. He was attacked by Sigel and Reynolds, but held his own, and soon heard that relief was near, but the whole Union Army was also near, and the fight not over. He had beaten off Sigel, when Pope arrived, took command, and made a concentrated attack on him, in which battle his terrible powers of counter-stroke were never more effective. *Longstreet* seemed to have escaped notice, and only came into action in the evening, to some extent. Porter and McDowell found that their orders were unsuitable to the real situation, and could get no answer to their messages to Pope: McDowell moved off, leaving Porter to confront the whole of *Longstreet's* Corps. When Pope's orders came, they dealt with an unreal situation, and had they not done so, it was then too late to carry them out. Had Pope's whole army been up early, it might still have been possible to crush *Jackson*, but, when he arrived, he seemed quite to have forgotten his own orders and intention not to fight a general action on that ground; but he may have still thought that his original plan was possible.

The Confederates fell back a little during the night, and Pope still maintained that they were retreating: he was furious with Porter for not carrying out his impossible orders of the day before, and thought the report of *Longstreet's* Corps being present was only an excuse. He elected to fight it out there, and gave orders to "pursue the enemy." *Lee* saw the mistake, and let it go on, for he had formed one of the greatest plans of his life, trusting to *Jackson's* weakened Corps to bear the brunt of the Union attack, while *Longstreet* moved round to take Pope in flank. Pope did not expect an attack on his own left, and had withdrawn troops which covered the left of his own attack, which was beaten. McDowell, in this part of the field, saw the danger, and took steps to meet it, and at last

Pope saw it too, and acted promptly and well, but too late.

Jackson could only just hold his ground, with support from *Longstreet's* artillery. *Longstreet* struck at the salient of the Union position, Bald Hill, *Jackson* advancing at the same time. The position was at length carried, but the Henry Hill held out till dark, and under cover of this defence the Union army retreated across Bull Run in good order; there was no pursuit, and just after the battle 20,000 good fresh troops came up, from the IInd and VIth Corps.

The Union army had 55,000 men in action, the Confederates 54,000: the Union losses for the two days are not separated from those of the rest of the campaign, but the Confederates lost 9,474. The battle was fought on the old Bull Run battlefield, with the positions reversed, and is generally called the Second Bull Run, or the *Second Manassas*, but the two would seem to be better described if the first was called Bull Run, the other Manassas.

On the 31st the Confederates began to move, and *Jackson* got the worst of a severe action with the IXth Corps at Chantilly: Pope's army was withdrawn to the lines of Washington next day.

Neither Pope nor his men were demoralized, but the public were, and Halleck, who at first behaved as if he still trusted him, was too weak to resist their pressure, suddenly removed him from command, and put no one in his place: then the army did go to pieces.

Had Pope fallen back on his communications on the 25th and 26th, he would have caught *Jackson* isolated and crushed him, and had he stuck to his plan of falling back to Centreville on his supports, he would have got away safely; but he fought a general action without them. He had not the confidence of the army, like McClellan, and his braggadocio and abuse of the Army of the Potomac set every one against him. He disappears from the War.

Just before the battle, McClellan reported to Halleck at Washington, but the latter was helpless, as ever, in emergency, so McClellan did the work, but had to wait for sanction for everything: but for this, the VIth Corps would have been up before. He was expressly limited to the command of the Washington lines, even after the battle. He wanted to know whether the troops, 70,000 good men, were to be used to help Pope to win, or to defend the Capital, and while Halleck vacillated, Pope was beaten. Pope being dismissed, and matters getting worse, Lincoln took charge, and on September 3rd appointed McClellan to command the army. This change was made possible by the nerve and ability of Banks, on whom the weight fell, through Halleck's default. Though too ill to take the field himself, he was directed to assume command at Washington in McClellan's absence, and through his exertions chaos was reduced to order, McClellan's army was enabled to start, and steady re-organization went on at Washington. He made the situation safe. Lincoln thought that *Lee* might cross the border, and that Baltimore and Pennsylvania must be covered as well as Washington. *Lee* gives his plans thus: That as Virginia was now clear of the enemy, it was desirable to keep it so, and also to move into Maryland, since its "condition encouraged the belief that the presence of our army would induce the Washington Government to retain all its available force to provide against contingences," i.e. that he (*Lee*) would utilize the known Southern sympathies of the State. His military plan was "to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in order, by threatening Washington and Baltimore, to cause the enemy to withdraw from the south bank, where his presence endangered our communications. Having accomplished this object, it was proposed to move the army into western Maryland, establish our communications with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah, and by threatening Pennsylvania induce the enemy to follow,

and thus draw him from his base of supplies." The plan was good, giving a chance of striking at one of the objectives, and of raising recruits: it would also shift the burden of occupation on to the enemy, and secure the crops of the Valley and of north-east Virginia. Further, the Confederate army was more mobile, and McClellan never attacked. There was, however, another point, and a difficult one: Were *Lee* and his army in a condition to carry the plan out? It must be done at once, if at all, but the men were in rags, and the whole army in urgent need of a refit. Was the time or the refit most wanted? He wanted recruits, but the ragged misery of his army was not an attractive advertisement. Another thing, his numbers were not sufficient to encourage doubters. Further, he had not calculated on the way in which the defeat of Manassas had united the North, or that Maryland was so firmly controlled, that no rising was now possible, while Washington was secure. The refit was an absolute necessity, and the decision must be condemned as ill-considered and premature, resulting in more harm than good to the Confederate cause.

McClellan had foreseen *Lee's* probable move, and watched the fords with cavalry, the Confederates crossing on the 4th. He moved west from Washington, with his right well forward and his left on the river, so as to cover both Washington and Baltimore, concentrate at once in any direction, and be able to follow into Pennsylvania if required. *Lee* crossed at Leesburg, and moved on Frederick, hoping that this would cause the retreat of the Union troops at Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, which were on his communications; but as it did not, he determined to free them as he went, trusting to McClellan's slowness, and ordered *Jackson* to clear Martinsburg, and *McLaws* and *Walker* to take Harper's Ferry. The army was to pass the mountains and concentrate near Hagerstown. These orders were issued at

Frederick on the 9th, but a copy was left behind, which fell into McClellan's hands on the 13th. He had been moving slowly, and Halleck's interference made things worse, but he now woke up, for he had just time to catch *Lee's* army separated, and beat it in detail. *Jackson* had cleared Martinsburg, but the taking of Harper's Ferry caused a delay which would have been fatal had McClellan moved at once; but he delayed till next day, and the danger passed. The Union army moved in two bodies, on Crampton's and Turner's Gaps, in the South Mountain Range, where, on the 14th, was fought the confused series of actions for Turner's Gap, called the battle of Boonsboro or South Mountain, between the Union advance and *D. H. Hill* and *Longstreet*, who fell back, though McClellan did not know this till next morning. These actions gained time for the capture of Harper's Ferry and the concentration of the Confederate army at Sharpsburg. McClellan had lost both chances, of beating *Lee* in detail, and of saving Harper's Ferry. Both he and Franklin, commanding the VIth Corps, were so much impressed with *Lee's* "enormous forces," that they did not press on as they should have done. *Lee* issued a proclamation to the people on getting into Maryland, saying that his army had come to help them to throw off the yoke of the North, which deprived them of their rights, believing that they wished to do so, but if this had ever been true, they were now under firm control, and the proclamation was coldly received. The people sympathized with the South, but not to the extent of making their State part of the theatre of war.

Lee heard of the battles of South Mountain and the capture of Harper's Ferry at the same time, and was astonished at McClellan's new activity, on which he had not reckoned. Maryland was apathetic, and his political attempt had failed: it was no use going on, and he had the choice of either recrossing the Potomac or of holding his ground, and chose

the latter, though the most risky, because he wanted to shew the Maryland people that he was as good as his word, and a successful action might cause a change in his favour. He therefore took position at Sharpsburg with the troops which were up, on the 15th, and though McClellan came up, he did not attack. Next day *Lee* changed position to cover his retreat better, standing across an angle of the Potomac, with the unfordable Antietam Creek about 800 yards in front of his right and centre. *Jackson* came up, and Hooker's 1st Corps took ground opposite *Lee's* left for the attack next day, and this disclosed the plan, which was to attack his left strongly at first, and if successful, to push a Corps against his right, and cut off his retreat, holding him in the centre. This plan was spoilt by delays in execution, partly owing to jealousy among the Union generals.

McClellan's orders for the 17th were clumsy, and made combined action difficult, and *Lee* had seen through his plan the day before. During the morning, the 1st, XIIth, and IInd Corps attacked the Confederate left in succession, piecemeal, and without mutual support, and also were formed in long lines, close together, a most clumsy and helpless order (cf. p. 132): they gained a little ground by the Dunker Church, but *Jackson* retook it with one of his great counterstrokes. The holding action in the centre was carried out by the VIth Corps and part of the IVth, mostly with artillery, but had McClellan thrown in his strong IXth Corps on the Confederate right, when *Lee* had his hands full on the other flank in the morning, the Confederate army must have been destroyed. The IXth went in alone, after midday, and was beaten. Though there was a little desultory fighting afterwards, the battle was practically over: tactically it was a draw, but an invading army cannot afford such a result, and the invasion of Maryland was at an end.

The Union army was 87,000 strong, and its losses 12,500; the Confederate, 35,000 strong, losses about 9,500.

Lee's awful losses would have broken down a weaker man, and his resolution was never better shewn than when he decided, after hearing the reports that night, and against the opinion of his generals, not only to hold his ground, but to drive in the Union right in the morning: he only gave the attack up when a careful reconnoissance shewed it to be impracticable; but he stood his ground, and offered battle again all day, but it was not accepted. It is said that in the early dawn of the 18th, the Union scouts were checked by seeing an extended fighting-line in their front, and waited till it got light, when, as no one moved, they advanced and found a line of dead men, and that the time gained by this check enabled *Lee* to make his dispositions. *McClellan's* army was much disordered, but his reason for not attacking on the 18th was probably due to his habitual overestimate of the enemy's strength, and this gave *Lee* the invaluable time required to arrange for retreat: that night the Confederate army crossed the Potomac. Next day there was an attempt at pursuit, but *Jackson* was at hand, and under his direction the rearguard turned so savagely to bay that it was not molested further, and both armies drew off to rest and refit.¹

McClellan held the line of the Potomac, inactive. On October 6th,² *Halleck* ordered him to go and fight *Lee*, or drive him south, but he did not move, and *Stuart* raided round his army, destroying much property, and returning to Virginia in safety. At the end of the month, *McClellan* moved on Warrenton,

¹ W. Iuka, Miss., September 19th, 20th.

W. *Bragg's* Invasion of Kentucky, September.

W. Siege of Nashville, Tenn., September.

² W. Corinth, Miss., October 3rd, 4th.

W. Perryville, Ky., October 8th.

W. Fredericktown, Mo., October 21st.

to get between *Lee* and Richmond, and force him to concentrate farther south, by Gordonsville, which would clear the way for an advance by Fredericksburg or the Peninsula. The North, however, had had enough of him, his vapours, delays, and excuses, for though he had driven *Lee* out of Maryland, and covered Washington, yet he was impossible, always quarrelling with the Government, and at loggerheads with his generals, so, on November 7th,¹ he was relieved, and Burnside put in his place. He was not employed again during the War.

McClellan's retirement was immediately followed by the trial and disgrace of General Fitz John Porter, for the causes of which we must go back a little. General Pope's report on the battle of Manassas censured Generals Porter, Franklin, and Griffin, and recommended that they be removed; but when McClellan returned to command, he persuaded the President to retain them. When McClellan left, however, Porter was relieved on the same day, and the case against him only was taken up. He was tried by court-martial, charged with disobedience of orders at the battle of Manassas, and with shamefully retreating instead of pushing into action, and cashiered. The sequel will be found later on (cf. p. 437).

When Burnside took command he proposed to feint at Culpeper and Gordonsville, and then move on Fredericksburg, to go on against Richmond; and this was approved, with the proviso that it be done quickly if at all, Halleck engaging that the requisite stores, especially pontoons, should be sent forward at once (cf. p. 451). Burnside re-organized the army in three Grand Divisions of two Corps each, under Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker, and moved to the Rappahannock in the middle of November; but the pontoons were late, and this altered the situation. Sumner reached the river on the 17th, and was told to wait for the pontoons, at a time when *Lee* had

¹ W. Relief of Nashville, Tenn., November 17th.

only a weak picquet line along it, *Longstreet's* Corps being at Culpeper, and *Jackson's* in the Valley. *Lee* feared that the enemy would be on him before he could concentrate on the Rappahannock, and at first thought of taking position on the North Anna River in rear, with such troops as he could get together, manœuvring against the Union flank with the rest; but when he knew the reason of *Burnside's* delay, he determined to concentrate the whole army at Fredericksburg, as a stronger defensive position, and fight there. It was an unfortunate decision, for the position had two grave faults: it could be turned by the fords above Falmouth; but especially, the ground on the north side of the river would prevent any pursuit if successful, and the battle could not be decisive. *Lee's* real reason for fighting here against his better judgment, was that the *President* had ordered him not to retire more than he could help, hoping for European intervention if he held his ground.

The high ground on the north bank commanded the lower wooded hills on the south, which had a strip of low land between them and the river; so *Lee* decided to allow his enemy to cross, and catch him deploying on the level, with the river behind him. He therefore kept his works and troops well back, at the edge of the woods, and, to deceive *Burnside*, did not complete his concentration till the day before the battle, but had all troops warned and in easy reach. The Confederate army was 78,000 strong. *Burnside* had wished to make *Lee* concentrate, and then slip away by sea and attack Richmond; but *Lee* watched the lower river till the very last, and the Government and public opinion prevented *Burnside* from carrying out his plan: he had to fight there, but thought now that he had caught *Lee's* army scattered, and could beat him in detail.

The Confederate position was six miles long, resting its left on the river opposite Falmouth; and *Burn-*

side determined to attack it straight in front, without proper reconnaissance, and making little or no plan beyond sending in Sumner's Grand Division on the right, Franklin's on the left, and ordering Hooker's to follow Sumner. He posted a great line of guns, many of them heavy, on Stafford Heights, and threw his pontoons over the river in full view of *Lee's* army on December 11th, when there was some sharp fighting at the bridges. The morning of the 12th was foggy,¹ and Sumner and Franklin crossed and began to deploy; but Sumner had not room for his numerous guns on the cramped ground. Hooker was kept in reserve behind the river. The army was 113,000 strong. Burnside's orders were very vague: those to Franklin merely tied his hands and weakened his attack, since he had to keep an eye behind him to hold the line of retreat open, which was the business of the reserve. Franklin had *Jackson's* Corps in his front, while Sumner faced *Longstreet*.

The battle of Fredericksburg, on the 13th, was very simple. Franklin's attack was strongly met and flanked, but at length he got forward and broke *Jackson's* first line, but the second line and reserves closed in and drove him back with heavy loss. Sumner, who had no definite orders, attacked the very strong ground of Marye's hill, and was repulsed with fearful loss; and then Franklin was ordered to attack again, but could get no more out of his beaten troops. Hooker covered the retreat as best he could. Burnside quite lost his head, and thought of attacking the next morning with one Corps, but was dissuaded. *Lee* expected an attack, and kept his strong position; but he never could have advanced from it against the great line of Union guns. The Union loss was 12,633, the Confederate 5,377.

The two armies remained facing each other across the Rappahannock till the end of the

¹ S.E. Foster's Expedition to Goldsborough, N.C., December 12th-18th.

year,¹ the Confederate cavalry making several raids within a short distance of Washington.

Suffolk, on the Nansemond, with the railway to Petersburg and Weldon, is the key to the approaches to the lower James from the south, and in September *Generals Pettigrew and French* advanced against it. General Peck was sent from Fort Monroe with three brigades to seize it, and fortified the position carefully, which alarmed the Confederates, who thought that this was to be the base for a new move on Richmond: they therefore stopped their advance and fortified a line along the Blackwater, against it. (Continued on p. 188.)

THE SOUTH-EAST

(Continued from p. 125.) Foster succeeded Burnside in the command of the Coast Force at New Berne, and in December² he advanced and dispersed a Confederate force which was concentrating at Goldsborough; this was about the only military operation in this district in the half-year. (Continued on p. 217.)

THE WEST

MISSOURI (cf. p. 130)

(Continued from p. 135.) After the battle of Pea Ridge the Confederates were scattered and powerless, though fighting went on here and there, but in October *Colonel Thompson* got a force together and began marauding in the south-east of the State. Colonel Plummer was sent against him with a Union force, and completely defeated him near Fredericktown on October 21st, after which only guerilla fighting went on in places.

¹ S. Holly Springs, Miss., December 20th.

W. Chickasaw Bluffs, Miss., December 29th.

The "Monitor" founders at sea, December 29th.

W. Stone's River, Tenn., December 31st.

² E. Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th.

KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE (cf. p. 134)

East of the Mississippi, at the end of June, Halleck's great army was widely scattered, and its communications were both long and vulnerable, for subsistence necessitated dispersion. McClellan in Virginia had begun to agitate for reinforcements from the western army, but if this were now weakened, all that had been gained would be lost again. Pope had just gone East, and Rosecrans took his place, Grant and Buell resuming their old commands;¹ in the middle of July, Halleck went to take up his duties as Commander-in-Chief, and Grant succeeded him, but kept his army command. Buell, based on Louisville, was at Huntsville, Alabama, on the Memphis-Charleston line, preparing to strike at *Bragg's* base at Chattanooga, while Morgan was at Cumberland Gap, and the line Vicksburg-Port Hudson was the only part of the Mississippi now held by the Confederates. Grant sent reinforcements to Buell, reducing his own and Rosecrans' forces to 42,000. He had to guard 200 miles of railway, and therefore concentrated at three main points, Memphis, Corinth, and Tuscumbia, with some troops at Jackson and Bolivar.

Bragg, who had succeeded *Beauregard*, was about to march from Tupelo to Chattanooga, to which place *Sidney Johnston* had sent all surplus stores, and make it his base for the next move. Things were going very badly for the Union in the East, and he seized the opportunity of their dispersion in his district to strike a blow, in co-operation with *Van Dorn* and *Price* from Mississippi, which should at all events free Tennessee from the invader, if not drive him back altogether. The Union chance was thus lost, and *Bragg* controlled events, for their armies were not again united till after the fall of Vicksburg, when they were collected under Grant to drive him out of

¹ E. Cedar Mountains, Va., July 9th.

S. The "*Arkansas*" in action, July 15th.

Chattanooga. The Confederates made great efforts to raid the Union depots and lines of communication. In the race for Chattanooga, *Bragg* had the great advantage of marching in country clear of the enemy, with no fear for his communications, while his opponent was hampered by the repairs of the railway, and weakened by detaching troops to guard it against Confederate cavalry raids in his rear. *John Morgan*, heavily defeated in May, started with a fresh raid from Knoxville in July, sweeping through central Kentucky and destroying depots, telegraphs, and railways. He claimed to have travelled over 1,000 miles in 24 days, destroyed all U.S. stores in 17 towns, and neutralized and dispersed 2,700 men, with a loss of 20, recruiting 300 on the way. At the same time *Forrest* started from McMinnville, and surprised and took Murfreesboro, with huge stores and much treasure, easily eluding the force sent against him, and attacking the line south of Nashville, while *Morgan* dealt with that to the north of it. Buell was helpless for want of cavalry, small infantry detachments being useless, and even when he got it, was not at first able to make head.

Buell knew that *Bragg* was going to move against him, but not by what route, but he assumed that Nashville, held by Rosecrans, would be his objective, and posted Thomas at McMinnville, on the flank of *Bragg's* route. *Bragg* manœuvred to confirm him in this idea, till the available Union force was concentrated in Murfreesboro, leaving the rest of the country clear. *Bragg's* plan, which was intended to free the soil of the South from the Northern armies, was for *Kirby Smith* to move through eastern Kentucky to Lexington and thence to Cincinnati, while he himself, with the main army, pushed through central Kentucky to Louisville. *Van Dorn* and *Price* were to move on Corinth, to prevent Rosecrans from reinforcing Buell. With Louisville and Cincinnati in their hands, it would be a short step to the

Northern States, and, with the number of recruits which they hoped to obtain en route, they could easily resist any force brought against them. This had been *Sidney Johnston's* plan, which *Bragg*, as his successor, tried to carry out, but success depended on the man, for *Johnston* was a Kentuckian and most popular there, while *Bragg* was the very reverse, and spent the crisis of the campaign in wrangling and wasting time with politics, when all his thoughts should have been kept for purely military matters.

Kirby Smith threatened Cumberland Gap, and Buell detached a force to watch him early in August,¹ but found that this district was taken from his command, which did not help the Union side. *Kirby Smith* cut the post off, perhaps owing to this, and then moved on Cincinnati, defeating Nelson at Richmond, in front of Louisville, on the 23rd, and, while threatening the latter place, taking care to keep his men together for the decisive battle. Though this advance caused the utmost consternation in Cincinnati,² the Kentucky people were lukewarm in the Confederate cause, and did not come forward. *Bragg* moved on Gainesville, forcing Buell to use a parallel line farther west, and to leave detachments at various places, but missed a chance of bringing him to action while in retreat and weakened. Buell would then have been driven into Ohio to refit, and *Bragg* could have wintered and recruited in Kentucky, or concentrated against him when he moved south on Nashville. Buell, at Murfreesboro, did not find out what was going on till the beginning of September, and started for Louisville on the 7th, hoping either to retard *Bragg's* march, or to make him, "if he would not fight for Kentucky, leave the State in the possession of the Union forces before he could gain anything by his advance." Though *Bragg* had the start, he

¹ S. Baton Rouge, La., August 5th.

² E. Manassas, Va., August 30th.

lost time by taking Munfordsville,¹ which let his opponent up, so he retreated to Bardstown to keep touch with his depot at Lexington, and uncovered Louisville, where Buell went at once, filled up with supplies, and moved out again on the 30th. His army now consisted of three Corps and two divisions, which latter were sent against *Kirby Smith*, with whom *Bragg* tried to make a junction, retiring fighting. He had already given up the great attack on the North, for the huge political promises of a rising en masse were utterly false, and he was encumbered by the mass of supplies which he had brought for his intended recruits; he said openly that the State was not worth fighting for, and only wanted to get away, the battle of Perryville² being fought as a rear-guard action to cover the concentration and retreat, while he and *Kirby Smith* were at Frankfort, installing a provisional Confederate *Governor* of the State. *Bragg* relied on the separation of the Union forces, and told *Polk*, on whom the command of the battle fell, to crush the portion at Perryville, McCook's Corps, on October 8th. McCook, however, held his ground, and the Union army concentrated during the battle. Buell intended to attack the next day, but found that *Bragg* had retired in the night.

Union force: strength 58,000, 22,000 being very raw, loss 4,211. Confederates: strength 35,000 to 40,000, loss 3,396.

Buell followed, but *Bragg* held him off with his rearguard, and retreated steadily, the pursuit ceasing before he reached Cumberland Gap.³

Meanwhile *Breckinridge* had been besieging Nashville, and reduced it to great straits: at one time he gained considerable success, but *Bragg* forbade him to storm the place for political reasons. It was relieved

¹ E. Sharpsburg, Md., September 17th.

W. Iuka, Miss., September 19th, 20th.

² W. Corinth, Miss., October 3rd, 4th.

³ W. Fredericktown, Mo., October 21st.

on November 17th. *Bragg* made a great mistake in detaching so large a force for this siege, as he wanted every available man for his main object. *Buell* gave up the pursuit in order to cover Nashville, for he expected *Bragg* to concentrate within reach of it and fight a decisive battle for Kentucky, but he did not do so.

To go back to the secondary Confederate operations in connection with the Kentucky campaign. *Bragg* called up the forces of *Van Dorn* and *Price* from Mississippi, to prevent the junction of *Rosecrans* and *Buell*. *Price* was the nearest, and struck at the Union post at Iuka, which he took, but this gave *Grant* the chance of striking at him before *Van Dorn* could come up: he attacked on two sides,¹ to surround him, but the timing of the combination failed, and *Price* got away and joined *Van Dorn*, *Lovell* also joining them a few days later. *Grant* was so hampered by the Confederate cavalry raids that he used the triangle of lines by *Humboldt*, and made his headquarters at Jackson. *Van Dorn* considered the situation, and thought that he could best attack *Grant*'s great fortified triangle from the west or north-west against *Corinth*, when success would entail the fall of the whole and drive him back into Kentucky, as *Bragg* had driven *Buell*, destroying the whole fruits of the Union campaign from *Fort Henry* to *Corinth*. He started to carry this out at once, and attacked *Corinth* on October 3rd. After a very severe fight the Union forces were driven from the advanced to the main line of defence. The battle was renewed the next day, *Van Dorn* attacking the main position furiously. Several redoubts were taken and retaken, but the main attack failed, the supports being late, and by noon the Confederate army was in full retreat. *Rosecrans* could not pursue, for his men were worn out, but, being reinforced on the 5th, he started to do so: *Grant* sent other troops to cut off *Van Dorn*'s retreat, but he got away, and the troops were recalled. Each

¹ September 19th, 20th.

side had about 23,000 men in action: Rosecrans' losses were 2,359, *Van Dorn's* 4,838. There seems to have been more blame than praise earned in these campaigns. Both Buell and *Bragg* were blamed for the Kentucky campaign, and Grant was much dissatisfied with Rosecrans in that of Corinth. Sherman says that the effect of the battle of Corinth was very great,¹ and enabled the Union side to assume the offensive, being a decisive blow to the Confederate cause in west Tennessee (cf. p. 240). *Jefferson Davis* replaced *Van Dorn* by *Pemberton*, and Rosecrans succeeded Buell on November 24th, for Halleck, as soon as the Kentucky campaign was over, had ordered the latter to make a campaign into eastern Tennessee, on very unfavourable lines. Buell answered that it was impracticable, and disposed his men to cover Nashville and the railway, on which Halleck removed him from command. The fact was, that the greatest pressure was being brought to bear on President Lincoln to send help to the Unionists of Knoxville and district, who were being very roughly handled, and he insisted that this be made a matter of urgency.

Rosecrans, like Buell, expected *Bragg* to concentrate near Nashville and fight for Kentucky, in order to save Tennessee also, and began by restoring his communications with Louisville; but *Bragg* concentrated at Murfreesboro,² sending out almost all his cavalry to raid, on which Rosecrans moved against him from Nashville on December 26th. The advantage which he so promptly seized was a very real one, for *Morgan* was now in command of a model independent cavalry force of two brigades, with artillery. He did much damage, but was far away when the decisive battle was fought, wasting his power on secondary objects; his presence would probably have turned

¹ W. Perryville, Ky., October 8th.

² E. Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th.

W. *Forrest's* Raid, late December.

S. Holly Springs, Miss., December 20th.

the scale. *Bragg* was on the watch, and delayed his enemy for several days with advanced detachments, while he concentrated his army at leisure in his chosen position on Stone's River. Rosecrans came in front of it on the 29th,¹ and spent the 30th in reconnaissance and preparation for the attack on the morrow.

Bragg's main body was on the west of the river, with a detachment under *Breckinridge* on the other side, covering his base and line of retreat, which Rosecrans planned to attack with two Corps, leaving one, McCook's, to hold its own for the requisite time. Oddly enough, *Bragg's* plan was exactly the same, for his right, under *Breckinridge*, to hold its own, while with the rest he destroyed McCook. *Bragg* struck first, and caught McCook unready, and badly posted, *Hardee's* Corps driving him in with a rush. Luckily, the next Union Corps, Thomas', had not yet moved, and steadied the fight till Rosecrans came up in person. He saw at once that his planned attack must be abandoned, and that he could only just hold his own, and ordered Crittenden's Corps, which had started, to come back into reserve. The fighting was most furious, Thomas' stubborn defence being gradually driven back, and the reserves brought into action. *Bragg* also was quite alive to the importance of the struggle, and threw in his last reserves for a final great attack, which was repulsed, and the battle ceased from sheer exhaustion, after the most frightful losses. The Union line was driven back a good way, but still held the key of the position. The result was due to Rosecrans' brilliant personal leadership, without which even Thomas' dogged defence would have been of no avail. *Bragg* brought up his trains, to finish it where he stood, but his army was quite fought out. (Map on p. 218.)

To return to Grant, and the headquarters of the district. He had started a very important move in

¹ S. Chickasaw Bluffs, Miss., December 29th.

the administration of the country, the employment of freed slaves within their own districts, on a regular system, which was practically the beginning of the "Freedmen's Bureau": they were thus able to maintain themselves at their own homes; they were not at first paid wages, but carefully looked after, and supplied with what they wanted in return for their labour.

The military situation was, that he had hardly enough troops to defend the district which he occupied, but might cover it by driving the enemy back, and after the battle of Corinth the time seemed favourable for taking the initiative: he therefore proposed to concentrate at Grand Junction, and move down the railway to the back of Vicksburg, Halleck ordering Curtis to co-operate with him from Helena. He was told that he might soon expect a good reinforcement of new levies. He was, however, bothered with a political intrigue, for one of his lieutenants, McClernand, a man of great political influence, had gone to Washington and got the command of an independent river expedition against Vicksburg behind Grant's back, who heard of it when making his new plans, and asked where he stood. He was told that he commanded the troops in his department, but that operations in Mississippi must be confined to the enemy's troops, which must be turned by a river column. This looked very like holding Grant back till McClernand had made his try. Grant and Sherman talked things over, and seemed to have the choice of two courses:

1. To send Sherman back to Memphis with two divisions, to pick up the new levies there, and the troops at Helena, and move down the river to the mouth of the Yazoo, to attack Vicksburg in rear, while Grant co-operated from Oxford.

2. To concentrate the whole force at Grenada, repair the railway to Memphis, and then move against Vicksburg via Jackson.

No. 1 had the disadvantage that the enemy held the interior lines, but as both portions were strong enough to take care of themselves, it was thought better than No. 2, which meant moving by land alone, and repairing railways; but as they could not be used in the later stage of the advance, this would be too slow. Admiral Porter and his flotilla were to co-operate.

Halleck was kept informed, and on December 5th he told Grant not to go south of the Tallahatchie river for the present, and authorized him either to command the river column or give it to Sherman: he chose the latter, partly to forestall McClernand, whom he did not think fit for it.¹ On the 18th he was told to form his army into four Corps, giving one to McClernand, which was to operate down the river, and this was the reason why he took command himself.

The Confederates were now thoroughly alarmed, and put *Joseph Johnston* in command from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi, with *Bragg* and *Pemberton* under him, though he pointed out that the district was too large to work. *Forrest* was sent to reinforce *Pemberton*, and moved against Grant's communications, making a most successful raid which destroyed the railway from Jackson to Columbus, cut off Grant's communications with Columbus and Washington, from the 19th to the 30th,² and stopped his supplies for a longer time. *Van Dorn* also made a cavalry raid from Tupelo, and destroyed Grant's main depot at Holly Springs, and then attacked Bolivar, but was repulsed, and retired to Grenada. Grant had sent out his cavalry against the Mobile-Ohio Railway, but they were hastily recalled, to drive *Van Dorn* away. The Confederates were using their interior line with a vengeance against Grant's luckless scheme No. 1, for the raids had a most decisive

¹ E. Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th.

² W. Stone's River, Tenn., December 31st.

influence. Grant had to fall back, and lost touch with Sherman, who had started down the river from Memphis, with 32,000 men, without waiting for McClernand. He attacked Chickasaw Bluffs, before Vicksburg, in pursuance of his orders, on the 29th, but was heavily repulsed: he could not keep his army there, on low, unhealthy ground, Grant could not help, and he returned to the Mississippi on January 2nd. Though all these operations are put in the Western district, as I have defined it, for continuity of narrative, some of them were in the Southern.

The Mississippi flotilla, whose headquarters were at Cairo, was much strengthened, two new types of gunboats being added: one light, called "tinclads," proof against field-guns and musketry, and of light draught; the other heavily armed and armoured, drawing nine feet of water. Porter had succeeded Davis in command, and was busy equipping them till late in November. Davis, before he went, had arranged with General Curtis to scour the river on both sides, to prevent the Confederates, who were continually attacking Helena, from making a lodgment anywhere. A division of gunboats was told off to patrol the rivers Tennessee and Cumberland, but the most important change was that the control of the flotilla was transferred from the Army to the Navy, a great gain in efficiency. (Continued on p. 217.)

THE SOUTH

(Continued from p. 138.) Such urgent orders were sent to Farragut to take Vicksburg, that though he saw that his fleet would require the aid of a large land force to do so, he tried with a small one,¹ a brigade and two batteries under Williams, which landed and took position while the fleet ran past the batteries, but could do no more. Williams was not strong enough to cut the place off by a canal,

¹ W. *Morgan's* and *Forrest's* Raids, mid-July.

the season was unhealthy, and he returned to Baton Rouge.

The Confederates had built a powerful ram, the "*Arkansas*," which was attacked by the Union gunboats in the Yazoo River on July 15th, and then ran through the fleet to Vicksburg. *Van Dorn* proposed to take Baton Rouge and the mouth of the Red River, to keep touch with the West; but his attack on Baton Rouge, on August 5th, failed, the ram broke down, and being found useless, partly owing to her wretched engines, partly to damages received in action, was destroyed. *Breckinridge*, however, secured the mouth of the Red River, and seized and fortified Port Hudson: the Union troops fell back to New Orleans at the end of the month. When communication was made between the fleets on the upper and lower river on July 1st, Porter reported the importance of the Red River and the Atchafalaya to Farragut: had these been seized and held, the Union side would have gained a solid step forward, which was not done by the premature attack on Vicksburg. At the end of November, some gunboats were sent up the Yazoo under Walke, to clear the way for the army, and had continuous and severe fighting, losing one of the new heavy boats by a mine.

In December, Banks succeeded Butler in command of the Department of the Gulf, being ordered to co-operate with Grant, occupy the Red River country, protect Arkansas and Louisiana, and form a base for operations against Texas. Though his army, now numbered as the XIXth Corps, was over 30,000 strong, it was so scattered by detachments that only half that number was at his disposal (cf. p. 228). (Continued on p. 221.)

THE SOUTH-WEST

(Continued from pp. 130 and 139.) In Arkansas, in July, *Hindman* was sent to re-organize the Con-

federate district, and raise a new army, which he did with great energy, and Curtis retreated to Helena. More troops were collected on the Union side, and an "Army of the Frontier" formed under Schofield, who nearly cleared the State of Confederate forces by the end of the year. *Magruder*, the Confederate commander in Texas, retook Galveston on January 1st, 1863, which may be considered as a part of the great Confederate rally. (Continued on p. 269, Chapter X.)

THE BLOCKADE

(Continued from p. 140.) The Blockade was being steadily drawn tighter in the narrow waters of the east coast, and strengthened outside the main ports; but, while Fort Fisher stood, it was always at a disadvantage off Wilmington. Several efforts were made to block the entrance to Charleston by sinking ships in the channel, but without success. The North suffered a loss, perhaps more sentimental than very great, in the foundering of the famous "Monitor" at sea on December 29th, on her voyage to New York. Really, however, her defects were known, and a better class of vessels of the same type was nearly ready to take her place. In the Gulf, Farragut controlled the whole coast, except at Mobile and Sabine River. (Continued on p. 229.)

THE WAR AT SEA

(Continued from p. 141.) The Confederates now began to make themselves felt at sea. In August the "*Florida*," which had been closely watched for a long time by the Northern cruisers at Nassau, while trying to meet the vessel carrying her armament, which was waiting about in the neighbourhood (cf. p. 471), succeeded in doing so; but she was short of stores and men, her crew were down with fever, and she ran for Havana, lying there for some months, till

her captain, *Maffitt*, ran the blockade into Mobile to fit up properly, and was there till the close of the year. In August, also, the "*Alabama*" met her tender, and was armed at the Azores, having left Liverpool in July. She immediately began her attack on Northern commerce, destroying twenty vessels in the first two months in West Indian waters, but was nearly caught by the "*San Jacinto*" in November. The North made a systematic attempt to stop these cruisers, telling off special vessels for the work, and giving them excellent information. This service was in charge of Captain Wilkes, of "*Trent*" notoriety, and he shewed his high-handed ways to the detriment of his own side, annexing to his own command vessels belonging to others which came in his way (cf. pp. 98, 234). Farragut and others fell foul of him over this, and the friction was a help to the "*Alabama*" at least once. An American steamer, called the "*Uncle Ben*," had been seized in Cape Fear River at the very beginning of the War; she was converted to a sailing ship, armed, and about November sailed as the cruiser "*Retribution*," and kept among the Bahama Islands, doing much damage.

Meanwhile, *Bulloch* was not idle in England: he had definite orders to build some sea-going ironclads, and finally contracted with Lairds' to build two turret-ships as soon as possible, which were begun in July. *Lieutenant North*, of the Confederate Navy, was sent over with, it seems, independent instructions, and he contracted for an armoured frigate, which was built on the Clyde; but, when nearly finished, it was so evident that she would be stopped, that she was sold to the Danish Government. A small wooden vessel was also being built for *Bulloch* by Miller of Birkenhead, who built the "*Florida*," and at the end of the year she was nearly ready for launching.


Although the French Proclamation of Neutrality was much more stringent than the English, since it forbade any French subject to co-operate *in any*

manner whatever in the equipment or armament of a vessel for either side, yet in 1862 *Mr. Slidell*, the Confederate *Commissioner* to France, received an intimation that if his *Government* made arrangements to build ships of war in France, the builders would not be interfered with, and the ships would be allowed to leave French ports on any moderate excuse. This hint came from an authoritative source, and we shall see the reasons for it later (cf. p. 235). (Continued on p. 233.)

SUMMARY

(Continued from p. 142.) Though the Confederates seemed to have reached the height of their aggressive power in September and October, their recoil from the extreme points which they then reached was not the result of a defeat in battle on either of the two main theatres of war, for these expeditions both had the defect that they were political as well as military, and both *Sharpsburg* and *Perryville* were fought when the army was retreating, having failed in its political object. *Corinth* was a real defeat, and felt as such, but a fortunate battle might still undo the results of the *Fort Donelson* campaign in the West, and they were within an ace of winning it at *Stone's River*.

At the end of the year, nothing could be more uniformly gloomy than the Union prospects. In the East, the Army of the Potomac had just received another stunning blow, and was helpless for the time being; but *Lee* was not in a position to follow up his success, and *President Davis* made the fatal mistake of acting as if the War were practically ended, instead of straining every nerve to finish off his opponents. Neither *Lee*, *Johnston*, nor *Bragg* was deceived on this point in the least. In the West and South, *Grant* was helpless, his troops dispersed, and his communications destroyed: *Farragut* had had to retire on *New Orleans*, having failed in his attempts on *Vicksburg*, and the Confederates had strengthened their lines on the *Missis-*



issippi: Sherman, isolated from Grant, had just been heavily defeated before Vicksburg, and Rosecrans, at Stone's River, was driven back and beaten to his knees, but still unconquered. At sea, the blockade of Galveston was raised on January 1st, 1863, the famous "Monitor" went down in December, and the "*Florida*" and "*Alabama*" were let loose, the latter preying actively on Northern commerce.

Union Gain.—The State of Missouri and part of Arkansas, the control of the Mississippi from Helena to Vicksburg, and almost all the Gulf Coast.

Confederate Gain.—Galveston, Texas, retaken. (Continued on p. 236.)

NOTICES OF OFFICERS

(Continued from p. 143.) A number of Generals dropped out, and were not employed again in the War, of whom the most notable were Generals McClellan, Pope, Buell, and McDowell.

George Brinton McClellan was educated at West Point, and distinguished himself in the Mexican War as an Engineer: he was attached to the Allied Armies in the Crimean War, left the Army as a Captain, and became the Manager of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, where his great organizing powers had full scope. On the outbreak of the Civil War he was given the command of the State forces of Ohio, but soon got a larger district from Government, and was one of the four new Major-Generals first appointed. His campaign in West Virginia was brilliant, and the day after the battle of Bull Run he was given the command of the Army of the Potomac, becoming Commander-in-Chief soon after, but he did not hold this office long. He raised his army to a great strength, and so thoroughly organized and trained it that it never lost the stamp of his hand, or its enthusiastic loyalty to him personally, which latter fact was, later on, embarrassing to the Government. Naturally a man of charming manners, his sudden advancement seems

to have turned his head, and he posed as the saviour of his country, somewhat prematurely. He minded his own business, and took no notice of amateur advice, especially of that of the politicians of Washington, but he went too far in the undisguised contempt and rudeness with which he treated them all. It is difficult to understand why *Lee* said that McClellan was the ablest commander whom he met in the War, for his faults as a commander in the field were flagrant. He was over-cautious and dilatory, and though able to plan could never strike, or throw his weight on the decisive point. He was always unduly oppressed with the "enormous forces" of the enemy, even when far inferior to his own, and would refuse to move till reinforced, which was curious in a man so confident otherwise. The devotion of his men was also curious, for he was hardly ever seen in battle, or seemed to influence it when it was going on: he was no conspicuous, dashing leader, as were Sheridan and *Stuart*. He was always laying on others the blame of any failure, and the relations between him and his Government went from bad to worse, till he became impossible. McClellan is a striking illustration of the fact that a very great military organizer, good handler of large bodies of men, and fair strategist, may be only a mediocre commander in the field on a large scale. In the two latter ways his talents seemed to lie in a smaller compass, for his little campaign in West Virginia was most effective. Still, no account of the War can fail to acknowledge his great services, for he forged the weapon which others used with crushing effect. Though he ran as Democratic candidate for the Presidency in 1864, he repudiated the doctrine of the extremists of the party, who advocated the abandonment of the war as a failure. He was, however, beaten by an overwhelming majority.

Major-General John Pope's ^{valued on General Scott's Staff} only service before the War had been in the cavalry on the Indian frontier, after he left West Point. He is often called a mere

incompetent braggart, due to the effect produced by his amazing Order on taking command of the Army of Virginia, and by the airs which he assumed; but is this judgment fair? He lost his head and made a fool of himself, but an unbiassed examination of his work shews him to have been a most able soldier. In the West he was considered Halleck's best lieutenant, and did well whatever was entrusted to him: he also did well in the command of a Department, and was put in command of the Army of Virginia when it was seen that McClellan's retreat would uncover Washington. This was a scratch force of three Corps, of which only one had much military value, yet with these, and some reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac, he did as much as, or more than, any other Eastern commander on the Union side. Though opinionated and obstinate, he was bold, skilful, and wary, quick to plan, to manœuvre, and to strike, the only man who could stand against *Lee* and *Jackson* on even terms in manœuvre or battle. His good manœuvring drove *Lee* to the desperate expedient of *Jackson's* flank march, which might almost be described as the gambler's throw of strategy, and was only saved from total failure by the merest accident; then, when the battle came, no Eastern Union army was so little beaten as was the Army of Virginia, the next day. Pope was an excellent commander when he could see the situation for himself, but had not the gift of writing clear orders, and failed in co-ordinating the movements of a number of large units. He was the first Eastern commander who thoroughly understood the use of cavalry, which after his time increased in numbers and efficiency. He was also no intriguer, and, though aggrieved at the manner of his removal from command, did not resign his commission in a huff, like some, but accepted as duty the insignificant task of keeping order on the Indian frontier. During the Reconstruction period, after the War, he was given

the military command of one of the disturbed districts of the South.

Don Carlos Buell was a West Point man, a thorough soldier, and excellent organizer, who drilled and organized his army carefully from the first; the Army of the Cumberland owed its efficiency to him as much as did the Army of the Potomac to McClellan. He was a good strategist, and the great campaign of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Nashville was planned by him: at Shiloh he saved the situation. He seems to have made few or no bad mistakes in the field, and owed his removal to criticizing Halleck's plans, and not attempting to do what he believed to be impossible. He was one of the officers who had been shelved, to whom Grant, when Commander-in-Chief, again offered command in the field, but his Spanish pride made him refuse to serve under an officer who had been junior to him.

It seems a mystery why General Irvin McDowell held no command in the field after the battle of Manassas. An old West Point man, a soldier pure and simple, he never intrigued or meddled in politics, and it does not appear that he ceased to be employed because he was a "McClellan man," as it is almost certain that Porter did. Though senior to Pope, he worked under him loyally, which good service Pope cordially acknowledged. He was an excellent organizer, and had the clearest military insight of any Eastern Union officer in the early part of the War, being the one man who saw through the object of *Jackson's* Valley Campaign, and the way to deal with the whole situation; but his advice was not taken. When the Fog of War descended so thickly on Pope and *Jackson*, in the last two days before Manassas, McDowell was the only man who saw anything through it; in the battle itself, his information and observation were the most accurate, and both the measures which he advised, and those which he took, throughout, were those best fitted to deal with the

situation. His one military mistake seems to be that he went too far forward at the battle of Bull Run, and lost control of it. He had a sharp tongue, however, and was unpopular in the Army. He demanded an enquiry after Manassas, as an answer to some adverse criticism, but although this was not proved true, he was not employed again. (Continued on p. 237.)

1862	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER
EAST	<p>The Army of the Potomac at Harrison's Landing, to 15.</p> <p>14. Pope and Lee, preliminary, to 23.</p> <p>Banks and Jackson in the Valley.</p> <p>9. Cedar Mountain.</p>	<p>24. Campaign of Manassas to 1.</p> <p>29. Battle of Groveton.</p> <p>30. Battle of Manassas.</p> <p>31. Chantilly.</p>	<p>3. Pope relieved from command.</p> <p>McClellan appointed.</p> <p>3-19. Lee's Invasion of Maryland.</p> <p>14. South Mountain.</p> <p>17. Battle of Sharpsburg, or the Antietam.</p>
SOUTH-EAST			
WEST	<p>Morgan's Raid in Kentucky.</p> <p>Forrest's Raid in Tennessee.</p>	<p>7. Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky.</p> <p>23. Richmond.</p> <p>Van Dorn's and Price's Campaign.</p> <p>Guerilla Warfare in Missouri.</p> <p>Combined Operations on the Mississippi.</p> <p>Porter equipping the new Mississippi flotilla.</p>	<p>7. Buell marches against Bragg.</p> <p>Siege of Nashville.</p> <p>19, 20. Iuka.</p>
SOUTH	<p>15. The "Arkansas" in the Mississippi.</p> <p>Farragut and Williams attack Vicksburg.</p>	<p>5. Van Dorn attacks Baton Rouge.</p> <p>Combined Operations on the Mississippi.</p> <p>Farragut retires to New Orleans.</p>	
SOUTH-WEST AND NAVAL	<p>Hindman re-organizes Confederates in Arkansas.</p> <p>Ironclads laid down for the Confederates, two at Laird's, one on the Clyde.</p>	<p>Union "Army of the Frontier" formed under Schofield in Arkansas.</p> <p>The "Florida" and the "Alabama" armed at sea.</p>	<p>The "Florida" goes to Havana.</p> <p>The "Alabama" at sea.</p>

1862	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER, TO JANUARY 1, 1863
EAST	McClellan watching <i>Lee</i> in Virginia.	7. Burnside succeeds McClellan. 15. The Fredericksburg Campaign, to 20.	13. Battle of Fredericksburg. Some Confederate raids, nearly to Washington.
SOUTH-EAST			12-18. Foster's Expedition to Goldsborough, N.C.
WEST	<i>Bragg's</i> Invasion of Kentucky, to 20. 8. Perryville. Siege of Nashville, to 17. <i>Van Dorn's</i> and <i>Price's</i> Campaign. 3. Corinth. <i>Thompson</i> and <i>Plummer</i> in Missouri. 21. Fredericktown. Operations on the Mississippi. Porter equipping his flotilla.	24. Rosecrans succeeds Buell.	Last half of December. <i>Forrest's</i> raid on Grant's communications. 26. Rosecrans marches against <i>Bragg</i> . 31. Battle of Stone's River.
SOUTH	Operations on the Mississippi.	Walke's Gunboats up the Yazoo.	<i>Van Dorn's</i> raid against Grant. 20. Holly Springs. 29. Chickasaw Bluffs.
SOUTH-WEST AND NAVAL	Schofield nearly clears Arkansas of Confederate troops. Farragut gains control of the whole Gulf and Sabine River. The " <i>Florida</i> " at Havana. The " <i>Alabama</i> " at sea, in West Indian waters.	The " <i>Florida</i> " goes to Mobile. The " <i>Retribution</i> " at sea, among the Bahama Islands.	<i>Magruder</i> retakes Galveston, January 1, 1863. Coast, except Mobile. The " <i>Florida</i> " at Mobile. 29. The " <i>Monitor</i> " founders at sea.

CHAPTER IX

THE FIRST HALF OF 1863, TO JULY 4TH. THE CONFEDERATE RALLY EXHAUSTED, THE NORTH GAINS DECISIVE VICTORIES

GENERAL

(Continued from p. 150.) The elections of 1862 had gone against the party which wished to prosecute the War vigorously and finish it, with results which caused serious difficulty later. On March 3rd, Congress passed an Act authorizing the President to suspend the Act of Habeas Corpus "whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require it" (cf. p. 251). The Constitution especially allowed this to be done, in cases of emergency.

The great Confederate Rally ended at Galveston on January 1st; the South had shot its bolt, and its chance of winning independence by force of arms passed away with the old year, broken against the indomitable defence of Rosecrans' army at Stone's River. The North were thus free in the West to pull themselves together, though it was some time before they could begin to move forward steadily, but in the East they had another bitter disappointment and danger before they reached the same point.

Their objects were: to open the Mississippi, seize the Confederate base at Chattanooga, drive *Lee* back on Richmond, and protect the Unionists in east Tennessee. The Confederate objects were at first to cover Chattanooga and hold Rosecrans, concen-

trating against Grant, and to strengthen their position on the Mississippi. In the East, after Chancellorsville, to make a decisive politico-military stroke, to play on civilian fears, and to bid for foreign recognition. (Continued on p. 249.)

THE EAST

(Continued from p. 165.) On January 25th, Hooker succeeded Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac, and went back to the organization by Army Corps, of which he had seven, his total strength being 124,000 to *Lee's* 62,000: as both sides were spread out along the Rappahannock, facing each other, it is evident that *Lee's* line was the weaker: they remained in observation till the end of April.

It was in the spring of 1863¹ that the celebrated "*Jack*" *Mosby* began his raids and surprises on Union outposts and communications. He was a partisan leader pure and simple, who depended for success on ubiquity and the smallness of his force. When the Army of the Potomac was lying in front of Centreville, he attacked their outposts continually, and caused such a scare that the planks of the chain bridge at Washington were taken up at nights; at this time he could not muster more than 20 men. He was often pursued by large forces, but easily escaped. In February he nearly succeeded in capturing General Wyndham in his own quarters, and did

¹ S.E. Charleston. Confederate rams attack blockaders, January 3rd.

W. Stone's River, January 1st-3rd.

W. *Bragg* retreats, January 4th.

S. Arkansas Post, January 11th.

S.W. *Magruder* retakes Galveston, January 1st.

The "*Alabama*" sinks the "*Hatteras*," January 11th.

The "*Florida*" leaves Mobile, January 15th.

S. Grant on the Yazoo, February and March.

S. Banks v. *Taylor*, February and March.

S. Farragut attacks Port Hudson, March 14th.

S.E. Naval attack on Charleston, April 7th.

S. Grant moves to Grand Gulf, April. Crosses river, 29th.

S. Grierson's Raid, April 17th-May 2nd.

take General Stoughton in his, soon after. Just before the battle of Brandy Station, Hooker asked for the cavalry division from Washington to reinforce Pleasanton (cf. p. 195), but it was refused, as being necessary to hold the communications against *Mosby*, who had just destroyed a supply train. He was chased by a major-general and 3,000 men, vanished, and a few days afterwards captured a cavalry camp in Maryland. He often neutralized a hundred times his own force, and created a constant feeling of insecurity on the Union side.

We saw that in September, 1862, General Peck had seized the important position of Suffolk, and made the Confederates fortify a line against it to protect Richmond. In February, Hooker being still inactive, *Longstreet* was sent with two divisions to strengthen the troops already there, and take command of this district, with headquarters at Petersburg. His force was about 20,000, while Peck began with 15,000, and was reinforced up to 25,000. *Longstreet* invested Suffolk, and made several unsuccessful assaults, the gunboats of the James flotilla taking an effective part in the defence. On April 19th, part of his lines were taken, but he reported still that he could take the place, but that it was not worth the cost, and that he should confine himself to getting supplies. Hooker moved before *Lee* expected, and *Longstreet* did not arrive in time for Chancellorsville, though sent for in all haste.

The main armies were in their old places, *Lee* at Fredericksburg, Hooker opposite, and Hooker's plan was to feint below that town with three Corps under Sedgwick, while Slocum with the other four went round by Kelly's Ford against *Lee's* left and rear, so as to turn him out of his works on the heights. Hooker began, rightly enough, by ordering Stoneman to move against *Lee's* communications with the cavalry, try to make him fall back for want of supplies, and then harass and detain him till the

main army, following a fortnight after, came up. The Confederate cavalry was very weak at this time, while his own was strong. The weather was wet, and the river unfordable, which delayed Stoneman's start for a fortnight, and then Hooker would not wait, and all crossed together. His impatience spoilt his plan, for his cavalry were of little use to him on this account. He made demonstrations in various places to puzzle *Lee*, and on April 28th his army began to cross. Averell, with a cavalry division, outmanœuvred *Stuart*, who fell back on *Anderson's* force at Chancellorsville. Sedgwick handled his command most ably, to make it seem larger than it was, and got a good part of it over the river, but as he did not advance, *Lee* saw that the attack would come on the other side, and at once concentrated on Chancellorsville, leaving a force to watch him. Hooker dallied so long in front that *Anderson* had time to fortify his position, and *Lee* to concentrate his army: a prompt stroke would have driven *Anderson* back, and secured Banks' Ford, which would have brought the wings of the Union army twelve miles nearer to each other, and forced *Lee* to fight at a disadvantage, but now he was between them, and the disadvantage on the Union side. When Hooker moved, he found his enemy in front of him in a fortified position.

On May 1st, Hooker moved out to attack and drive back the enemy, and form a line from Tabernacle Church to Banks' Ford, but he got into thick cover, the troops lost their way, and the resistance was strong and ably managed. Though ground was gained, the advantage was not pressed, and the Union army fell back to its old positions. The left rested on the river, but Howard's XIth Corps, on the right, was "in the air." Howard was warned about it, but he was so over-confident, and so tetchy about being interfered with, that Hooker said no more. The more *Lee* looked at his enemy's position the less he liked it. Hooker's centre and left were unassailable, but *Stuart*

discovered that the right was not so, on which *Jackson* proposed to march round through the woods with his own Corps and drive it in, which was approved. This left *Lee* to withstand Hooker's whole army with almost a skeleton force, and, as a plan of battle, was risky in the extreme, but it promised great results if successful : *Lee* had used it with success at both Manassas and *Sharpsburg*, for he relied with confidence on the valour and devotion of his men, and they never failed him. Had Howard strengthened his positions like the others, *Jackson* would have been held fast, and *Lee* probably destroyed. *Jackson* started at once, screening his movements with cavalry, but the column was seen, and the march reported to Hooker as either a retreat or an attack on Howard, to whom an urgent warning was sent, and also to Slocum, commanding the next Corps. Attacks to try the Confederate front showed Hooker that they were not retreating, so must be attacking, but though Sickles proposed to cut off *Jackson*, and Slocum attacked *Lee* single-handed, he vacillated, and would not order a combined attack, which might have had great results. The Union cavalry followed *Jackson* for some distance, but then came back. Howard laughed at the reports of *Jackson's* march, and only threw out two battalions to cover his flank, while he sent his reserve brigade to support Sickles. His men, therefore, were off their guard when the attack burst on them, and drove them in in utter rout, for which they were unjustly blamed, for no troops could have withstood such an attack under such circumstances. The whole Corps was driven to the rear, the only question being whether the rest of the army could hold its ground ; but a desperate cavalry charge saved a line of guns, which was able to maintain its fire and keep the Confederate advance in check till reinforcements came, and steadied the fight. *Jackson* sent for *Hill's* fresh division to hold the front in the evening, going forward himself to reconnoitre, but as he returned in the

dusk he was fired on by his own outposts and mortally wounded: he died on the 10th. In the night (of May 2nd) Sickles recovered a good deal of the lost ground and some of Howard's guns, etc., by a determined attack, and the 1st Corps came up fresh. Pleasonton, commanding the army cavalry, held Hazel Grove, the key of the position, which he fortified, and Hooker ordered Sedgwick to take *Lee* in rear. The unlucky XIth Corps was sent away to re-organize.

On May 3rd, Hooker formed a new line at Hazel Grove with an exposed salient, which was taken by *Jackson's* Corps, now under *Stuart*, and from it his guns searched the main Union position with fire. The Confederates took two lines on the east of the road, but the third was held till night. On the west side, after a furious battle, swaying to and fro, the last Union line was taken. Hancock held on till the last, and retired in good order. The Union army now stood on three sides of a square, and had 37,000 fresh men in reserve, while they were surrounded and attacked by *Stuart* with only 26,000 exhausted men, disposed on a weak, over-extended line: had half these reserves been put in, the fortunes of the day could have been retrieved. Hooker was incapacitated from the concussion of a shot striking the pillar of a house against which he was leaning, but as he was not unconscious, no one else would take the responsibility of acting. *Lee*, that morning, had found his enemy's position too strong to attack with his skeleton force, and turned on Sedgwick. Hooker's plan had depended on the latter attacking *Lee's* rear at day-break, but it was nearly noon before he had taken Marye's Hill, opposite Fredericksburg, and then, instead of pushing on at all hazards, he halted till three o'clock to reform: this gave *McLaws* time to take position at Salem Church and stop him; he could not force this position, and meanwhile the main Union attack was beaten.

A bridge was thrown in the night to shorten the

communications between the Union wings, and Sedgwick sent for orders, but Hooker, who was still dazed from the shock, was understood to say that he must take care of himself. On the 4th, the main Union body was inactive, and *Lee* kept it quiet by attacking with a small force, while he reinforced *McLaws*, to capture Sedgwick's command or drive it across the river. It was surrounded and driven back to a convex position, with both flanks resting on the river, and only the road to Banks' Ford open for retreat, but, luckily, the engineers threw another bridge in its rear. The main Union army was in a similar position some miles off, and *Lee's* army between the two. *Lee* now determined to break Sedgwick's centre, and crush him, but the day was getting on: *Early* attacked his left, to cut him off from the river, but though driven back, his line was not broken, and at dark he was still covering the bridges. In the night he took up a shorter line, but to do so abandoned Taylor's Hill, the key of his position, for which he has been censured, since it might have enabled Hooker to concentrate, and practically attain his object, but Hooker was still useless; Sedgwick's force had had all the heavy fighting of the day, and it was reported that *Lee* had been strongly reinforced: Sedgwick had to deal with the situation as he found it. *Lee* did not molest his retreat. On the 5th, the Union army retired, and was not followed, leaving its dead and wounded, 14 guns, and 20,000 stand of arms.

The Union loss was 17,197, of whom 5,000 were missing, that of the Confederates 13,019, of whom 2,753 were missing.

To turn back to Stoneman and the Union cavalry. They did not get their intended start, and had no influence on the battle, for their army was in retreat before they came on *Lee's* communications, where they did little damage, though his main depot was at their mercy, and the loss of it would have made him fall back for substance, victory or none; but

they did not know where to strike. Stoneman covered his march with a division, and was getting into touch with the enemy when he was recalled: he covered himself by raiding and breaking railways in all directions, and rejoined on the 8th. He detached Kilpatrick's command, which passed close to Richmond and caused great alarm, going on thence to Gloucester Point, held by the Union troops, and then, by skilful manœuvring, to Urbanna, where the crossing of the Rappahannock was covered by a gunboat. Kilpatrick rejoined on June 3rd.

After Chancellorsville,¹ things remained in statu quo for some time, as both armies wanted rest. *Lee* was depressed, for the Confederacy could not continue the War at such fearful cost, and he had lost his great lieutenant, "*Stonewall*" *Jackson*. He saw that an immediate alteration of balance was necessary; but the South was elated, thinking that the War could now be finished by another victory, this time on Northern soil. The reports of its agents, both abroad and in the Northern States, all spoke of a favourable change of opinion, that France was becoming very civil, and England only waiting for some such event to recognize or even join them, and that the Northern people were sick of disaster and ruinous taxation, and would then be quite willing to come to terms. On the other hand, it was plain that if *Johnston* were not strongly reinforced Vicksburg must soon fall, with disastrous consequences. Were they not now in a position to hold their own in the East for a time, with a smaller army, and send *Longstreet's* fine Corps to him? *Longstreet* wanted to send troops to enable *Bragg* to start another Kentucky campaign, and draw Union troops off. And, thirdly, *Lee* might take position in the Valley with two Corps, using the third (cf. p. 195) to raid

¹ S. Grant fights his way round Vicksburg, and invests it, May 1st-18th.

S. Banks invests Port Hudson, May 27th.

Mexico. The French take Puebla, May 17th.

Pennsylvania, and cut the communications between east and west. What was wanted was to settle on the decisive point, and bring all available troops to bear on it: the chance of a great victory on Northern soil was distinctly better than that of avoiding defeat in the South: further, it would be immediately decisive, while the latter would not, and even fair success in the North would probably bring foreign recognition, with the power of raising loans, or even the chance of an alliance, as an offset to the loss of the great river, which, in such a case, might be only temporary. *Longstreet's* dispersion theory would not do, and public opinion demanded something more energetic than the last plan. *Lee* advised that *Longstreet* should remain in the East, and that the *Army of Northern Virginia* should invade Pennsylvania. The Confederate *Government* gave their great general a free hand, and consented to abide by his decision. The general plan being settled, the next thing was the choice of route. Hooker was protected on the east by the wide rivers and Union gunboats, and their army would be exposed to defeat in detail if it crossed the Rappahannock by Fredericksburg. The lines along the east or west side of the Blue Ridge remained, and *Lee* at first intended to use the former, relying on *Stuart* to flank the march and hold Pleasonton (cf. p. 189), who now commanded the Union cavalry, in check; but the battle of Brandy Station, on June 9th, so weakened the Confederate cavalry that he changed his plans.

During May, *Longstreet* and his two divisions had come in from Suffolk, and *Lee's* army was now 88,000 strong, of whom some 68,000 were effective. He re-organized it in three Corps (cf. p. 194), of which *Longstreet* kept the *First*, *Ewell* took the *Second*, and *A. P. Hill* the *Third*; there was thus no direct successor to *Jackson*, for though *Stuart*, who took his Corps pro tempore, proved a brilliant handler of

all Arms in general action, he could not be spared from the cavalry. He was certainly junior to both the new Commanders, but in choosing them *Lee* was not guided by seniority, nor even, it is said, by merit, for he passed over the two senior officers (cf. p. 72), *Generals D. H. Hill* and *McLaws*, for the sole reason that they were not Virginians. The break-up and resettlement caused some friction.

Richmond had been denuded of troops in order to collect an army strong enough for the work, although the Union forces held Fort Monroe and other places in the lower Peninsula, with the IVth Corps and other troops, General Dix being in command of the District. *Lee* was much blamed for exposing the *Capital*, and was sensible of the danger, asking the *President* to put a reserve army under *Beauregard* at Culpeper, where it could be used in either direction, but all available troops were wanted where they were. The battle of Brandy Station was followed by *Ewell's* advance, which caused such terror that Dix was ordered to strike at Richmond and at *Lee's* communications. He moved out in several columns, one of which was within fifteen miles of Richmond, on the 15th, and the panic was so great that *Lee* was very nearly recalled; but the *Government* got together some troops, and warded it off: this was the second panic in a month, Kilpatrick's raid causing the other.

¹The first move in the campaign was the cavalry action at Brandy Station on June 9th. Pleasanton, with three cavalry divisions and two infantry brigades, was watching the fords of the upper Rappahannock, and thinking that *Stuart* was at Culpeper and off his guard, planned to surprise him, and ordered the cavalry divisions to converge on Brandy Station by different routes, posting the infantry to cover the retreat. *Stuart*, however, was at Brandy Station

¹ S. Sieges of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, June, Mexico. The French enter Mexico City, June 5th.

with his whole force, and beat the first two Union divisions, which came up separately, in detail, the third arriving too late to do any good. The Confederate infantry was coming up, and Pleasonton retreated: but for *Mosby* and his merry men, he would have had another division, and might have ruined the Confederate cavalry, with the most far-reaching results. He claimed to have gained valuable information and crippled *Lee's* cavalry, fairly enough, for *Lee* had to change his plans in consequence, and move by the Valley. Though it abounded in supplies and was protected by the mountains, the passes of which could be held by small forces against Hooker's army, this route lengthened his communications very much. A strong Union garrison at Winchester under Milroy had first to be dealt with, and though Halleck saw through *Lee's* plans, he had only told Milroy that he would soon have to fall back, but might remain for the present, since he reported that he had only a small force in his front. Suddenly *Ewell* fell on him with his whole Corps, and drove him in in confusion, but this fighting took three days, and though it cleared the Valley, the delay gained both time and valuable information for the Union side.

To return to Hooker. He got wind of the proposed invasion at the end of May, and saw clearly that all troops must be under one command, so as to be directed to a common end to the best advantage: he therefore applied to Halleck for the garrison of Harper's Ferry, and other troops not under his command, but was refused. His army was then along the Rappahannock by Fredericksburg, and when he heard that *Ewell* had gone to the Valley he merely made dispositions to keep him there, and remained in observation. He first proposed to stop *Lee's* advance by keeping back, to destroy his rear Corps and communications, but was forbidden to uncover Washington and Harper's Ferry, the former being strongly held, the latter of no military

value. On June 10th, hearing that Richmond was practically defenceless, and *Lee* moving away, he proposed to march south, join the large force under Dix, seize Richmond, and then move his army back north of the Potomac, but was told that *Lee's* army must be his objective. When the Confederates heard this they thanked Halleck for another good turn. Hooker's plan was therefore to cover Washington and move parallel to *Lee's* advance, so as to strike at his communications at the first chance, and on the 13th he began to move his army back in two wings, the left, the 1st, IIIrd, and XIth Corps, under Reynolds, while he took the right, the IInd, Vth, VIth, and XIIth. He took position at Centreville, with his left covered by the cavalry.

Great was the alarm in Pennsylvania, and Military Departments for defence were hastily formed, while Lincoln called for 120,000 men for temporary service, but had not arms for them. Meanwhile *Ewell* advanced to the Potomac, and one of his brigades crossed it and reached Chambersburg on the 15th: the people fled in terror, calling on Hooker for protection, but he was not to be drawn from his purpose. On this day, when *Lee* was so nearly recalled to Richmond, the main advance began, the VIth Corps retired from Fredericksburg, and *Hill*, who was watching it, moved to Culpeper, while *Longstreet* marched on the east side of the Blue Ridge with his flank covered by the cavalry. His object was to hold Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps and tempt Hooker to move against them, when he might be attacked with advantage, or give a chance for a stroke at Washington. Hooker saw this, but wanted to get possession of Loudon County so as to throw *Lee's* march further away, and lengthen his communications. After some smart cavalry fighting, which resulted in *Stuart* being driven back from Aldie's Gap on Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps in rear, and on *Longstreet's* Corps, he gained his object, and then watched, for he did not think that *Lee* would lengthen

his communications so much as to invade Pennsylvania; but *Lee* was "between the devil and the deep sea," and his only chance was to go forward. *Ewell's* Corps crossed the border, the other two covering his rear.

On the 18th, Hooker seized the gaps of the Bull Run Mountains with three Corps, the rest being in the second line, which gave him a capital base, and covered Washington: he thought it needless to keep a large force idle there which would be of use at the front, but the Government were too frightened to hear reason. This move threw *Lee's* march along the Cumberland Valley: still the politicians would not let the Washington garrison hold the passes of the South Mountain to free Hooker, who was still south of the Potomac; but when he saw where the enemy was going, and that Washington was safe from surprise, he decided to follow on a parallel line east of the mountains. On the 25th, he began to cross the Potomac, three Corps to watch the gaps of South Mountain, three in second line, and one at Harper's Ferry, to threaten *Lee's* communications. On this day *Longstreet's* and *Hill's* Corps got to Hagerstown, and *Ewell* was at Chambersburg, with *Early's* division moving on York. *Lee* was quite in the dark about the enemy's movements, for *Stuart*, the eyes of the army, was out of touch with half the cavalry, and most of the remainder was guarding the gaps and communications, only one brigade being at the front, with *Ewell*. *Stuart's* ride round the Union army is often thought to be a raid, ordered by *Lee*, who is blamed for the mistake of parting with him just before a battle, but the fact was that more cavalry was urgently wanted at the front on the Susquehanna, most of it having been kept back to cover the flank of the march, and *Stuart* was sent by the shortest route. *Lee*, of course, considered the probable moral effect of the march of three Confederate brigades close to Washington, but it was to be a march, not a raid. *Stuart* started on the

24th,¹ to go by the rear of Hooker's positions, but next day he found the whole Union army in motion, and had to make long and dangerous detours to avoid it, thus losing touch with *Lee*, who got no information from him. On the 28th, he captured a large supply train close to Washington, and made the mistake of taking it along with him: this was turning the march into a raid, but it is said that he wanted to get even with Pleasonton for his defeat at Aldie's Gap. *Lee*, trusting him to act in the spirit of his instructions, had not tied him with definite orders. His march caused the usual scare at Washington, and at the same time Richmond was in the same condition, for a cavalry raid, sent by General Dix, was close to the town. On the 27th, *Lee* knew nothing of Hooker, and *Ewell's* Corps reached the Susquehanna, being at Carlisle, Kingston, and York, while *Longstreet* and *Hill* were at Chambersburg. *Lee* heard, on the 28th, that Hooker had crossed the Potomac.

To return to Hooker. Disregarding *Ewell*, he had followed the enemy's main army, crossing the Potomac on the 25th and 26th: on the 27th the left wing was watching the gaps west of Frederick, the right wing at Frederick, and one Corps near Harper's Ferry. On the 28th, Hooker ordered the XIIth Corps to pick up the garrison of Harper's Ferry and strike at *Lee's* communications, but as Halleck forbade the garrison to move, he sent in his resignation, because "he was not allowed to manœuvre his own army in the presence of the enemy," and it was accepted. To get at the real reason for this extraordinary instance of "swapping horses in crossing a stream," changing the command of the army just before the decisive battle of the War, as well as for the persistent way in which Hooker was thwarted, we must go back a little. When it was necessary to look for a successor to Burnside, after Fredericksburg, the choice lay between Hooker, Reynolds, and Meade, but both Halleck and

¹ W. Rosecrans' Tullahoma Campaign.

Stanton were against Hooker for chief command. Reynolds was sounded, but stipulated for a free hand, which threw him out, and then a strong political ring took up Hooker, and Lincoln appointed him, against Stanton, who at first thought of resigning, but was too loyal to do so on a personal question, and gave Hooker his best support. When the retreat from Chancellorsville was known, it was decided that Hooker must not be entrusted with the conduct of another battle. He knew something of this, but his political faction was so powerful that the great mistake was made of letting him begin the next campaign, which he did with such ability and success that he hoped to be allowed to carry on; but it was settled that he should not do so, and strong measures were taken to force his hand, for political reasons, so that he should rather resign than be dismissed: this is the explanation of the seemingly insane way in which he was thwarted. The risk of having the decisive battle on them before the change was made, was imminent, and an officer was sent down at night to wake Meade up, order him to take command, and then settle with Hooker. The tension for all parties was extreme: Meade did not like it at all, while Hooker was excessively sore and hurt, but the transfer was effected by the Staff, and Hooker left the Army of the Potomac next day.

Meade took command on the night of the 28th, the day that *Lee* heard of the movement of his army, and both sides had to pause, get their armies in hand, and make new plans. Hooker had intended to advance to the Susquehanna on a broad front, keeping his left strong against *Longstreet* and *Hill*, with the XIIth Corps following *Lee* in rear to harass his communications, or cut him off if defeated. Meade varied this by calling this Corps in, and also the garrison of Harper's Ferry, the very thing which had just been forbidden to Hooker. The general idea was to cover Philadelphia if *Lee* went north, and Baltimore or

Washington if he turned back. When *Lee* heard of Hooker's moves, he proved their wisdom by at once turning back: his extreme care for his communications was rather on account of ammunition than food. He determined to strike at Baltimore, since this would draw the Union army away from the Cumberland Valley, his line of communication, and sent orders on the night of the 28th for a concentration at Cashtown, for he did not then know that Meade's new orders did not menace his line of retreat.

When Meade took command, he had three Corps at Frederick, one just to the south of it, one near Harper's Ferry, and two near Middletown, watching the South Mountain. *Lee* seemed to be pressing forward to the Susquehanna, and Halleck indicated York as a likely find, so the Union orders were made for an advance on a broad front on the 29th, which would bring the left wing to Emmettsburg and neighbourhood, the right to Westminster and the country just west of it. Of the three cavalry divisions, one was on the outer flank of each wing, and one (Kilpatrick's) was sent to stop *Stuart*: Army Headquarters to Taneytown. On this day, the bulk of the Confederate army was at Chambersburg and Fayetteville, with a division at Cashtown, the point of concentration, other outlying ones at Carlisle and York, and two cavalry brigades along the Susquehanna.

The left cavalry division, under Buford, had pushed detachments to the west of the mountains, without locating the enemy, but on this day a Confederate brigade sent from Cashtown to Gettysburg, a seat of the boot trade, to get what it could, brought word that the Union army was in force a little to the south, and *Hill*, on hearing it, ordered it to return to Gettysburg the next day. On the 30th, *Stuart* met Kilpatrick at Hanover, and managed to break off the action and get away, but where was he to go? The enemy's troops were between him and his army, so he struck for York to join *Early*, but he was gone, then tried

Carlisle to find *Ewell*, and ran against a force of Union militia: he then heard of *Lee's* concentration near Gettysburg, and got there on July 2nd with men and horses utterly worn out from marching night and day. Had he left the waggon train alone, he might have arrived in time to be of use.

Pettigrew's brigade of *Heth's* division occupied Gettysburg as ordered on the 30th, but retired when Buford appeared with two cavalry brigades in the afternoon. Buford then occupied it as well as he could, and sent word to Reynolds and Pleasonton. Pleasonton was anxious about Gettysburg, as it was the key to both sides of the South Mountain range, standing in a place where the hills are low, and easily passable, while a number of good main roads radiated from it in all directions; in fact, it was the most important road centre between the Susquehanna and the Potomac. The Confederates, as we have seen, heard of the approximate position of the Army of the Potomac on the night of the 29th, but it was some twenty-four hours later before Meade got definite information about them, that they were not moving northward, but were close at hand to the north-west. On the evening of the 30th the two armies lay, the Confederates to the north and west, the Union to the south and east, of Gettysburg, mostly within a radius of about twenty miles. Considering that *Lee* had ordered concentration near Gettysburg on the 28th, and had definite information of Meade's whereabouts on the 29th, a day sooner than Meade had of his, the Confederate movements seem slack: there should never have been any advanced fighting for Gettysburg, but the smartness of the Army of the Potomac under its new chief had taken them by surprise. The Confederates were about 73,000 strong.

On this evening Meade got information of the presence of the Confederates in force, and found his army scattered, close to them: they were better placed for concentration than he was, and could

probably forestall him on the important position of Gettysburg. His left wing was badly exposed, and liable either to be destroyed in detail, or to draw the army into a general action at a disadvantage, by having to come up by dribblets to extricate it. The problem was to find a place of safe concentration, and he sent engineers to select a good one for the purpose, whether *Lee* came from the north or the west, indicating the general line of Pipe Creek as a suitable locality, to the east of which stream runs a low line of hills called Parr's Ridge. Westminster, just in rear, was a railway terminus and an excellent base, being also a good road centre. This position covered Washington and Baltimore, and could not be turned without great danger, so that *Lee* must either attack it or retreat. The orders for July 1st were that the army should close in to its left front thus: 1st and XIth Corps, Gettysburg (both under Reynolds); IIIrd, Emmettsburg; IInd, Taneytown; Vth, Hanover; XIIth, Two Taverns (Slocum to command the two latter); VIth to remain at Manchester and await orders. Corps Commanders were, however, informed that it might be necessary to fall back on the Pipe Creek position, and were given careful instructions as to how it was to be occupied, if ordered. Although the move of the army indicated preparation for a battle, Meade told Reynolds that he was not sure whether he would attack or not till he knew more of *Lee's* plans, but the matter was decided for him, and he accepted the fight at Gettysburg, though it is said that he did not like the position. Though nominally over 100,000 strong, the Army of the Potomac had probably about 82,000 present, for it lost many men by straggling; but had Halleck called in the scattered detachments and garrisons available, he could have added some 30,000 to this number, which would have made the battle immediately decisive.

The battlefield of Gettysburg lies between two streams, Willoughby Run and Rock Creek, on the

west and east respectively, which rise north of the town, and run past it in a southerly direction, being some two miles apart opposite it, and three at the south end opposite Round Top: the sides of both streams are wooded. To the west, the roads from Chambersburg and Hagerstown crossed Willoughby Run and converged at the entrance to the town a mile further on, while those from Mummasburg, Carlisle, and Harrisburg converged at the north entrance; these were the roads by which the Confederates advanced. A line of hills ran close along the east side of Willoughby Run, S.S.W. from Oak Hill, a commanding eminence a mile and a half north of the town, and from the same point another line of hills ran nearly south. This was called Seminary Ridge, from a theological college on it, just west of the town. Immediately south of Gettysburg lies Cemetery Hill, and from it an irregular ridge, Cemetery Ridge, runs S.S.W., which almost joins Seminary Ridge a mile and a half further south, at Peach Orchard: a mile S.E. from this are two steep eminences, called Round Top and Little Round Top, and in the Plum Run Valley, between them and Peach Orchard, is a rough tangle of wood and rock called the Devil's Den. On the other side, the ridge turns eastward at Cemetery Hill and runs in a semi-circle to Rock Creek, a mile away, ending in a height called Culp's Hill. Inside this inner position runs the Taneytown road, due south from Gettysburg, on which were Meade's headquarters in the battle.

THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG, JULY 1¹

Buford was occupying a line from McPherson's Farm, running north, and held it from 8 to 10 a.m. against *Heth's* advance from Cashtown. The 1st Corps then came up and relieved him, but they were driven back to Seminary Ridge, and Reynolds was killed when bring-

¹ W. *Bragg* escapes to Chattanooga. End of Tullahoma Campaign, July 1.

ing up reinforcements: at noon Howard arrived with the XIth Corps, and prolonged the line to the right, posting his reserve at the Cemetery. Buford had moved off and formed a line on the hills to the north, facing north, and also scouted to his front, where he soon met *Ewell*, and reported his advance, on which Howard threw back his right to face north, and asked the nearest Corps for support, as his line was much over-extended. *Lee* had told *Ewell* not to bring on a general action till the army was concentrated, but he seized the important point of Oak Hill, enfiladed the Ist Corps, and drove in the cavalry line: the XIth extended more, to cover this ground, but *Early* came up and took them in flank, driving them through Gettysburg to Cemetery Hill. *Hill* then drove the right of the Ist Corps to Seminary Ridge, Buford covering their retreat. Howard, who commanded on the field, had had warning of this attack, and neglected it, as at Chancellorsville. A second attack drove the Corps back to the Cemetery Ridge, where the position had been carefully fortified by Steinwehr, commanding the reserve division, on which the Corps was rallied: the Ist prolonged the line to Culp's Hill.

When Meade heard of Reynolds' death, he sent Hancock to take command of the field, who arrived near the Cemetery at about 4.30 p.m., while on the other side, *General Lee* reached the Seminary, and ordered a reconnaissance of the Union position, hoping to carry it, but his troops on the ground were in no condition to attack till 5.30, and by that time it had been made secure. The position was now a good one, suitable for the force holding it. Thus ended the first day's battle.

The selection of Hancock to supersede Howard in command was somewhat curious, as he was the junior Corps Commander, but so far as merit goes he was, after Reynolds' death, about the most brilliant officer in Meade's army; but it nearly caused friction, for Howard insisted on his seniority, the difficulty being

got over by Hancock's tact. They selected the ground round from Culp's Hill to Round Top as the best position in which the army could fight. Hancock transferred the command to Slocum, when he came up, and went back to report to Meade. Meade has been blamed for remaining at Taneytown on this day, but he was in the centre of his army, for he did not know where *Lee's* main force was.

THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG, JULY 2ND

Lee, the attacker, had now to consider his position and prospects. *Longstreet* wanted to turn Meade's left, cutting him off from Washington, and either forcing him to attack, or fall back on Pipe Creek, which he thought would uncover the Capital. *Lee*, however, saw that while Meade could wait, he could not, for, having only one cavalry brigade up, he could not live on the country, and depended on his trains: if he advanced eastward, Meade could cut his communications. A battle was necessary to the invader, and a defeat at Gettysburg would be less serious than one further east, for he would only have to hold the passes of South Mountain to cover the retreat. Besides, not counting cavalry, all his army was up, except a division and a brigade, and he knew that Meade's was several Corps short: he also knew that some of these troops were close to, and would arrive during the next forenoon, so that there was no time to lose. He therefore determined to attack at once, and ordered *Longstreet*, on the right, to begin as early as possible in the morning, while *Ewell*, on the left, as soon as he heard that he was fairly in action, was to attack the Union right about Culp's Hill, to prevent the other part of the line being reinforced, *Hill*, in the centre, using his Corps as required. A plan of this sort is always very risky, but in this case was particularly so, since the Confederate army enfolded a long and narrow position on three sides, and a message from

one flank to the other had to go a long way round : a slightly concave position is often very strong, but here the advantages disappeared, the parts of the army being too far apart for combined action.

Meade arrived on the ground soon after midnight, and inspected the positions as soon as it was light.

A first he thoughtt of attacking *Ewell*, but on examination found that this was not advisable, and decided to stand on the defensive, taking the precaution to order his Staff to have everything ready for retreat on Pipe Creek in case of need. The Union Corps were posted thus, from right to left: XIIth, Culp's Hill and ground to the N.W.; at the Cemetery salient, the XIth and Ist; along Cemetery Ridge, the IInd and IIIrd, as they came up; the Vth in reserve. The last three Corps, with the Artillery, were coming in during the whole morning, so that the whole left flank of the Army of the Potomac was at *Lee's* mercy till nearly noon. The ground for the IIIrd Corps was weak, with nothing better in the rear; Peach Orchard in front of it was not good, but its possession would be advantageous to the attack, and to that extent it was advantageous to deny it to them. Sickles, therefore, who commanded the Corps, determined to take the risk of occupying this advanced position, which might at all events gain time, for time was everything just then.

On the Confederate side, *Longstreet* was to open the ball, the rest taking the time from him, and he should have started his men as early as possible, but in the early morning he was with *Lee* at the Seminary, arguing on the advantages of his own scheme of turning Meade's left and forcing him to attack, till *Lee* would wait no longer, and sent him back to his Corps. Fine soldier as *Longstreet* was, he was sometimes a difficult subordinate. He was to attack at once with the troops that he had, but he first waited for a brigade, to complete *Hood's* division, and then *McLaws'* division took a roundabout route to avoid being seen by the

Union signallers on Round Top, and lost over an hour: it was 4 p.m. before the *First Corps* was ready to attack, instead of doing so soon after daybreak, when the position could not have been defended: by 4 it was manned and ready. *Hood* was deploying his men about 3, and proposed to go round, turn the Union flank, and seize Round Top from the south, which could have been done while *McLaws* was coming up, but this time *Longstreet* would not wait. Meade had called his Corps Commanders and Staff together about 3, and Warren, the Commanding Engineer, went thence to the signal station on Little Round Top, and saw that the woods opposite were full of men, while no Union troops were on the ground: he laid hold of some troops of the Vth Corps, and brought them up in the nick of time to repulse a Texan brigade, which had just reached the top; from this time till dark, furious fighting went on in the broken ground below. *McLaws* broke the exposed salient of Peach Orchard, Sickles was wounded, and his Corps steadily driven back to the main position, Hancock, by Meade's direction, taking command of this, with his own IInd. A little after 7 p.m. the Confederate attack had broken the main Union line, but Meade was indefatigable in bringing up reinforcements, while supports for the attack were not forthcoming, so that they were turned out, but at night held the bases of the Round Tops, the Devil's Den, and the Emmettsburg road.

Ewell's troops advanced, after an artillery duel, about 6.30 p.m. and found the Union position almost bare, for every man who could be spared had gone to help Sickles at Peach Orchard. Greene, who commanded the defence here, handled his one brigade most ably, with the help of a few men from the XIth and Ist Corps, and held on till dark, but *Johnson's* Confederate division had seized the works of the XIIth Corps close to the Baltimore road, whose garrison had been sent away to other places, but it

was too dark for them to see the advantage they had gained. *Lee's* orders were, that when *Ewell* attacked on the right, with *Johnson's* division, the others, *Early's* and *Rodes'*, should assault Cemetery Hill. *Early* attacked at 7 o'clock, broke the Union line, and held the position for an hour, but *Rodes*, for some reason, did not move, and then the troops which Hancock no longer wanted on the left came back, and turned *Early* out. *Stuart* and his cavalry came up on this day, after a smart brush with Kilpatrick, but were not available for action.

The result of the day's fighting was that the Confederates had broken into the Union main line with every one of their attacks, and had held it for a time, but had failed for want of support. It was the most disjointed battle that *Lee* ever fought, for the attacks not being simultaneous, as intended, the Union reinforcements could be sent backwards and forwards. On the other side, exactly the reverse was the case, Meade and Hancock getting troops up in the nick of time to save every point. The Army of the Potomac had never been so smartly handled. In the afternoon Sedgwick's strong VIth Corps came up, tired with its 35-mile march from Manchester, and made some of the ground safe, but was not available for much fighting. Buford's shattered cavalry division was sent to guard the base at Westminster, and Gregg's was to have replaced it, but the one had gone before the other arrived, so that Meade was deprived of the use of his cavalry all day. The Confederates had gained ground on both flanks, and were in possession of the Union works on the extreme right, which their late owners, who got back after dark, and bivouacked close by, purposed to recover as soon as it was light enough.

THE THIRD DAY AT GETTYSBURG, JULY 3RD

To begin with the attacking side again. *Lee's* position was a most anxious one: he had gained some

successes, but the losses were fearful; he was in an enemy's country, and could not replace them. He had one fresh division, and *Stuart's* cavalry had come up, but they were in very poor condition. The question was less, could he attack? than, could he afford not to do so? for if he had a chance of victory, now was the time to use it, and to pass to the defensive at this stage would be to acknowledge defeat. It being decided that he should attack again, the question was, where and how? *Longstreet*, it is said, considering how his Corps was shaken, and the position generally, advised that the advantage on their left should be improved, and all forces which could be spared turned to that point, but *Lee* thought it too dangerous, for, unless success was decisive, his retreat might be cut off, while the shape of the Confederate line was so awkward as to make the plan unlikely to succeed. Part of *Hill's* Corps was comparatively fresh, and he decided that the attack should be made by *Pickett's* division of *Longstreet's* Corps, when it came up, supported by these troops, but, though only five miles away, no attempt seems to have been made to hasten *Pickett's* arrival. *Ewell* was to reinforce *Johnson*, so that he could drive in the Union right at the same time, but the orders were not worked out with the usual skill, on this occasion, for *Lee* had not recovered from an illness which he had had in the spring, and was not himself at Gettysburg.

Meade called a Council of War after dark on the 2nd. His prospects were by no means rosy, either, for out of seven Corps, three, the 1st, IIIrd, and XIth, were practically ruined, the IInd and Vth much shaken, and only the VIth and XIIth anything like intact; one of his cavalry divisions also was ruined, and had been sent away to refit. There was no question of attacking, but all thought they should fight it out where they stood, in which opinion Meade concurred, and then issued excellent orders for the purpose. On the extreme right, a strong line was

to be formed on Power's Hill, opposite Culp's, and *Johnson* turned out of the XIIth Corps' works at dawn; the IIIrd Corps to go into reserve, the Vth taking its place in line, and some reinforcements for the Ist helped to eke this out; most of the VIth Corps was also held in reserve. Gregg's cavalry division was on the right on Rock Creek, facing *Stuart*, while Kilpatrick's came in on the left. The army was better posted than the day before, when it came up by dribbets, and all its parts were now well connected together. Still, the exhaustion was so great that these dispositions were not carried out by dawn, or for some time after, and an early attack by the Confederates might have settled the matter.

On the Confederate side, *Ewell's* Corps was the only one ready early; *Johnson* had been strongly reinforced during the night, but the initiative here was taken by the other side, who attacked at daybreak in great force. *Johnson* fought gallantly all morning, but at about 11 o'clock had to retire. To prepare and cover the main assault, of *Pickett's* division, *Lee* formed a line of over 100 guns, which was faced by one of over 80, but it was imperative to economize ammunition for the decisive moment, to the Confederates especially, who had not really enough to undertake such an operation at all. Again, in this unfortunate battle for them, the Confederate lack of combination was apparent, for they did not open fire to prepare the attack till 11 a.m., the very time at which their left wing was retiring, beaten, and the point of the whole plan was that these two attacks should be simultaneous, and help each other. After a time, the Union batteries ceased firing, to save ammunition, and though neither *Longstreet*, nor *Alexander*, who commanded the Confederate line of guns, thought they were really silenced, there was nothing for it but to order *Pickett* to move forward, at 3 p.m. Then the Union guns reopened, raking his line with cross fire, which caused a change of direction, and

threw his supports out ; though he got through, and stood for some ten minutes among the wrecks of the IInd Corps Artillery, the men soon fell back in groups, and there was nothing for those in the rear to support. The Confederate guns ceased firing, to save ammunition in case of an advance by Meade, but none came, and the troops were coolly and quietly re-formed. Though desultory firing did not cease, the battle was over, in this, the principal part of the field.

The cavalry were engaged on both flanks. Gregg's and *Stuart's* divisions were fighting all day, Gregg getting rather the best of it. On the Union left, Kilpatrick moved against the Confederate right about 5 p.m. and made several charges, but though costly, they effected little, for there seemed to be no combination with the other arms.

The numbers were not so uneven as the nominal strength of the forces would shew, for the Union army lost more men by straggling, in the severe marches by which it was concentrated: the Confederates were veterans, and better marchers. On the first day the Confederates were the stronger, about as 25,000 to 18,000. On the second day there were perhaps 50,000 a side, but the Confederates, in their main attack, threw 15,000 against 10,000. On the third day there were perhaps 70,000 a side, of whom a large part of the Union VIth Corps were not engaged. The losses were: Union 17,569, missing 5,434, total 23,003 ; Confederate 15,401, missing 5,150, total 20,551. The Union side lost Generals Reynolds and Farnsworth, killed, and the Confederates, *Generals Pender, Armistead, and Garnett*.

On July 4th,¹ *Lee* entrenched a line from Oak Hill to Peach Orchard, and started his trains back under cover of it, facing Meade all day. Meade ordered French, at Frederick, to seize the lower passes of

¹ S. Vicksburg surrenders, July 4th.

S. *Taylor* threatens New Orleans, July 4th.

South Mountain, and started some cavalry to harass the retreat further back, if it took place as he expected, but the day was principally passed in trying to ascertain *Lee's* movements, and in the care of the wounded: besides, it rained in torrents all day, which hindered movement. Meade determined to hold the ridge, which he still thought he could do, against attack, and forbade his subordinates, in the conduct of several small engagements which broke out, to risk bringing on a general action, but, if he could then have succeeded in crushing *Lee's* army, he would have saved two years of war. Whether this was possible was the question, for his army was so disorganized that it would hardly seem to have been in any condition to attack on the 4th.

In this campaign, up to and during the battle, the Confederates acted as if they underestimated their enemy. They were certainly surprised by the unexpected smartness of movement of the Army of the Potomac, when it came under the orders of a first-rate handler of large numbers, and, though theirs was really the better manœuvring army of the two, they failed to concentrate in time. Another thing: *Lee* had not realized the magnitude of the loss of *Jackson*, that he had no other general who could be trusted with his peculiar work, especially in the matter of acting without definite orders.

NOTE.—MOVES IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

The Army of the Potomac was formed in seven Army Corps, and a Cavalry Corps of three divisions.

The *Army of Northern Virginia* in three Army Corps, and a Cavalry force of six brigades, of which three were with the army, three with *Stuart*. A mounted brigade under *Imboden* followed the army, but did not join till after battle.

June 3rd.—Both armies concentrated, facing each

other, Union on Stafford Heights ; Cavalry, Warrenton Junction.

Confederate at Fredericksburg : *Stuart*, Culpeper C.H.

June 6th.—Union, same place, but half a Corps across the river.

Confederate Corps : Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Culpeper C.H. Cavalry, Fredericksburg. *Stuart*, Culpeper C.H.

June 9th.—Union army : No change. Cavalry, Brandy Station.

Confederate : one Corps Fredericksburg, two Culpeper C.H. Cavalry, Fredericksburg. *Stuart*, Brandy Station.

(The Cavalry battle of Brandy Station was fought.)

June 12th.—Union : Four Corps opposite Fredericksburg, the others at Stafford C.H., Deep Run, and Bealeton. Cavalry, Warrenton Junction. Milroy's command in Valley, at Winchester and Berryville.

Confederate Corps : Fredericksburg, Culpeper C.H., Front Royal (in Valley). Cavalry, Fredericksburg and Millwood (in Valley). *Stuart*, Brandy Station.

June 13th.—Union Corps : Two at Dumfries, the rest at Hartwood, Deep Run, Bealeton, Freeman's Ford, Catlett's Station. Cavalry, Warrenton Junction. Milroy driven out of Valley.

Confederate Corps : Chancellorsville, Culpeper C.H., and in Valley, at Winchester and Martinsburg. Cavalry, Culpeper C.H., and Martinsburg. *Stuart*, Culpeper C.H.

June 17th.—Union Corps : Two at Manassas Junction, the others at Occoquan Creek, Brimstone Hill, Fairfax C.H., Centreville, Herndon Station. Cavalry, Aldie.

Confederate Corps : Culpeper C.H. ; Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps ; Winchester and Shepherdstown, in the Valley, and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Cavalry, Freeman's Ford, Thoroughfare Gap, Chambersburg. *Stuart*, Middleburg, Ashby's Gap.

June 24th.—Union Corps : Leesburg, Edwards'

Ferry, Broad Run Railway Bridge, Aldie, Gum Springs, Centreville, Thoroughfare Gap. Cavalry, west of Aldie's Gap. Militia at Gettysburg.

Confederate Corps: Boonsboro; Hagerstown; McConnellsburg, Chambersburg, and Greenwood. Cavalry, Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps, Chambersburg. *Stuart*, Salem.

June 25th.—On this day Hooker began to move his whole army into Maryland, and *Stuart*, who started to march round his camps, and join *Ewell* at the front, found all the Union troops in motion.

June 28th.—Union Corps: Three along South Mountain, three at Frederick, one at Urbanna. Cavalry, Monocacy, Adamsville, Boonsboro. Militia at Harrisburg and Columbia on the Susquehanna, none at Gettysburg. During the night Meade succeeded Hooker in command.

Confederate Corps: Chambersburg; Greenwood; Carlisle, York, and Wrightsville. Cavalry, Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps, Mechanicsburg, and New Holland, the two last at the front. *Stuart*, Rockville.

June 29th.—Union Corps: Two south of Emmetsburg, two south of Middleburg, two at Uniontown, one at Taneytown. Cavalry, Sabillasville; S.W. of Westminster; Littlestown.

Confederate Corps: Chambersburg; Fayetteville, Cashtown, and Fairfield; Chambersburg, Carlisle, York, and Wrightsville. Cavalry, Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps, Mechanicsburg, New Holland. *Stuart*, Westminster.

On this day Meade ordered French's division, from garrison duty, to cover his rear, and *Imboden's* Confederate brigade, on the same duty, was at McConnellsburg.

June 30th.—Union Corps: Marsh Run, Littlestown, Emmetsburg, Bridgeport, Uniontown, Union Mills, Manchester; Headquarters and Artillery, Taneytown. Cavalry, Cemetery Hill (S.W. of Gettysburg), Westminster, Hanover. French's command reached

Crampton's Gap, en route for Frederick, and there were militia at Carlisle, Harrisburg, and Columbia.

Confederate Corps: Chambersburg; Greenwood and Cashtown; Fayetteville, Heidlersburg, and Huntertown. Cavalry, Martinsburg, Huntertown. *Stuart*, Hanover.

ITINERARY OF *STUART'S* MARCH

June 25th and 26th.—Started from Salem, but delayed by the marching columns of the Army of the Potomac.

June 27th.—Reached Dranesville in afternoon, and crossed the Potomac that night.

June 28th.—Rested his men in morning; then advanced to Rockville, where he took a Union convoy, and halted for the night.

June 29th.—Damaged the Baltimore and Ohio Railway at Hood's Mills; halted for the night at Westminster, after a brush with Kilpatrick.

June 30th.—Sharp action with Kilpatrick at Hanover in afternoon; broke it off, and marched all night, to join *Ewell* at Carlisle.

July 1st.—Dover in morning, met defence force at Carlisle, *Ewell* gone, received *Lee's* orders for concentration, and turned back, marching continuously.

July 2nd.—Rejoined *Lee* before Gettysburg in evening; horses quite used up. (Continued on p. 252.)

THE SOUTH-EAST

(Continued from p. 165.) The only military operation in this district was a small expedition by the Union coast forces to Jacksonville, Florida, which they did not permanently hold, to disperse Secessionists, in March. For the naval operations, see BLOCKADE, p. 229. (Continued on p. 255.)

THE WEST

(Continued from p. 175.) At Stone's River, on January 1st,¹ *Bragg* made several feints to find out whether

¹ S.W. *Magruder* retakes Galveston, January 1st.

Rosecrans was retreating or not: though he might have held his own against an attack, he was quite unable to make one: the Confederate army was completely fought out. Rosecrans took the offensive and sent a division across the river, which fortified a position from which it could enfilade *Polk's* Corps, so that on the next day, the 2nd, *Bragg* found that he must either take this position or move *Polk*. He attacked, but unsuccessfully, Rosecrans reinforcing his advanced force and improving his position. On the 3rd,¹ *Bragg* attacked again, but his men were driven back into their works, which were taken. Next day he made an able retreat to Tullahoma, covered by his cavalry. Though strong in this arm, he had felt the loss of *Morgan* very badly in the campaign. The Union cavalry under Stanley were well handled. The Union's weak point was McCook's faulty disposition, against which Rosecrans should have guarded by not giving him the post of danger, for McCook had failed him at Perryville in the same way.

The Union army was 43,400 strong, and its loss in killed and wounded 8,800, with 2,800 men and 28 guns taken. The Confederate strength in the battle was 46,000, with a loss in killed and wounded of 9,000, with 1,100 men and 3 guns taken.

Rosecrans next re-organized his army in three Corps, numbered XIVth, XXth, and XXIst, and took over from Grant the control of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. There was little movement of the main armies till the end of June,² for *Morgan* had destroyed the Louisville line so badly that it took a long time to

¹ S.E. Confederate rams attack blockaders off Charleston, January 3rd.

² S.E. Naval attack on Charleston, April 7th.

S. Grierson's Raid, April 17th-May 2nd.

S. Grant takes Grand Gulf, April 29th.

E. Chancellorsville, May 1st-4th.

S. Grant invests Vicksburg, May 18th.

S. Banks invests Port Hudson, May 27th.

E. The Gettysburg Campaign opens, Brandy Station, June 9th, Mexico. The French enter Mexico City, June 5th.

repair, and many troops to guard. Tennessee was so important to the Confederates that *Bragg* remained there as long as he could, where he could also hold Rosecrans in his front. Grant wanted Rosecrans to advance, and prevent *Bragg* from sending troops to *Johnston* or *Pemberton*, but he thought that it was better to keep him where he was, lest he moved his whole force to help one of them before Grant had settled with them, and also that his army, where it was, could act as Grant's reserve. He did not, however, prevent *Bragg* from depleting his army to help *Johnston*, outside Vicksburg, but *Johnston* did not strike, and Rosecrans drove *Bragg* in before they returned. Grant's contention was that he should have struck sooner and harder, but this seems to have been impracticable.

There were a number of minor operations, chiefly in the form of cavalry raids on communications, and Rosecrans, like Buell, asked in vain for more cavalry. He sent Colonel Streight from the lower Cumberland round through northern Alabama, who fought several actions with *Forrest*, to whom he had to surrender at a crossing of the Coosa River.¹ This raid ended in the Southern district, but was in connection with Rosecrans' operations. In April, Grierson started from La Grange, Tennessee, and raided through Mississippi, but this was in connection with Grant's operations in the Southern district (cf. p. 225).

Halleck's mind again comes in, with evil consequences: he had stopped Buell from taking Chattanooga when he had a chance, and now quarrelled with Rosecrans. In March he wrote a letter, of which both Rosecrans and Grant had copies, offering the vacant Major-Generalship of the United States Army to the first general who gained a real victory. The cool-headed Grant put it away without comment, but the high-spirited Rosecrans took it as a personal insult, and told Halleck plainly what he thought of him and his huckstering ways (cf. p. 276). With a

¹ Map 64, p. 404.

nature like Halleck's, in chief command, this was a fatal mistake, for it was never forgiven, and Rosecrans' requests in future were neglected. It is only fair to say, though, that Grant found him a difficult subordinate, though he recognized his great ability. Grant, with Halleck and Stanton, urged him to attack *Bragg*, but the country was hopelessly muddy, and he waited till June, since he heard good reports from Vicksburg, and of Burnside's approach to Knoxville. On June 23rd he ordered the advance from Murfreesboro. ¹ *Bragg's* base was Chattanooga, and his advanced line from Shelbyville to Wartran, with cavalry on the flanks, at McMinnville and Columbia, the main position being a large entrenched camp at Tullahoma. Rosecrans held the first Confederate line with a feint, and moved round to strike at their line of retreat: though much delayed by mud, he manœuvred *Bragg* out of all his positions by July 1st,² with but little fighting, and with fine weather would very likely have cut him off. *Bragg* escaped across the mountains to Chattanooga. In this most brilliant little campaign Rosecrans regained what had been lost the year before, driving an army 43,000 strong out of good positions with less than 60,000 men, with a loss of only 560.

Though Burnside takes no active part in the affairs of the first half of 1863, yet his command was a factor which *Bragg* could not ignore. He took command of the Department of the Ohio in March, with special instructions to protect the Unionists of the Knoxville district from Confederate oppression, and to intercept the important railway from Lynchburg to Chattanooga. He was to organize a force in Kentucky, and co-operate with Rosecrans' advance by moving against Knoxville, but he did not press forward, and seems only to have

¹ Map 37, p. 268.

² E. Gettysburg, July 1st-3rd.

S. Vicksburg surrenders, July 4th.

S. *Taylor* threatens New Orleans, July 4th.

come into evidence when the Tullahoma campaign was over. *Buckner* was holding Knoxville at this time.

Tennessee and Kentucky were much disturbed by Confederate guerillas, and now the value of the gunboat division which had been told off to patrol the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers became apparent, for these raiding parties had a few guns for the attack of transports, but the gunboats could move faster than a land force, and stop the crossings of the rivers. A serious attack on Fort Donelson in February was beaten by the fire of a gunboat, and, on the Mississippi, on July 4th, the Confederates attacked Helena, Arkansas, and carried part of the position, but were then beaten by one of the gunboats. This was one of *Johnston's* operations against Grant's communications. (Continued on p. 257.)

THE SOUTH

(Continued from p. 176.) When Sherman retreated to the Mississippi on January 2nd,¹ after his repulse at Chickasaw Bluffs, he met McClernand, who produced his credentials and took command. Sherman suggested to him and Porter that they should move up the White River to attack Arkansas Post, or Fort Hindman, which was done successfully, the fort surrendering on the 13th. Grant then ordered the troops back to the Mississippi, since they were intended for the attack of Vicksburg, and took command himself. McClernand was thus brought to his place as a Corps Commander in Grant's army, much to his disgust. The army now consisted of four Corps, the XIIIth, XVth, XVIth, and XVIIth, under McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson, respectively. The XVIth remained at Memphis as depot.

Soon after the fall of Arkansas Post, Admiral Porter attacked the Red River, which the Con-

¹ W. Stone's River, January 1st-3rd. *Bragg* retreats.

S.W. *Magruder* retakes Galveston, January 1st.

S.E. Confederate rams attack blockaders off Charleston, January 3rd.

federates controlled, by sending three of his vessels down past the Vicksburg batteries, but one was sunk in action, and the others taken. On hearing of it, Farragut determined to move, came up with his fleet, and attacked Port Hudson, nominally in co-operation with Banks, but the land force was not able to take part: the ships were very severely handled, the "Mississippi" being destroyed, and only the flagship "Hartford" and one other getting past, but they were able to gain control, and close the Red River to the Confederates. Farragut then came up to the south of Vicksburg, and got into communication with Porter and Grant.

To open the campaign against Vicksburg, Grant ordered the canal to be enlarged which had been cut the year before, but when he came, saw that this would be useless, as the enemy had established a battery which enfiladed it. He then tried to turn the position by the bayous of the Yazoo and its tributaries, but the distances were great, the work slow, and the Confederates forestalled and defeated all his attempts. He spent February and March in vain endeavours to turn the right flank of the defences, and then had to devise something else; but what? There seemed a choice of three plans: (1) To assault the batteries. (2) To go back to Memphis and start afresh, along the Mississippi Central Railway. (3) To move round opposite Vicksburg, cross the river below it on to the high land, and attack it in rear. The first would almost certainly be defeated. From a military point of view the second was the best, but Grant chose the third, though it was most risky, and even the supplies depended on success, because if successful it would be decisive, and political considerations forbade even the semblance of retreat. The war was at a standstill, generally, and many clamoured for his removal from command. It was the turning-point of his career. The detail of the plan was

to move down the bayous to the west of the river to New Carthage, some thirty miles below Vicksburg, run the gunboats and transports past the batteries, make a combined attack on Grand Gulf, and bring the army over; then to move along the valley of the Big Black, and attack the land side of Vicksburg. The original plan appears to have been for Banks to co-operate from the South, but this was nullified by the unexpected strength of Port Hudson.

The Confederate line was very long, there being several outlying works such as Fort Pemberton, up the Yazoo to the north, but the main line began at Haines' Bluff, a detached position north of the town, and ran with intervals to Grand Gulf, 30 miles away by land, 60 by water. To Port Hudson, also in *Pemberton's* command, the line was 200 miles long, and was held by about 50,000 effective men. The latter position was quite new, for the Confederates, after Sherman's attack at Chickasaw Bluffs, had recognized that the Union army meant business, that they could not form a flotilla to oppose Porter's, so that the river must be held by land works, and the fortifications of Port Hudson, just begun, were pushed forward in all haste in January. Fort Pemberton and Grand Gulf were the outworks of the main line: to the north stretched the Yazoo watershed, a district of swamp, tangled forest, and bayou, from where the high land receded from the Mississippi, 180 miles away, to where they met again at Vicksburg, each curving outwards till there was a breadth of some 50 miles between them in the centre. Fort Pemberton was in the middle of this almost impenetrable tangle, through which Grant vainly tried to force his way. The river front of the Vicksburg fortifications was three miles long, and the works were carried round in rear at a distance of about two miles from the town. Some nine miles back from the Mississippi ran the Big Black River, coming out by Grand Gulf, 30 miles below. There were also strong

works at Warrenton on the Mississippi, a few miles south of Vicksburg. The garrison was commanded by *Stevenson*, the district by *Pemberton*. From Vicksburg a railway ran eastward, connecting it with two important lines, the New Orleans and Memphis, and the Mobile and Ohio, at Jackson and Meridian respectively. A relieving force was being assembled to the north-east, but *Johnston*, the Confederate commander from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi, was at this time at Tullahoma with *Bragg*.

On the Union side, McClernand's Corps moved on March 28th, and reached New Carthage on April 20th,¹ the gunboats passing the batteries on the 16th. The ground was swampy and the work of moving the army very slow, but all were ready by the 29th, opposite Grand Gulf. On that day Grant tried to cover the crossing with the fleet, but the gunboats were very roughly handled, and could not stand the plunging fire from the high batteries, and he saw that the place must be taken by the army. Next day the fleet bombarded the place, and McClernand's Corps crossed: Sherman was sent to make a demonstration at Haines' Bluff to cover this operation, and handled his force so well that *Pemberton* thought that the real attack was there, and recalled the reinforcements which he had sent to Grand Gulf, which ensured Grant's success, but *Bowen*, commanding at Grand Gulf, made such a gallant defence against overwhelming numbers that the fighting was very severe before McClernand made good his footing on the high ground. Sherman rejoined the army on May 7th.² At this critical time Grant had the good luck to be cut off from Washington, for Halleck ordered him to join Banks further south, which would have killed his plan. This order was delivered to him when he was driving *Bowen* before him, but he could then disregard it, owing to the

¹ S.E. Naval attack on Charleston, April 7th.

² E. Chancellorsville, May 1st-4th.

changed circumstances. He made his base at Grand Gulf, for the new campaign.

When Grant was withdrawing his army from the north side, *Pemberton* reported that he was retreating, and was ordered to send to *Bragg* all the troops that he could spare, which he did before he found out his mistake: he was only able to get a few of them back, and especially missed *Van Dorn's* cavalry, for he had to use infantry to do their work in trying to stop Grierson.¹ Grierson's raid was one of the most successful of the War. He left La Grange on April 17th with about 1,700 men, but detached a regiment, and went on with 1,000, marched 600 miles in sixteen days through the State of Mississippi, destroyed some 50 miles of railway, and inflicted more loss than he suffered, distracting the enemy's attention at a most critical time. He rode into Baton Rouge on May 2nd. This was almost the only successful raid carried out in an enemy's country, but it passed from one secure base to another, avoiding the great danger of return.

Pemberton's army was over-extended and weak in the centre, stretching from near Vicksburg to Jackson, forty miles away, when Grant got a footing to the south: he was told to concentrate, but thinking that Grant would have to retire from want of supplies, did not do so. *Johnston* came down with a small force, but though he had been ordered to go and take command of the army outside Vicksburg, did not do so, but told *Pemberton* to come and join him. Grant was too quick for them, he struck and broke *Pemberton's* centre at Champion's Hill, and then drove off the force at Jackson; he next turned on *Johnston* and drove him away also. *Johnston's* plan was to fight a decisive battle for Vicksburg in the field, not to shut up a large force there, which must fall with the place, and whose strength, added to the field army, would do more to secure it. *Pemberton* on the other hand did not want

¹ Map 49A, p. 350.

to uncover Vicksburg, as being the key of the Mississippi, and also an enormous depot ; further, it was the Southern policy to gain time, either for foreign recognition, or to tire the North out. This plan, however, had no real chance of attaining its objects : *Johnston's* was the true view, but he was by no means the man to carry it out. *Pemberton* then went south to cut Grant's communications, which did not then exist, and the Confederate commanders were at cross-purposes ; they had about as many men as Grant, 40,000, but divided, with his army between them, and he beat them in detail. Grant having thus prevented the junction of the Confederate generals, and driven their troops apart, thought best to strike while the iron was hot and take Vicksburg by storm : he surrounded it, making connection with the fleet on both flanks, on the 18th,¹ and made an unsuccessful assault next day. He then set to work to make good roads to the Yazoo for his right flank, and was very anxious to take the place before *Johnston's* new army, which was concentrating at Canton, could interfere ; but Grierson's destruction of railways had hindered this very much. Grant also sent for all possible reinforcements, and was so promptly answered that *Johnston's* chance was soon gone. After the failure of the 19th, Grant carefully reconnoitred Vicksburg, and tried again on the 22nd : he was checked, but McClernand's men got into a redoubt, and he reported to Grant that if the other Corps would now do their part, the place was theirs. They therefore attacked again, only to make bad worse, for before they did so, the redoubt had been retaken, and McClernand's men made prisoners ; the result was a heavy defeat. McClernand published a most offensive congratulatory order to his command, claiming that they had taken the place, but that the others had failed them, which was absolutely untrue. Grant therefore removed him from his command, and gave it to General Ord.

¹ Mexico. The French take Puebla, May 17th.

Pemberton, when his troops had been defeated outside the town, retired within its lines, abandoning the outlying works. Vicksburg lies on a line of bluffs rising from the river, and deeply seamed by ravines, a position very favourable for defence, but the best line was too long for his force of less than 30,000 men, and though it was well fortified, with many guns, the proportion of heavy ones was too small. Grant, finding that the place could not be rushed, invested it, for *Pemberton* had to feed the population as well as his own men, so could not hold out long, though *Johnston*, whose army was now said to be 30,000 strong,¹ might raise the siege. To cover it, therefore, he took the IXth Corps, which had just come, and a division from each of the others, and put them under Sherman in the middle of June. Sherman took a position from the Benton Road, east of Haines' Bluff, along the valley of the Big Black to the railway-crossing, and fortified it carefully, holding *Johnston* in check till *Pemberton*, who had been waiting in his trenches for forty-seven days, gave up in despair, and surrendered on July 4th.² *Johnston* was always suggesting plans, but did not strike. 24,491 men were surrendered, 172 guns, 60,000 small arms, and a great quantity of ammunition. Grant began with 43,000 men, and ended with 75,000; his losses were 9,362, including 453 missing. *Pemberton's* greatest force just before the siege was 40,000; when he moved into the town it was only 28,000. His losses were probably about 10,000, but the campaign cost the Confederates the Mississippi and the States to the west. This was the first campaign in the War in which the newly raised coloured troops were regularly used, both with the main army and to guard the country in rear, though a few were with Banks at Port Hudson in May.

¹ Mexico. The French enter Mexico City, June 5th.

² E. Gettysburg, July 1st-3rd.

W. Bragg escapes to Chattanooga: end of Tullahoma campaign, July 1st.

¹ EVENTS IN LOUISIANA (cf. p. 176)

After the capture of Galveston by *Magruder*, works were thrown up in south-western Louisiana at La Fourche, Donaldsonville, Brashear City, and Berwick Bay, to protect the Union troops acting along the Mississippi, and secure the rear of New Orleans. Banks' troops were raw and badly equipped, and when he started for Vicksburg from the south he knew nothing of the occupation of Port Hudson, which was a complete surprise to him; he could neither communicate with Grant nor turn the place by the other side of the river, but went back from Baton Rouge to co-operate with Farragut in March. Farragut, however, attacked at night, so that the army had to be mere spectators. Banks returned to the Atchafalaya, where he was opposed by *Taylor*, whom he drove back on the Tèche to Fort Bisland, and then took that place. Thence he moved to Alexandria on the Red River, and *Taylor* retired to Shreveport, on which Banks, now in communication with Grant, crossed the Mississippi, and moved against the rear of Port Hudson on May 23rd. He invested it on the 26th, and assaulted it the next day, gaining some ground; then a regular siege was begun, but the force was sickly, Grant's success problematical, and his communications harassed by *Taylor*. Banks assaulted again on June 14th, and was heavily repulsed. Meanwhile *Taylor* crossed the Atchafalaya, surprised Brashear City and Bayou Boeuf, threatened Donaldsonville, and mounted guns to cut off the Union communications with New Orleans, which was very weakly held. A division had been sent to attack Grant's communications at Milliken's Bend, and when this failed, *Taylor* asked for these troops, with which he might have taken the place, but they were refused. He came up within a few miles of the city, and was checked by the fire of the gunboats, but the situation

¹ Map 51, p. 362.

was so serious that Emory, in command there, wrote on July 4th to tell Banks that he must choose between New Orleans and Port Hudson.

After the naval attack on Port Hudson in March, Porter made several expeditions up the rivers, doing much damage, and then went on to Vicksburg, leaving some boats with Banks, while Farragut, finding things going on well, had gone to see after the blockading portion of his command, in the Gulf. (Continued on p. 268.)

THE SOUTH-WEST

(Carry forward from p. 177, Chapter VIII, to p. 269, Chapter X)

THE BLOCKADE

(Continued from p. 177.) On the South-East Coast the War centred round Charleston. On January 3rd,¹ the two Confederate rams, the "*Palmetto State*" and "*Chicora*," dashed out against the blockading squadron, and attacked two armed merchant steamers, which surrendered, but the nearest warships closed in, on which the rams returned to Charleston, and never got through the blockade at all, but the Confederates made a great proclamation for the benefit of foreign nations, claiming to have raised it. The new monitors soon arrived from the North, and Dupont sent them on small expeditions to test them. The "*Montauk*" attacked Fort McAllister, on the Ogeechee, and stood its fire well, and in March she went up that river again and destroyed the Confederate cruiser "*Nashville*" under the guns of the fort. Dupont's deductions from these minor operations were that "whatever degree of impenetrability they might have, there was no corresponding quality of destructiveness as against forts," and it confirmed his opinion that Charleston should be attacked by a combined naval and military force, of

¹ W. Stone's River, January 1st-3rd. *Bragg* retreats.

S.W. *Magruder* retakes Galveston, January 1st.

The "*Alabama*" sinks the "*Hatteras*," January 11th.

The "*Florida*" leaves Mobile, January 15th.

which the army should contribute 25,000 men, but they could not then be spared. It seems curious that Burnside's useful coast force could not have been used, instead of being broken up after clearing Pamlico Sound.

Mr. Fox, however, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, an ex-naval officer, had formed a most exaggerated opinion of the powers of the new vessels, and Dupont was told he was expected to take Charleston with the force at his disposal, 9 new ironclads and 5 unarmoured gunboats. He had already tried to block the harbour by sinking vessels in the fairway, but with only temporary effect. Seven of the ironclads were improved monitors, which, though larger and better than the original, were not really able to "keep the sea," his flagship was a large central battery ship, carrying 18 guns, and one was a lightly armoured vessel, the "Keokuk." The flagship, "New Ironsides," had $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch plates, the regular monitors eleven 1-inch plates, and the "Keokuk" $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2-inch armour. The monitors carried guns of different calibre in their single turrets, a curious arrangement, with their poor magazine space. They drew 11 feet each, the flagship rather more.

¹ This force assembled at North Edisto, and on April 6th, crossed the bar and anchored off Morris Island, but haze prevented the attack. Next day at noon they weighed anchor, but to handle a squadron of new-type ships in a narrow, shallow channel, in a tideway, was most difficult and tedious. The flagship steered so badly that she had to anchor and let others go on more than once: once she lay right over a big submarine mine, but the firing gear would not work. The orders were to go forward without returning the fire from Morris Island, and concentrate their fire on the north-west face of Fort Sumter, at ranges of from 600 to 800 yards, the gunboats to form outside the bar, and be ready to help the ironclads.

The Confederates had marked the ranges with

¹ Map 34, p. 258.

buoys, and placed obstructions and submarine mines, which caused confusion in the advance, and the ships masked each other's fire. At 2.50, Fort Moultrie opened fire, followed by other Confederate works; the leading ships turned at the line of obstructions between the bank near Sumter and Sullivan's Island, and were clubbed between the two strongest forts, and severely punished. The flagship could not be got to her place, so Dupont ordered the fleet to withdraw at 4.30, intending to renew the attack next day, but when the reports came in in the evening he had the moral courage to say that he would not turn a repulse into a disaster. The results of this, the first important action of ironclads, may be instructive. The fleet had been exposed to converging fire from many heavy guns, five monitors were more or less disabled, and the wretched "Keokuk" was literally riddled, and sank the next morning. In the others, the armour, though badly damaged, had prevented much loss of life, but the difference between the solid plates of the flagship and the laminated protection of the monitors was most marked: in the former vessel there was a sense of absolute security in the battery, while the men in the turrets were exposed to flying bolts and splinters, and the armour was crushed in in many places. The "Nahant's" turret jammed, water poured in round that of the "Passaic," and the "Passaic," "Patapsco," and "Nantucket," had each a gun put out of action. The damage inflicted was but slight, only the barbette guns of Sumter having suffered to some extent. The armament was quite unsuited to the work, being mainly the heavy 15 and 11-inch smooth-bores, of short range, which, although most effective against wooden ships, were not so against forts, for the ships were compelled to stand in to a range where the forts had the advantage: a powerful long-range rifled gun was wanted. So much for details. The general lessons were that the number of guns was insufficient, the fire too slow, the view from the conning-towers unsatisfactory, while the

crews were not large enough to detail a landing party to secure any advantage. These were insuperable difficulties in the way of a purely naval attack.

On the side of the defence, the heavy concentrated fire at marked ranges had its full effect, and the obstructions were well placed and useful, but the submarine mines did no harm : several exploded close to the ships, but only shook them, while the electric firing gear failed in the one case where it could have been used. A land force of 30,000 men was ready to deal with an attack by the army, but after this action it was broken up, and most of it sent elsewhere.

On the evening of the attack, Dupont was ordered to send all his ironclads but two to New Orleans, the opening of the Mississippi being the most pressing work, while he held his position as best he could with what force was left. General Hunter also proposed to occupy Morris Island with the army, but Dupont had to decline to co-operate.¹ The Confederate force available would at this time have been able to defeat this plan.

Early in June, information was received that the Confederate ironclad "*Atlanta*," late the blockade-runner "Fingal," which had been converted at Savannah, was lying in Wassaw Sound, and would soon sweep off the Union vessels, and the monitors "*Weehawken*" and "*Nahant*" were sent there. On June 17th, the "*Atlanta*" came down to attack them, but got aground, when the "*Weehawken*" took an advantageous position at short range, and with four shots so ruined her armour that she surrendered : the "*Nahant*" took no part in the action.

Dupont sent his battered ironclads to Port Royal for repairs ; meanwhile the order to send them away

¹ E. Chancellorsville, May 1st-4th.

S. Grant invests Vicksburg, May 18th.

S. Banks invests Port Hudson, May 27th.

Mexico. The French take Puebla, May 17th.

Mexico. The French enter Mexico City, June 5th.

was countermanded, and he was told to attack Charleston again on April 16th, but this was impossible, as the repairs took some months. On June 12th, Gillmore succeeded Hunter in command of the army, and got together men and matériel for combined action with the fleet.¹

THE GULF OF MEXICO

Magruder, commanding in Texas, planned to recover Galveston by an attack of his army, supported by two improvised gunboats, and to raise the blockade, and on January 1st carried out his plan, bringing two brigades against a small Union force of a few companies. He took one Union vessel, and destroyed another, losing one of his own gunboats in the action. Galveston was not recovered by the North, but they re-established the blockade in about a week. The Confederates broke the blockade at Sabine Pass, which was restored at once, but they also drove off a small land force in connection with it on January 21st, and an attempt to regain the ground failed. (Continued on p. 270.)

THE WAR AT SEA

(Continued from p. 179.) The "*Retribution*" ended her cruise in the Bahamas, being brought to Nassau, and sold, in February. We left *Maffitt* and the "*Florida*" at Mobile, where he had run in with half a crew, to recruit and refit. In January, he chose a thick, wild night, with half a gale blowing, to elude the blockading squadron, and got clear off, though chased. He took some prizes in West Indian waters in February, and then ran down the South American coast; in five months he destroyed 14 ships, using the colliers for supplies. One prize was commissioned as a cruiser,

¹ E. Gettysburg, July 1st-3rd.

S. Vicksburg surrenders, July 4th.

W. *Bragg* escapes to Chattanooga: end of Tullahoma Campaign, July 1st.

and put under *Read*, who did much mischief along the Atlantic coast of the United States, twice changing into another vessel as soon as the one he was in became too well known. He made a bold attempt to cut out a ship from the harbour of Portland, Maine, but was defeated and captured. These ships were, the "*Clarence*," taken off the Brazilian coast, cruising in May and June, "*Tacony*," at work in June in mid-Atlantic, "*Archer*," on American coast, end of June. Together they took 16 ships.

When the "*Alabama*" was cruising in the Caribbean Sea, *Semmes* saw by papers taken in prizes that Banks intended to attack Galveston and invade Texas. He therefore planned to get to Galveston at the same time as the fleet of transports, and make a night attack on them, as there would probably be no escort, and they would be busy with landing preparations. He came up a little before dark on January 11th, but saw, instead of transports, the Union fleet coming back to re-establish the blockade. The "*Hatteras*," an armed merchant steamer, came out about dark to see what the "*Alabama*" was, a sharp action ensued, and the "*Hatteras*" went down in thirteen minutes; she had not a chance against her opponent. The "*Alabama*" went back to the Atlantic, to the crossing of the homeward-bound and East India trades, working outwards from the north end of the Bahamas to about half-way between the Canaries and Bermuda, where on March 2nd she turned south down the South American coast, till at the end of June she was due south of Bahia, about opposite Rio. She seems to have taken about 20 prizes in that time.

The Northern flying squadron, looking for Confederate cruisers, which had been under Wilkes, was in June given to Lardner, as Wilkes had made himself impossible by his constant quarrels with other naval officers (cf. pp. 98, 178).

In Europe, *Bulloch* was working away to supply his *Government* with ships and munitions of war, and

in March a small wooden steamer was launched for him by Miller of Birkenhead, and called the "*Alexandra*." She was being got ready for sea, but not armed in any way, when the U.S. Consul, Mr. Dudley, filed affidavits that she was intended for the Confederate States, and she was seized on April 5th; the matter was brought to trial in June, the complaints being that the ship was being "equipped," not "armed." The jury found for the defendants, but this was reversed in November, and she was detained. To finish the matter here: her name was changed, and she sailed as a merchant ship for Halifax under another name, thence to Nassau, where she was seized again, but the court decided that there was nothing to justify her forfeiture, and she was released in May, 1865, after the War was over.

When the "*Alexandra*" was seized, and Lord John Russell stated that a much sharper watch would be kept in future, the difficulties increased enormously, especially as the two ironclad turret-ships which Laird was building were such unmistakable war-ships, fit for nothing else. In view of the overtures which had been made to *Mr. Slidell* in France, it was hoped that they might be fitted out there, and got away from England as the ostensible property of a French subject. They should have been ready in the first half of the year, but armour-plating was a new business, and there were many delays. *Bulloch* was given a free hand, and sold the ships to a French firm for whom Laird agreed to complete the contract, as they had an order for two ironclads from the Pasha of Egypt, and all seemed right, but they agreed with *Bulloch* to re-sell them to him beyond British jurisdiction for a sum which would give them a fair commission. *Bulloch* went to France in March, to see a French ship-builder, who informed him that he had been officially and confidentially told that the Emperor was willing that he should build ships for the Confederates (cf. p. 179), that he could send them out

under the French flag to any place, and that if the United States raised objections, he could get authority to complete, arm, and despatch them, as a matter of legitimate business. A contract was made with him to build four clipper corvettes, each carrying twelve to fourteen 6-inch rifled guns of regulation French pattern, and he received a letter dated June 6th, from M. Chasseloup-Laubat, the Minister of Marine, granting him authority to arm these ships. In June, *Bulloch* was told to build some sea-going ironclads able to navigate the Mississippi and fight vessels carrying 15 and 11-inch guns, as soon as possible (cf. p. 273). France was evidently the only place where this could now be done, since nothing more was required than the most ordinary business prudence.

The Confederate *Government* sent over *Commander Maury*, on special service, at the end of 1862, and in March, 1863, he bought a new iron steamer on the Clyde, called the "Japan." She sailed in April, met her armament off Ushant, a cousin of *Maury's* took command, and she was commissioned as the "*Georgia*"; she sailed across the Atlantic, reaching Bahia in May, coaled there, and went on towards the Cape of Good Hope. (Continued on p. 271.)

SUMMARY

(Continued from p. 180.) During the first half of 1863, the War for a time was at a standstill, for though the South was exhausted, the North could make no progress: Hooker could not move, all Grant's efforts were failures, Rosecrans was stuck fast in front of *Bragg*, and Banks and Farragut were blocked at Port Hudson. Then *Lee* swept back his enemies from Chancellorsville, over the border, and followed them up: he deliberately planned this invasion to be the deciding point of the War, but failed to win, rather than was beaten, at Gettysburg: like so many decisive battles, this was tactically indecisive.

Johnston was at cross-purposes with *Jefferson Davis* and *Pemberton*, so that Grant invested and took Vicksburg, the other decisive point, at the same time. At the same time also, Rosecrans had just manœuvred *Bragg* out of central Tennessee back to his base, Chattanooga. All three were winning strokes, and July 4th, Independence Day, saw the future existence of the Nation secured. Abroad, however, Napoleon's progress in Mexico began to be a factor in the conduct of the War, affecting both sides, and his new ventures there made him wish rather for two republics to the north of it than one: he was very favourable to the Confederate agents, but did not go so far as definite political recognition.

The half-year closed with the Union prospects as bright as they had been gloomy at the end of the preceding one; the North had permanently gained the control of the Mississippi (for the fall of Vicksburg brought that of Port Hudson), of Kentucky, of Tennessee, west of the Cumberland Mountains, and of Alabama, north of the Tennessee River.

Union Loss.—Major-General John F. Reynolds, killed in action.

Confederate Loss.—*Lieutenant-General Thomas J. Jackson*, died of wounds. (Continued on p. 274.)

NOTICES OF OFFICERS

(Continued from p. 184.) Several prominent men disappear from the War during this half-year, "*Stonewall*" *Jackson*, Generals *Pemberton*, Reynolds, *Van Dorn*, and McClernand.

A short notice of the most remarkable and fascinating character of the Civil War must necessarily be very bald, and readers are referred to Henderson's delightful book, "*Stonewall Jackson*." *Thomas Jonathan Jackson* was born at Clarksburg, West Virginia, in 1824, lost both parents when quite young, and was brought up by an uncle. His father died very poor,

and he had to make his own way, which developed his character early. He went to West Point in 1842, and, in spite of his defective education, did well enough to get a commission in the Artillery, four years later, just as the Mexican War broke out. During the first part of it he was on fortress garrison duty, but went to the front with General Scott in 1847, being appointed to a field battery; he gained great credit at Contreras and Chapultepec, was mentioned in despatches, and breveted, first Captain, then Major, within eighteen months of joining the Army. In 1851 he left the Army, his health having been injured by the Mexican War, getting an appointment as Professor at the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington. Here he married, and had time for military study, and the religious side of his character developed, which had hitherto been in abeyance. Like *Lee*, *Early*, and other great Confederate soldiers, he was against Secession, but followed the fortunes of his State, to which he considered his first duty to lie. His first command was at Harper's Ferry, where he had the difficult task of driving notions of discipline and duty into his motley levies, his stern ideas on these questions making him most unpopular with all ranks at first, but when war had taught the value of them, no man was more adored by his command. They first saw this at Bull Run, where the steadiness of his brigade earned for its commander the nickname of "*Stonewall*": this, however, was for the outside world; to his own men he was "*Old Jack*." A fortnight before this he received his commission as Brigadier-General, and from that time to the day of his death the history of his services is that of the War in Virginia. There was nothing showy about *Jackson*; he was a good, though ungraceful, rider, and often both badly mounted and shabbily dressed: as a Yankee prisoner remarked to his comrades, "Boys, he's not much to look at, but if we'd had him we shouldn't have been in this mess." He believed in

mystifying his opponents and concealing his own plans, but carried the latter idea too far, for had anything happened to him, no one else knew enough to carry them out. He was a model subordinate, the only one to whom *Lee* could entrust a task without definite orders, and, though he always spoke his mind, he accepted an adverse decision without cavil. Perhaps his greatest military peculiarity was his terrible power of counterstroke, in which no one has ever approached him. Though the kindest of men, always ready to pardon a mistake, to anything savouring of dishonesty, untruthfulness, or neglect of duty, he was absolutely merciless, and his code of morality was most rigid. The mainspring of his life and of all his actions was his trust in God, duty first, popularity nowhere. A shy and self-contained man, in public he was reserved and reticent, but in his home his warmly affectionate nature came out fully, and he was one of the happiest of men. In fine, *Jackson* seems really to have succeeded in being what the best of the seventeenth-century Puritans tried to be.

Lieutenant-General Pemberton is principally remarkable for the fact that he was about the only Northerner who held high command in the field on the Confederate side. He was a Pennsylvanian, educated at West Point, who had served with distinction in the Mexican War, but, though a very good officer, he could not be called a first-rate general. When in the old Service, he was quartered in the South for a long time; he married a Virginian lady, and imbibed the States Rights doctrine so thoroughly that he practised it by fighting against the side of his own State. After the fall of Vicksburg he was not employed again.

Reynolds was said to have been the best officer who was killed in the War on the Union side. He was a brilliant soldier, who had served with credit in the Mexican War, and a smart and handsome man, universally popular. The choice of Burnside's successor in command of the Army of the Potomac lay

between him, Hooker, and Meade, but he put himself out by stipulating for a freer hand, if chosen. When Hooker had to go, the whole army looked to Reynolds, but the politicians put Meade in, much against his will, for he was one of Reynolds' warmest admirers. Reynolds was in command of a wing of the army, and it was to him that Meade looked to manage the all-important opening stage of the great battle of Gettysburg, where he fell, respected and lamented by both sides.

Major-General Earl Van Dorn passed out of West Point in 1842, with Rosecrans, Pope, *Longstreet*, and others, distinguished himself in the Mexican War, and was major in the old Army when the War broke out. He was one of the first to resign his commission, and offered his sword to his native State, Mississippi. A brave and dashing soldier, his ability was greater than his good fortune, for, with few mistakes, he made few successes in army command. He raised such a storm by his enforcement of martial law in his own State, that after Corinth he was superseded by *Pemberton* (cf. p. 171), and given a cavalry command, which seemed to suit him much better, and where he exercised a real power, his greatest success being the destruction of Grant's main depot at Holly Springs, in December, 1862. In the summer of 1863 his health broke down, and he died the next year. Personally, he was a handsome and charming man, but of rather delicate physique.

Major-General McClernand was a powerful politician before the War, a Member of Congress from the President's own State, Illinois, and who had great influence with him, which got him a high command. He grasped the methods of systematic warfare on a large scale more quickly than any other civilian general, and would have made a fine officer, but that he was insubordinate and unscrupulous, and an incorrigible intriguer, who trusted to shady methods to get what would have been earned better by a proper use

of his own great abilities. No braver, and few abler men, took part in the War, and he might have aspired to almost any position at the end of it, but he was the worst of the politicals, his crooked ways were his ruin, and he was dismissed in disgrace. Exit McClelland.
(Continued on p. 275.)

1863	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH
EAST		<i>Longstreet</i> commanding against Peck, at Suffolk.	8. <i>Mosby</i> captures General Stoughton at Chantilly.
SOUTH-EAST	3. Confederates attack blockaders, off Charleston.		29. Jacksonville Expedition, Florida.
WEST	1-3. Battle of Stone's River. 4. <i>Bragg</i> retreats. 11. <i>McClelland</i> takes Arkansas Post.	Guerilla Warfare in Kentucky and Tennessee.	
SOUTH	Grant getting his army to Vicksburg. First Operations.	Grant's fruitless attempt to get at Vicksburg through the swamps of the Yazoo Valley. Banks and <i>Taylor</i> in Louisiana.	14. <i>Farragut</i> attacks Port Hudson.
SOUTH-WEST, NAVAL, AND MEXICO	1. <i>Magruder</i> retakes Galveston. 11. The " <i>Alabama</i> " sinks the " <i>Hatteras</i> ," off Galveston. 15. The " <i>Florida</i> " escapes from Mobile. The " <i>Retribution</i> " at sea, among the Bahamas.	The " <i>Alabama</i> " and " <i>Florida</i> " at sea. The " <i>Retribution</i> " sold at Nassau.	

1863	APRIL	MAY	JUNE, TO JULY 4
EAST	12. Siege of Suffolk, 28. Stoneman's Raid, to	1-4. Battle of Chancellorsville. to 4. 8. Kilpatrick's, to 20-28. Glendenin's Raid below Fredericksburg.	Mosby captures a supply train. 3. Gettysburg Cam- paign. 9. Brandy Station. 11. Confederates cross Potomac. 28. Meade succeeds Hooker. July 1-3. Battle of Gettysburg. June 15. Dix threaten Richmond. 26-30. Dix advances on Richmond.
	7. Naval bombard- ment of Fort Sumter.		17. The "Weehaw- ken" captures the "Atlanta."
SOUTH-EAST			23-July 1. Rose- crans' Tullahoma Campaign against Bragg. July 4. Confederate attack on Helena fails.
	27. Streight's Raid, to 3. 17. Grierson's Raid, to . . .	2. 1-18. Grant fights his way round to east of Vicksburg. 18. Siege of Vicksburg, to July 4. 18. First Assault. 20. Second assault. Banks moves against Port Hudson. 27. Siege of Port Hudson.	July 4. Vicksburg surrenders.
WEST	Grant moves his army to South of Vicksburg, and crosses the Mississippi at Grand Gulf, 29. 16. Fleet passes Vicksburg batteries. Banks and Taylor in Louisiana.		
SOUTH			
SOUTH-WEST, NAVAL, AND MEXICO		6. The "Clarence" at sea, off South American and West Indian coasts, to 10. 10-25. The "Tacony" in mid-Atlantic. 25. The "Archer" along U.S. coast. 5. The French enter Mexico City.	
	The "Alabama" and "Florida" at sea. Mexico. 17. The French take Puebla.		

CHAPTER X

THE SECOND HALF OF 1863. THE NORTH TAKES A WINNING POSITION

AFFAIRS IN MEXICO

As the operations of the French in Mexico began to be a real factor in connection with the Civil War in the summer of 1863, it may be well to give a sketch of them here to date.

Napoleon IIIrd had long watched with apprehension the marvellous progress of the United States, and considered that it was becoming a menace to the Old World: so long as the different American countries kept within themselves, and supplied the raw material for his French manufactures, he was content, but when the United States threatened to become a serious manufacturing rival, and also gained influence over her neighbours, he cast about for some pretext to intervene, and place a limit on her growing power, so as to adjust the balance to his liking.

Since the overthrow of the Spanish dominion by Yturbide in 1822, Mexico had had no stable government, but was the prey of factions, and of adventurers rather than rulers, of whom some were strong and some were honest, but none combined these qualities till the advent of Juarez. After 1856, the main struggle was that of the Liberals against the supporters of the absolute power of the Roman Catholic Church, the Clericals. The country was bankrupt, with no pro-

spect of improvement. In 1846, its President, Paredes, had said that its best chance was the monarchy of a foreign prince, backed by Europe, and in 1859 President Buchanan had asked Congress for military force to invade Mexico to obtain security for their loans, laying down their position clearly: that Mexico was like a ship drifting, directed by unstable passions, and that the United States should hold out a helping hand, for if any one else came in they might have to intervene at a disadvantage. This fear nearly came true, for two events played into Napoleon's hands in 1861: the outbreak of the Civil War, and the suspension of payment by Juarez' Government, in April and July respectively.¹ The latter afforded a pretext for immediate intervention, while the former not only made the United States unable to interfere with him, but gave him a chance of weakening them permanently by aiding their definite separation, and at the same time setting up a power on their borders to curb their expansion. He remembered Paredes' saying, and was in communication with Mexican refugees of the defeated Clerical party, who consulted him about approaching some Catholic prince and establishing a monarchy. He recommended Maximilian of Austria, whom they sounded in the spring of 1862 to such effect that he refused the proffered crown of Greece a year later.

When Mexico suspended payment, France and England broke off relations with President Juarez, and then, with Spain, agreed on joint intervention to obtain security, and asked the United States to join them. Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State, did not consent (cf. p. 80), but proposed to Congress on October 14th that the United States should meet claims on Mexico up to a given sum, taking as security the public domain and the valuable mines; this, however, the last thing that Napoleon would have wished, was not agreed to. The three Powers signed the

¹ E. Battle of Bull Run, July 21st.

Convention of London on October 31st, again asking the United States to join them, but this time Mr. Seward sent a strong reply¹ to the effect that the States could not agree to any measures of coercion in the distracted state of Mexico, and adding that "it is of the highest importance to the United States that the Sovereigns agreeing to the Convention do not seek for any territorial aggrandisement, and do not intend to exert any influence to hinder the right of the Mexican people to the free choice and establishment of their own form of government."

The joint expedition started and arrived in December, but in January, 1862, the French admiral made claims against which the others protested. In February,² the Convention of Soledad was signed, recognizing Juarez, and formally disclaiming any intention of attacking the independence, sovereignty, or integrity of the Mexican Republic. This was conformable with the intentions of England and Spain, whose ideas of intervention were limited to such acts as the seizure of the Customs as guarantees for payment; but Napoleon suddenly sent very large reinforcements,³ and brought back the Clerical refugees who had been intriguing with him to establish a monarchy, that is, to interfere with the form of government, so his allies broke off the agreement, sent their men back, and let France go on alone. The French notified the Mexican Government that hostilities would begin as soon as the troops of the other nations had retired, and persuaded the refugee General Almonte to proclaim himself dictator ad interim. As the Convention of Soledad would put the French troops in a very bad position in case of war, their commander, General Lorencez, broke it on some flimsy pretext, and advanced against the Mexican

¹ The "Trent" affair, November 8th, 1861.

² W. Fall of Fort Donelson, February 16th, 1862.

³ E. The "Monitor" and "*Merrimac*," March 9th.

E. McClellan starts for the Peninsula.

general Zaragoza on April 19th.¹ He had very hard fighting, was beaten at Puebla, and gained ground very slowly, so General Forey was sent out to take command in October. Napoleon showed his hand too much at this time² in his attempts to create a Buffer State between Mexico and either or both parties in the Civil War, for his Consul in Texas wrote to the *Governor* of that State to suggest the re-establishment of the old Republic, that is, the secession of Texas from the Confederacy, adding that the answer would be a useful guide to him in correspondence with his own Government (cf. p. 73). The French Consul at Richmond had also been meddling in the matter,³ and both of them were ordered to leave the Confederate States. In the spring of 1863,⁴ Forey advanced, taking Puebla in May, driving Juarez from Mexico City, and entering it on June 5th. Now was his time to put in force his instructions for the reconstruction of the country, which were written by Napoleon himself, and laid stress on the danger of the United States becoming the controlling power on the American continent, but said that if Mexico, with French help, obtained a stable government, "we shall have placed an impassable barrier against the encroachments of the United States." Definite instructions were given for calling an Assembly and forming a provisional coalition Government of all parties, who were to ascertain the will of the nation as to the form of government desired, with due care:

- ¹ E. McClellan before Yorktown, all April.
S. Capture of New Orleans, April 20th.
- ² E. June. The Peninsular Campaign.
E. *Lee's* Invasion of Maryland, September.
W. *Bragg's* Invasion of Kentucky, September.
- ³ E. Fredericksburg, December 12th.
W. Stone's River, December 31st.
- ⁴ E. Chancellorsville, May 1st-4th, 1863.
W. Tullahoma Campaign. June.
E. Battle of Gettysburg, July 1st-3rd.
S. Surrender of Vicksburg, July 4th.

if a monarchy were chosen, the name of Maximilian was to be submitted as the candidate approved by France. The Emperor went on to say that whoever took the throne would have to act in the interests of France, both because they were identical with those of Mexico, and because he would be dependent on French support, and reminded Forey that the carrying out of the objects of the expedition was a necessity for the honour of France, both military and political.

Napoleon's trusted agent in the country, however, to whom his generals were referred for instructions, was M. Dubois de Saligny, an ambitious and intriguing man, whose reports were framed rather to suit his master's wishes and his own ambitions than the real state of affairs, and the idea of an honest plébiscite did not suit him at all: his aim was rather, now, to commit Napoleon to an enterprise from which he could not recede, and by means of which he, de Saligny, might perhaps rise from his present anomalous position to be Ambassador at the Imperial Court of Mexico. No time was to be lost for him and Almonte, who persuaded Forey to issue the requisite proclamations, and then chose a Governing Committee of 35, who named a Provisional Executive of 5, and an "Assembly of Notables" of 215 members, all the members of these Committees consisting of their own supporters in the Clerical party. The Assembly passed the following Resolutions on July 10th: (1) "That the Government be a hereditary Catholic Monarchy." (2) "That the monarch's title be The Emperor of Mexico." (3) "That the Crown be offered to Maximilian." (4) "That in case of his refusal, Napoleon be asked to name another suitable prince."

The Provisional Government called itself "The Regency of the Empire," got in the adhesion of some towns in French occupation quickly, and sent to Maximilian, to offer him the Crown as the genuine wish of the people, these adhesions being only an

instalment. He accepted it, if ratified by the voice of the whole nation, and they plied him with nominal adhesions and votes, till on December 26th he wrote and accepted the Crown definitely. Napoleon had begun to suspect that de Saligny was playing his own game, and was very angry when he found how he had been outwitted: he wrote at once, repudiating the Resolutions, and insisting that his instructions be carried out properly before anything were fixed, for the farce was too flagrant to pass muster, and the blame lay on him. He recalled de Saligny and Forey, but the mischief was done: he was, however, pacified by the fresh adhesions sent to Maximilian, and let things go on, appointing Bazaine, who had been in the country for some time, to the command. Having driven back the Mexican army, the next thing was to settle down, and try to re-organize the hopeless finances, both for their own sake, and also to enable them to bear a good share of the cost of the expedition. Napoleon took the same view as Seward and *Jefferson Davis* (cf. pp. 69, 96), and planned to get a concession of the valuable Sonora mines for a French company, on condition that it paid a tax to the Mexican Government, and also part of its profits to the French Government.

In December the French Minister at Washington said to Seward that the Emperor would be willing to act as a Mediator when the time came for the inevitable separation between North and South, but after Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, Seward could laugh at him. This only increased the profound suspicion with which he regarded the Emperor and all his projects, which was confirmed by information from other sources.

GENERAL POSITION AND PLANS

(Continued from p. 188.) After the taking of Vicksburg, Halleck repeated his mistake of the summer before, and dispersed Grant's army instead of keeping

it together to break down all opposition, leaving him there with merely a skeleton force. Rosecrans wanted more men to guard his communications before he advanced on Chattanooga, but they were refused. Grant wished to use the whole army against Mobile, and Banks also was for attacking it, when Port Hudson surrendered, but Halleck seemed to think the trans-Mississippi district of most importance, while the President was anxious to secure a good foothold in Texas, on account of his suspicions of Napoleon, and the effect of the entry of the French troops into Mexico City on June 5th. He expected French interference in the War, which fear was shared by the Confederates. For both sides the main objective was the central district, the possession of Chattanooga: though not perhaps quite realized in July, it soon became fully apparent, and everything else was made secondary to it, as being the last military base of the Confederacy in front of its heart, Atlanta, now an invaluable manufacturing centre. The object of Grant's proposed attack on Mobile was to gain quickly a base from which Atlanta and *Bragg's* army might be attacked in rear. As he said, there was no need of a great expedition to Texas to watch the French, for with the Union command of the sea, a strong garrison might be maintained at Brownsville, which was all that was wanted at the time. In the East, Meade was a most cautious strategist, following *Lee* with little vigour even before he sent troops to Chattanooga, and Burnside, in east Tennessee, hardly affected the main issue. In the South-East, a great combined attack was planned on Charleston: success here would have left the Confederates but one Atlantic port, Wilmington, to which the coast and blockading forces could then have turned their attention; Mobile, their only other port, was at this time but weakly held, and would probably have quickly fallen to a land attack.

On the Confederate side, the loss of Vicksburg and the failure at Gettysburg were felt to be the beginning

of the end: from henceforth they fought with little hope, and *General Taylor* could not see why his *Government* went on with a struggle which was only ruining the country, though he, as a soldier, fought so long as they kept up the War. There was, though, as both Grant and Sheridan have put on record, still a chance, and not a hopeless one, of tiring out the North politically by the increase of the voting power of those who opposed the vigorous prosecution of the War. The elections of the autumn of 1862 had gone much in their favour, which made Grant take the great risk that he did in choosing the plan for the final attack on Vicksburg. The consequence was that the North had the greatest difficulty in raising men, even by offering high bounties, and the Government was compelled to resort to conscription. In September, the President used the powers given him by the Act of March 3rd (cf. p. 187), and suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus for the duration of the War, in support of the new Conscription Laws. The authorities would not use force to raise men, and there were serious riots in New York, to quell which, and enforce the draft, troops were sent back from the army.

All this gave encouragement to the Confederates, and was a legitimate factor in their calculations. Chattanooga was much more valuable to them than to their opponents, for on the south side it was not only strong, but had good communications, and if they could but clear the Knoxville district, it commanded their best railway line and junction, even after the loss of the Memphis branch.

We have seen the extreme danger of New Orleans from *Taylor's* able operations in western Louisiana, and Banks' nerve in holding to his objective at Port Hudson after Emory's alarming letter of July 4th cannot be too strongly commended.

In August, the Union Government began to think of re-establishing Civil Government in Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and Halleck wrote to

Sherman about it, but he was strongly against putting power into local hands at this stage (cf. p. 421). (Continued on p. 280.)

THE EAST

(Continued from p. 217.) We have seen that both armies stood facing each other during July 4th, *Lee* entrenching a line in which he might resist attack and gain time for the retreat of his trains and wounded. Meade also prepared to resist attack, for his troops were too much shaken to make one, and he employed the day in re-organizing and caring for the wounded. He was also watching whether *Lee* would retreat, and sent back cavalry to strike at him if he did so. On the 5th, he followed cautiously, Sedgwick coming on *Early's* rearguard, which formed up to cover the trains, but was only molested by long-range artillery fire. At this time Kilpatrick's cavalry was attacking *Lee's* trains further back, and *Lee* was thus able to turn on him and save them, but had Sedgwick been allowed to attack in force, this could not have been done, for *Lee* must have turned his whole attention to him, with results which would have been disastrous, and might have ended the War. *Lee* was almost out of artillery ammunition, and the garrisons might have been used with effect against the retreating Confederates; the risk would have been little, and the result great, but this chance was lost. Meade moved very slowly, while *Lee* marched day and night,¹ and gained so much time, that when he found the Potomac in flood, and could not cross, he had time to fortify a position, and renew his ammunition supply before his pursuers appeared. Lincoln urged the pressing of the retreat, but Meade did not rise to the occasion: on coming to *Lee's* position, he spent the 12th and 13th in reconnaissance for an attack on the 14th, but then found that *Lee* had crossed the river in the night. If below par

¹ W. *Morgan's* Raid in Indiana and Ohio, July.

S. Surrender of Port Hudson, July 9th.

at Gettysburg, *Lee* was at his best in the retreat from it, which was wonderfully managed. There was some sharp cavalry fighting, which cleared the way into Hagerstown for the retreating army. The Union cavalry seems to have been less well handled than before, while *Stuart*, like *Lee*, was at his best, but to leave two cavalry brigades in Virginia till July 1st was a great loss of power on the Confederate side in the campaign.

Lee retreated by way of the Valley, crossing the Blue Ridge by Chester and Thornton's Gaps to Culpeper, Meade advancing to the Rappahannock. At the beginning of September,¹ Meade heard that *Lee* had sent away large forces to strengthen other places, and advanced, *Lee* falling back; but a few days later came the news of Chickamauga, when the XIth and XIIth Corps were put under Hooker, and sent to Tennessee. *Lee's* army was reduced to 38,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry: he depended largely on the watchfulness of his cavalry, and *Stuart's* outpost service at this time is a perfect model of such work. Meade's cautious strategy, at this time of *Lee's* weakness, was ordered by Halleck, which looks like another good chance missed. In October,² Meade, hearing that *Lee* was going to advance, fell back to Centreville, his cavalry being badly beaten at Buckland Mills on the 19th. As *Lee* did not follow, Meade took position at Warrenton. In these operations *Lee* had several chances of striking at Meade's columns in detail, but probably because of the weakness of his army he was over-cautious; also, Pleasonton's able handling of the Union cavalry foiled him, time and again.

Meade advanced again to the Rappahannock at the

¹ The "*Alabama*," "*Tuscaloosa*," and "*Georgia*" at the Cape of Good Hope, August.

W. Burnside occupies Knoxville, September 9th.

S.W. Banks defeated at Sabine Pass, September 8th.

S.E. Fort Wagner taken, September 7th.

W. Chickamauga, September 19th, 20th.

² Mexico. The Crown offered to Maximilian, October 3rd.

beginning of November, and attacked, taking a part of the Confederate works, while the rest of the army crossed the river. After some fighting, both sides were facing each other on Mine Run at the end of the month.¹ Meade planned to attack both of *Lee's* flanks, one of which attacks he expected, and defeated, but depleted the other flank to do so, and had not Meade stopped the attack here, when he heard that the other had failed, it would probably have succeeded. The chance was lost, for when he wished to attack there the next day, the position had been made safe. On December 1st, the army returned to its old camps on the north of the Rapidan: headquarters, Brandy Station. Both sides remained inactive during the winter.

In the Valley, *Imboden* commanded a cavalry force some 3,000 strong after Gettysburg, with which he struck at the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, doing damage and creating a feeling of insecurity. On the Union side, *Averell* made two raids, one to overawe the Moorefield district of West Virginia, which was strongly Confederate in feeling, the other, in December, to the west of Lynchburg, breaking the Virginia and Tennessee Railway, and destroying a great depot of stores.

Though the covering of Washington always tied the Union army, yet it was not fair to blame Meade for having done so little, since Halleck forbade him to take a more decided line. His campaign was marked by some brilliant manœuvring and handling, in partial actions, very interesting to the student of tactics, but hardly so to the general reader. The result remained in *Lee's* favour, for he had never been fairly tackled. (Continued on p. 284.)

¹ W. Siege of Knoxville, November 17th–December 4th.

W. Chattanooga, November 23rd–25th.

The "*Alabama*" in the Sunda Islands, November, December.

Mexico. The French occupy Tampico, November.

Mexico. The French fleet at Matamoros, December.

Mexico. Maximilian accepts the Crown, December 26th.

THE SOUTH-EAST

(Continued from p. 217.) In this district, attention was centred on the operations against the defences of Charleston on the south side, especially Fort Wagner on Morris Island, by the army and navy combined. As we saw, General Gillmore had been making preparations for it in June, and on July 6th Admiral Dahlgren came to relieve Dupont. Gillmore, a first-rate Engineer, who had attacked several places on the coast, notably Fort Pulaski, off Savannah, was sent for to Washington after the failure of the naval attack on April 7th, and consulted as to the silencing of Sumter, so that ironclads could go up the harbour. He thought that it might be done by rifled guns from Morris Island, but said that with the small force available no advance could be made against the city from the swampy islands at the mouth of the harbour against the Confederate works and forces on James Island. The army work was to be restricted to taking Morris Island and silencing Fort Sumter, in these stages: (1) To gain a secure footing on the south end of Morris Island. (2) To besiege Battery Wagner, a strong work on it: this taken, the other works on the island would fall. (3) To destroy Fort Sumter from the position thus gained, and aid the fleet by fire when it attempted to enter the harbour. (4) The fleet to remove the obstructions, run past the enemy's batteries, and go up to the city.

The creeks of the inland waters behind the coast islands communicated with the waters held by the Union fleet, and were strongly fortified, where they approached Charleston. Several Union attacks here had been beaten. The Union held the coast islands, except Morris Island. By adding the little garrisons to the Port Royal force, there would be 11,000 men available: they had some 200-pounder rifled Parrott guns, and some heavy mortars. Much of the ground

was deep swamp, while Battery Wagner, the principal objective, was a very strong work, which had been closed in rear during the siege, and made into a small fort. It extended right across the island, which was a low neck in front, often awash at high tide, and all approach was over absolutely open ground, flanked by the Confederate batteries on James Island.

The first move was a demonstration up Stono Inlet, which drew off some of the defence force, when a landing was effected on Morris Island on July 10th.¹ Next day an unsuccessful attack was made on the fort. Batteries were made, armed, and opened, and another attempt made on the 18th, which was beaten by a terrible musketry fire at close range. On the first occasion, four monitors supported the attack, on the second, the flagship and five monitors. They had been improved, and stood fire better. The silencing of Sumter being the principal object, it was decided to attack it, and besiege Fort Wagner, at the same time, since Sumter was within the range of the guns mounted in the parallels for the attack of Wagner. The fire of the defence, in front and flank, was most severe, but the approaches moved forward steadily, and on August 17th² the attack on Sumter began with such effect that it was soon a mass of ruins, having only one gun serviceable on the 24th: it was reduced to an infantry outpost. Meanwhile the approaches to Wagner, aided by fire from the ships, were advancing, but the narrow neck in front was so difficult to pass that mortar fire was largely used, and the "New Ironsides" came close in on September 5th. The rifled guns from the batteries did little damage to the sand parapets, but the heavy and accurate fire of the ship's great 11-inch smooth-bores was most effective, for the big shells lobbed into the work, burst just over

¹ W. *Morgan's* Raid in Indiana and Ohio, July.

S. Surrender of Port Hudson, July 9.

² The "*Alabama*," "*Tuscaloosa*," and "*Georgia*" at the Cape of Good Hope, August.

the guns, and silenced the fire completely: though the defenders' flank fire from James Island was maintained with great effect, the sap was close to the ditch on September 6th, and the work was evacuated that night.¹ This brought the fall of Battery Gregg, on Cumming's Point, just opposite Sumter. Wagner was very strong, and practically uninjured. Fort Sumter was summoned to surrender, but refused, and on the 8th a boat attack was made on it, which failed. To put pressure on Charleston, a sand-bag battery was constructed on the swamp, of piles and framework, armed with a 200-pounder Parrott, which threw shells into the town at the then great range of 8,000 yards, but burst after a few rounds, after which a pair of heavy mortars were put there, to attack James Island. After Sumter was practically silenced, at the end of August, Dahlgren asked for another bombardment on the 30th, to enable him to go up the harbour, but he did not attempt to do so, or to remove obstructions. Sumter was heavily bombarded on October 26th, and at different times afterwards, to prevent guns being remounted. There were no more aggressive operations against the defences of Charleston.²

Some small raids and minor operations were carried out in North Carolina, and at St. Augustine, Florida. (Continued on p. 299.)

THE WEST

(Continued from p. 221.) At the end of June, *Bragg*, at Tullahoma, finding himself threatened both by Rosecrans, and by an advance of Burnside against *Buckner* at Knoxville, ordered *Morgan* to raid into

¹ S.W. Banks defeated at Sabine Pass, September 8th.

W. Burnside occupies Knoxville, September 9th.

W. Chickamauga, September 19th, 20th.

² W. Siege of Knoxville, November 17th-December 4th.

W. Chattanooga, November 23rd-25th.

The "*Alabama*" in the Sunda Islands, November, December.

Mexico. The French occupy Tampico, November.

Mexico. The French fleet at Matamoros, December.

Mexico. Maximilian accepts the Crown, December 26th.

Kentucky, break Rosecrans' railway connection with his base, and attack his detachments. *Morgan* wanted to go on into Ohio, but *Bragg* would not consent; he¹ started on July 2nd from Burkesville, with 2,460 men and 4 guns, and though the Cumberland River was watched by 10,000 men, eluded them cleverly, and got across. He then proceeded to carry out his own idea, not *Bragg's*, and marched north: he was driven back at Green River, but took the post at Lebanon, and then moved to Brandenburg on the Ohio, crossing the river on the 9th into Indiana, followed by troops from Kentucky. The militia were called out, and met him everywhere. He turned north-west, marching round the north of Cincinnati to Buffington Island, where his pursuers closed on him, and he lost half his men, but got away. He then struck for Pennsylvania, but had to surrender at Beaver Creek, near New Lisbon, with only 400 men. Had he obeyed his orders he would have helped his side more, for he did not succeed in either breaking up the railways or disturbing Rosecrans' communications, being dealt with by the militia of the different localities.

Rosecrans, when he followed *Bragg* up towards the Tennessee River,² had to rest and refit, and repair his communications, his first supply train not getting through till July 25th, when he established a depot at Stevenson. He wanted to know what Burnside was doing, for on his movements depended much of the safety of crossing the river against *Bragg's* flank and rear. Also, he asked that part of Grant's scattered army be used to protect his long line of communications. Again, if he waited till the middle of August, the corn would be ripe, another great point, so he waited, and made his preparations. He could either attack Chattanooga from the north or north-west, and besiege it, or cross the river and flank *Bragg* out.

¹ Maps 43, 44, p. 308.

² E. *Lee's* retreat from Gettysburg, July 5th-16th.

W. Port Hudson surrenders, July 9th.

The first would give him very bad communications over barren country, leaving good ones to his opponent: the second would be at the best place for the defence; he therefore chose the third, and determined to cross the river below Bridgeport, where *Bragg* had a detachment, move across the tangle of mountains to the south of it, and strike at his communications, the railway to Dalton.

His own army was then lying on the line McMinnville-Winchester,¹ and when the main depot in front was made safe, Crittenden's Corps moved up to the Tennessee River on August 20th, on the north and west of Chattanooga, and next day fired on it. *Bragg* drew in his detachment from Bridgeport, and concentrated against the feint. Rosecrans further puzzled him by threatening a long line of the river, and on the 26th Burnside moved forward, on which *Bragg* called in *Buckner* from Knoxville. Burnside occupied Knoxville on September 2nd, and Cumberland Gap on the 9th. He was now to move down to connect with, or perhaps join, Rosecrans, and marched out with the greater part of his force, leaving a garrison to fortify Knoxville. The field force had reached Cleveland, and was getting into touch with the Army of the Cumberland, when the battle of Chickamauga was fought, in consequence of which it returned to guard east Tennessee.

Under cover of Crittenden's feint, the rest of the Union army moved to its assigned places, and crossed the Tennessee between August 29th and September 4th, getting into touch with the Confederate outposts on the 6th.² On the 9th, Rosecrans heard that *Bragg* had evacuated Chattanooga and gone south: he ordered McCook's Corps to strike across and cut off his retreat, but on the 11th the

¹ The "*Alabama*," "*Tuscaloosa*," and "*Georgia*" at the Cape of Good Hope, August.

² S.E. Fort Wagner taken, September 7th

S.W. Banks defeated at Sabine Pass, September 8th.

passes were found blocked, the advanced troops could not get forward, and definite information came in that *Bragg's* army was concentrated right in front, at the exit from the mountains, and that he was expecting *Longstreet's* Corps from Virginia. This was serious, for the Union army was scattered over a front of some thirty miles, in a maze of valleys, with very bad going, and worse communication between them, and under these unfavourable circumstances it was vital to concentrate it at once. Rosecrans had made a rash and badly calculated move, and was caught in the middle of it.

Bragg saw his opponent's mistakes, on the 8th, both in thinking that he was in retreat, and in his loose dispositions, and gave orders which would have exposed the Union army to defeat in detail, but he was on bad terms with his subordinates, who delayed, and gave Rosecrans the time he wanted. *Bragg* ordered a concentration on the east bank of the Chickamauga, keeping up a cavalry screen till *Longstreet* arrived from Virginia, which he did on the 18th and 19th, without cavalry or artillery. *Bragg* issued his orders on the 18th for the battle next day, intending to destroy the Union left, seize the Lafayette road, and cut Rosecrans off from Chattanooga. His Corps were to advance in succession from the right, outflanking the Union left, and turning to the left as they crossed the river, so as to drive the Union forces southward up the valley from *Polk's* front: *Polk*, the left Corps but one, who was really facing the bulk of the Union army, to push forward and join in the attack. *D. H. Hill*, on the left, was to cover that flank by attacking Rosecrans' right. These movements were not carried out as soon as they should have been, partly owing to the bad ground and the unexpected resistance of the Union outposts, but partly also to the dilatoriness of some of the commanders.

Between the 12th and 18th, Rosecrans was con-

centrating, some of his troops being far to the south at McAlpine, and on the 18th he sent Thomas to occupy the important Lafayette road. He held the line Crawfish Springs-Lee and Gordon's Mills-McLennon's Cove, the general line being along the Chattanooga-Rossville road. The whole army was in position about daybreak on the 19th. He told Thomas, when he sent him to the left, that he was to hold the Rossville road, and that, if hard pressed, the whole army would come to his help. On this day, 18th, there were some movements near the fords, and Thomas took more ground to his left. Next day, Thomas moved first, and *Bragg* found that instead of outflanking his enemy, he was outflanked himself, and was attacked instead of attacking, for a sharp fight began before his troops were in their places. Both sides brought up supports, and the battle swayed backwards and forwards. *Bragg*, seeing that Rosecrans had discovered his plan, and would fight for the Rossville road, put *Polk* in command on the right, supporting him with *Hill's* Corps. A furious attack drove Thomas back and reached the Lafayette road, but it was recovered, and Thomas took up a more compact position. Granger, with three brigades in reserve, was at Rossville, covering the rear and left. The first day's battle was in favour of Rosecrans, for *Bragg* had failed to shake his hold on the important roads.

For the next day, *Bragg*, now that all *Longstreet's* force was in, divided the army into two commands, under him and *Polk*, on the left and right respectively. The attack was to be made in échelon from the right, at dawn: when in action, the whole army was to wheel to the left, but also to press the Union left, to seize the Chattanooga road.

Rosecrans' plans for the 20th were for Thomas to hold his old position and the Rossville road, McCook to hold his advanced line as long as possible, touching Thomas with his left, Crittenden to be in

reserve in rear of the centre. All the troops were not in their places at daybreak, and Rosecrans found much fault with McCook's disposition, directing him to alter it. Much time was lost in making these corrections.

On the other side, *Bragg* came up and found the attack hanging fire, and *Polk* not present. He saw that Thomas was not holding the Chattanooga road strongly, and threw a heavy attack on it, which was repulsed, but he now put his whole weight in here, and Thomas had to call on McCook for reinforcements till a thin place was made in the line: before it could be made good, *Longstreet* burst in with one of his tremendous attacks, with five divisions, broke the line, and cut the Union army in two on Thomas' right, while *Bragg* again attacked on his left, to cut him off from Chattanooga, but was again repulsed. *Longstreet*, however, now saw that the conditions warranted a departure from the original plan of battle, and instead of wheeling to his left, to drive McCook up the valley, turned to the right on Thomas, Crittenden's men had all been thrown into the fight, and Granger's command at Rossville was the last reserve; he had been told to stay there, to cover the rear, but saw also that his orders were no longer applicable, and moved up in the nick of time to save Thomas from defeat. *Longstreet's* last reserve was all that remained on the other side, and *Bragg* threw it in for a last furious attack, which failed, and when night fell Thomas was still holding his ground.

Just before *Longstreet's* attack, Rosecrans had gone to look after things on the right, and could not return to Thomas except via Rossville. He there heard that the army was beaten, and made the fatal mistake of not going to see for himself, but to Chattanooga, to make arrangements for his beaten army, sending to tell Thomas to take command on the field, and retreat to Rossville. Thomas, however, determined to hold

on till dark, and did not move till all attacks had been beaten off. He then took post at Rossville Gap till all was ready at Chattanooga, when the whole army was brought there, and works thrown up which protected it from direct attack.

Though Rosecrans' full strength was 67,500 men, his long line took so many to guard it that he had no more than 55,000 on the field, out of which he lost 11,080 in killed and wounded, missing 5,255, total 16,335.

Bragg had some 70,000 men in action; his losses were believed to be 2,673 killed, 16,274 wounded, 2,003 missing, total 20,950.

Up to the time that *Bragg* left Chattanooga, Rosecrans had outgeneralled him at every point: it was a most masterly performance to turn out a man of his calibre, first from Tennessee, then from his base, in such a way, but the calculations for the campaign which ended at Chickamauga do not seem to have been so carefully worked out as before. Rosecrans appears over-confident, to have under-estimated the difficulties of the country of northern Alabama, after crossing the Tennessee, and, when he heard that his opponent was moving out of Chattanooga, to have been too ready to assume that he dared not face him, and to have acted rashly in consequence: that he was not beaten in detail was more owing to the friction among the Confederate generals than to his own good management. *Bragg* never expected him to come the way he did, because he rightly thought the country too difficult for such an operation. The loss of time in concentrating the Union army was what brought on the battle of Chickamauga; otherwise it would have been better to seize Chattanooga, which *Bragg* left to fight on better ground. Grant thought that when Rosecrans had got *Bragg* out of Chattanooga, he should have entrenched in a strong position, and not have rushed blindly forward, with his columns out of touch with each other, but his great mistake,

which was fatal, was in leaving the field on hearsay evidence, and going to do quartermaster's work, which a subordinate could have done as well: further, if the danger was extreme, there was the post of the commanding general. He had gloriously shewn at Stone's River how his brilliant leadership could turn defeat into victory, and he now failed on what seems his strongest point: this case was no worse, and his personality was again indispensable. Thomas' indomitable character again saved the army from destruction, but he lacked the quickness and dash of Rosecrans, to go further and win. McCook failed again, and should never have had this chance. It is curious that the main battle was fought by subordinates, *Longstreet* and Thomas, almost entirely.

This was one of the hardest battles of the whole War, of which it was said that neither side ever fought so well. *D. H. Hill* says that the "barren victory" broke the Confederates' hearts, and that their dash was never again seen to perfection. *Bragg* had again fought his army to a standstill against the great Rosecrans-Thomas combination, and lost his objective, Chattanooga. Both sides lost by the campaign, Rosecrans tactically, *Bragg* strategically, and neither could profit by his success in the other direction.

Great was the consternation in the North at the news. Reinforcements were hurried up from all sides: Hooker went from the East, with the XIth and XIIth Corps, 15,000 strong, Sherman and Hurlbut sent troops from Vicksburg and Memphis, and Burnside moved forward. Rosecrans was in a most precarious position, down in a hole, with approaches from north and north-west over sixty miles of rough mountain tracks, and these made insecure by Confederate cavalry, while his regular line of supply from the west passed through the Tennessee Valley, which his enemies commanded. The railway to Knoxville was useless, owing to Confederate operations, and Chattanooga was a wretched position, commanded from all

sides. *Bragg* was thus certain that the Union troops must soon evacuate it, unless help came.

The news from Chattanooga became worse and worse, for retreat would have meant not only the loss of all Rosecrans' guns, but of the army itself as an organized body, such a disaster, in fact, as had not yet been incurred, which would have gone far to neutralize the results of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, and to avert which a stronger hand was wanted. Grant was put in command of the country between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, with the exception of Banks' district, and chose the scheme of re-organization which substituted Thomas for Rosecrans. McCook and Crittenden were also relieved from command. The XXth and XXIst Corps were made into a new IVth, and put under Granger, Sherman and Hurlbut were hastening up, and things looked better. Grant at once took up the shortening of the line of supply, by river and a new bridge near Wauhatchie, covered by Hooker's command, and when it was opened on November 1st, Thomas' army had only two or three days' rations left.

¹ At this time *Bragg* sent *Longstreet* away against Burnside, at Knoxville, which seems a huge mistake, to send away his best lieutenant and two divisions, just before an important campaign, but the reason was that they could not pull together, and *Jefferson Davis* came down, it is supposed, to settle the trouble. Grant, who knew both men well, was not surprised, for *Bragg* was most quarrelsome, and *Longstreet* would not be put upon. When he heard that *Longstreet* had gone, he planned to attack *Bragg's* position as soon as Sherman came, for he wished him to take the principal attack, as he thought that Thomas' army was rather demoralized. The weather was so bad that Sherman did not arrive till the 21st: he was to attack Missionary Ridge, supported by part of Thomas' command, the rest making a feint of attacking from

¹ The "*Alabama*" in the Sunda Islands, November, December,

Chattanooga, Hooker to hold Lookout Valley, and Howard's XIth Corps, north of the river, held at disposal.

On the 23rd, Thomas was sent to make a reconnaissance in force, to see whether *Bragg* was sending men away or retreating: he gained some ground on the side of Missionary Ridge, and entrenched it, while Sherman attacked the north end of the hill, with the same result. Sherman was ordered to attack at dawn on the 24th, and was told that Thomas would do the same, Hooker making a demonstration against Lookout Mountain. The day opened thick and wet, and the Confederates on the high ground could not see what was going on below, which helped Hooker, who pushed up Lookout Mountain, above the clouds, cleared the near end of it, and drove the Confederates down the other side: he entrenched where he stood. On the 25th he went on to Rossville, chasing the enemy till dark, from there, and from their works on the battlefield of Chickamauga. On this day, Sherman made his main attack on Missionary Ridge, but was stoutly opposed, till Grant told Thomas to take four divisions, seize the first line of rifle-pits in his front, and await orders, but instead of this they charged right up the steep hill and cleared it, because the fire on the first line of works taken, from those in rear, was so severe that they were less exposed if they went on up the steeper part of the hill. Though this part of the Confederate main line was very strong, *Bragg* sent for reinforcements as soon as he saw the move, but the Army of the Cumberland would not be denied, and swept over all with hardly a check, driving his troops back beyond Chickamauga Station. In the night he withdrew his troops from Sherman's front, and Sherman occupied their ground: the pursuit was kept up till the 28th, and the railway to Atlanta destroyed in many places.

Union strength, 57,000: killed and wounded, 11,405; missing, 4,774; total, 16,179.

Confederate strength, 71,500 : killed and wounded, 15,801 ; missing, 2,003 ; total, 17,804.

This great victory of Chattanooga enabled Grant and Sherman to plan the stroke which should sweep through the heart of the Confederacy and bring home to its people the meaning of WAR, at their own doors: the first stage being the advance to Atlanta, the great railway and manufacturing centre of the South, to be undertaken the next spring: the XIVth Corps was thrown forward to Dalton, the IVth sent to Cleveland, and the ~~XXth~~^{XIa and XIIa} to hold Lookout Valley. Grant went to his headquarters, Nashville, on December 20th, and on the other side, *Johnston* succeeded *Bragg* on the 27th.

When Burnside heard of the battle of Chickamauga, he went back to watch east Tennessee. In October he was attacked from the east, but drove his assailants back: on the 22nd, however, his outposts were driven in, and he lost the country south of Loudon, his troops being drawn in to Knoxville on November 1st, to oppose *Longstreet*, whose strong cavalry was under *Wheeler*. They tried to cut off Union detachments and occupy advantageous ground opposite Knoxville, while Burnside tried to get in his trains and supplies, and gain time to finish the defences. A sharp rearguard action was fought at Campbell's Station on November 16th, in which the last trains were safely brought in, the ground being held till dark.

Knoxville lies on the Holston River, a tributary of the Tennessee, and has some natural strength as a position, which had been carefully improved by fortification, the lines on the north side being about $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles long, with many redoubts and batteries: there were also interior lines, in case of need. On the south side there were some works, but no continuous line. The principal works, however, were not finished, and had to be used as they stood. On the 17th, the troops were set to strengthen the lines, under cover of the Union cavalry, which held its position outside the lines

till dark, and by noon next day the place was defensible, the cavalry holding on till 2.30, when they were driven in. Then the siege began, though the town was not completely invested. A heavy attack was made on the 29th, but defeated with great loss. This was the last of the fighting, for on December 1st the Confederate trains were seen to be moving, the siege being raised on the 4th: on the 8th, General Sherman rode in. The garrison had been in the greatest straits for food, and suffered much from exposure in the trenches. After the battle of Chattanooga, Grant had sent the IVth Corps and other troops, under Sherman, to relieve Knoxville, before which *Longstreet* retired, but remained in east Tennessee during the winter. Burnside resigned, and was succeeded by Foster.

The Union communications were much harassed by guerillas, in Tennessee especially, which kept a great many Union troops to watch them: Grant, at first, was not strong enough to put them down, then he had more urgent work to do.

On the Mississippi, the Navy Department put the whole river above New Orleans under Porter, Farragut restricting himself to the work at sea. Porter divided his command into eight districts, six of which were on the Mississippi, one on the Ohio, from Cairo to the mouth of the Tennessee, while the eighth took the Upper Ohio and the Valley of the Cumberland: the number of districts was afterwards increased to eleven. (Continued on p. 301.)

THE SOUTH

(Continued from p. 229.) As soon as *Johnston* heard of the surrender of Vicksburg, he retreated,¹ followed by Sherman, whose army had been reinforced for the purpose, and now numbered 48,000 men. *Johnston* halted at Jackson, which had been strongly fortified,

¹ W. *Morgan's* Raid in Indiana and Ohio, July.

E. *Lee's* Retreat from Gettysburg, July 5th-16th.

on the 7th, and Sherman prepared to besiege him, but he was not to be caught, and got his army away most skilfully on the night of the 16th. Grant wanted to keep Sherman's force in hand, so the pursuit was not carried far.

Banks was pressing Port Hudson hard, and when *Gardner*, commanding there, heard of the surrender of Vicksburg, he also surrendered, on the 9th, but he must have done so in a very few days. At the beginning of the siege he had 7,000 men to Banks' 14,000. 51 guns were taken, and a great number of small arms. The fall of Port Hudson cleared the Mississippi, which was henceforward entirely controlled by the Union forces. The first steamer from New Orleans reached St. Louis on July 16th.

As soon as he was free, Banks moved against *Taylor* and drove him back, recovering Brashear City and lower Louisiana. *Taylor* retired to Opelousas, and kept annoying the Union posts till the end of the year. (Continued on p. 309.)

THE SOUTH-WEST

(Continued from p. 177, Chapter VIII.) Banks' next work was to deal with the trans-Mississippi country: Halleck wanted a move on Shreveport, but the Red River was so low that Banks, who had full discretion, decided to move first against Sabine Pass and City, and strike from thence at Houston, the capital of Texas. He went by sea, convoyed by some gunboats, and made a combined military and naval attack on Sabine Pass, on September 8th,¹ but was defeated. He then thought of marching into Texas, but the distance was so great that he went back to an expedition to go by sea, which sailed from New Orleans on October 26th, landed at Brazos, November 2nd, and occupied Brownsville on the 6th. Leaving a force

¹ W. Burnside occupies Knoxville, September 9th.

W. Chickamauga, September 19th, 20th.

there, Banks proceeded to occupy the coast islands,¹ from thence to the Sabine, taking a strong work on Matagorda Bay on December 30th.

In May, Curtis was relieved in command of the Department of Missouri and Arkansas by Schofield, who sent all the men he could spare to Grant, while Steele, acting under him, took command of the army in Arkansas in July. On the other side, *Kirby Smith* had succeeded *Holmes* in February, with *Holmes* and *Price* under him. *Holmes* attacked Helena on July 4th, on Grant's communications, but was repulsed, and Steele soon after moved against *Price*, who retreated, Steele being then ordered to hold the line of the Arkansas River till Banks moved up the Red River, and both sides remained in statu quo till the end of the year. *Kirby Smith* made no attempt to collect the really considerable forces under his command, and strike with them as an army, while Halleck's orders tied fast the 47,000 men under Schofield and Steele. (Continued on p. 309.)

THE BLOCKADE

(Continued from p. 233.) Before Charleston, the Confederates attacked the blockading fleet with torpedo-boats, an unsuccessful attack being made on the "New Ironsides," on October 5th: no real harm was done, but she received a severe shock, and the engine-rooms of both vessels were flooded with the water thrown up, the boat's fires were put out, and her crew taken prisoners. This boat was practically a submarine, showing only a small hatch above water: she had been used twice before, both times going down and drowning her crew. Early in December, the monitor "Weehawken" sank at her anchors: she

¹ W. Siege of Knoxville, November 17th–December 4th.
W. Chattanooga, November 23rd–25th.
Mexico. The French fleet at Matamoros, December.

was overloaded with ammunition and badly trimmed, so that when water came in through the hawse-holes, which had, carelessly, not been packed, it would not flow to the pumps, and she foundered.

So long as Fort Fisher held out, the blockading fleet off Wilmington had to keep well away to sea: ironclads could not be used here, for they were not really seaworthy, and the coast was more exposed than at Charleston.

Farragut, now relieved of the care of the Mississippi, was keeping watch and ward in the Gulf of Mexico, but on the Mexican border the situation was complicated by the presence of the French fleet, watching the Mexican port of Matamoros, by which route arms were being run in, both by the Union side, for Juarez, whom the French were steadily driving northwards, and for the Confederates, to be smuggled into Texas. The task of the French cruisers was very difficult, since, if they found arms, they did not know for whom they were intended. They seized Tampico in November, to get hold of the Customs of that port. (Continued on p. 313.)

THE WAR AT SEA

(Continued from p. 236.) The "*Florida*" ran into Bermuda in July,¹ to refit, but as she wanted more thorough repair, she sailed for Brest at the end of the month, and remained there till the end of the year. At the beginning of July, the "*Alabama*" was to the east of Rio, and turned to cross the Atlantic to the Cape of Good Hope, where she arrived in August,² eluding the U.S.S. "Vanderbilt." She had in company a prize which had been commissioned as the "*Tuscaloosa*," which Admiral Sir Baldwin Walker

¹ E. Lee's Retreat from Gettysburg, July 5th-16th.

W. Surrender of Port Hudson, July 9th.

² S.E. Fort Wagner taken, September 7th.

S.W. Banks defeated at Sabine Pass, September 8th.

W. Chickamauga, September 19th, 20th.

refused to admit, as a prize, but was overruled by the civilian authorities; the Home Office, however, ruled that the admiral was right. When she came back, after an unsuccessful cruise in the Atlantic, she was detained, but released because she had been allowed in before. The "*Alabama*" struck eastward across the southern Indian Ocean, via St. Paul's Island, then up to the Straits of Sunda, which she reached early in November,¹ and began to prey on American shipping with great effect, remaining in the narrow seas between Sumatra, Borneo, and Siam, till the end of the year.

The "*Georgia*" was also at the Cape in August, having left Bahia in May. She went to the North Atlantic, and came into Cherbourg for repairs at the end of October, where she remained till the end of the year. Her sail power was insufficient to patrol the trade routes for any length of time, which made her use too much coal to be a successful cruiser under Confederate conditions (cf. p. 316).

Maury bought a vessel called the "Victor," which was sold out of the British Navy in the autumn, and though she was allowed to be rigged at Sheerness, as was the custom, he feared that she would be stopped, and ran her off to sea before she was ready, where she was commissioned as the "*Rappahannock*." She put into Calais for repairs, and was handed over to *Captain Barron*, who directed the Confederate cruisers from Paris, having originally come to Europe to take over the turret-ships from Laird. He kept her there till the end of the year, looking for a chance to arm her.

In the summer, *Lieutenant Sinclair* was sent to England with orders to build a cruiser, and take command of her: he found a suitable steamer building on the Clyde, nearly ready for sea, and made arrangements to buy her, but she was seized before she left the builders' hands, while still their property. They compromised the case with the Crown, so that the

¹ W. Chattanooga, November 23rd-25th.

ship remained their property, but they were not to sell her for two years without the Crown's consent. She was called the "Pampero."

Urged on by the Northern agents, the English Government, on October 9th, seized the two turret-ships at Laird's, although sold to the French firm, the builders working on them under guard, with a powerful squadron lying outside in the Mersey. The Government tried to buy them from the French owners, but they declined to entertain the proposal.

Owing to the difficulties of constructing engines in the Confederate States, *Bulloch* looked out for a vessel to carry marine engines, which he could buy in England, a service beyond the capacity of the ordinary blockade-runner. In October he bought a vessel in Glasgow, called the "*Coquette*," which proved herself most useful for this service.

On receipt of the letter, ordering him to get some sea-going ironclads built (cf. p. 236), *Bulloch* went into the difficult conditions very carefully, and on July 16th contracted with the French builder already mentioned, to build two such small, handy, and powerful vessels. At the end of November, they were progressing rapidly, and the four corvettes also, but just then things began to look less rosy, for the Northern Government found out what was going on, and interfered vigorously: he saw grave difficulties ahead, and doubted his ability to get the ships to sea, in spite of the assurances of the French Government that it would be all right. So far had they gone, that *Mr. Slidell* was confident that their policy, and that of the Emperor, was that the Confederate States should be able to maintain their position, and he believed that they would have been recognized by France, if England would have done the same, but that France was not prepared to take the step alone. The financing of the orders for these ships was extremely difficult. *Bulloch* was repeatedly asked if he could not buy some old ironclads, but reported that they would either be too heavy, or else

merely unseaworthy floating batteries. (Continued on p. 315.)

SUMMARY

(Continued from p. 237.) The end of 1863 saw the positions of the two sides almost reversed, from those of the end of 1862; for the North were then beaten at all points, the only question being whether the South could maintain their advantage: now, the North had opened the Mississippi from end to end, cutting the Confederacy in two, and had also won the battle which *Lee* elected to make decisive for political reasons. Though Chickamauga was a set-back, yet the battle of Chattanooga finally secured the advantage gained and placed the Union in a winning position, from which it could go forward and finish the War. The end was now in sight.

Union Gains.—In the East, the northern half of Virginia proper; for the line of the Rapidan and Rappahannock, east of the Blue Ridge, was never again lost. In the West and South, the country as far south as the line Vicksburg-Ringgold, also the southern half of western Louisiana.

Confederate Gains.—Nil.

No prominent officer was killed on either side.

The year 1863 was remarkable for the first employment in war of two weapons which, even in the opening of the twentieth century, were hardly developed, viz. the Submarine Torpedo-Boat and the Breechloading Magazine Rifle, and also for the first use of Machine Guns.

The Submarine is, of course, a very old idea, but the Confederates first made it practical, in the sense that in their hands it became a real offensive weapon; but the service was most desperate, for the wretched things went down and drowned their crews as often as not. They were not true submarines, not being entirely submerged, but the principle was there: only a small hatch, some ten feet long by two feet high,

shewed above water, which was practically invisible in a bad light. They used spar torpedoes.

During this year also the first practical breechloading magazine rifle, the Spencer Repeater, came: the Colt Rifle, merely a revolver with a stock and long barrel, had been used, but the loss of gas made it a poor rifle. The Spencer was a good weapon for its day, with a tube magazine running down the small of the butt, charged from the butt-end, and holding eight cartridges. Later came the Henry Rifle, improved by Winchester, with its long under-barrel magazine holding seventeen rounds. It was in reference to these that the Confederates used to say that "those confounded Yankees loaded up their guns in the morning, and shot all day." The Northern soldiers used their repeaters, tactically, to the best advantage, on the defensive, holding their magazine fire till the assault got to close quarters, and then crushing it all at once. Repeaters were principally served out to the cavalry, who had to hold positions with small forces till reinforcements came, for whom this power of repelling attack was specially necessary. The Breechloader did not become general during the War, but was developed at this time, but the Magazine principle was kept in abeyance for military purposes for many years, until it was adapted to take cartridges of the size and shape which the increasing power of military rifles required.

We have also, in this year, the first mention of a machine-gun, Requa's, which Gillmore used in the trenches before Fort Wagner. Gatling's is said to have been invented during the War, but I have found no mention of its use. (Continued on p. 317.)

NOTICES OF OFFICERS

(Continued from p. 241.) On the Union side, several senior officers were relieved from command, of whom the most notable were General Rosecrans and Admiral Dupont.

Major-General W. S. Rosecrans was a professional soldier, educated at West Point, of brilliant and well-known attainments, and was one of the three men whom *General D. H. Hill* named as the most dangerous opponents of the Confederacy when the War broke out. He was warm-hearted and impulsive, beloved by his men, and the soul of honour, even to the verge of quixotism—witness his quarrel with Halleck at the beginning of the year (cf. p. 219). A brilliant leader in battle, he was probably the best minor strategist whom the War produced, and was the only man against whom even *Lee* could do nothing, in West Virginia, but he was enamoured of his own opinion, and seems to have done little to adapt his own plans to those for the War as a whole. Grant found him a plaguy lieutenant, probably for this reason, and was on the point of relieving him from a subordinate command in his army, when he was given the command of the Army of the Cumberland, to succeed Buell. After Chickamauga, Grant's first act was to replace him by Thomas. He was given the minor command in Missouri later on, where he, or rather Pleasanton, defeated *Price's* invasion of that State.

At the opening of the War, Captain Dupont, of the Navy, was President of a Commission appointed to consider the problem of blockading the long coast line of the Confederacy, and drew up a careful memoir thereon. He suggested seizing Port Royal as a base, and was requested to co-operate with General T. W. Sherman in organizing an expedition against it, being appointed Flag-Officer, as it was then termed, before sailing. When the rank of Rear-Admiral was created, in July, 1862, he was the second on the list. In the spring of 1863, we have seen that his opinion of the naval attack on Charleston, which he was ordered to make, was correct, and after it he had the moral courage to decline to make bad worse; but the Navy Department shirked the responsibility, and the disappointment of the country was visited on him.

He was very harshly treated, and relieved from command; but his dashing successor, Dahlgren, could do no more, with the Navy alone. Dupont was afterwards offered the command of the Pacific Squadron, but indignantly refused a peace command in war time. (Continued on p. 320.)

1863	JULY 4-31	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER
EAST	4-16. <i>Lee's</i> Retreat from Gettysburg.	Operations of Meade and <i>Lee</i> in Virginia. 25-30. Averell's Raid in West Virginia.	
SOUTH-EAST	Charleston. Combined attack on Fort Wagner.		6. Fort Wagner taken.
WEST	<i>Morgan's</i> Raid into Indiana and Ohio. 4. <i>Holmes</i> defeated at Helena, Arkansas.		9. Burnside occupies Knoxville. 10-20. The Chickamauga Campaign. 19-20. Battle of Chickamauga.
SOUTH	9. Surrender of Port Hudson. <i>Banks v. Taylor</i> in Louisiana.		9. <i>Banks</i> defeated at Sabine Pass.
SOUTH-WEST, NAVAL AND MEXICO	Steele drives back. 16. The " <i>Florida</i> " at Bermuda. 25. The " <i>Florida</i> "	<i>Price</i> , in Arkansas. goes from Bermuda to France. The " <i>Alabama</i> " and " <i>Tuscaloosa</i> " at the Cape. The " <i>Georgia</i> " at the Cape, and in the North Atlantic.	3. The " <i>Florida</i> " at Brest.

1863	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
EAST	Operations of Meade and Lee in Virginia. 8-21. Averell's Raid in South-West Virginia.		
SOUTH-EAST			
WEST	17. Grant takes command, from Alleghanies to Mississippi River.	17. Siege of Knoxville, to . . . 23-25. Battle of Chattanooga.	4. Longstreet retreats.
SOUTH			
SOUTH-WEST, NAVAL AND MEXICO	28. The "Georgia" comes to Cherbourg, and stays there. The "Rappahannock" lying at Calais, unarmed. The "Alabama" in the Sunda Islands, and the neighbourhood of Singapore. Mexico. 3. The Crown offered to Maximilian.	Banks occupies the Texas Coast. The "Florida" at Brest, refitting. comes to Cherbourg, and stays there. The "Alabama" in the Sunda Islands, and the neighbourhood of Singapore. Mexico. The French fleet at Matamoros. 26. Maximilian accepts the Crown.	

CHAPTER XI

THE FIRST HALF OF 1864. THE CLOSING OF THE NET

GENERAL POSITION AND PLANS

(Continued from p. 252.) The feature of the opening year was the commanding position to which Grant had risen: for the first time, the balance of interest had shifted from the political to the military centre of the War, and all hopes were pinned on the great commander in the field, rather than on the dictator in the office. Halleck had interfered with him less and less, and now the plans for finishing the War were being openly made by Grant and Sherman: though *Lee's* was the best Confederate army in the field, both it and the Army of the Potomac had been playing a subordinate part in the last few months.

The politicians thought it would be a capital move to bring one of the seceded States so under the control of the Union that they could form a State Government, to take part in the Presidential Election of 1864, and they chose Florida, because it was very open to attack by sea, and had been denuded of men for the Confederate service (cf. p. 299).

The movements of the French in Mexico also demanded attention, for they had driven back Juarez to the north-west, and entered Guadalajara on January 5th, and Napoleon had also managed to get the valuable Sonora Mines ceded to a French Company, and thus under his control. These, properly worked,

would furnish the money for his project, which the French nation was tired of providing.

The plans at the very beginning of the year were that Thomas, at Chattanooga, was to hold *Johnston* fast and prevent him from detaching against Sherman, who would strike at Meridian, and so destroy the railways that a small force could hold the east side of the Mississippi Valley, while the Red River Expedition, under Banks, would do the same for the west side. A great concentration would then be made against *Johnston*, and Banks was to go on against Mobile in combination with Farragut, which, if taken, would be a fresh base for cutting another great slice off the Confederacy. Grant thought that the next great campaign would be through east Tennessee against Virginia, but in any case the two sides of the Mississippi must be cleared.

¹ On March 3rd, Grant was called to command the armies of the United States, the rank of Lieutenant-General being revived in his favour. This marked a great change in the President's policy, he at last saw that civilian direction of and interference with military movements simply spelt disaster, and for the future allowed Grant to translate Government requirements and views into military plans, giving him his whole-hearted support. Even that stickler for political supremacy, Stanton, assented for the present, but the real cause of this happy change was the personality of Grant. The others saw that they were at last dealing with an absolutely loyal and single-minded man, unassuming, able, and resolute, who could really be trusted. Halleck remained at Washington as "Chief of the Staff," and saw to the correspondence of the War, as a link with the Cabinet.

Before he became Commander-in-Chief, Grant's plan was to strike at *Johnston's* army first, then at Atlanta, Banks moving against Mobile: as Banks was not

¹ S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th.
S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th.

then under his command, this inclusion is significant. Grant thought that *Forrest* was the most dangerous opponent in the Mississippi Valley and that in secondary operations he was probably the best officer on either side. After his promotion he varied the plan but little. He considered Butler's army at Fort Monroe his left, Meade's the centre, and his old army, now under Sherman, the right. Other forces were Sigel's in the Valley, Banks' in Louisiana, and Steele's in Arkansas. Butler was to move on the south side of the James against Richmond, Meade against *Lee*, who was entrenched behind the Rapidan, and Sherman to push *Johnston* beyond Atlanta. These movements were to be made in the last week in April, but by that time it was probably seen that Banks could not co-operate.

Though Richmond was still very important, yet it was considered that its value had declined, the likelihood of European recognition of the Confederacy being less, and that the attitude of Great Britain towards Mexico in 1862 shewed that she would not side actively with the Confederates, but that the French invasion looked as if they might do so. This was a false inference, for England kept the two matters separate, going to Mexico only to protect her own interests, with no regard to her policy about the Confederacy, while France, the smaller creditor of Mexico, used this pretext to interfere for ulterior designs against the United States, in which the backing of the Confederacy was a factor. She gave the Confederates to understand that she would recognize them if England did.

Not one of the eleven original Confederate States was now intact, but North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, were nearly so, and these four, with the bulk of southern Virginia and part of northern Florida, still held solidly together: of the rest, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, were cut off, in Mississippi the Confederate power was broken,

and Tennessee had passed under the control of the Union. The signs of exhaustion were unmistakable: there were not the means of meeting the losses of another campaign, and the only chance was to gain time on the defensive. In March, *Davis* ordered *Johnston* to invade Tennessee, *Longstreet* advancing from the Holston Valley and meeting him at Kingston, when the whole was to march into the valley of the Duck River: query, against Nashville, the real key of the War? This plan assumed a combined strength of 75,000 men, but *Johnston* shewed that it would give barely 57,000 against Sherman's 110,000, which could deal with the two parts separately from its present position. The trans-Mississippi district was lost to the Confederacy if it could neither break the Union control of the river somewhere, nor engage so many troops to secure it as would cause paralysis elsewhere or make the North lose an important battle, for Banks' expedition was known to have denuded the garrisons to the last degree, and defeat, involving a retreat from distant Shreveport, should destroy it. Sherman would be stopped, and such trouble and delay caused as might tire the North out. In these calculations it was not seen that so long as the North controlled the Mississippi and central Missouri they could disregard the defeat of Banks, for Sherman's Meridian campaign had restricted the Confederates to their troops west of the river, where the Union forces were quite able to hold them fast.

The Blockade was becoming stricter and stricter, and the distress in the Confederacy more and more acute, so that instead of growing cotton as a medium of exchange they were forced to convert Georgia into a wheatfield, to raise food, because they could not deal with cotton. Though their cruisers had practically driven the American flag from the sea, yet this brought no gain to them, as their lack of fighting ships prevented them from utilizing their advantage. (Continued on p. 326.)

THE EAST

(Continued from p. 254.) The first events in this district are more connected with the Chattanooga and Knoxville campaigns in the West than with those in Virginia, the problem being how to deal with *Longstreet*, who had retired into East Tennessee for the winter. Grant came down to see Foster, who had succeeded Burnside, and was watching *Longstreet*, and who suggested that it would be best to let him be quiet where he was as long as possible, since he would do more harm anywhere else, to which Grant agreed. Foster's health broke down, and he was succeeded in command of the Department and Army of the Ohio in February by Schofield from Missouri. As we have seen, *Davis'* proposal for *Longstreet's* and *Johnston's* action was shown to be impracticable, so the former remained where he was till *Lee* sent for him in April.

In January and February¹ the two armies stood watching each other on the Rapidan, but on February 28th Kilpatrick started for a cavalry raid on Richmond to try to release the Union prisoners there. He divided his force into two columns, putting one under Colonel Dahlgren, but a warning was sent to Richmond from the front, and its garrison moved out and stopped both columns. The raid failed, Dahlgren was killed, and papers were found on his body inciting his men to kill *Davis* and his "traitorous crew," which brought a strong letter from *Lee* to Meade, who, however, was able to assure him that no such order had been given to Dahlgren by any military superior. The raid was ordered from Washington without Meade's approval, but although it depended for success on secrecy, was currently discussed there, and the plan got out. Other movements were

¹ Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th.

Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napoleon, January.

S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th.

S. Sooy Smith v. *Forrest*, February 18th.

S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th.

S.E. The "Housatonic" sunk off Charleston, February 18th.

made as diversions, one of which, under Custer, succeeded in drawing off *Stuart's* attention.

On March 3rd, Grant was appointed Lieutenant-General to command the armies of the United States. He at first intended to direct operations from the West, but after he had been to Washington, saw that his place was in the East ; but in the field, not in a hot-bed of intrigue like the Capital. He recognized the awkwardness of being with the Army of the Potomac, but did not delegate authority properly to Meade, and often issued detailed orders over his head. In the West he was succeeded by Sherman, and Sherman by McPherson. The Army of the Potomac was re-organized by consolidating its five Corps into three, numbered the IInd, Vth, and VIth, under Hancock, Warren, and Sedgwick respectively. This has been criticized as a mistake, in view of the very thick country in which they had to work, for which a greater number of smaller commands would have been better. Meade suggested that Grant might want another officer in his place, begging him to consider no one's feelings in the interests of the nation,¹ which much raised him in Grant's esteem ; but he did not want to lose him. He did, however, substitute Sheridan for Pleasonton in command of the cavalry, for he was not satisfied with the reports of cavalry work in the East. Sheridan laid his ideas of it before Meade, viz. to use cavalry as a strong and united body to break down that of the enemy ; but Meade's notions of it were confined to out-posts and scouting and the protection of convoys, and he did not see that the best security lay in defeating the enemy's power of attack. Still, he conceded something, of which Sheridan made full use, but he did not get a free hand till after the battle of Yellow Tavern.

¹ The Shenandoah and Kanawha Valleys were formed into a Department and put under Sigel, Crook being specially charged with the latter. They were to attack the Confederate, and protect the Union, lines of commu-

¹ Maps 47, 56, pp. 338, 388.

nication, Crook going against the Virginia-Tennessee line and the salt works, while Sigel threatened the Virginia Central at Staunton. Crook started at the end of April;¹ he failed in his attack on the salt and lead works at Saltville and Wytheville, but drove the Confederates back at Cloyd's Mountain, and succeeded in breaking the railway bridge over the New River. Sigel says that this stroke would have been much more useful before *Longstreet* returned from Tennessee, for he had just taken post at Gordonsville, on *Lee's* left. Sigel himself moved forward to create a diversion and free Crook, covering his flanks with two cavalry forces; but both were beaten, on May 8th and 13th, by *Morgan*, who was then commanding the Confederate *Department of South-Western Virginia*. Burbridge's division from Kentucky was ordered to reinforce Crook, but when *Morgan* went on his raid into Kentucky at the beginning of June, Burbridge turned back and defeated him (cf. p. 308). Sigel met *Breckinridge* advancing on the other side on May 25th at New Market, and was defeated, losing some guns and retiring down the Valley from one position to another. He heard of Crook's success, and was planning a combined move when Hunter came to succeed him in command of the Department,² under whom he took command of a division (cf. p. 295).

Though some of these operations were successful, yet they did no good as a whole, because *Lee* from his central position was always able to get the advantage. The consequence was that a large force had to be told

- ¹ S.W. Sabine Cross Roads, April 8th.
- S.W. Pleasant Hill, April 9th.
- S.W. Jenkins' Ferry, April 30th.
- W. *Forrest's* Raid, Fort Pillow, April 13th.
- S.E. Confederates retake Plymouth, April 19th.
- W. Sherman moves against *Johnston*, May 5th.
- E. Kautz' Raid, May 4th-12th.
- E. The Wilderness, May 5th-7th.
- E. Spottsylvania, May 8th-18th.
- E. Sheridan's Richmond Raid, May 9th-13th.
- ² W. New Hope Church, May 25th-June 4th.

off to do the work that half the number could have done, early in May. Sigel never had 10,000 men ; Sheridan, who soon followed him, had 40,000. *Lee* recalled *Breckinridge* after Sigel's defeat, but soon had to send him back.

¹ Grant wanted Butler's army to act in concert with the Army of the Potomac, establishing itself to the south of Richmond, and holding City Point as strongly as possible, but Butler's idea was to occupy Bermuda Hundred, which, though good for defence, was not so for offence, holding City Point with a comparatively small force. Butler's, the secondary object, was Richmond, Meade's, the primary one, *Lee's* army. If *Lee* fell back on Richmond, the Army of the James was to unite with that of the Potomac on the river above the town, and they would destroy the Confederate lines of supply according to the direction of his retreat, the force in the Valley acting in concert with them if possible by destroying the lines of supply there, and then making a junction with the main army in Central Virginia. Merely taking Richmond would not prevent *Lee* from retiring westward, where he might perhaps join *Johnston*, and in any case would be most difficult to hem in.

Then, by which flank should the main army move ? To go by the right would give better country but worse communications, but it might prevent *Lee* from interfering with the Valley, which he could now do freely. To go by the left would be to work in difficult country, but the communications would always be short to different points on Chesapeake Bay, following the advance, and no troops would be wanted to guard them. Still, though the troops might fight their way through the thick country, which was thoroughly known to their opponents, the movement of the trains would be difficult, at first at all events, for *Lee's* signal station on Clark's Mountain commanded the whole country. Grant chose the second alternative.

Meade's army, counting Burnside's IXth Corps,

¹ Map 54, p. 386.

which was not added to it till the end of May, was 118,769 strong, with 316 guns, while *Lee's* was 61,953 strong, with 224 guns.

The bulk of the *Army of Northern Virginia* lay along the Rapidan from Barnett's Ford to Horton's Ford, nearly twenty miles. The left was rather refused, the river, front entrenched, and the right covered by the Wilderness, the cavalry being mostly on the lower river, where forage was better. *Longstreet* was at Gordonsville to guard that side, but was too far away when the move came. Headquarters, Orange Court House. A day or two before the army moved, the ubiquitous *Mosby* might have captured Grant, who was returning to the army from Washington by train without any guard. *Mosby* had just crossed the line in pursuit of some Union cavalry: had he seen the train, he would have got a better prize.

THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN, FROM THE RAPIDAN TO
COLD HARBOUR

The Army of the Potomac began to move at midnight on May 3rd,¹ two cavalry divisions leading: Butler started on the 5th. The two columns crossed the river and reached their destinations unmolested, rather to Grant's surprise. A short march was made to keep the trains covered, which did not get over till the afternoon of the 5th. That morning the army moved forward on the roads through the dense woods, and *Lee* planned to do what he had done successfully before, attack it in the flank and pen it up by the river, but this time he had to deal with a very different antagonist. Even *Lee* attempted no bolder stroke than to attack double numbers in thick ground, and had *Longstreet* been at hand when wanted, more might have been done, but he was away at Gordonsville and did not arrive till the best chance had passed. This was one of the disadvantages of watching a long line with inferior forces, which had to be accepted.

¹ W. Sherman marches against *Johnston*, May 5th.

The battle of the 5th was severe, between the IInd and Vth Union Corps and those of *Ewell* and *Hill*; the Union troops were brought to a stand by flank attacks, but *Lee* forbade the bringing on of a general action till *Longstreet* came, so both sides halted and entrenched where they stood. Next day the Confederates repulsed an attack, then made one, and were beaten: just then up came *Longstreet's* men at the double along the plank road, and the Union troops were again checked. Meade sent for reinforcements, and there was a lull till *Longstreet* moved again, driving Birney's division back in confusion, but as he went forward to make dispositions to follow up his success he was severely wounded by his own men, which stopped the Confederate attack. Both sides now tried to combine their efforts in the thick cover, but *Longstreet's* men, now under *Anderson*, drove Hancock's back to their works, Burnside failed to move *Hill*, and after several ineffectual attacks by both sides the fight became stationary, and darkness fell. On the Union right, *Ewell* made a sudden and effectual attack, but gained no real advantage. On this day *Stuart* got the better of Sheridan, who fell back to cover his trains: next day Sheridan beat *Stuart*, but could not pursue and expose the trains. On the 7th, *Lee* had a strong entrenched line across the turnpike and appeared more dangerous than ever; Grant turned his trains off to the left, and moved by that flank in the night to Spottsylvania. On this day the Confederate cavalry made a desperate attempt to get at the huge trains on the Union left rear, defended by their cavalry, which beat them off with heavy loss, both then and on the morning of the 8th. On the 8th, Grant started Sheridan on his cavalry raid to Richmond (cf. p. 295).

No great battle had ever been fought on such ground, for it was almost like fighting blindfold, but *Lee* deliberately chose it because his enemy could not use his superiority of numbers. Grant had tried to force back the Confederate advance on the Orange

plank road and so get between their army and Richmond, while *Lee* tried to strike a crushing blow at the head of Grant's column where it crossed this road and throw it back into the Wilderness in confusion. Both plans failed, but the advantage remained with the Confederates to this extent, that at the end of the battle they were closer to the Union line of march than at the beginning, and had inflicted more loss than they had suffered, but their losses were irreparable; those of the other side were not. The North lost some 15,000 men, the Confederate about 11,000, in killed, wounded, and missing.

On the night of May 7th, *Stuart* informed *Lee* that Grant's trains were moving southward, then that his army was doing the same, and the race for Spottsylvania began. *Stuart's* cavalry blocked the road, the Union infantry came up to dislodge him, and that of his own side in support; after a sharp action, the Confederates held their ground at the Court House, and both sides entrenched. A heavy attack was made later by the Vth and VIth Corps, which was defeated.

Next day, the 9th, *Lee's* army was all up, and took up a line covering Spottsylvania Court House. The position was a great salient with both flanks resting on the river Po, and the right extending over the Fredericksburg road. Both sides strengthened their positions, and while superintending this work, General Sedgwick, commanding the VIth Corps, was killed, a most serious loss to the Union army. On the 10th, Hancock moved round the Confederate left with a reconnaissance in force, and threatened their trains in rear, but *Early* attacked him sharply, and he fell back as ordered. On this day also, the main Confederate lines were furiously assaulted, the last attack being repulsed with fearful loss. On the 11th, there was no serious fighting, and *Lee* thought that Grant was beginning to withdraw from his front, and expecting another race for the next position, he ordered some guns to be withdrawn from places whence they would

be difficult to move in a hurry, on the left and centre, most of those at the point of the salient being removed. This position had been occupied because it was good for artillery and would have been advantageous for the enemy, but as such a projection is always more or less dangerous, the apex of the salient had been strengthened by a line across its base. At dawn on the 12th, a strong attack forced this point, the guns were sent back to support the defence, but only came in time to be taken, with almost the whole of *Johnson's* division. The supports, however, quickly occupied the line in rear, and Hancock's attack was stopped, *Lee* putting in every man to save his centre: all that day, and far into the night, raged the desperate hand-to-hand struggle across the Confederate breastworks, in rear of which a shorter and better line was being made, which was taken up at dawn on the 13th.¹ From then to the 18th, the army was gradually shifted more to the eastward to meet the extension of Grant's left, as before. On the latter day came a last great effort by the IInd and VIth Corps to force the line here, which was the greatest failure of all, after which the advance of the Army of the Potomac by its left flank began again, and *Ewell* was sent to head it off on the 19th:² he held on all the next day and then had to withdraw, but delayed the operation for twenty-four hours. In no other battle in this desperate War was the fighting so heavy and long-continued or the losses so awful, and it was from here that Grant wrote the famous letter to Halleck, in which he said, "I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer."

On the night of the 20th, Hancock was sent towards Richmond, hoping to tempt *Lee* to attack and expose himself to a counter in the open, but he saw the trap, and reported the move to Richmond. *Pickett*, in command there, moved out and stopped Hancock, and then the rest of the Union army marched off for the

¹ W. Sherman at Resaca, May 13th-16th.

² W. Sherman at Cassville, May 19th-22nd.

North Anna, the Confederate army starting next morning. This time *Lee* had the advantage of marching by the chord of the arc on which Grant was moving and was able to take position on the south bank, and rest his men, before the Union army appeared, on the 23rd.

The position which *Lee* had now taken up to stop Grant's advance is about the most astonishing instance of military checkmate on record, and cannot be more clearly explained than in the words of the Confederate *General Law*: "It did not seem to be *General Lee's* purpose to offer any serious resistance to Grant's passage of the river at the points selected. His lines had been retired from it at both these points, but touched it at Ox Ford, a point intermediate between them. Hancock's Corps, having secured the Chesterfield bridge, crossed over it on the morning of the 24th, and, extending down the river, moved out till it came upon *Longstreet's* and *Ewell's* Corps in position and ready for battle. The VIth Corps (General Wright) crossed at Jericho Mill and joined Warren. The two wings of Grant's army were safely across the river, but there was no connection between them. *Lee* had only thrown back his flanks, and let them in on either side, while he held the river between them: and when General Grant attempted to throw his centre, under Burnside, across the ford and the bridge, it was very severely handled, and failed to get a foothold on the south side. A detachment from Warren's Corps was sent down on the south side, to help Burnside across, but was attacked by *Mahone's* division, and driven back with heavy loss, narrowly escaping capture. General Grant found himself in what may be called a military dilemma. He had cut his army in two by running it upon the point of a wedge. He could not break the point, which rested upon the river, and the attempt to force it out of place by striking on its sides must necessarily be made without much concert of action between the two

wings of his army, neither of which could reinforce the other without crossing the river twice; while his opponent could readily transfer his troops, as needed, from one wing to the other, across the narrow space between them."

For two days Grant tried every way to get forward, but *Lee's* position was absolutely impregnable: the master of numbers was completely foiled by the master of fence. *Lee* has been blamed for not following up Grant's repulse by an attack, but not only was he ill at the time, almost confined to his tent, but it would have been foolhardy to attempt to cross the river and attack double numbers in open country. *Lee*, however, thought that he had lost a chance of gaining an advantage.

On the morning of the 27th,¹ Grant's army had disappeared, and again the race began, *Lee* trying to head him off: on the 28th, a severe cavalry action was fought at Hawes' Shop; this gained time for the Confederate infantry to fortify a position on Totopotomoy Creek, which Grant found too strong to attack, so again "sidled off," to Cold Harbour.

On the 31st, Sheridan's cavalry had taken possession of Cold Harbour, and was followed by the VIth Corps, and three divisions under Smith, from the Army of the James. *Longstreet's* Corps and part of *Hill's* were thrown across their front on June 1st, but although at first driven back, restored their line: both sides entrenched, and it looked like a repetition of Spottsylvania. On June 2nd, *Early* attacked the Vth and IXth Corps, preventing their co-operation in the next day's battle. During the night the Confederate line was shortened and strengthened, and repulsed a great attack the next morning with the most awful loss, the whole affair only lasting eight or ten minutes. Although Grant issued orders for a general attack, both that afternoon and the next day, they could not

¹ W. Sherman at New Hope Church, May 25th-June 4th.
Mexico. Maximilian lands, May 28th.

be carried out, so appalled were all ranks by the slaughter. The army was therefore directed to entrench where it stood. *Lee* had to send away troops to the Valley at this time, which prevented him from taking the offensive (cf. p. 296). *Ewell* resigned command of the *Second Corps* from ill-health, and was transferred to the lines of Richmond, being succeeded by *Early*.

During this campaign from the Wilderness to Cold Harbour, two secondary operations had been going on: the first, the move of Butler's army to the James, the second, Sheridan's raid on Richmond.

¹ Butler's army of the James (cf. p. 300), consisting of the Xth and XVIIth Corps, an independent division, and Kautz' cavalry division, moved on May 5th by sea to the south side of the James, and took up a position at Bermuda Hundred, which it entrenched across between the Appomattox and the James, but not as Grant wanted, for the main force was not at City Point. On the 9th, Butler moved out against the defences of Richmond and carried a part of the Confederate lines at Drury's Bluff on the night of the 13th, but on the 16th he was driven back into his lines by *Beauregard*, who entrenched a line opposite him, bottling him up so that he could safely be held with a small force, which would allow of reinforcements being sent to *Lee*, but this cut both ways, for Butler was also strong enough to detach three divisions to Cold Harbour and send his cavalry under Kautz to attack the Danville railway. Kautz started on the 12th and got back on the 18th, having destroyed some stations and trains and part of the Danville line, and then done the same to the South Side line.

On the Confederate side, *Beauregard*, a first-rate engineer, had been brought from Charleston where the danger seemed to have blown over, to command at Richmond where it was imminent, *Pickett* taking charge of the lines of Petersburg.

¹ Maps 54, 55, p. 386.

On May 8th, Grant ordered Sheridan to make a raid towards Richmond (cf. p. 289): he started on the Fredericksburg road next day with 10,000 men, and destroyed part of the Virginia Central line, *Stuart* concentrating against him. On the 11th, they met at Yellow Tavern, only six miles from Richmond: a severe battle ensued in which the Confederates were defeated and *Stuart* mortally wounded. His loss was a most serious one to *Lee*, and he was, like Sedgwick, mourned by both armies. Sheridan moved forward in the night and lost his way in the mud, close to the defences of Richmond, where the command was in a most dangerous trap, but was extricated by his indomitable pluck, and marched round to Haxall's Landing, on the James; here he got supplies from Butler, started back on the 21st, and rejoined Grant four days later, having drawn off and defeated *Lee's* cavalry, with the loss of their leader, damaged his communications, and, especially, given a moral strength and confidence to the Union cavalry which it never afterwards lost.

¹ When Hunter relieved Sigel in the Valley (cf. p. 286), he was ordered to strike at Staunton, and at Gordonsville or Charlottesville, to hold as many Confederate troops as possible, try to join Crook at Staunton, thence move to Lynchburg, and destroy the railway and canal there: he was specially ordered to live on the country. He moved out on May 26th with 8,500 men and 21 guns, driving back a Confederate force, and occupying Staunton on June 6th, Crook joining him on the 8th with nearly 10,000 men. He thoroughly destroyed the Virginia Central line and the factories and stores at Staunton, going on to strike at Lynchburg, a manufacturing town in a rich district, the most important town to *Lee* after Richmond, but his cavalry was away on a raid and out of touch, which delayed him at Lexington and saved Lynchburg, for the Confederates

¹ Map 47, p. 338.

repaired the railway and closed in. *Lee* had sent back *Breckinridge* against Sigel on June 7th, and when he heard of Hunter's advance, *Early's* Corps followed on the 13th. *Early* moved to attack Hunter in rear, for he had gone by the west of the town: the other side would have been better as threatening Gordonsville, and giving him a better line of retreat. He was driven through Buford's Gap down the Kanawha Valley, but *Early* did not follow far, wishing to keep in touch with *Lee*. Hunter's men suffered severely in the retreat, for the country was barren and their main depot had been moved from Meadow Bluff to Gauley Bridge, as safer from raids. They met the first supplies on June 27th, and their troubles ended.

Grant has been blamed for these campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley, but he could well afford to divide his army, while *Lee* could not, and he thus forced *Lee* to detach largely (cf. p. 294). Hunter had done more than he expected, and had got well out of a difficult fix, but strategically he had uncovered the Valley and the way to Washington more than Sigel had done, though defeated. *Lee* took full advantage of this, and ordered *Early* and *Breckinridge* to strike at Maryland and again play on the fears of the Washington politicians, to relieve Richmond. Sheridan was sent to co-operate with Hunter, destroying the railway at Trevilian Station and near Charlottesville. Wherever he came on the line, he broke it, and had a sharp action at Trevilian Station with the Confederate cavalry: though he drove them back, he heard nothing of Hunter, and returned. He started on June 7th, and rejoined the army on the 29th.

The battle of Cold Harbour definitely defeated Grant's plan of interposing between *Lee* and Richmond, and Richmond had been made so strong that he went round to the south and besieged Petersburg, in the end. At this time he debated whether to

continue his move by the left to the south of the James, or invest Richmond from the north. Though the latter seemed to protect Washington the best, the communications via Fredericksburg would be exposed, and those of *Lee*, to the south, unmolested. The hope of beating *Lee* to the north of Richmond had also failed, so Grant determined to hold his ground, sending the cavalry to break the railways to the west, and then to move the army to the south side of the James. Meade sent Wilson, with his own and Kautz' cavalry divisions, to cut the Weldon and Southside railways and go on doing damage till stopped. He started on the 22nd, and did much damage, but was surrounded by the Confederate cavalry and beaten at Reams' Station, losing all his guns: the wreck of the command got back on July 2nd. Grant did not blame him, thinking that the damage balanced the loss, for he had marched 300 miles in ten days, destroying 60 miles of railway and much rolling-stock.

Grant remained opposite *Lee's* lines at Cold Harbour till June 12th,¹ when he moved the army across the James, the leading troops reaching the river the next night. Smith had been sent back to Butler for an attack on Petersburg on the 10th, which failed: another attack was made on the afternoon and evening of the 15th, and a gap made in the Confederate line, but Smith lost time by securing his own line instead of seizing the chance, which by the next morning had passed away. The Confederates admitted that he had had the prize in his grasp. Next day all the army was up, and attacks were made on it and the two following days, gaining some ground, but driving *Lee* back to a stronger line. Up to the 18th the place had been defended by *Beauregard*, but on that day the *Army of Northern*

¹ W. Sherman at Kenesaw Mountain, June 10th-30th.

Cherbourg. The "Kearsarge" sinks the "*Alabama*," June 19th.

Mexico. Maximilian enters Mexico City, June 12th.

Virginia began to come in and occupy the works. *Lee* had kept outside to defend Richmond, not at first thinking that Grant was really going to strike at Petersburg, but at last *Beauregard's* report and his own observations convinced him. The Union army surrounded the place, but without attacking, and the long siege of Petersburg had begun. The Confederates had formed a strong flotilla on the James, including some ironclads, which tried to molest Grant's move across to the south side, but he had a sufficient force of monitors and other vessels to hold them in check, and also placed obstructions in the river.

When the *Army of Northern Virginia* fell back on Richmond, the Confederates felt the want of a Commander-in-Chief badly, for *Beauregard*, whose plans had to fit in with *Lee's*, was not under his command, and all communications passed through *Bragg*, the *President's* Chief Staff Officer. *Lee*, also, had been ill during the retreat from the North Anna to Cold Harbour, perhaps the most critical and anxious time of all for making plans for co-operation and the defence of Richmond.

When the Army of the Potomac found itself stopped by the defences of Petersburg, Grant determined to invest the place partially by a line of works stretching round towards the Southside Railway, consisting of redoubts connected by infantry parapets, from which the army might be moved at any time against the railways or *Lee's* army, leaving a small force to hold them against attack. The Confederate works were similar, except that their redoubts were not closed in rear.

Grant's policy of wearing down *Lee's* army by mere attrition, on the principle that the North could afford to lose men while the South could not, would have failed before the enormous losses of this campaign, with a less resolute man. The fighting was mostly what the great Duke of Wellington called "bludgeon work," and the losses of the Army

of the Potomac, in the forty-three days from the Rapidan to the James, came to the appalling total of 60,000 men: 3,000 more were lost in the last ten days of June, and Butler lost about 7,000: total for May and June, 70,000. *Lee's* losses in the same time were 20,000. For desperate and sustained fighting, there was nothing in the War to equal that at Spottsylvania, but the greatest slaughter in a short time, with its paralyzing moral effect, was at Cold Harbour. (Continued on p. 331.)

THE SOUTH-EAST

(Continued from p. 257.) In accordance with the plan to get one of the seceded States to take a nominal part in the Presidential Election in the North for political reasons, and the selection of Florida for the experiment (cf. p. 280), President Lincoln wrote to Gillmore, in whose Department Florida was, in January,¹ and he sent a division under Seymour, which was accompanied by five gunboats. It was thought that a column striking inland from Jacksonville might break up the internal communications and form a base for Union sympathizers. The declared objects were: (1) To procure an outlet for the raw products of the State. (2) To cut off the enemy's supplies. (3) To recruit for the coloured regiments. (4) To restore Florida to her allegiance.

The expedition landed at Jacksonville on February 7th,² and a proclamation was issued, calling on the people to take the oath of allegiance, and declaring that the State had now passed under Union control. Seymour advised taking a strong position on the coast which would be an equally good rallying place for Union people, without the risk of an expedition inland, but

¹ S.W. Banks recalled from Texas, January 4th.

Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th.

Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napoleon, January.

² S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th.

S. Sooy Smith v. *Forrest*, February 18th.

was ordered to go on. By the 13th the Confederates had collected about 5,400 men and 12 guns, under *Finegan*, at Ocean Pond on the Olustee. The country was open, but the small lakes were obstructions. Seymour advanced with about an equal force, and after a hard fight had to retire to Jacksonville with the loss of 6 guns, and thus ended the attempt to bring Florida back into the Union. Soon afterwards, when Grant consolidated all the outlying forces that could be spared for service at decisive points, most of these coast forces were withdrawn and sent to the Army of the James as the Xth Corps, under Gillmore (cf. p. 294).

The Confederates had built a formidable ironclad ram, the "*Albemarle*," on the Roanoke River: she was of their usual central battery type, with inclined sides and low ends, and was protected by four inches of armour in two thicknesses; she had twin-screws and good engine power, and carried a heavy gun at each end of the battery, so mounted that it could be fought in line with the keel or on either side.

They decided to attack the town of Plymouth, then held by Union forces, and *General Hoke* was ordered to co-operate. On April 18th,¹ the "*Albemarle*" went down the river, passed the forts without injury, rammed and sunk one Union boat, and drove off another. By the use of her ram she was nearly lost, for vessels of her type are not adapted either to give or receive a blow with the stem: having no proper "inclined water-line" they cannot offer effectual resistance against being dragged or pushed down, and swamped. The next morning, *Hoke* attacked the land works and carried them, but with heavy loss.

On May 5th,² the "*Albemarle*" steamed down the river into Albemarle Sound with two transports in company to fight the Union squadron, four double-

¹ S.W. Red River Expedition, March 8th-May 19th.

² E. Grant marches against *Lee*, May 3rd.

W. Sherman marches against *Johnston*, May 5th.

ended gunboats and some armed steamers. A sharp action ensued, in which her armour proved a complete protection, but she was nearly sunk by being rammed by the gunboat "*Sassacus*." She replied with a shot through her assailant's boilers which put her out of action, another gunboat signalled that she was sinking, and the Union squadron drew off: this was prudent, the object being to hold the inland waters, which could not have been done had more ships been disabled. Both sides retired, and the "*Albemarle*" lay off Plymouth, strongly guarded on all sides: her mere presence there was a terror to her enemies.

Lieutenant Cushing of the "*Monticello*" had made a name for himself in the Navy by the most daring exploits: he had raided the Confederate headquarters at Smithville, Cape Fear River, and in June had reconnoitred up to Wilmington, and captured some despatches; he had also found out that the Confederates had destroyed their ironclad the "*Raleigh*." This was clearly the man for a desperate service, like the cutting out or destruction of the "*Albemarle*," so Admiral Lee sent for him, agreed to his plan of attacking with two armed launches, and sent him to Washington to lay it before the Secretary of the Navy. (Continued on p. 353.)

THE WEST

(Continued from p. 268.) Early in the year¹ there was a good deal of guerilla warfare in Tennessee and Kentucky, which the scattered Union forces were powerless to check. The head and front of the trouble was the ubiquitous *Forrest*, who raided up

¹ Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th.

Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napoleon, January.

S.W. Banks recalled from Texas, January 4th.

S.E. The "*Housatonic*" sunk off Charleston, February 17th.

S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th.

S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th.

S. Sooy Smith v. *Forrest*, February 18th.

S.W. Red River Expedition, March 8th-May 19th.

from the south (cf. p. 310) early in April, between the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, as far as Paducah, where he was repulsed, and then turned back towards Memphis, attacking and taking Fort Pillow, which was held by coloured troops: his men began to massacre the garrison, but he stopped the slaughter as soon as he came up. Sherman acquits him from blame, saying that the policy, which he himself had always opposed, of raising troops from their own slaves to keep them in order in their own districts, made the Confederates so "fearfully savage" that they became quite uncontrollable on such occasions. After this *Forrest* went back into Mississippi.

When Sherman succeeded Grant in the West, the XIth and XIIth Corps were amalgamated to form a new XXth under Hooker, Howard took the IVth Corps, and a cavalry corps of four divisions was formed, but these seem to have been distributed among the different armies before the advance. He had the Armies of the Cumberland, IVth, XIVth, and XXth Corps, under Thomas, of the Tennessee, XVth, XVIth, and XVIIth Corps, under McPherson (of which the two former had each a division with Banks,¹ and the latter did not join till June), and that of the Ohio, under Schofield, the XXIIIrd Corps, less a division in Kentucky under Burbridge. Sherman was most anxious to get back the divisions lent to Banks before he started, but it was soon clear that he must go without them.

The base of the Army of the Cumberland was Louisville, and Cincinnati for that of the Ohio, the great problem being that of supplies. Nashville, the chief depot, was 136 miles from Chattanooga, in the enemy's country, and had to be guarded. The Army of the Cumberland had practically the control of the railways, which caused friction, so Sherman took charge

¹ These two divisions were under A. J. Smith, and never rejoined their Corps. They were renumbered as the XVIth Corps, the other divisions of the old XVIth going to fill up the XVIIth, but for a time there were two corps numbered XVI (cf. pp. 344, 362).

of them himself, and, with the patriotic help of Mr. Guthrie, the President of the Louisville and Nashville Railway, collected sufficient transport for the work. He aimed at getting together a picked force of 100,000 men, in the lightest possible marching order, to be ready by May 1st. The actual strength then was 98,797 men and 254 guns, not counting Stoneman's and Garrard's cavalry divisions, which soon joined.

The key to the topography of the country south of Chattanooga is the direction of the Alleghany Chain, nearly N.N.E. and S.S.W. of which the eastern ranges run out, ending in broken country. Sherman was practically tied to the railway, for if he made Cleveland his base he would uncover Tennessee. *Johnston* quite saw this, and made his main position at Dalton impregnable, hoping that Sherman would come to grief against it. Sherman first planned to threaten him in front and send McPherson out beyond Resaca against his communications; but McPherson's army was so weak that it was brought closer up, and sent against Resaca by a shorter way, where it would be in touch with the army. Sherman was at his Department Headquarters at Nashville till the end of April, when he went to the front, and on May 5th,¹ the day fixed by Grant, the army started. On the 7th it came up to *Johnston's* position, naturally strong and artificially strengthened to the utmost, and the orders were to hold him while McPherson went round by Snake Creek Gap, which was a complete surprise to the Confederates; but even so, *Johnston* had so guarded his rear that McPherson found Resaca too strong to attack, and fortified a position at the mouth of the gap, to which he retired. Sherman thinks that in this he was over-cautious and lost the chance of a lifetime; but it must not be forgotten that the

¹ S.W. Jenkins' Ferry, April 30th.

E. Grant marches against *Lee*, May 3rd.

E. The Wilderness, May 5th-7th.

whole movement depended on McPherson, and that he was not in chief command. Though the position was now untenable, *Johnston* held on at Dalton all the 10th,¹ but retired suddenly on the 11th and had his whole army in well-prepared defences at Resaca, before Sherman's, which had moved first, could deploy against them. Sherman again planned to hold him in place by an attack while he sent troops to get in his rear, across the Oostenaula River, to attack the railway near Calhoun. On the 15th,² the entrenchments of Resaca were sharply attacked, but *Johnston* held his own and retired at night: though his army was only half as strong as Sherman's, he had the advantages of positions fortified in advance by gangs of negroes, under his engineers, and of concentration. The Union army, on the contrary, was more or less dispersed, and had to grope its way by tracks over the roughest country. Though *Johnston* retired in the night of the 15th, and pursuit was immediate, his rearguard was not overtaken till the evening of the 17th,³ and the next morning had again disappeared. The Union army reached Kingston on the 19th, and the enemy was reported to be in a strong position at Cassville, four miles to the east: Thomas' and Schofield's armies were converging on this place, and McPherson was directed to strike at the railway in rear of it. The Confederate rearguard fell back on its lines in excellent order, and preparations were made for Thomas and Schofield to attack next day, but in the morning *Johnston* had again disappeared. Sherman, knowing the Confederate army to be about 60,000 strong, in three Corps, could not see why so good a position had been abandoned; but *Johnston* told him after the War that he had fully intended

¹ E. Spottsylvania, May 8th-18th.

E. Sheridan's Richmond Raid, May 9th-13th.

E. Cloyd's Mountain and Wytheville, May 10th.

² E. Butler before Richmond: Drury's Bluff, May 12th-16th.

³ S.W. Banks at Simsport: end of Red River Expedition, May 16th-19th.

to fight, but that owing to a disagreement with his generals, he continued the retreat beyond the Etowah River and the Allatoona Range of mountains, where he held the hills to the south with a thin line, with his main body in reserve. The country here was more broken, and gave him a better choice of positions.

The art of repairing railways had been brought to such marvellous perfection by Colonel Wright, Sherman's railway engineer, that *Johnston's* destruction of them caused very little delay. The camp joke ran that he "carried a spare tunnel along."

Sherman halted at Cassville a few days to rest his men, repair communications, and get up supplies. Knowing the country, and the great strength of the Allatoona Pass, through which the railway runs, which was *Johnston's* line of retreat, he determined to turn it via Dallas, the Army of the Cumberland, in the centre, marching straight on that place, that of the Ohio to the left of it, and the Army of the Tennessee to the right, rather to the south. It would be a difficult and risky move to leave the railway and depend on the waggons for twenty days, in a thick and almost roadless country; but it was the lesser evil of the two.

The march started on the 23rd,¹ and on the 25th all the columns were moving on Dallas and came into touch with the enemy near that place. The Confederates were ready for them behind a strong line of works, near the centre of which, at New Hope Church, there was some very severe fighting, on that and the following days.² This line completely blocked the Union march to get round south of the Allatoona Pass, and in touch with the railway again, as soon as possible. Sherman wanted to pass McPherson's army from right to left, but a strong force in front held it

¹ E. Lee on the North Anna, May 23rd-27th.

² Mexico. Maximilian lands, May 28th.

E. Hawes' Shop, May 28th.

E. Totopotomoy, May 29th-31st.

fast, and it could not move before June 1st: the whole army though was gradually sidling away to the left, towards Acworth, by continuous fighting, both sides extending their lines in hot action.

On June 1st,¹ Sherman sent two cavalry divisions to seize the ends of the Allatoona Pass, and ordered the railway to be repaired from Kingston forward. On the 4th, the move to the railway was made, *Johnston* having gone. This closed the first phase of the campaign, in which, practically in the month of May, the Union army had advanced 100 miles over the most difficult country from Chattanooga to Big Shanty, with continuous, but not heavy fighting, till they got to New Hope Church. The Union loss amounted to 9,299, all told, while the Confederate loss was 5,393, not counting missing, probably about 8,500 in all. Sherman's cavalry divisions joining had brought in some 7,500 men, making about 105,000 in all, while *Johnston* started the campaign with 42,856 men, but *Polk's* Corps and other troops gave him over 64,000 men at New Hope Church.

When *Johnston* moved away from his front, Sherman shifted McPherson's army, which was stronger than Schofield's, to the left, and Schofield's to the right, of Thomas, and strengthened Allatoona as a secondary base. Blair came in on the 8th with the two good divisions of the XVIIth Corps, which balanced the losses. On the 10th, the army advanced against the very strong position on three hills, Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain, which however was rather long for the defending force. It commanded all the approaches, and made great caution necessary, while the wet weather delayed movements. The Confederate cavalry were threatening the communications, and *Forrest* beat Sturgis on the 10th (cf. p. 308), who had been sent against him from Memphis, but was held off by other Union forces.

A long line of works was made in front of *Johnston's*

¹ E. Cold Harbour, June 1st-12th.

by the 14th,¹ and the weather improved: on this day *General Polk* was killed when going round his lines on Kenesaw Mountain. Though the Union troops gained some ground next day, they found better lines confronting them, as strong as a permanent fort: the work of fortification was so severe that Sherman organized pioneer corps of freed slaves, which was a great saving to his men. *Johnston* kept contracting his line, and Sherman thought that this was to collect a force for offence, to strike at the railway on which he depended. A large Confederate cavalry force passed to his rear, of which he warned his communication troops.

The Union army worked on the principle of an advance against fortified positions, gaining ground by degrees, by continuous fighting, but as soon as they took one line, they found a new one confronting them: Schofield therefore ordered his army to take so much ground that *Johnston* must over-extend and weaken himself. On the 27th, a great assault was made, which failed, but the Union men held their ground and made works close to the Confederate lines. They lost about 2,500 men, the Confederates 800. In this fortnight's fighting, both sides being in fortified lines, Sherman records that all attacks failed, by whichever side made. Meanwhile Schofield had moved to a position threatening *Johnston's* retreat, Stoneman's cavalry was nearly up to the Chattahoochee on the right, and Sherman, to avoid the fearful losses of attacking entrenchments, planned to move round again as before, leaving the railway, striking it again at Fulton, and trusting to the cavalry to hold Allatoona, his immediate base. This ended the month of June, in which Sherman's army lost 7,500, *Johnston's* nearly 6,000, a great contrast to the awful butcher's bill in the East.

¹ W. Burbridge beats *Morgan* at Cynthiana, Ky., June 12th.

E. Siege of Petersburg begins, June 15th.

E. Action of Ream's Station, June 22nd.

Cherbourg. The "Kearsarge" sinks the "*Alabama*," June 19th.

Mexico. Maximilian enters Mexico City, June 12th.

When they reached Kingston, the armies moved into what we have for convenience called the Southern Division of the theatre of war, in which these operations will be continued (cf. p. 341).

¹ Sherman had sent Sturgis from Memphis to drive *Forrest* back and cover the communications (cf. p. 306). He started on June 1st with two small cavalry brigades and some infantry, 5,000 men, and two batteries. On the 10th, he reached Brice's Cross Roads, and met *Forrest*. After a hard fight, lasting all day, he was driven back with the loss of all his guns, and a small infantry brigade which came up could not retrieve the crushing defeat. Sherman expected that raids along his whole line of communications would follow. General Smith, with the two divisions from Banks' army, had returned to Memphis on June 9th, and was ordered to join Canby at Mobile, but the occasion was so urgent that he was sent against *Forrest* instead, and by the end of June had advanced as far as La Grange. *Wheeler* attacked the Nashville and Chattanooga railway, but Rousseau, commanding at Nashville, drove him off.

Morgan, who was in command of the *Department of South-Western Virginia*, which included part of east Tennessee (cf. p. 286), had been fighting against Crook and Averell in Virginia in May, and heard that they were to be reinforced: he had also been instructed by *Buckner*, his predecessor in command, to strike at Kentucky. He started with about 2,000 men, drove off the Union garrison of Pound Gap and pushed on, sending detachments to cut the railways, to stop troops being sent from the north, but Burbridge, commanding a division of the XXIIIrd Corps and a cavalry division, moving from Kentucky to join Crook, heard of this march and doubled back. *Morgan* took Mount Sterling on the 9th, but a detachment which he had left there was routed by the Union cavalry that night. He took Lexington next day, then Cyn-

¹ Map 49A, p. 360.

thiana, capturing a cavalry brigade coming up to its relief, but on the 12th Burbridge came up in force and routed him with the loss of half his command. He got back to Abingdon, Virginia, on June 20th. Though defeated, he had caused the diversion he intended, and delayed the apprehended incursion into south-western Virginia for some months.

At the beginning of the year, the commands in Missouri and Arkansas were divided, Rosecrans coming to take the former, on January 28th, while Steele was confirmed in the latter, which he had formerly commanded under Schofield, who, as we have seen, succeeded Foster in the Department of the Ohio. In March, Pleasonton came to command Rosecrans' cavalry.

(For MISSISSIPPI FLOTILLA, cf. p. 313.) (Continued on p. 359.)

THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-WEST

(Continued from pp. 269, 270.) At the end of 1863, Banks had occupied several places on the Texan coast, but in the beginning of January¹ Halleck sent him back to New Orleans to prepare for the Red River Expedition, which had to be made in the spring in combination with the Navy. In order to clear the Mississippi River and Valley and free as many men as possible for the campaign in the West, the attack of *Johnston's* army, and advance to Atlanta, Banks and Porter were to strike to the west up the Red River, while Sherman swept the Confederate troops out of central Mississippi. One great object was to drive back *Forrest*, for which General Sooy Smith, who was at Memphis with 2,500 cavalry, was to start the first week in February, when Sherman moved from Vicksburg. A Confederate concentration against Sherman might enable Smith to strike south from Corinth and destroy the railway, and when Sherman had broken

¹ Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th.

Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napoleon, January.

the line crossing it at Meridian,* Memphis and Nashville would be safe from a large force for some time.

Polk commanded the Confederates near Meridian, two divisions of infantry and two of cavalry, not counting *Forrest's* command. Sherman marched on February 3rd with four divisions straight for Meridian, and drove the Confederate cavalry before him, but they harassed his march steadily, and once nearly took him prisoner: their infantry made no stand.¹ He remained at Meridian several days, breaking railways and destroying stores. He gave out that he was going to Mobile, to distract attention, for he really meant to be back at Vicksburg on March 1st to co-operate with Banks on the Red River, but Grant forbade this, and ordered him back to his army at Huntsville, Alabama.

*To return to Sooy Smith. He was to start from near Memphis on February 1st, with 7,000 cavalry and 20 guns, destroy the enemy's communications, drive back his cavalry, and meet Sherman at Meridian on the 10th. He was delayed by floods and did not reach West Point, between Tupelo and Meridian, till the 18th,² where he came on *Forrest* in a strong position, and retired, *Forrest* following. On the 22nd,³ a sharp fight took place much in *Forrest's* favour, who took 6 guns, and the Union retreat became a rout before reaching Memphis. *Forrest* had only 2,500 men. After re-organizing his command, he moved north, raiding into Kentucky (cf. p. 302). (Continued on p. 341.)

THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION (Map 51, p. 362)

The plan for this expedition was that Porter's flotilla, taking Smith's force in transports, should move up the Red River and be at Alexandria on March 17th, while Banks marched across from the

¹ S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th.

² The "Housatonic" sunk off Charleston, February 17th.

³ E. Kilpatrick's and Dahlgren's Raid to Richmond, February 28th-March 4th.

* Map 49A, p. 360.

Tèche and joined them there, and that Steele should come and meet them at Shreveport. Two armies and a fleet, hundreds of miles apart, were to concentrate on a given day within the enemy's lines, on a difficult river, which was both obstructed and fortified, a most risky plan. Smith had 10,000 men, Banks 17,000, Steele 15,000, 42,000 in all, while *Kirby Smith*, commanding the Confederate *Department*, could oppose them with 25,000. *Taylor*, commanding in western Louisiana, covered Alexandria with one division, which fell back when the flotilla and Smith's force came up and took Fort De Russy on the 13th, in front of that place.

Banks was detained at New Orleans by Lincoln's orders, installing the new Governor and officials of the "free State" of Louisiana, and directed Franklin to start with the troops, the larger part of the XIIIth and XIXth Corps, and a raw cavalry division under Albert Lee. Lee reached Alexandria on the 19th, Banks on the 24th, and the infantry the two following days. On the 27th, Banks received fresh orders from the Commander-in-Chief to return Smith's force to Sherman in less than a month whether Shreveport were taken or not, and that he was himself then to go against Mobile, but the expedition was not countermanded. Banks might get to Shreveport, and might be joined by Steele in time: both were unlikely, but he took the risk. The river was lower than usual, and the progress of the flotilla slow, the heavier boats being unable to pass the rapids above the town, behind which *Taylor's* force was waiting, but he was surprised near Henderson's Hill, lost most of his cavalry, and retired beyond Natchitoches as the Union army advanced, now only 26,000 strong. *Magruder* however sent him a cavalry division from Texas, and two of infantry, from *Price* in Arkansas, were on their way. His enemy was toiling over a barren stretch of country, with a huge length of train to guard, on one road, across which he took up a good position

at Sabine Cross Roads. On April 8th, he suddenly attacked the Union flank and drove it in: reinforcements were brought up by Franklin, who was wounded, but they only staved off defeat for a time: the whole army was driven back in disorder, but a brigade came up in rear and stopped the pursuit. The campaign was lost to Banks, with Shreveport only two marches in front. *Price's* two infantry divisions joined *Taylor* that night. The Union army took position at Pleasant Hill, and *Taylor*, following in pursuit, attacked them there: after a fierce battle, in which about 12,000 men were engaged on each side, the Confederates were completely beaten and fell back in confusion. *Kirby Smith* joined *Taylor* that night, and decided to move against Steele, leaving *Taylor* to harass Banks. Banks now fell back on the river, where the flotilla was in great difficulties, but it managed to reach the falls of Alexandria with the loss of one ironclad, and here the real trouble began. *Taylor* attacked, but was driven off, and then Hunter came¹ with orders from Grant to Banks to end the campaign, but this was easier said than done, for he could not abandon the twelve gunboats and thirty transports in their perilous situation, with the water falling, and an active enemy on both banks. Colonel Bailey, an engineer, raised the water by building dams till they were able to pass, but only by stripping the ironclads of some armour, and destroying a number of guns. The building of the dams and passing of the boats took from April 30th to May 13th,² and the whole expedition reach Simsport on the 16th, losing several vessels on the way. After a sharp rearguard action they crossed the Atchafalaya safely on the 19th.

¹ W. *Forrest's* Raid, Fort Pillow, April 13th.

S.E. The Confederates retake Plymouth, April 20th.

² S.W. Jenkins' Ferry, April 30th.

E. Grant marches against *Lee*, May 3rd.

W. Sherman marches against *Johnston*, May 5th.

E. The Wilderness, May 5th-7th.

E. Spottsylvania, May 8th-18th.

Thus ended this ill-fated expedition, which produced recriminations on both sides; Porter and Banks were at loggerheads, and the latter found that Canby had been put over him; several Union commanders were changed, Porter was replaced by Lee, and, on the other side, *Taylor* attacked *Kirby Smith*, his commander, so bitterly, for losing such a chance, that he was relieved. It being considered too late to use Banks' army against Mobile, the XIXth, with part of the XIIIth, Corps, were sent to Grant in the East.

We have seen that part of the plan of the Red River Expedition was that Steele should co-operate with Banks from Arkansas. He started and drove back *Price*, who had sent reinforcements to *Taylor*, but on hearing of Banks' retreat, and that *Price* had been reinforced, fell back on Little Rock. *Price* attacked him in his retreat, and a severe battle took place at Jenkins' Ferry on the Saline River on April 30th, in which the Confederates were badly beaten, and Steele continued his march without molestation. His district was put under Canby, commanding the Gulf Department, as Sherman could not now give attention to it. *Price* planned an incursion into Missouri and began collecting his force, but did not move for some months (cf. p. 360).

The army being now mostly removed from the Mississippi, very heavy patrolling duty devolved on the gunboat flotilla; several expeditions were undertaken up the Yazoo in pursuit of raiders, and the service up the Tennessee and Cumberland, in rear of the army, became so important that an 11th gunboat division was formed. (Continued on p. 359.)

THE BLOCKADE

(Continued from p. 271.) The Blockade was steadily increasing in stringency, and the Confederacy felt the pinch severely: all efforts to raise it by fighting ships

having failed, they turned their attention more to submarine attack with torpedoes.

In the district of the North Atlantic Squadron two attacks were made, on the U.S. frigates "Minnesota" and "Roanoke," on April 9th and 12th.¹ In both cases the torpedo was exploded close under the ship. The "Minnesota" seems to have kept a bad look-out, and her assailant, a "David" or submarine, was seen making off: the ship was little the worse. The "Roanoke" was badly shaken, but not endangered: nothing was seen of her assailant. If the spar torpedo was fired by electricity, not contact, the small damage done may be due to its having been fired prematurely, on account of the great risk of the attacking boat going down with the ship.

In the South Atlantic district, in Charleston waters, there were three attacks. The first, on February 17th,² sank the gunboat "Housatonic": after dark something like a plank was seen close to the ship, and the torpedo exploded before a gun could be fired, the ship sinking at once: the torpedo-boat was lost, and probably sank with her. The other two attacks were made on the "Memphis" and "Wabash," on March 6th and April 18th,³ but a bright look-out being kept, each opened a heavy fire: in both cases the boat is believed to have been sunk.

In the Gulf of Mexico, Farragut wanted to attack Mobile at the beginning of the year, in combination with the Army, but had to put it off, as Banks' troops were under orders for the Red River. He heard of the approaching completion of the Confederate iron-clad "*Tennessee*" in March, and begged for reinforcements to take the place before she was ready, but in vain. (Continued on p. 366.)

¹ S.W. Sabine Cross Roads, April 8th.

S.W. Pleasant Hill, April 9th.

² S.E. Olustee Expedition, February 7th-20th.

S. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, February 3rd-March 5th.

³ S.E. The Confederates retake Plymouth, April 20th.

THE WAR AT SEA

(Continued from p. 274.) The sudden appearance of the "*Alabama*" in the China Seas soon paralyzed the American trade, and their ships were all locked up in port. There was thus nothing more to do there, and when the U.S.S. "Wyoming" came in search of the "*Alabama*," she sailed westwards at the beginning of the year, reaching Cape Town in February: though she crossed the trade route of the Indian Ocean, touching in India on January 14th, she did not meet a single American ship till she came off the Brazilian coast at the end of April.¹ Here she turned northwards and took two ships, going on to Cherbourg for repairs, which were badly needed, and reaching that port on June 11th. While waiting to dock, the U.S.S. "Kearsarge" came in to pick up the prisoners whom *Semmes* had just landed, but was not allowed to do so in a neutral port, and went out again. *Semmes* sent a message to ask her captain, Winslow, to wait till the "*Alabama*" had coaled, when he would come out and fight. The two ships were very fairly matched, of about the same tonnage, between 1,000 and 1,100, and size of crew about 150. The "*Alabama*" was faster, and carried one gun more, but the armament of the "Kearsarge" was more effective against a wooden ship at suitable ranges, for her two 11-inch smooth-bores were more destructive than the "*Alabama's*" rifled 100-pounder and smooth-bore 68-pounder. The "*Alabama*" carried six 32-pounder smooth-bores; the "Kearsarge" four, and a light rifled gun.

On June 19th, *Semmes* stood out; his enemy was waiting, and at about a mile range the "*Alabama's*" rifled gun opened the fight; then the ships closed to about 500 yards, steaming round each other in circles: this was the very best range for the "Kearsarge," and she made full use of it. Winslow had protected the vulnerable parts of his ship by chain cable, boxed in,

¹ S.E. The "Housatonic" sunk off Charleston, February 17th.

and the "*Alabama's*" shot took little effect. She soon began to sink, and surrendered. Winslow had only two boats left, and asked an English yacht, the "*Deerhound*," to help in saving life, which she did, landing *Semmes* and many of his crew in England. The United States Government demanded their surrender as escaped prisoners, to which Lord John Russell replied that not only was there no obligation to do so, but that even could he do so legally, he would not violate national hospitality.

In this action the "*Alabama's*" gunnery was inferior, as was likely, seeing that she could spare no ammunition for practice, and that her powder had deteriorated with age. One shell lodged in the "*Kearsarge's*" stern post early in the action, which would have altered the result had it exploded. Thus ended the career of the famous "*Alabama*."

The "*Tuscaloosa*," *Captain Low*, had been cruising in the Atlantic with very poor success, because the American flag had almost vanished from the sea. She was at Cherbourg when the "*Alabama*" came in, and some of her officers wanted to join their old ship for the fight, but this would have violated French neutrality, and was forbidden. Nothing more is heard of the "*Tuscaloosa*" as a cruiser, and she seems to have been disarmed, and gone to sea again as a merchant steamer.

At the end of 1863, the "*Florida*" was repairing at Brest, and sailed in February, 1864, cruising in the North Atlantic and along the American coast, where she destroyed some vessels, and went in to Bermuda to coal.

The "*Georgia*," as we saw, was put at the disposal of *Captain Barron* in France, but being an unsatisfactory cruiser (cf. p. 272), he sold her to an English merchant: she was however followed and seized by the U.S.S. "*Niagara*," and condemned at Boston, while those who had fitted her out were prosecuted in England under the Foreign Enlistment Act, and fined.

The "*Rappahannock*" was lying at Calais waiting

for a chance to fit out and sail, but the French would not allow any armament or increase of crew, so she stayed there as depot ship.

At the beginning of the year,¹ the builders of the Confederate warships in France were formally told by the Government that the ironclads would not be allowed to sail, and the corvettes must not be armed in France, but nominally sold as neutral traders, which was almost a "volte face" after the assurances which had been given. *Bulloch* arranged for a nominal sale of the corvettes, and hoped that he could smuggle away one of the rams if he could sell the other to Sweden. In June, however, he heard that the builders had sold all the vessels to other Governments by Napoleon's imperative orders, and that the French Government required proof that the sales were bona fide. The French builder was as much surprised as was *Bulloch*, whom he met with *Slidell*, but they could do nothing. The explanation of this sudden action was that the American Embassy in Paris had got possession of some letters which disclosed all the transactions, and their Government was able to put powerful pressure on Napoleon.

During this spring also² the two turret-ships fitting out at Birkenhead, which had been sold to a French firm, were bought by the English Government and added to the Navy as the "Scorpion" and "Wyvern." (Continued on p. 366.)

SUMMARY

(Continued from p. 275.) The North had gained the Peninsula and the country up to Richmond, in the East: in the West they controlled the country as far

- ¹ Mexico. The French enter Guadalajara, January 5th.
- Mexico. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napoleon, January.
- S. Meridian Campaign, February.
- S.W. Red River Expedition, March-May.
- ² E. & W. Grant and Sherman start, May.
- Mexico. Maximilian lands, May 28th.
- Mexico. He enters Mexico City, June 12th.

south as the Chattahoochee, within striking distance of Atlanta, and all to the west of the Mississippi, for though challenged, their power was never in danger again. The Blockade was drawn tighter, and the Confederates reduced to the greatest straits. The second quarter of the year had fully vindicated the substitution of military for civilian control of the War, for all efforts were properly directed to a common end for the first time, while on the other side the lack of this advantage was seen on several occasions.

Napoleon and his plans require a word here. In judging him, it must not be forgotten that with all his personal, all his family, ambition, there never was a more patriotic Frenchman, but that it was the very essence of his nature to prefer crafty ways to open ones, and that he saw his duty to France through Napoleonic spectacles. While maintaining the military prestige of France, it was his special ambition to do for her supremacy in the arts of peace what his great predecessor had done for her in war, and in this, England and America were his principal rivals. The Mexican Expedition was his way of dealing with the latter, and of gaining military prestige in the New World at the same time, while the action of the British Government with regard to the ships building for the Confederates in England, afforded him an opening for increasing French trade at their expense in 1863. He gave *Slidell* to understand that he would be willing to recognize the Confederacy, but that the hindrance to this was the action of his ally England, and he told French shipbuilders that they had now a capital chance of cutting in for a share of the trade, and that he would defend their right to do "legitimate business," on the broadest possible lines, and would not be too inquisitive about the bona fides of their customers. In the summer of 1864 the situation was quite different. The Confederacy was weakening so rapidly that it was more than doubtful whether the ships could arrive in time to be of use, while the

North was not only becoming stronger daily, but very seriously angry about the shipbuilding, and as it was no part of his plan to increase the complication by a direct quarrel with them, it seemed advisable to simplify things by dropping the Confederacy, which was now useless to him as a card in the game, and by directing his whole attention to Mexico. Here his army was progressing well, driving Juarez back to the far corners of the land, Maximilian had landed and entered Mexico City with great *éclat*, and it seemed quite on the cards that by pushing on here, the Empire might be firmly established before the United States recovered the power of interference. He could therefore trouble himself less with their steady support of the Mexican Republic, and opposition to the Empire. He had also got his hands on the Sonora Mines, and hoped to finance his venture from that source, for the grumbling of the French taxpayer at having to find the money for it was becoming too ominous to be disregarded.

The midsummer of 1864 found the Confederates in a worse position than ever, for *Lee* had been forced back to his lines before Petersburg, in the East, and his serious losses could not be replaced; *President Davis* much wanted to follow the example of the North and enlist coloured troops for service, for many of the negroes openly said that they would sooner fight "for their own white men," but there was such opposition to the idea that it was shelved for a year, and when passed in the spring of 1865 was too late. In the West, *Johnston* had been turned out of position after position, although with almost miraculous intuition he knew exactly how long he could hold them, even after they had become untenable in a military sense, but when on the defensive he never, like *Lee*, attacked in earnest. In the South-West, *Kirby Smith* had thrown away a great chance of wrecking both the naval and military parts of the Red River Expedition; but this was not the crisis of the War, as *Taylor* thinks, be-

cause though the Expedition was a total failure, and the Confederates regained possession of much territory, the Northern control of the Mississippi remained unbroken. This being so, it seems odd that the North diverted so many men for a campaign of so little military importance, but it is said to have been a political move. Grant and Sherman had the two main Confederate armies by the throat, and they could quite well let the West simmer for a time. The South-West was definitely cut off from the mass of the Confederacy: *Taylor* says that after May 18th not a shot was fired in their *Trans-Mississippi Department*. In Missouri there was a small campaign in the autumn, and then all was quiet. The Confederates had gained no real success against the Blockade or in the rivers and sounds, while at sea, though the American flag had practically disappeared, they had lost the famous "*Alabama*" and could not replace her, and the powerful vessels building for them in Europe were stopped and sold to others. The sad keynote of the Confederate position was LOSS, LOSS, LOSS, WHICH COULD NOT BE MADE GOOD.

Union Loss.—Major-General Sedgwick, killed in action.

Confederate Losses.—*General Polk*, killed in action *Lieutenant-General Stuart*, died of wounds. (Continued on p. 369.)

NOTICES OF OFFICERS

(Continued from p. 277.) Several well-known names disappear: on the Union side, Generals Sedgwick and Pleasonton; on the Confederate, *Generals Polk* and *Stuart*, and *Admiral Semmes*. Pleasonton and *Semmes* went to minor parts, and disappear as great leaders.

General Leonidas Polk was the Bishop of Louisiana when the War broke out, but then took so active a part in Secession and was so influential a man in the South, that he was given a high command: though he had gone into the Church, he was educated at West

Point, then, as perhaps now, the best school in the world, and had many army friends. At first he was in command of a district, but soon took an active part in the field, and was a fair general, though he seems not to have pulled well with *Bragg*, but this was not singular. He was killed while going round his lines on Kenesaw Mountain.

Lieutenant-General J. E. B. Stuart, nicknamed "*Jeb*," from his initials, was a very young man for his position, having been a lieutenant in the 2nd Cavalry when the War broke out, but he was so universally beloved that his rapid rise, due entirely to his conspicuous talents, seems to have caused no jealousy. Of medium height, he was a powerful, handsome man, of sunny disposition, fond of bright colours, and of the showy side of cavalry service, while not neglecting its essentials. A sincere and earnest Christian, his rule of life was as strict as *Jackson's* own, and between these two men, outwardly so different, was the strongest bond of sympathy and regard. *Stuart* seems to have been *Lee's* favourite subaltern in the old 2nd Cavalry, and the two were together at the time of John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry. *Lee* felt his loss most acutely, as a man and a dear friend, as well as in his character of the magnificent cavalry general who could not be replaced. He brought the Confederate cavalry to a pitch of efficiency to which their opponents could not attain for a very long time, he used the sword as freely as the rifle, while as a scouting officer, and especially on outpost duty, he was unrivalled. On the one occasion on which he had command of the three Arms in action, when he took over the *Second Corps* at Chancellorsville, after *Jackson* was wounded, he proved himself a master of the art, and it is a moot point whether he would not have been of more use as *Jackson's* successor than even as Commander of the Cavalry.

Major-General John Sedgwick was one of the most universally esteemed officers on either side. He was

a brave, honest, thorough-going soldier, who never intrigued or made interest in any way. It is said that he was proposed for the command of the Army of the Potomac after Fredericksburg, but said that he would not do, being a "McClellan man." He was on several occasions given the command, more or less independent, of forces larger than one Corps, and was a good, though not brilliant, handler of large bodies.

Major-General Alfred Pleasonton was a major in the famous 2nd Cavalry of the old Service when the War broke out, and rose to command the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, which he brought to a high state of efficiency. He was an excellent cavalry handler, as was shown during *Lee's* march to the border before Gettysburg, and in Meade's operations in Virginia afterwards. Good as he was, though, the management of the Arm did not please Grant when he came east as Commander-in-Chief, and he replaced him by Sheridan, though he said that this was no reflection on Pleasonton. May not part of the reason of the poor cavalry tactics have been Meade's views on the subject, which Pleasonton was not strong enough to combat as did Sheridan, with Grant to back him? At Chancellorsville he was put in command of a scratch force of all arms which he handled brilliantly, and was mainly instrumental in stopping *Jackson's* attack after the rout of the XIth Corps. In March, 1864, he was sent to Missouri, where he was placed in charge of the cavalry under Rosecrans, and took the principal part in driving *Price* out of that State.

Rear-Admiral Raphael Semmes ended his notable service at sea with the loss of his ship, the famous "*Alabama*," but he continued to serve till the end of the War, commanding the Confederate flotilla on the James, and after the evacuation of Petersburg guarding the railways with a small naval brigade: these however were but minor points, and a notice of him would most fitly come in here.

In the Mexican War he commanded a ship at the blockade of Vera Cruz and afterwards went to Mexico City with the army. He had specially studied international law, and was thus well qualified for his very responsible duties, which required him to represent his Government abroad diplomatically and to know exactly what he might or might not do, without sending home for instructions. He was not considered a particularly smart or showy handler of a ship, but was unequalled in a comprehensive knowledge of what was required in making and carrying out large plans. His strategy, aimed at the destruction of American commerce, was unique, and was based on a most thorough knowledge of the great ocean highways: one of his peculiarities was his marvellous power of judging exactly how long he could stay in any locality before a heavier vessel of the United States service came to drive him away, and the combination of these qualities enabled him with the little "*Alabama*" to do more damage to his country's enemies than has been done by any single vessel before or since. After the War he settled in Mobile as a lawyer. (Continued on p. 371.)

1864	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH
EAST		<p>28-4. Kilpatrick's and Dahlgren's raid to Richmond.</p>	<p>3. Grant appointed Commander - in - Chief.</p>
SOUTH-EAST		<p>Olustee Expedition. 20. Ocean Pond.</p>	
WEST	<p>28. Rosecrans takes command in Missouri.</p>	<p>19. Schofield takes command of Department of the Ohio.</p>	
SOUTH		<p>3. Sherman's Meridian Campaign, to 5. 1-25. Sooy Smith and Forrest. 22. Action at West Point.</p>	<p>8. Red River Expedition. Steele and Price in Arkansas.</p>
SOUTH-WEST, NAVAL, AND MEXICO	<p>4. Banks recalled from Texas. 1st week. The "<i>Alabama</i>" leaves the China Seas, and sails Westward. The "<i>Rappahannock</i>" lying at Calais, unarmed. 5. The French enter Guadalajara. Cession of Sonora Mines to Napoleon.</p>	<p>17. The sinking of the "<i>Housatonic</i>" off Charleston. The "<i>Florida</i>" in the Atlantic. The "<i>Tuscaloosa</i>" in the Atlantic.</p>	

1864

APRIL

MAY

JUNE

EAST

3. Grant marches against *Lee*.
 4-12. Kautz' Raid.
 5. Butler marches against Richmond.
 5-12. Battle of the Wilderness.
 8-18. Spottsylvania.
 9-13. Sheridan's Richmond Raid.
 11. Battle of Yellow Tavern.
 12-16. Butler before Richmond.
 23-27. *Lee* on the North Anna.
 28-31. Hawes' Shop and Totopotomoy.
 1-26. Sigel's Valley Campaign.
 26. Hunter's Lynchburg Campaign and retreat, to 27.

- 1-12. Cold Harbour.
 15. Siege of Petersburg begins.
 7-29. Sheridan's Trevilian Raid.
 11. Battle of Trevilian Station.
 22-July 2. Wilson's Raid.
 29. Battle of Ream's Station.

SOUTH-EAST

20. The Confederates retake Plymouth.
Forrest's raid in Kentucky and Tennessee.
 13. Captures Fort Pillow.

5. The "*Albemarle*" fights a Union Squadron.
 5. Sherman marches against Johnston.
 15. Occupies Resaca.
 19-22. At Cassville.

- 1-12. Sturgis and *Forrest*.
 10. Brice's Cross Roads.
 1-22. *Morgan's* raid in Kentucky.
 12. Action at Cynthia.
 Church, to 4.
 10-30. Sherman before Kennesaw Mountain.

WEST

25. At New Hope

- Church, to 4.
 10-30. Sherman before Kennesaw Mountain.

SOUTH

- Red River Expedition, to 19.
 8. Sabine Cross Roads.
 9. Pleasant Hill.
 Steele and Price in Arkansas.
 30. Jenkins' Ferry.

- 9-13. The Union flotilla runs the rapids at Alexandria.

SOUTH-WEST, NAVAL AND MEXICO

- The "*Rappahannock*" lying at Calais, unarmed.
 The "*Florida*" in the Atlantic, to Bermuda.
 The "*Tuscaloosa*" in the Atlantic.
 24. The "*Alabama*" in the Atlantic, to

- to Cherbourg.
 Cherbourg.
 19. "*Alabama*" sunk by "Kearsarge."
 Mexico.
 12. Maximilian enters Mexico City.

- Mexico.
 28. Maximilian lands.

CHAPTER XII

THE SECOND HALF OF 1864. THE DISRUPTION OF THE CONFEDERACY

NOTE.—As the important phases of the War had shifted into different districts, the continuity of the narrative would be better kept by taking them in the order East, South, South-East, West, and South-West.

GENERAL POSITION AND PLANS

(Continued from p. 283.) The midsummer of 1864 found the North faced with a very serious crisis on which the issue of the War might turn, in the increasing power of the political party which openly declared it a failure, and that it would be better to allow the South to go and establish a separate Government. It was now the beginning of July, and the Presidential Election was coming on in November. The extreme Republicans, or Radicals, put up Frémont, but he had no chance, and would have split the Republican vote. Lincoln therefore arranged with them in September to withdraw him, making a change in the Cabinet to suit their views (cf. p. 18). The Democrats had put forward General McClellan as their nominee for President, personally a very popular man, especially with the army in the East: he was besides able and ambitious, a really strong candidate. The appalling losses of the Army of the Potomac in advancing from the Rapidan to the James had depressed the country profoundly, and if no real success could be scored immediately the outlook was very bad for the Republican party. Grant was ex-

ceedingly severe on the way in which the papers in the North were allowed to preach treason to the detriment of the Nation, and admired the strong control which the Confederate *Government* exercised over croakers of all sorts. He says, "In the North the people governed, and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. The South was a military camp, controlled absolutely by the *Government*, with soldiers at its back to quell any discontent." Speaking generally, beyond the political outlook, he says plainly, "Anything that could have prolonged the War a year beyond the time that it did finally close would probably have exhausted the North to such an extent that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a separation."

The moral weakness of the North was not so apparent to outsiders like Napoleon as it was at home, and he was therefore more impressed with the evident material weakness of the South. It was a race between him and the North, which could settle its own affairs first, and keep up the opposition to the other. In this the advantage now lay with the United States, for whether the Republic represented by Juarez survived or not, there seemed little chance of stability for Maximilian's Empire. At this time the fortunes of the Republic were at their lowest point, for its two senior generals went over to the Empire, but the best, Porfirio Diaz, resisted all Maximilian's tempting overtures. He commanded the only real Republican force in the field in the south, but Juarez and his Government could not keep the field in the north, and retired further, trusting to the chaotic state of affairs and the size of the country to keep the French busy. Here Juarez was out of the way, close to the American border, and was freely supplied by the North with arms, ammunition, and men, for they controlled the coast and border for some way inland as well as all west of Texas. Further, a most important point,

they had always recognized the Mexican Republic, and could thus keep up agitation indefinitely, which must ruin Maximilian in the end without risk of war, since the French could not always be at his back. On the other hand, Napoleon could not so help the Confederates, as he had never recognized them, and Mr. Seward began to take a very high tone with him. Things did not go smoothly in Mexico, for Maximilian, who had come as a nominee of the extreme Clerical party, was Liberal in his views, and neither could nor would restore the sequestered Church property. An Imperialist Liberal party arose, opposed to both Republic and Clericals: the French were no backers of the Clericals, and would not force on Mexico conditions from which they boasted that they had freed themselves: further, Maximilian was weak and irresolute, an amiable dreamer and poet, the very last man to undertake such a task as he had done. Thus, though the military situation was easier, the settling of the Mexican Empire did not really progress. Lastly, Napoleon had not been able to get any advantage from the Sonora mines, to relieve the French taxpayer, and if his troops were to remain in the country, this must be done immediately.

The North now saw clearly that if they were to crush the Confederacy quickly, they must apply the screw by destroying its home sources of supply, principally the fertile districts of Georgia, now a wheat-growing country, and the Shenandoah Valley. This idea had been growing of late, and was now made an integral part of the plans of campaigns.

In the military sense, the centre of interest was the true one, the Middle States, where Sherman was trying to force back *Johnston*, who commanded the strongest Confederate army in the field. In the East, Grant was completely hung up by *Lee*, and his main plan was to destroy the railways on which he depended.

In planning the next moves, Grant warned Sherman,

on whom the principal work depended, that his real danger was that *Kirby Smith* might elude Steele, force the passage of the Mississippi, and attack him in rear, and wanted to collect a force at New Orleans, in case *Smith* moved on Mobile, but there were no men to spare. Sherman also wanted reinforcements, but Halleck strongly advised them to go slowly, on account of the great political excitement and opposition to the draft, to enforce which troops might even have to be sent back from the front, which actually happened soon after. The main plan was still to cut the Confederacy in two again, from Atlanta to Mobile, but Sherman thought this line too vulnerable: the idea of the March to the Sea came later. Charleston was so strictly blockaded that it was almost useless to the Confederates, Savannah was little better, and if Mobile were soon taken, only Wilmington would be left to them. This was defended by the powerful Fort Fisher, which Grant, as soon as he reached the James, and had his hand almost on Richmond, planned to take with a combined military and naval expedition. There was also a political reason for this, because foreign Governments, the British especially, were always threatening that they would not recognize the blockade unless it was really effective.

On the Confederate side, the one chance was to prolong the War and not risk a decisive battle. With a Commander-in-Chief who could control the work from a military point of view, this might have been done, for it would have been better than the campaigns of even men like *Lee* and *Johnston*, directed by a politician. *Lee* knew well that there was only one end to being tied to Richmond and Petersburg, and that well-considered operations in the field would be better, but he had to obey orders. Though he sent *Early* to put pressure on Washington to relieve that on Richmond, and thus deferred active attack for a time, he was not now in a position to make

Grant relax his grip or withdraw a single man from Sherman. Unless he could materially weaken the latter, time gained at Richmond would not of itself appreciably lengthen the War. At the decisive point, *Johnston* was spinning out time capitably, and Grant thinks that when *Jefferson Davis* changed his policy from defensive to offensive, and *Johnston* for *Hood*, he threw away his last chance.

Davis was rather comically "hoist with his own petard" at this time. He was the great upholder of the theory that the Constitution was but a compact between "Sovereign and Independent States," any of whom had a right to withdraw when it suited their interests, and to manage their own State affairs their own way. In practice, however, he ignored this in toto, and ruled the Confederacy with an iron hand; but now *Governor Brown* of Georgia claimed to administer and control the State Militia in the interests of the State rather than of the Confederacy (cf. p. 150). He put them under *General G. W. Smith* in June, and sent them into the field in July as allies of the Confederates, for State defence, not as a component part of the Confederate forces. *Davis* was furious, and, about the time that *Johnston* was superseded, came down and roundly abused both him and *Brown* as little better than traitors, which did not promote harmony at a critical juncture.

The Trans-Mississippi States were becoming disaffected, and thought themselves neglected by the Confederate *Government*: so far from being willing to send more men east of the river, they wanted those already there to be sent back. As the Union control of the river prevented either side helping the other, and the Union troops were withdrawn from the southern portion, they were left to themselves, and thought of either setting up a separate Government, asking Napoleon for help, or joining Maximilian, the latter idea predominating.

The condition of the armies on both sides gave rise

to serious difficulties in different ways. On the Union side, Sherman found his army seriously depleted after the fall of Atlanta, because a number of regiments were at the end of their service, and many senior officers took the opportunity to go on leave, especially those who were standing for Congress, which amounted to a public scandal. On the Confederate side, the terrible depletion of their army brought a different trouble. They, wisely perhaps, as maintaining esprit de corps, kept the names of regiments and larger units after they had become mere skeletons, grouping them in provisional units for service. For instance, one brigade was made up of fourteen regiments, and contained 858 of all ranks present for duty, of which the famous "*Stonewall Brigade*" comprised about a third. This arrangement had the effect of misleading the enemy as to their real strength, which was sometimes an advantage. (Continued on p. 376.)

THE EAST

(Continued from p. 299.) When Hunter was driven out of the Shenandoah Valley, *Early* was ordered to cross the border and threaten Washington again, in order to divert Union troops and ease the pressure on Richmond. He started so promptly that he was across the Potomac before the North had moved any troops to stop him. He was at Winchester on July 2nd, next day drove back Sigel, broke the Baltimore and Ohio line, and on the 5th and 6th crossed the Potomac, Sigel retiring to the lines on Maryland Heights. On the 8th, *Early* moved on Frederick, his cavalry going on to break railways: he was to strike at Washington and try to release the Confederate prisoners there. At the crossing of the Monocacy, however, General Lew Wallace was posted¹ with a small force of raw troops, reinforced on the field with a division of the VIth Corps. He fought gallantly, but was utterly routed: still he delayed *Early* a day, which just

¹ S. Sherman crosses the Chattahoochee, July 9th.

enabled reinforcements to reach Washington in time, for Grant, who at first had thought the whole thing bluff, did not send them off till he heard that *Early* had crossed the border. Washington was saved by Wallace's self-sacrifice. *Early* levied heavy contributions on the Maryland towns and arrived before Washington on the 11th, but was stopped by the strong defences, now well manned. He intended to attack them the next day, but heard that the VIth and XIXth Corps had come up, and retreated without trying to release the prisoners. He moved off at dark on the 12th and recrossed the Potomac at Leesburg on the 14th:¹ the pursuit was feeble, because Wright, in command, was harassed by contradictory orders from Washington. During this time of danger, Halleck was either helpless or sulky, and would take no responsibility. Grant then told Wright to take command, and Hunter to close on *Early's* rear. Halleck blamed Hunter, it seems, because he did not report direct to him and Stanton, but Grant approved his action. As soon as the danger was over, Halleck interfered, as ever, with bad effect.

On the Confederate side, this brilliant little campaign did more for the force employed (10,000 men), and gave less satisfaction, than any other, because it was not understood that there was no intention of taking Washington. The net results were, that a strong force had been withdrawn from before Richmond, and the Confederates were enabled to get their crops in the Valley; it certainly helped to prolong the War.

Grant sent the XIXth Corps to Washington, but expected *Early's* next blow to be against Ohio or Pittsburg, and wanted the VIth back, to strike at *Lee* before he made it, but as soon as they had gone, *Early* drove in Crook and Averell at Kernstown, followed them to the Potomac, broke the Baltimore and Ohio railway,² and raided into Maryland with his cavalry,

¹ W. Smith beats *Forrest*, July 14th.

² S. Battle of Atlanta, July 22nd.

levying heavy ransom on the towns, and burning Chambersburg in revenge for the depredations in Virginia. Averell, however, followed the brigade which did this to Moorefield, across the Potomac, and dispersed it. *Mosby* now dashed in and kept up the panic, which had never been worse during the War. The troops taken from the Valley were sent back in all haste, with more to garrison Washington, Grant ordering Halleck to take charge, as no proper commander had been appointed. If we take the smaller numbers into consideration, the effect of this second raid was even greater than that of the first. *Early* had fully carried out his orders, to divert troops and break the important Baltimore and Ohio line, but at the sacrifice of his cavalry.

Grant then determined to put an overwhelming force under a good commander and crush him, lest he become a permanent menace, and so to devastate the Valley that the Confederates could not keep an army there at all. To do this, several district commands must be amalgamated, and an energetic commander found. There was a strong cavalry force, and Grant thought of Sheridan, Hunter, who would not work under Halleck any more, retiring in his favour. This was in the first week in August,¹ and the Army of the Shenandoah consisted of six infantry and three cavalry divisions, 40,000 men, besides garrison troops: it was afterwards increased. *Early* at this time had about 20,000 men.

Sheridan began cautiously, making a strong base at Halltown to menace the Valley, and *Early* fell back on his lines at Fisher's Hill near Strasburg to wait for reinforcements. Sheridan moved out, but, hearing of their coming, retired again, as he could not live on the wasted country, and waited for reinforcements in his turn. *Early* took position opposite Halltown, where he could feed his men, and prevent the repair of the

¹ S. Farragut forces Mobile Bay, August 6th.

W. Rousseau and *Wheeler* in Tennessee, August.

railway. When stronger, he advanced, and Sheridan took position within his lines. *Early* tried to draw him by moving as if to invade Maryland again, but in vain, and as he could neither attack nor pass him, he fell back to the Opequon.¹ Grant now told Sheridan that his operations would cause *Lee* to send for men from the Valley, and that he must take the chance to move out and lay the Valley waste. He moved on August 28th, but was much bothered by Halleck ordering him to detach in all directions, till Grant told him to keep his men together.

As Grant had foretold, *Lee* was in desperate straits for men, and sent for *Anderson's* division back at the beginning of September.² *Early* then retired further, having succeeded in keeping the railway broken, and Maryland in a state of panic. On the 17th, he advanced and drove Averell to Martinsburg, but spread out his army from there to Winchester. Sheridan moved at once to catch him scattered, but Wilson's cavalry was checked at Berryville, and *Early* was able to concentrate at Stephenson's Cross Roads, whence, after a sharp fight, he was driven through Winchester in disorder. This battle of the Opequon gained permanent control of the lower Valley for the Union.

Early retreated to his base lines at Fisher's Hill, and on the 20th Sheridan was fighting his way into position against them and told Crook to turn the Confederate left, their right being almost impregnable: *Early* saw this, and meant to retreat in the night, but at sunset Crook burst in from flank and rear and rolled up his line, but the Confederate cavalry covered the retreat. *Lee* sent him back *Kershaw's* division, and he retreated, fighting, up the Valley, Averell being superseded by Sheridan for slack pursuit. On the 26th, the Confederate reinforcements reached Port

¹ S. Kilpatrick's Raid in Georgia, mid-August.
The "*Tallahassee*" off New York, August.

² W. *Morgan* killed at Greenville, September 4th.
W. *Price* invades Missouri, September.

Republic and checked the pursuit. Sheridan moved on Harrisonburg, and *Early* at once attacked and drove in the Union cavalry.

Grant wanted to have the railways repaired in Sheridan's rear, and that he should move on Charlottesville, but he thought it too risky, that it would be better to complete the devastation of the Valley, and that then his troops would be wanted before Richmond. At this time Wilson was sent as cavalry commander to Sherman, and Custer took his division. Sheridan wished to fall back and shorten his long and vulnerable communications, returning the VIth and XIXth Corps to Grant, since nothing seemed left to do, and an army could not be fed in the upper Valley. He preferred the Baltimore and Ohio line to that in mid-Virginia, as better concealed. On October 5th,¹ the two Corps started back, raiding right across the Valley, which destruction prevented local Confederates from joining their own army, since, when their slaves were gone, they had to stop and work. *Early* followed at once, as aggressive and strong as ever, for he had a good new cavalry brigade under *Rosser*, which was so troublesome that Sheridan told Torbert, his cavalry commander, to "whip the rebel cavalry or get whipped himself." Torbert turned and completely defeated *Rosser* at Tom's Brook on the 9th. Grant thought Sheridan should keep the XIXth Corps, and Halleck was harping on his dividing his force to threaten Gordonsville and Charlottesville as well, but when he knew that Grant wished it, he asked for the VIth Corps too. At this time *Early* suddenly attacked Crook at Hupp's Hill, and though he soon retired, this brought the VIth Corps back at once: had he waited a little, he would have caught Sheridan weaker. Sheridan now prepared for a general action, but *Early* had disappeared.

¹ E. Burbridge beaten at Saltville, October 2nd.

E. Butler attacks Richmond, October 6th.

The "*Florida*" captured at Bahia, October 7th.

Sheridan was now told to hold as many men as he could of the enemy, and threaten the Virginia Central Railway and Canal, just as he was starting to confer with General Augur, commanding at Washington, but he left instructions with General Wright to go on. *Early* could not stay where he was, and noticed that the Union left seemed badly guarded: he sent *Gordon* to turn it while he attacked in front. On the 19th,¹ at dawn, *Kershaw* surprised and drove in Crook's VIIIth Corps, and then *Gordon* burst in on the Union rear: the VIth Corps, which came up, could not hold the ground, and the whole was forced back, but the Confederate cavalry was weak, the fighting hard, and *Early's* small force was getting exhausted, when Sheridan returned to find his army in full retreat. He succeeded in rallying them, and the tide turned: breastworks were thrown up, and an attack on them failed. *Early* now tried to make good his retreat with the captured guns, but Sheridan advanced and drove his army back in hopeless confusion, the Union cavalry striking the flying mass with terrible effect. This victory of Cedar Creek was due entirely to Sheridan's personal leadership, for which he got the greatest praise. Till *Early* struck at Hupp's Hill, the Valley campaign was thought over, but he was seen to be both strong and dangerous even after Cedar Creek, for he had been reinforced again, and was at New Market. He advanced, but was driven back, when Sheridan retired, and soon had to return *Kershaw's* division to *Lee*. Grant also sent for the VIth Corps back, and sent Sheridan's cavalry to break the Virginia Central line,² but *Early*, as soon as they left his front, again broke the Baltimore and Ohio line, in answer. The supreme importance of these operations to *Lee*, which kept a first-rate Union general in the Valley,

¹ The "*Shenandoah*" sails from the Desertas, October 20th; the "*Olustee*" and "*Chickamauga*" from Wilmington end of month.

² S.E. Cushing sinks the "*Albemarle*," October 27th.

S.E. Union fleet retakes Plymouth, October 31st.

with over 40,000 men, and made two Union Corps spend half their time in marching and counter-marching, may be judged by the fact that he made *Early's* command about equal in strength to his own at Petersburg.

All this time Sheridan had been much harassed by the raids of *Mosby*, *McNeill*, and others, and in November¹ sent Merritt's cavalry division against them, which kept them back for the time. His first raid against the Virginia Central line, under Torbert, drove back the Confederate cavalry, but their infantry stopped it at Gordonsville. Custer, with another raid, was stopped at Harrisonburg by *Rosser*. The weather was so severe that no more cavalry raids were made. After this, Sheridan sent most of his infantry away, mostly to Grant, and wintered at Kernstown, *Early* remaining at New Market.

Nothing in the whole War is more remarkable than the indomitable pertinacity with which *Early* carried out his orders to keep the North in a state of panic, make them detach as many men as possible, and break their communications. He had no opportunity for brilliant strategy, like *Jackson's*, against divided forces, being opposed by a far stronger concentrated army under an excellent general: he had no chance of success, often very little of safety for his command, but whenever his opponent moved back, or he was reinforced, he struck at once, regardless of consequences. Now that *Jackson* was gone, it is safe to say that even the magnificent Confederate army produced no greater fighter.

All this time the siege of Petersburg went steadily on, and a great mine was run under the Confederate works by the IXth Corps. On July 30th² it was to be

¹ S.E. Sherman marches for the sea, November 15th.

W. Hood invades Tennessee, November 20th.

The "*Olustee*" and "*Chickamauga*" off U.S. coast, November.

² E. The Second Kernstown, July 24th.

E. Chambersburg burnt, July 30th.

S. Siege of Atlanta begun, July 28th.

fired and the works rushed, but Burnside made poor dispositions, and the misconduct of the officer commanding the assault completed the failure. The troops on the flanks did their best, but the attack, both here and in other places, was defeated with heavy loss, for *Beauregard* had detected the tunnelling and cut off the threatened point with works in the rear, posting batteries specially to deal with the attack. Though Grant sent Hancock and Sheridan, with the IInd Corps and three cavalry divisions, to make a dash at Richmond, and draw troops away, this also had been guarded against.

When the VIth Corps was sent to Washington, Grant drew in his left, and devoted the month of July mainly to fortification, the siege train having arrived at the end of June. The lines were designed so that they could be held with a very small force, and be steadily extended, to compel similar extension on the Confederate side, and stretch their thin line to breaking point, for at the end of July, the numbers available, not counting cavalry, were 69,000 and 39,000 respectively.

¹In August,² Grant heard exaggerated accounts of the numbers sent to *Early*, and sent Hancock with the IInd and IXth Corps and a cavalry division, to make a dash at Richmond on the north of the James, but *Lee* stopped him, and the troops returned to their places. At the same time, to make *Lee* withdraw troops from the Valley, Warren's Vth Corps, with some cavalry, was sent to break the Weldon railway, but not attack fortifications. Warren seized the line, a force under *A. P. Hill* drove him back, and then the arrival of Union reinforcements drove *Hill* back: Warren entrenched a good position, held it against *Hill's* attacks, and then connected these new works

¹ Map 54, p. 386.

² E. Moorefield, August 7th.

S. Farragut forces Mobile Bay, August 5th.

S. Siege of Atlanta, August, September.

The "*Tallahassee*" off U.S. coast, August.

with the old Union flank works, depriving *Lee* of the use of this important railway. *Hill*, however, prevented the destruction of the line, and was able to seize and hold some Union works.

At the end of September,¹ as the Confederates had only six infantry brigades and one of cavalry, besides artillery, north of the James, the XVIIIth and Xth Corps, with Kautz' cavalry division, were sent to attack the New Market and Darby Roads; the XVIIIth was to attack Chapin's Bluff and hold fast the force in its front. Fort Harrison was taken and held, but Fort Gilmer, the key of the ground, defeated all attacks.

Meade now attempted to make *Lee* concentrate in the wrong place, by pretending to move to his left. If Petersburg were weakened enough, he was to attack it or the Southside railway. He took the cross roads covering the Boydton plank road, but *Hill* came up and stopped him, the Union troops entrenching the ground they had gained. Kautz held the works lately taken on the Darby road, but was driven out on October 6th, and Butler's attempts to retake them failed. At the end of October,² Grant planned to extend his works to the Southside line, leaving just enough men to hold his present ones: the attempt was made on the 27th by Hancock, with the IIInd, Vth, and IXth Corps, and a cavalry division, but the Confederates were ready, and their works too strong to assault. *Lee* brought up troops and attacked furiously, and Hancock managed to hold on that day, but retired the next. On the Peninsula, Butler ad-

¹ E. Fisher's Hill, September 22nd.

S. Sherman occupies Atlanta, September 27th.

W. *Price* in Missouri, Pilot Knob, September 27th.

² E. Cedar Creek, October 19th.

S.E. Cushing sinks the "*Albemarle*," October 27th.

S.E. Union fleet retakes Plymouth, October 31st.

W. *Price* beaten at Newtonia, October 28th.

The "*Olustee*," "*Chickamauga*," and "*Shenandoah*" sail, end of October.

vanced to the old *Seven Pines* battlefield, up to the Confederate works, where he was heavily defeated by *Longstreet*. In December, Warren moved out and destroyed the Weldon line for a long way, *Hill* being too late to stop him.

At the end of November, Hancock resigned the command of the IInd Corps, from ill-health, and was succeeded by Humphreys, being soon afterwards sent to Washington, to raise a new Ist Corps for the campaign in the spring. In December, most of the troops from the Valley rejoined their respective armies, and the Union Xth and XVIIIth Corps were reorganized as the XXIVth and XXVth, white and coloured, instead of mixed, and put under Generals Ord and Weitzel.

¹When *Morgan* was killed in September (cf. p. 360), *Breckinridge* took command of the *Department of South-West Virginia*, with its important railway, and salt and lead works. In September, *Burbridge* advanced against the salt works from eastern Kentucky, but a cavalry brigade under *Giltner* managed to delay him till *Breckinridge* came up. *Burbridge* attacked, but the position was held and the valuable works saved, on October 2nd. Next day *Burbridge* retired, and was pursued to the Big Sandy River.

Stoneman, who was taken prisoner in July, had been exchanged, and in December² was put in command in east Tennessee. He at once moved against south-west Virginia with 4,000 cavalry, and was met by *Breckinridge* at the salt works with about 2,000, but to get even this force together, the rest of the country was denuded, so *Stoneman* went past, occupied the country, and moved on Wytheville and its lead works. *Breckinridge* stopped the Union main body at Marion on the 18th, but a column had been

¹ Map 56, p. 388.

² S.E. Sherman takes Savannah, December 21st.

S.E. First attack on Fort Fisher, December 24th, 25th.

Europe. *Bullock* buys the "Sphinx," December.

Mexico. Porfirio Díaz shut up in Oajaca, December.

sent against the unprotected salt works, and nearly destroyed them before he could get back. Stoneman then withdrew into Tennessee. (Continued on p. 379.)

THE SOUTH

(Continued from p. 310. SHERMAN'S OPERATIONS from p. 308.) Sherman, when he found that the enemy was retreating from the Kenesaw position, strengthened and consolidated the force in front, on which *Johnston* fell back to a new line in rear, fighting continuously with the advancing troops till he found that they were turning his left and getting nearer to Atlanta than he was, which meant that to save the line of the Chattahoochee he must fall back at once. He retired on his new works, a great entrenched camp forming a tête-de-pont, with the cavalry watching the fords and ferries on the flanks, also covered by works. Before the main works, the strongest that he had yet encountered, Sherman had to pause, and also the railway must be repaired before going further: all this gave *Johnston* time to complete his works at Atlanta. The mistake in the Chattahoochee position was that, though the main works covered the principal bridges, yet by concentrating his main force in front, instead of in rear of the river, *Johnston* lost the power of striking at any force trying to cross. A strong bridge-head, held by a detachment, the main body concentrated in rear, would have been better.

Thomas invested the main works, McPherson watched the flanks, and Schofield's army was held as a striking force. The weather had been execrable, and movements most difficult, but it now cleared up and Sherman regained freedom of movement, which he used to manoeuvre his opponent out of one position after another. On July 7th, Schofield surprised a crossing, and entrenched a bridge-head. *Johnston* saw at once that the river line was lost, drew in his cavalry, and after holding on till the very last moment,

withdrew his army on the 9th¹ from the great bridge-head and destroyed the bridges. Meanwhile the Union army had begun to cross, and made demonstrations in various places to puzzle *Johnston*.

It now became necessary to tell off a special force to guard the communications, for which Northern Georgia was made a Military District, and General Steedman put in command.

Atlanta lies some ten miles south of the Chattahoochee, and *Johnston's* strongest line was close to it, but if the enemy crossed below Atlanta, he would be cut off from the south, and would have to evacuate the town or change his base to the east to keep his communications with Richmond. He therefore took position on Peach Tree Creek to the north-east, thus not only securing his own communications with Richmond, but threatening Sherman's if he crossed below the town.

Sherman heard from Grant that some 20,000 men might be sent to *Johnston* from Virginia, and determined to strike at the railway near Decatur: though this was a difficult crossing, above the town, it was the best. Schofield was to move on Decatur, McPherson against the line further east, and Thomas straight on Atlanta. Sherman then meant to wheel to his right against the town, holding the railway and bridge. This might throw the whole weight of the Confederate attack on to Thomas, but he was sure that he could stand it.² *Johnston* saw this too, and planned to crush Thomas and cut him off, but he was then superseded by *Hood* by orders from Richmond: *Hood*, however, took over his orders for the battle, and *Cheatham* took command of *Hood's* Corps. The news was received with the greatest satisfaction by the Union side. *Hood* was personally brave to rashness and cunning as a fox, but not to be compared with *Johnston* as a general, and was also so crippled

¹ E. Battle of the Monocacy, July 9th.

² W. A. J. Smith beats *Forrest*, July 14th.

with wounds as to affect both personal activity and temper. The appointment meant a change of tactics from defensive to offensive, which *Hood* was not strong enough to carry out, and which was simply playing the game of the North.

On July 18th, Sherman's army was all across the river, and the great wheel to the right began, but the maps were wrong and caused mistakes. The next day Thomas came close to the Confederate lines, which were on two sides of a great salient. *Hood* meant to hold the north front against him with one Corps while with the other two he crushed his left flank, but did not expect Schofield and McPherson to come up as quickly as they did; the result was that he found his own right threatened and had to alter his dispositions. The main attack fell on the XXth Corps, as Thomas' other Corps went astray in the difficult country, but Hooker held his own and the Confederates retired, having lost heavily. *Hood* intended this to be a decisive victory, but the advance of Sherman's left wing upset his plans, and made him first tell off *Wheeler's* cavalry to stop them, and then reinforce him with an infantry division; this stopped *Hardee's* attack on Hooker's hard-pressed Corps, but had it not been done, *Wheeler* would have been driven in, and the Union left wing have marched into Atlanta. This was on the 20th.

The next day was spent in entrenching, the Armies of the Cumberland and Ohio moving close to the enemy's works. Howard was opposite the great salient, and *Hood's* flank being insecure, he prepared to retire to a new position which faced Sherman's flanks: this he proposed to hold with two Corps, sending *Hardee* round to the south against McPherson's flank and rear; if he were successful, *Cheatham* would strike in and roll up Sherman's army from the south. *Hardee* took *Wheeler's* cavalry, and marched that night.

On the morning of the 22nd, the old Confederate

lines were empty and an advance was ordered, when *Hardee* burst in on McPherson's flank and rear, McPherson himself being killed almost immediately. Logan took command of the Army. The Confederates gained ground, and *Cheatham* was ordered to advance. He broke the line of the XVth Corps, but Sherman, who was near, got together a great line of artillery and restored the battle. *Hardee* and *Cheatham* were too far apart to act properly in concert, which enabled the Union men to hold on, and the crisis passed.¹ The only result of further Confederate attacks was to increase their own losses. The absence of Garrard's cavalry raiding had enabled *Hardee* to surprise the XVIth Corps (cf. pp. 302, 362), but the operation was a wonderful performance, a most difficult night march, coming up exactly at the right time and place, the attack being driven home with real power. Nothing had been seen like it since *Jackson's* death.

On both sides reorganization was wanted. Logan was the senior officer of the Army of the Tennessee, an able and brave leader, the best man to command it in the opinion of Grant, who knew him well, but he was a civilian and a thorough-going politician, captious and critical, and a rival of Blair's: there had been so much trouble from political appointments that Sherman preferred a professional soldier, Thomas agreed, and Howard from the IVth Corps succeeded McPherson. Logan was bitterly disappointed, but this did not affect his loyal support of Howard. Hooker was the senior Corps Commander, but had shewn himself so impractical and insubordinate that he was passed over, when to Sherman's great relief he resigned, and Slocum came from Vicksburg in August to take his place. On the other side also there was friction. *Hood* blamed *Hardee* for the failures of both Peach Tree Creek and Atlanta, for he always had a scapegoat when things went wrong. *Jefferson Davis* had to ask *Hardee* not to resign. *Stephen Lee*

¹ E. The Second Kernstown, July 24th.

took *Hood's* old Corps, *Chatham* reverted to a division in *Hardee's*, and the other was *Stewart's*.

Sherman at first worked by the east side of Atlanta in order to destroy *Hood's* communications with Richmond, but now changed to the west, both to attack them on that side also, and for convenience of supply. He brought the Army of the Tennessee over from left to right and repaired the Chattahoochee railway bridge: his cavalry also had been resting and refitting.

On the morning of the 27th the move began, the XVIth Corps passing beyond the right of Thomas' Army and the XVIIth extending to Ezra Church, within a mile and a half of the southern railway. *Hood* replied with a long line of works to cover the line, and planned to attack the Union right as it came up, with one Corps, holding Thomas and Schofield in check with the other two. Logan's XVth Corps passed beyond the XVIIth to take the extreme right, and on the morning of the 29th *Hood's* attack struck it. Logan threw back his flank and held on, though two Confederate Corps were brought against him, and he defeated them with heavy loss. They had lost so heavily under the new régime that they did not shew their old dash, and *Hood* dared not take the offensive again for a month. Even *President Davis* warned him against the losses incurred by attacking, thus completely vindicating *Johnston's* policy.

Meanwhile Sherman's cavalry was not idle. Rousseau had been guarding the communications from Nashville, but now had orders to raid round in the Confederate rear, and on July 10th he struck south from Decatur (Ala.) with two cavalry brigades: in nine days he had marched three hundred miles and was a hundred miles in rear of *Johnston's* army, to the consternation of the people: he destroyed railways and supplies and joined Sherman on the 22nd near Atlanta. On the 27th, McCook's division moved down the Chattahoochee to Campbelltown, and thence across to the Macon railway, damaging it badly and

taking many prisoners, but McCook met a strong force on his return, and had to cut his way through with heavy loss, rejoining on August 3rd. Stoneman started on the same day as McCook, to break the railway by Jonesboro and go on to Macon and thence move against Andersonville, the great Confederate military prison. He was however attacked by superior forces, stood at bay with the rearguard to cover the retreat of his main body, and had to surrender. He was exchanged late in September. These raids were not successful, for cavalry could not stay to watch railways, after breaking them, so Schofield was sent to the south with his Army and Palmer's XIVth Corps; but Palmer resigned on a question of seniority and was succeeded by Jefferson Davis. On August 15th,¹ Schofield's right was at East Point Junction, having gained ground against the Confederate line in many places. On August 15th also, Kilpatrick's cavalry division tried again to break the Macon railway, but was stopped by another under *Jackson*.

Sherman now determined to hold the Chattahoochee bridge with the XXth Corps and swing the rest round to the south of the town. *Hood* had sent *Wheeler's* cavalry against his communications, but he took no notice, trusting to Rousseau and Steedman to hold them, which they did. *Hood*, however, thought he was falling back on the river, and when he reached East Point, told *Hardee* to take his own Corps and *Lee's*, move to Jonesboro and attack the enemy in flank the next morning, the 31st. Howard, whose command was threatened, expected an attack, and had fortified a good position: when the attack came, it was rather easily held off. Schofield and Stanley destroyed the railway south of the town.

This puzzled *Hood*, who was in Atlanta with one Corps, and he sent for *Lee's* Corps back while *Hardee* attracted attention at Jonesboro, and Sherman, thinking that the whole Confederate army was there, tried

¹ E. Hancock strikes at Richmond, early in August.

to surround and capture him, but he held his own. *Hood* then stopped *Lee* south of Atlanta to cover his evacuation of the place, and on September 27th¹ concentrated at Lovejoy's Station, Slocum entering and receiving the surrender of the town the same day, for the explosions in the night betrayed *Hood's* plans. In this latter phase of the campaign, *Hood's* army was scattered and he seemed bewildered, while Sherman had all his men in hand. Sherman lost about 31,000 men in the fighting round Atlanta, and *Hood's* losses are supposed to have been about 35,000, but his returns were irregular.

Sherman now held Atlanta and the railways to East Point and Decatur as well, while he watched the line of the Chattahoochee. The capture of Atlanta closed the last through east and west railway which the Confederates had, and materially narrowed the extent of their control. The army rested and prepared for the coming campaign. Many changes came with the fall of Atlanta, and the period of inactivity which succeeded it: regiments ended their term of service and were disbanded, and numbers of officers took leave for political and other reasons, including Generals Schofield, Logan, and Blair. On the other side, *Governor Brown* withdrew the division of Georgia militia from *Hood's* army to look after their own affairs and get the crops in, and there seemed a good deal of disaffection in the State, and feeling against *President Davis*: many friendly overtures were made to Sherman, but though he met them halfway, nothing came of them. The extremely hazardous political situation in the North has been alluded to, but the brilliant success at Atlanta saved it.

The next thing was to secure the position which had been won: as it was clear that the whole army could not be tied up in the great Confederate lines in the

¹ E. Butler attacks Richmond, September 28th.

E. Fisher's Hill, September 20th.

W. Price in Missouri, Pilot Knob, September 27th.

midst of a hostile population, Sherman resolved to clear the civilian population out entirely, making the place a purely military station, and then to construct fresh lines suitable to the strength of the garrison to be left. He wrote to *Hood* about arrangements for moving the people, who mounted the high horse and denounced such "inhuman measures," etc., etc., but the commissioner appointed to represent him gratefully acknowledged Sherman's kindness and consideration.

It was extremely difficult to see what was to follow. Sherman's communications were 140 miles longer than at Chattanooga, *Wheeler's* cavalry were between him and that place, and *Forrest's* in Tennessee: either might break them at any time. He had hoped that by now Farragut and Canby would have taken Mobile, which would not only have shortened his communications, but cut another slice off the Confederacy; the sea entrance was taken in August, closing the port, but the town was not, for Canby had again been disappointed of A. J. Smith's command, which had now been sent to Missouri. Though *Hood's* army was still in the neighbourhood, the attacks of the Confederate cavalry on the long line were such a serious trouble that two divisions were sent back, to Rome and Chattanooga respectively, while Rousseau returned to Nashville.

About September 20th, *President Davis* came to Georgia, stumping the country to restore some enthusiasm, and making wild statements about the trap into which the Union army had fallen, etc., etc. These were perhaps to make the best of the present situation, for *Davis* says that the plan he arranged with *Hood* and shewed to *Beauregard*, who had just been appointed to command the whole South-West, over *Hood* and *Taylor*, was quite different: viz., to fortify a strong position between Atlanta and Chattanooga, against which it was hoped that Sherman might run his head and get beaten. If he could not be brought to action *Hood* should retreat to Gadsden, where the

largest force could be best collected, and against which Sherman must act at the greatest distance from support, with a wasted country behind him. If he turned eastward *Hood* was to follow and attack him in rear, keeping the shorter line to north of him, which would also protect South Carolina: it was hoped that the Confederate strength in cavalry would prevent his living on the country, and this alone might defeat him. If he had plenty of transport the march was to be delayed in every way till his subsistence was gone. It was assumed that his first objective was Augusta, where were the principal powder-mills in the Confederacy. Grant thought that the Invasion of Tennessee was *Davis'* plan and that it was the best he could have made, but *Davis* said that *Hood* should not have left Sherman's army unbeaten and invaded Tennessee: he did not calculate on *Hood* having to consider two Union armies, and thought that his army, after a rest, could beat Sherman's. *Hood* says distinctly that the formation of Thomas' army defeated *Davis'* plan, since, if he fortified a position on the railway, his opponents could do the same, and hold him with one army, freeing the other, or Thomas might march south through Alabama. He therefore determined to invade Tennessee.

Hood began by striking at one place after another to puzzle Sherman: *Forrest* took Athens on the Chattanooga line, and then appeared in Tennessee, where Rousseau stopped him, and he went back to Alabama: then *Hood* moved towards Tennessee, and Sherman sent back Thomas to Chattanooga with two more divisions, but *Hood* moved to Campbelltown: Sherman determined to attack him south of the Etowah, but suggested to Grant that Thomas could look after him if he went north of it. This was the germ idea of the Great March, but was not yet quite developed. A fierce attack on Allatoona shewed Sherman that he could not hold his line and keep any troops for offence: he followed *Hood* as far as

Resaca,¹ but proposed the March to the Sea, when he disappeared again. This was sanctioned, and all reinforcements were to go to strengthen Thomas against *Hood*, Thomas being told to neglect the railway and concentrate all his men, as the only way to beat him. *Hood's* concentration cleared the way, and made unnecessary Sherman's first idea of waiting till Grant had taken Wilmington or Savannah as a base for him, while *Governor Brown's* contumacy secured his supplies. (FOR THE MARCH TO THE SEA, cf. p. 354. For *HOOD'S* INVASION OF TENNESSEE, cf. p. 362.)

FARRAGUT AND GRANGER AT MOBILE (Map 61, p. 404)

Farragut had been waiting outside Mobile all spring for the reinforcement of ironclads which never came, while the Confederates had put the "*Tennessee*" into commission and stationed her at the entrance of the bay: they had also some well-armed gunboats. Farragut had always represented that he could not fight the ironclad with his weak squadron and that the blockade might be raised if he were not strengthened. Canby also, commanding the Department at New Orleans, was helpless, waiting for men, so things drifted till the beginning of August,² when he sent Granger with 1,800 men, and just then four promised monitors came. Farragut at once made preparation for forcing the entrance to the bay, Granger's work being to attack a fort rather away from the ship channel.

Mobile town stands about thirty miles from the sea at the head of a long bay, which is over twenty miles across at the lower end, but the entrance is

¹ E. Tom's Brook, October 9th.

W. Price in Missouri, October.

The "*Florida*" captured at Bahia, October 7th.

E. Cedar Creek, October 19th.

² E. Sheridan takes command in the Valley, August 7th.

W. Rousseau and *Wheeler* in Tennessee, August.

The "*Tallahassee*" sails from Wilmington, August 6th

nearly closed by a long spit running out from the east side, on the point of which stood Fort Morgan, a strong specimen of the old-fashioned brick fort, but unable to face the guns of that date. Then comes an opening of about three miles and a half to Dauphiné Island, at the east end of which stood Fort Gaines : between this island and the mainland three miles distant a small new fort, Fort Powell, had been built on a sandbank. Fort Gaines was a small brick and earth fort with a few heavy guns, but too far from the main channel to be useful for defence. Fort Morgan was the only work to be dealt with by the fleet, and it had been strengthened by making earthworks against its sides and had earthwork batteries in front, etc. The channel was sown with mines and had been narrowed by obstructions opposite the fort, while behind these lay the formidable "*Tennessee*" and three Confederate gunboats.

On August 5th, Farragut stood in to attack Fort Morgan and force the passage, his fleet consisting of four monitors, carrying 15- and 11-inch smooth-bores, three first-class sloops or small corvettes, and eleven gunboats. Most of the wooden ships carried a rifled 150- or 100-pounder Parrott gun and they had some 11-inch smooth-bores also. The vessels moved in two columns in échelon, the starboard column of monitors leading, the others consisting of the wooden ships lashed together in pairs, the stronger vessels nearest to the fort. The faster wooden ships began to overhaul the monitors, and the "*Brooklyn*," leading the port column, stopped and signalled for orders, causing a dangerous block right under the guns of the fort ; Farragut signalled to go ahead and went past in the "*Hartford*," when the leading monitor, the "*Tecumseh*," struck a mine and sank immediately : the ships were clubbed at close quarters and suffered severely, the gunboat "*Selma*," which was capitally handled, doing more damage to them than all the others ; she was captured later in the action. It was most fortunate

for the Union fleet that only one mine exploded, for several vessels struck them and heard the primers snap, but they had become so overgrown with barnacles that all but one missed fire. The fleet then passed the fort and went up the bay, where the next phase of the battle began, the fight with the "*Tennessee*."

The "*Tennessee*" was a large vessel of the usual Confederate central battery type with inclined sides and low ends, and carried two rifled 7-inch guns and two 68-pounder smooth-bores: she was protected with three layers of 2-inch armour on the battery, but was too big for her engines and unhandy, and thus missed several good chances of attacking. Her steering gear was unprotected and soon was smashed, when she became unmanageable. Her attempts to ram failed, but her size saved her from being driven under when rammed. Her guns were silenced by the heavy concentrated fire of the fleet, and she was further shaken by ramming till her armour ceased to be a protection, when being unable to use either gun or ram she surrendered. That evening the monitor "*Chickasaw*" silenced Fort Powell, which was evacuated after dark. *Von Scheliha* says that this fort was evacuated at the beginning of March after a ten days' bombardment, but in this case it must have been re-occupied. Granger landed troops on Dauphiné Island, but seems not to have been ready to co-operate with the fleet. On the 8th he took Fort Gaines, and then, having been reinforced by Canby with a siege train as well as troops, attacked Fort Morgan by regular approaches along the narrow spit on which it stood, the fleet, including the "*Tennessee*," helping with their fire. On the 22nd, Fort Morgan surrendered and the port of Mobile was lost to the South, but the town was well fortified, and Granger could only watch it till he was sent to Thomas' army in November. Farragut retired in September, Commodore Palmer succeeding to the command. (Continued on p. 402.)

THE SOUTH-EAST

(Continued from p. 301.) The first thing that was done in this district was Cushing's attack on the "*Albemarle*," lying off Plymouth, North Carolina. He got two steam launches, each armed with a howitzer and a spar torpedo, and started for the Roanoke via the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal, losing a boat on the way, but he went on with the other and reached the Union fleet late in October.¹

His main weapon, the torpedo, was a most complicated affair. It was fitted on a slung spar, handled by a topping lift from a short mast: before being fired, it was to be pulled off the spar by a cord, then allowed to float up under the vessel to be attacked, and then fired by pulling another cord. Each of these things must be done exactly, in proper sequence, and not prematurely, under the most difficult circumstances.

Cushing started from the fleet on the night of October 27th, with seven men in the launch, and a cutter in tow with thirteen more. He found both banks of the stream, some 150 yards wide, watched by outposts, but got close to the ship without detection: when hailed, he threw off the cutter to attack the shore guards, and ran straight at the ship under heavy fire from ship and shore. As he got close, seeing that the ship was guarded with a boom of logs some feet from her sides all round, he turned out again and ran square at it, trusting to bump over, which he did within ten feet of the muzzle of a gun: all this under the heaviest fire. Cushing's clothes were nearly cut off his back as he stood in the bow of his boat with the five lines of his complicated gear in his hands, which he actually succeeded in manipulating accurately, bursting the torpedo under the overhang of the ironclad. Just then the gun was fired, and the boat swamped by the

¹ E. Cedar Creek, October 19th.

W. Price beaten at Newtonia, October 28th.

The "*Olustee*," "*Chickamauga*," and "*Shenandoah*" start, end of October.

wave from the torpedo. Cushing called to his men to save themselves and struck out down the river; he landed in a swamp close to the town and lay close all day, but on the second evening seized a small boat and reached the fleet that night. His men were either drowned or captured, but he escaped with a slight scratch on one hand. The "*Albemarle*" sank in eight feet of water with her upper works shewing. She was the only really effective Confederate ironclad, probably because she was not too big for her engines: no others were handy in action like her. The Confederate power of building engines was so limited that it was best to let it govern the design of the vessel.

A few days after this exploit, the Union fleet came up and re-took Plymouth, and in December a combined expedition was sent further up the river to reduce some Confederate works, but lost a vessel by a mine and saw no enemy.

Surely no more gallant deed than Cushing's was ever done, for it combined the most extreme daring and dash with the coolest and most accurate calculation, in the dark, under a heavy fire at close quarters.

SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA (cf. p. 350)

Though the point of departure, Atlanta, lies in the Southern District, as we have taken it for convenience, yet the Great March crossed into the South-Eastern almost immediately, and is therefore best considered here.

As soon as the scheme was sanctioned, Sherman got ready to carry it out, reorganizing his army specially for the purpose of marching light and fast, all the men being picked and but few guns taken; for there was no prospect of severe fighting, at all events till the coast was reached. He took the Armies of the Tennessee and Cumberland, or at least two Corps from each: the former, under Howard, consisted of the XVth and XVIIth Corps, under Logan and Blair

nominally, but both were then away canvassing for election to Congress. Blair soon rejoined, but Logan did not do so till the end of the year. The Army of the Cumberland was under Slocum, Thomas being sent elsewhere, and consisted of the XIVth and XXth Corps, under Jefferson Davis and Williams: the cavalry was a division under Kilpatrick. Total strength, 59,545, with 65 guns.

The Confederates rather helped Sherman than hindered him, for *Davis'* angry speeches gave him useful information, and *Governor Brown* had filled the country with provisions by withdrawing the militia to get in the harvest, which simplified the march immensely. The quarrel between the State and *Army authorities* in Georgia was also all in his favour. He saw that there was no force in Georgia able to stop him, and that what was wanted was to place a Northern army at Columbia, South Carolina, which would practically end the War, since it had been shewn that a State severed from the Confederacy was lost to it, and then only North Carolina would remain. *Lee's* only chance would be to escape from Grant, abandon Virginia, destroy Sherman's army, and re-establish the Confederacy in some central place: if Sherman could stand till Grant closed in there was no hope for the South. This supposed that Thomas could hold his own against *Hood*, and also that *Lee* was the arbiter of the situation on the Confederate side, which latter, unluckily for them, was not the case. It was necessary to establish a new base on the sea since the old one in rear could not be kept, and also to destroy the railways in Georgia and the resources of the country, and effectually cut off the Gulf States. Though Sherman was aiming for Savannah, an alternative route might be found better as events developed, and he therefore asked that the fleet should look out for him at Morris Island near Charleston, Ossabaw Sound near Savannah, Pensacola, and Mobile: this would also tend to mystify the enemy and perhaps divide their forces.

On November 12th he broke his communications, destroyed the railway north of Atlanta and the machine shops there and at Rome, and concentrated at Atlanta on the 14th. The first precaution was very necessary, for Grant was not over-sanguine about the scheme, his Chief of Staff, Rawlins, was bitterly opposed to it (cf. p. 443), and the President and politicians extremely nervous: it might have been countermanded at the last moment.

On the Confederate side, *Beauregard* had too large a district to manage properly, and the responsibility for defence fell on *Hardee*, the very best man, who used the means at his disposal to the best advantage. His principal force was a good cavalry command under *Wheeler* and the Georgia militia, with which he could not hope to stop Sherman, but he strengthened the defences of Savannah and other places.

Sherman started on the 15th,¹ on two lines, the Army of the Tennessee taking the right, that of the Cumberland the left. Each Army usually marched on two roads, one for each Corps, and the right column moved roughly along the Savannah railway by Griswoldville and Millen, the left along that to Augusta by Milledgeville and Louisville. Some severe cavalry fighting took place, the Confederates being the stronger, but *Wheeler* had not always the best of it. The peculiarities of the march were not the battles fought, but that the destruction of railways, and foraging to enable the army to live on the country, were reduced to exact sciences. A whole division would lift a long length of line, drop it to loosen the sleepers, then pile them up, make a fire, and heat and twist the rails, often round trees: over 300 miles of line were thus destroyed, and all forage along a belt 60 miles wide. To destroy the subsistence in the country, the army lived on it entirely, each brigade detailing a foraging party daily, and turning over to the Quarter Master's

¹ E. Union Cavalry Raids in Virginia, November.

W. *Hood* invades Tennessee, November 20th.

department everything it brought in. The men started on foot and returned mounted, thus keeping the army teams strong and the Confederate cavalry weak: if attacked they formed a skirmishing line to protect the laden mules, and generally brought them in. Though there were strict orders not to damage private property, unless attacked by the people, when it was done by order, there was much looting and needless destruction. Pioneer corps, largely composed of negroes, were organized for repairing roads, and marched between the advanced guard and the main body. Though the work was hard, the weather was perfect, and the march was almost a pleasant picnic to the men after what they had gone through. So things went on till the army neared Savannah. Up to now, the defences of the place had been designed entirely to meet attack from the sea or the inner channels: on the land side the best line of defence was close to the town, but it did not cover the railway to Charleston and would only leave one line of retreat, to the north across the Savannah River. *Hardee* therefore entrenched one between the rivers Savannah and Ogeechee, but the XVth Corps was sent down the right bank of the Ogeechee and turned it, forcing him to fall back to his inner lines.

Foster commanded at Port Royal, and pushed a division to Grahamsville to threaten the crossing of the Savannah, but *Taylor* came up and saved it. *Hardee* sent a very clear report on the situation to Richmond, assuming that Sherman would establish a base at Savannah, before moving on Charleston; that he (*Hardee*) should not be caught there, but take his troops to reinforce *Bragg* at Augusta, and that this force should be used to stop Sherman's advance northwards. His small force of 18,000 men was helpless by itself, but would be a welcome addition to *Bragg's* army. It would have been well for the Confederates had their *Government* taken this sound advice. *Hardee* made the outlying Fort McAllister a separate com-

mand, and when Sherman came up he sent Howard against it, as it cut him off from the fleet: Howard took it with a rush on the 13th. Foster had entrenched a position commanding the Charleston railway, but as this did not prevent the Confederates from using it, he seized the railway by order. The gunboats secured the inner waters, roads were made, and heavy guns sent for.

Grant at this time asked Sherman to entrench a position to be held by a small force, and to bring the bulk of his army to Richmond by sea, but Sherman asked to take Savannah and then move on Columbia, and Grant assented.¹ Sherman now began to make siege works on one side of Savannah, but *Hardee* evacuated it before he was ready to attack, and retired on Augusta, leaving his heavy guns but destroying some ironclads on the stocks. He effected his retreat on the night of December 20th after some sharp fighting. Sherman was thus able to offer Savannah, 120 heavy guns, and 25,000 bales of cotton, to President Lincoln as a Christmas present. He then set to work to refit the army for the move forward in January.

² As a secondary operation to Sherman's march, the combined military and naval expedition against Fort Fisher left Hampton Roads on December 13th, but did not get there till the 22nd. Being in General Butler's district, he provided the troops, which were under Weitzel, but went himself also. Admiral Porter commanded the fleet, which included five ironclads. Butler was sure that the explosion of a fire-ship close to the fort would wreck it; this was done on the morning of the 24th, but without effect. The fleet then stood in and opened a tremendous fire on that and the next day, which drove the gunners to shelter:

¹ E. Stoneman's Raid in S.W. Virginia, December.

E. Warren breaks the Weldon line, December.

W. Battle of Nashville, December 15th, 16th.

Europe. *Bulloch* buys the "Sphinx," December.

Mexico. Porfirio Diaz shut up in Oajaca, December.

² Maps 57, 58, page 390.

on Christmas Day a large force was landed and advanced close to the north face under cover of the ships' fire, but when they masked this fire by their approach the fort opened on them with grape and musketry at point-blank range and drove them off. The fort mounted 44 guns : of these 8 were dismounted by the fire and 2 burst, while on the other side several rifled 100-pounder Parrott guns burst. Butler and Weitzel thought that the fort was little injured and could not be taken without a regular siege, the weather was threatening, and the expedition returned to Hampton Roads. The fort had had only a small garrison, but this was reinforced before the attack, and *Bragg* was at Wilmington with some troops. Butler had been ordered not to relinquish his hold if he once landed, and Porter begged him to hold on and try again, for he could keep up a heavier fire if wanted : he complained bitterly of Butler's conduct, and Grant also blamed him for the failure. (Continued on p. 388.)

THE WEST AND SOUTH-WEST

(Continued from pp. 309, 310.) On July 1st,¹ A. J. Smith, with his two divisions, sent to stop *Forrest*, was at La Grange, Tennessee, and he had also a cavalry division and a coloured brigade: *Forrest* with 12,000 men harassed his march. Smith moved against the Mobile and Ohio line and took position at Harrisburg on the 14th. Next day *Forrest* attacked with all his accustomed dash, but was repulsed, and the Union troops advanced and drove him back into the woods, where, being mounted, his command escaped from pursuit. The Union cavalry had destroyed the railway, and Smith started back to Memphis, but *Forrest* harassed the march again and attacked the coloured troops, who drove his men back in confusion. This was not

¹ S. Sherman crosses the Chattahoochee, July 9th.
W. Rousseau's Raid starts, July 10th.
E. Battle of the Monocacy, July 9th.

only the worst defeat he had had, but a loss of prestige, and things were quieter in Tennessee for a time, Sherman's communications being only menaced by such few cavalry as *Johnston* could spare, who were held off. In Kentucky, however, there was enough guerilla fighting and attacking of communications to keep *Burbridge's* command busy during the whole of the Atlanta campaign, and about this time *Morgan* recommenced operations from south-west Virginia. He moved through eastern to central Tennessee, and was killed in an action at Greenville on September 4th (cf. p. 340), *Breckinridge* succeeding him in command of the *Department of South-Western Virginia*. *Forrest*, who was not driven out of the district, recommenced his attacks on Sherman's communications in Tennessee and Kentucky in the autumn. On October 30th he attacked and took a gunboat and two transports on the Tennessee at Johnsonville and then joined *Hood's* army near Decatur. *Wheeler* had also been sent against the communications in July, but *Steedman* drove him off, thence he moved to east Tennessee where *Rousseau* stopped him, and he went back south in August, having done nothing.

We left *Price* in western Arkansas, preparing for the invasion of Missouri (cf. p. 313). He got together 15,000 men and 20 guns, and on September 1st crossed the Arkansas River at Dardanelle, and advanced to the Missouri border before *Rosecrans* at St. Louis heard of his movements and began to collect the Union forces, of which he had but few at the time, so that *Smith's* command, which was to have joined Sherman after defeating *Forrest*, was sent to strengthen them. *Ewing* was holding the important position of Pilot Knob with only 1,000 men, and *Price* attacked him on September 27th:¹ he held on all that day, but evacuated

¹ S. Sherman occupies Atlanta, September 27th.

E. Butler's attack in the Peninsula, September 28th.

E. *Early* driven back in the Valley, end of September.

E. *Burbridge* attacks S.W. Virginia, end of September.

the place in the night and joined Rosecrans at St. Louis. *Price* followed and attacked the lines of St. Louis, but was repulsed, and turned away against Jefferson City. There were several local commands which had not been touched by *Price's* advance, and Rosecrans collected them to defend the State Capital. Curtis and Blunt, commanding in Kansas, closed in, and when *Price* found himself followed by the Union forces under Smith and Pleasonton, he turned away westward against Kansas City and Fort Leavenworth, but was headed off. Blunt and Curtis delayed him by continual fighting outside Lexington till Pleasonton came up with the cavalry division just in time to take *Price* in rear on October 22nd, drive him through the town of Independence, and save Curtis from defeat. Next day Curtis and Pleasonton moved against *Price* from two directions, attacked him near Westport, drove him back and pursued him, Smith coming up and nearly cutting him off.¹ He made a stand near Mine Creek, Kansas, but was driven in, losing many guns, and chased nearly to Fort Scott: the pursuit was kept up and he turned again at Newtonia on the 28th, was again beaten, and retreated across the Arkansas River at Fort Smith. Most of the Confederate guerillas followed the wrecks of his force, and there was no more trouble in Missouri. During all this time *Kirby Smith* is never heard of. Steele was evidently able to watch him. Halleck blamed Rosecrans for letting *Price* overrun Missouri as he did, apparently with reason, for though he cannot have been ignorant of *Price's* preparations, he was surprised by him. He ceased to command the Department on December 9th, and was not employed again.

¹ E. Cedar Creek, October 19th.

E. Butler beaten at Seven Pines, October 27th.

S.E. Cushing sinks the "*Albemarle*," October 27th.

S.E. Union fleet retakes Plymouth, October 31st.

W. *Forrest's* Raid in Tennessee and Kentucky, end of October.
The "*Olustee*," "*Chickamauga*," and "*Shenandoah*" start,
end of October.

HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE (cf. p. 350)

Thomas was organizing his army at Nashville in November, which consisted of the IVth and XXIIIrd Corps and about two divisions of cavalry, some 28,700 men, but the total strength in his command was nearer 59,000, scattered along the lines of communication: before the end of the year it was 70,272. A. J. Smith's (new) XVIth Corps was sent to him after *Price's* defeat (cf. pp. 302, 344).

Hood concentrated at Decatur, and Schofield and Granger covered Nashville from the south. The weather was very bad, almost stopping operations. *Hood* crossed the Tennessee at Florence¹ and tried to turn Schofield's right with his cavalry, *Breckinridge* making a diversion in east Tennessee of which no notice was taken. *Beauregard* ordered *Hood* to take the offensive, and he tried to cut off Schofield at Pulaski on November 20th, but Schofield fell back to a prepared position at Columbia, delaying *Hood* as much as possible. *Forrest* was in command of the Confederate cavalry, but when Sherman sent Wilson to take command of the cavalry of Thomas' army, matters improved much (cf. p. 465). Granger was ordered to concentrate the detachments at Athens, Decatur, and Huntsville, at Stevenson, which relieved *Hood* of any anxiety for his right flank, and he pressed on. *Forrest* got the better of Wilson, and Schofield fell back again, destroying the bridges over Duck River: he had delayed the enemy as long as possible, for their army was now crossing in several places, and he risked being cut off. His trains and escort were at Spring Hill, badly protected, Wilson having taken a wrong road, and *Forrest* struck at them there, being supported by *Hood's* army, coming up by degrees. *Cheatham's* Corps was checked, and *Stewart's* did not arrive before dark. Some Union troops were still holding the river against *Lee's* Corps, and that night all retired to

¹ S. Sherman starts for the Sea, November 15th.

E. Union Cavalry Raids in Virginia, November.

Franklin. *Hood* blamed *Cheatham* for the failure, though he was present himself at the critical time.

Schofield took a position at Franklin to the south of the Harpeth River, covering the crossing, and entrenched it: Fort Granger, an earthwork on the north bank, commanded the bridges. Two brigades were pushed out to an advanced position to develop the attack, but not to fight there, but their commander Wagner tried to hold the ground, and his whole force was swept away by the furious Confederate attack. Pursuers and pursued broke through the Union line in rear, but supports came up and closed it again, and then began one of the fiercest fights of the whole War, *Stewart* and *Cheatham* putting in all their reserves and fighting to a finish. The Confederate loss was appalling, over 6,000 men, including twelve general officers, among whom was the gallant *Cleburne*. Schofield lost 2,500, of whom 1,000 belonged to Wagner's command. He retired across the river in the night, and Thomas congratulated him on his gallant stand, asking him to stand again at Brentwood to gain a little more time for detachments to come in.

Hood followed, his army being about 44,000 strong, intending to entrench a position in front of Nashville on the chance of getting reinforcements from Texas, and be able to defeat Thomas if he attacked, for he was not in a condition to do so after the losses at Franklin: he was very awkwardly placed, as either advance or retreat seemed equally bad: he went forward, putting *Lee's* Corps, which had suffered least, in the centre. Thomas took position on the heights round Nashville. In the first week in December, *Hood* sent out detachments to destroy railways and attack local garrisons, but Rousseau, commanding at Murfreesboro, was able to drive off a force of about double his strength under *Forrest* and *Bate*. *Forrest* then raided the country east of Nashville, but the Union gunboats and cavalry prevented him from crossing the Tennessee River.

Grant ordered Thomas to resume the offensive, but

he wanted to strengthen his cavalry more, and also the weather stopped all movements. Grant, however, fairly lost patience with him, and at one time even thought of coming himself, but sent Logan to supersede him if he did not move: before Logan arrived the decisive battle had been fought.

Both sides had been waiting for the weather to mend, and when it did, Thomas moved against *Hood's* lines, which were over-extended, on December 15th,¹ leaving a few men to hold his own works. The XVIth Corps took some redoubts on *Hood's* right and the IVth drove in his left: the XXIIIrd was in reserve. *Hood* was driven back two miles from one position to another, with slight Union loss. *Hood's* new line was shorter, to the south of Nashville across the Granny White and Franklin roads, with its right on the strong position of Overton's Hill. On the left was Sly's Hill, which, though steep, was not strong. This position was taken up under fire. Thomas' line overlapped *Hood's* at each end, Wilson's cavalry being out on the Hillsboro road. *Hood* sent for *Forrest* in haste, whom he had allowed to get away out of touch, hoping to hold on till he came.

On the 16th, Thomas attacked all along the line, Wilson moving round the enemy's left flank beyond the Granny White road. *Hood* kept detaching troops to stop him till the position at Sly's Hill became too weakly held; it was a sharp salient, and was crushed by the Union artillery. An attack on Overton's Hill failed, but the Confederate left was broken; a second attack carried Overton's Hill and the Confederates were driven from the whole position in confusion, but *Forrest* now appeared and saved them from destruction. He had been ordered to retreat east and south, but, always at his best in difficulties, pushed three cavalry brigades to the westward in rear of the beaten army,

¹ E. Warren breaks the Weldon line, December.
E. Stoneman's Raid in S.W. Virginia, December.
Europe. *Bulloch* buys the "Sphinx," December,

held Wilson off, and rejoined *Hood* at Columbia, where, with the addition of an infantry force to his command, he covered the retreat to the Tennessee, which was crossed on the 27th¹: two Union gunboats tried to interfere, but were driven off, and the retreating army was not molested further.

Thomas sent troops to re-occupy the posts in Alabama which had been given up at the beginning of the campaign, and as Sherman's projected advance northward from Savannah made it important that the enemy should not be allowed to concentrate troops in the Gulf States, he prepared for a new campaign in the spring. He stationed the IVth Corps at Huntsville, the XVIth and XXIIIrd at Eastport.

The Confederates were so demoralized by the battle of Franklin that they did not fight so well at Nashville, where *Hood* made the mistake of letting his opponent overlap his line obliquely on the first day, and attack from that position. He should have drawn back to a better one. He also was not the man he had been, and missed several chances at Franklin: why he followed and stayed before Nashville, when Thomas was receiving reinforcements, and none were likely to arrive for him, is a mystery. After the battle Thomas got all the credit for his skill and tenacity, and the result redeemed his strategical errors before it, but at first he carried caution to an extreme, when he had a greater number of good troops who might have been called in, in not moving till Smith came, and it also looks as if he might have concentrated farther south, and kept *Hood* behind Duck River. Granger's eccentric movement to cover the railways only helped *Hood* by clearing his flank and freeing *Forrest*: the consequence was that Schofield, covering the concentration, was much exposed and only just succeeded in doing so. Thomas' over-caution made him disregard Sherman's

¹ S.E. Sherman takes Savannah, December 21st.

S.E. First attack on Fort Fisher, December 24th, 25th.

Mexico. Porfirio Diaz shut up in Oajaca, December.

orders to neglect outlying districts and railways for the time being and concentrate all troops to fight *Hood* as soon as possible, and so he ran unnecessary risks.

There were no operations in the South-West District, other than the end of the pursuit of *Price* by Smith and Pleasonton, which is dealt with elsewhere. (Continued, WEST on p. 401, SOUTH-WEST on p. 402.)

THE BLOCKADE

(Continued from p. 314.) The Blockade, though stringent, was not impassable (cf. p. 125), for a vessel ran into Savannah just as Sherman's army marched in, and was captured at the wharf. Fort Fisher kept Wilmington open, and was still defiant at the end of the year; the Confederate ram "*North Carolina*" appeared here, but did nothing. As we have seen, Farragut took Mobile Bay, which was lost to the Confederacy in August. No regular attacks were made on Charleston, but some operations were undertaken up the Stono River close to it, and in the neighbourhood.

The "*Coquette*," which *Bulloch* had bought in 1863 for conveying heavy freight such as engines better than the ordinary blockade-runner, had been a most useful vessel and paid her way well, but her boilers had got into such bad order that she was sold out of the Confederate service early in July. (Continued on p. 404.)

THE WAR AT SEA

(Continued from p. 317.) During the summer, the "*Florida*," having coaled at Bermuda, cruised about in the Atlantic, but had to come close to the American coast to find American ships: here, however, she did a fair amount of damage. At the beginning of October she reached Bahia, where was the U.S.S. "*Wachusett*," Captain Collins, and when she anchored about half a mile away, a Brazilian man-of-war anchored between

them. Collins, however, was not deterred by any scruples about the violation of neutrality from trying to stop his enemy's depredations; he got under way early in the morning of October 7th,¹ and deliberately ran into the "*Florida*," firing on her till she surrendered, many of her officers and men being on shore at the time. He then took her out as a prize to Hampton Roads, where she was sunk by collision on November 28th. There seems no doubt that the United States Consul at Bahia had given positive assurances to the Brazilian Government that the laws of neutrality would be fully respected, which were binding on Captain Collins. The outrage was flagrant, the Brazilian Government instructed their Minister at Washington to make formal and immediate complaint to the Government of the United States, and Mr. Seward at once answered that the President would suspend and court-martial Captain Collins and dismiss the Consul at Bahia, since they could not take on themselves to do such things, but he specially declined to recognize that the "*Florida*" had any rights whatever or was other than a pirate. A large sum of money was taken in her, which was not returned by the United States authorities. The officers and men were paroled and allowed to go to Liverpool, on February 1st, 1865.

A blockade-runner called the "*Atlanta*" was fitted out at Wilmington as the Confederate cruiser "*Tallahassee*," and sailed on August 6th,² keeping close along the American coast where she was very successful, returning on the 26th to Wilmington. At the end of October³ she ran out again, now called the "*Olustee*,"

¹ E. Tom's Brook, October 9th.

W. Price in Missouri, October.

E. Cedar Creek, October 19th.

² E. Sheridan takes command in the Valley, August 7th.

S. Farragut forces Mobile Bay, August 5th.

³ E. Butler beaten at Seven Pines, October 27th.

S.E. Cushing sinks the "*Albemarle*," October 27th.

S.E. Union fleet retakes Plymouth, October 31st.

cruised up to Sandy Hook, took seven prizes and ran the blockade back into Wilmington. Here she was disarmed, and took a cargo of cotton to Bermuda to get supplies for *Lee's* army; this time she was called the "*Chameleon*." About the same time another fast vessel, the "*Edith*," was bought and armed at Wilmington, and soon sailed as the cruiser "*Chickamauga*," making a successful cruise along the coast, returning to Wilmington, but neither of these two were fit to keep in commission as cruisers, for they were not full-rigged, and depended on their steam power; the "*Chickamauga*," however, was kept for local defence, and was in action at the capture of Fort Fisher, in 1865.

The forced sale of the ships at Laird's had put some money into *Bulloch's* hands when he most wanted it, just after the loss of the "*Alabama*." He had seen a very fine vessel in 1863, with good steam and sail power and a lifting screw, called the "*Sea King*," and now came across her again: she was just what he wanted for the project, then mooted, of attacking the American whaling fleet, in the Sea of Okhotsk and the North Pacific. The greatest care had to be exercised in the purchase: *Bulloch* hardly dared go near her, and an English merchant bought her in his own name, the captain having a power of sale with the proviso that she should take no prizes till he had had time to return to England and cancel her register. Then a tender was wanted, and a good one was soon bought called the "*Laurel*," which sailed ostensibly with passengers and cargo for Havana, but the passengers were officers and men for the "*Sea King*," and the cargo her armament. Though two Northern men-of-war were specially on the look-out in the Channel, they missed both ships, which sailed from Liverpool and London respectively at the beginning of October, for Madeira, where they met, and the captain of the "*Sea King*" sold her to the Confederate States and returned to England. She was armed and

commissioned under the name of the "*Shenandoah*," and mounted four 68-pounder smooth-bores and four small rifled guns. *Captain Waddell* now took command with orders to go to Australia, thence to the New Zealand whaling ground, and then on to the North Pacific. He reached Melbourne on January 25th, 1865, having taken eight ships on the way. The "*Laurel*" went on to Nassau to report to the Confederate agent there for such service as she might be fit for.

By the time that one of the rams built for *Bulloch*, which had been sold to Denmark, then at war with Prussia, arrived there, the war was over and the Danes wanted to be off their bargain, of which her builder told *Bulloch*, and also negotiated the purchase of the ship for him in December.¹ She was then called the "Sphinx." She had an armoured semi-circular battery right forward, carrying one 300-pounder Armstrong gun, and a turret aft, with two 70-pounders, all rifled. The battery was thrown back from the stem to enable the heavy gun to fire right ahead as well as on each side: she had twin screws, was very heavy forward, clumsy, and unseaworthy-looking, but a formidable antagonist for any wooden ship. She was not ready for use till after the end of the year.

The "*Rappahannock*" remained at Calais as a depot ship all the half-year, for the French supervision was so close that she could not be manned or got away, even to be armed elsewhere. (Continued on p. 405.)

SUMMARY

(Continued from p. 320.) The year 1864 ended with the hopeless disruption of the Confederacy, Sherman's great march having cut a lane through the centre of it. As in the first part of the half-year the primary

¹ E. Stoneman's Raid in S.W. Virginia, December.

E. Warren breaks the Weldon line, December.

S.E. Sherman takes Savannah, December 21st.

S.E. First attack on Fort Fisher, December 24th, 25th.

W. Battle of Nashville, December 15th, 16th.

Mexico. Porfirio Diaz shut up in Oajaca, December.

military operations were those against *Johnston's* army, so in the latter part those round Atlanta, and of Thomas against *Hood*, were so, those in the East being secondary throughout. This is shewn by the fact that after the fall of Atlanta all available men were sent to Thomas. *Hood* had started out "to undo the work of Stone's River," the decisive battle of the War in a purely military sense, but it was now too late, even had he beaten Thomas, to carry the War into the North as *Sidney Johnston* and *Bragg* had hoped to do. In the East, the interest centred, not in *Lee's* wonderful holding on at Petersburg, but in the campaign of the indomitable *Early* in the Valley against larger numbers under an abler general, whom he succeeded in holding fast there and in materially prolonging the War.

The political danger to the Republican party in the summer, which *Early* succeeded in keeping alive in a wonderful degree, was dissipated by the fall of Atlanta followed by the battle of Cedar Creek, and the vigorous conduct of the War was assured from that time. There was however another political danger, which the appointment of Grant to chief command had not stopped, and that was the way in which Stanton and Halleck interfered in military matters, especially in the Valley. They gave orders which nullified Hunter's attempts either to beat *Early*, keep in touch with him, or prevent the Confederates from supplying themselves freely, till Sheridan was specially sent with orders to act otherwise: Grant once had to tell him not to obey Halleck, and then they even went so far as to alter Grant's orders, which went via Washington, and send their own notions to him in Grant's name, so that Grant had to see him personally at least once, because he could not rely on his orders being delivered as written. This was not done with President Lincoln's consent, for he wrote strongly to Grant, begging him to push his plans, because no one at Washington would adopt a vigorous

policy. When Washington was threatened, Halleck was absolutely helpless, and would neither take command nor responsibility.

The Union army was suffering much from the want of good leaders, for many had been lost and their places could not be filled. This seems curious, after some years of war, but Napoleon 1st suffered from the same trouble in his later years, 1814-'15.

In the trans-Mississippi district the War was over. In the South and South-East, the country was not only cut through, but the Confederates were quarrelling among themselves. Not only was the feeling in Georgia bitter against *Davis*, and between *Davis* and *Johnston* and *Governor Brown*, but also between the States of Georgia and South Carolina, the latter being blamed for all their misfortunes as the starter and maintainer of the War and the one which had hardly suffered at all.

Wilmington was the only port remaining to the Confederacy.

Union Loss.—Major-General McPherson, killed in action.

Confederate Losses.—*Major-General Morgan*, killed in action; the "*Florida*," captured in violation of neutrality. (Continued on p. 407.)

NOTICES OF OFFICERS

(Continued from p. 323.) Several notable officers disappear from the War during this half-year: on the Union side, Major-Generals Hooker and McPherson, and Admiral Farragut; on the Confederate, *Major-General Morgan*.

Major-General Joseph Hooker, known as "Fighting Joe," a nickname which he particularly disliked, was one of the senior officers in the War. An old West Point man, he had served in the Mexican War and was an experienced soldier. He commanded a division in the Peninsula, a Corps at the Antietam, a Grand

Division (two Corps) at Fredericksburg, and then the Army of the Potomac. He was afterwards a Corps commander in the West. His men believed in him enthusiastically, and besides being a first-rate officer he was an excellent administrator, but was at his best in command of a division or Corps. He was so hampered by the Government and Halleck that it is difficult to judge him as a commanding general, but after Chancellorsville he handled his army ably till superseded by Meade. His mistakes at Chancellorsville were largely due to an injury which dazed him for the time and from which he never really recovered. His great faults were selfishness and insubordination, especially under Sherman and Thomas, who had both been junior to him. He was always trying to cut loose and make a little glory for himself without regard to the operations of the army, leaving dangerous gaps, impeding other troops, etc. He would try to assert his authority as senior over other Corps commanders, to carry out his own schemes. Things came to a climax at Kenesaw Mountain: Sherman took him sharply to task, and nearly relieved him from command. When Howard was given the command of the Army of the Tennessee he sent in his resignation, which was forwarded, "heartily recommended." He was not employed again.

Major-General James McPherson was an old West Point man, and a lieutenant of Engineers at the beginning of the War. He was soon appointed Colonel, and served on Grant's Staff at Fort Donelson and after, as Commanding Engineer, then on Halleck's. In September, 1862, he was a Brigadier-General, in October Major-General, commanded a Corps before Vicksburg, and early in 1864 was given the command of the Army of the Tennessee. He and Sherman were the two whom Grant most specially thanked for their co-operation, when made Commander-in-Chief. McPherson was tall, handsome, vigorous, about the most lovable and popular man in the army, and whose

death, at the age of thirty-four, was felt as a personal bereavement by all who knew him.

Rear-Admiral David Glasgow Farragut was a Southerner, born in Tennessee, whose family afterwards went to New Orleans. He entered the Navy in 1810 and saw service in the West Indies, afterwards being naval commander at San Francisco in the troublous 'fifties. Early in the War, the fact of his being a Southerner made the Union authorities very doubtful about giving him a command, especially against New Orleans, but his Northern friends vouched for his absolute loyalty. He was a man of the most resolute character, who never shrank from responsibility or was affected by difficulty or danger. Though he never commanded a fleet of battleships in action in the open sea, he had to face heavy guns at close range with weaker ships, in cramped, shallow waters, with the new danger of submarine mines. His plans were well made and carried out, and he shewed every quality which marks a first-rate commander.

Major-General John Morgan had had no military training, but was a daring and resolute man, and more than a successful partisan leader. From the middle of 1862 to that of 1863, he commanded a cavalry division which was a model in its way, for the secondary operations entrusted to him. He, with *Forrest* and *Van Dorn*, reduced Grant to impotence at the end of 1862, and had he been present at Stone's River that decisive battle might have ended very differently. He was however ruined by his ambition : *Bragg* ordered him not to cross the Ohio with his great raid in July, 1863, but he did so to make a little glory for himself and was utterly defeated. He seems never to have been entrusted again with important operations, and after this only made a few small raids. Though given the command of the *Department of South-Western Virginia*, his sun had set, and he was killed in a skirmish at Greenville, Tennessee, in September, 1864. (Continued on p. 409.)

1864	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER
EAST	<p>1-31. Siege of Petersburg.</p> <p>30. The Mine at Petersburg.</p> <p>3-14. <i>Early's</i> dash at Washington.</p> <p>9. Battle of the Monocacy.</p> <p>11. <i>Early</i> before Washington.</p> <p>24. The Second Kernstown.</p> <p>30. Chambersburg (Pa.) burnt.</p>	<p>1-31. Siege of Petersburg.</p> <p>Hancock's attack on Richmond.</p> <p>Warren's attack on the Weldon Railway.</p> <p>7. Sheridan takes command in the Valley.</p> <p>7. Moorefield.</p>	<p>1-30. Siege of Petersburg.</p> <p>28-30. Butler's attack in the Peninsula.</p> <p>1-30. Sheridan and <i>Early</i> in the Valley.</p> <p>19. Battle of the Opequon.</p> <p>Burbridge attacks south-west Virginia from Kentucky.</p>
SOUTH	<p>9. Sherman crosses the Chattahoochee.</p> <p>18. <i>Hood</i> succeeds <i>Johnston</i>.</p> <p>20-24. Fighting round Atlanta.</p> <p>20. Peach Tree Creek.</p> <p>29. Ezra Church.</p> <p>10-22. Rousseau's Raid.</p> <p>26-28. McCook's Raid.</p> <p>26-31. Stoneman's Raid.</p>	<p>1-31. Siege of Atlanta.</p> <p>31. Jonesboro.</p> <p>15-22. Kilpatrick's Raid.</p> <p>5. Farragut forces the entrance of Mobile Bay, and takes Fort Powell.</p> <p>8. Granger takes Fort Gaines.</p> <p>23. Farragut and Granger take Fort Morgan.</p>	<p>27. Sherman occupies Atlanta.</p>
SOUTH-EAST			
WEST AND SOUTH-WEST	<p>Guerilla Fighting in Kentucky and Tennessee.</p> <p>1-23. A. J. Smith beats <i>Forrest</i>.</p>	<p>1-8. Rousseau and <i>Wheeler</i> in Tennessee.</p>	<p><i>Morgan's</i> last Raid.</p> <p>4. <i>Morgan</i> killed at Greenville.</p> <p>1-30. <i>Price's</i> Invasion of Missouri.</p> <p>27. Pilot Knob.</p>
NAVAL, AND MEXICO	<p>The "<i>Rappahannock</i>" lying at Calais, unarmed.</p> <p>The "<i>Florida</i>" at sea, in the Atlantic.</p>	<p>6-26. Cruise of the "<i>Tallahassee</i>."</p>	

1864	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
EAST	<p>1-31. Siege of Petersburg.</p> <p>27. Hancock attacks the South-side line.</p> <p>27. Butler beaten at Seven Pines.</p> <p>1-31. Sheridan and Early in the Valley.</p> <p>9. Tom's Brook.</p> <p>Hupp's Hill.</p> <p>19. Cedar Creek.</p> <p>2. Saltville. Burbridge retreats to Kentucky.</p>	<p>1-30. Siege of Petersburg.</p> <p>Merritt attacks Mosby.</p> <p>Torbert's and Custer's Raids in Virginia.</p>	<p>1-31. Siege of Petersburg.</p> <p>Warren breaks the Weldon line.</p> <p>12-24. Stoneman's Raid from Tennessee on south-west Virginia.</p> <p>18. Action at Marion.</p>
	<p>Hood's see-saw strategy, to puzzle Sherman.</p>		
SOUTH			
SOUTH-EAST	<p>27. Cushing sinks the "<i>Albemarle</i>."</p> <p>31. Plymouth retaken by Union fleet.</p>	<p>15-30. Sherman's March to the Sea.</p>	<p>10-21. Sherman besieges and takes Savannah.</p> <p>13. Fort McAllister taken.</p> <p>23-25. First attack on Fort Fisher.</p> <p>Expedition up the Roanoke River.</p>
	<p>1-28. Price's Invasion of Missouri, and retreat.</p> <p>20. Lexington.</p> <p>22. Independence.</p> <p>23. Westport.</p> <p>28. Newtonia.</p> <p>Forrest's Raid in Tennessee and Kentucky.</p> <p>30. Takes ironclad gunboat at Johnsonville.</p>	<p>20-30. Hood's Invasion of Tennessee.</p> <p>29. Spring Hill.</p> <p>30. Franklin.</p>	<p>1-20. Hood's Invasion of Tennessee.</p> <p>15-16. Battle of Nashville.</p> <p>Hood retreats to Tupelo.</p>
WEST AND SOUTH-WEST			
NAVAL, AND MEXICO	<p>The "<i>Rappahannock</i>" lying at Calais, unarmed.</p> <p>The "<i>Florida</i>" goes to Bahia.</p> <p>7. The "<i>Florida</i>" treacherously captured by the "Wachusett."</p> <p>The "<i>Olustee</i>" and "<i>Chickamauga</i>" leave Wilmington.</p> <p>20. The "<i>Shenandoah</i>" commissioned at the Desertas, Madeira.</p>	<p>Cruises of the "<i>Olustee</i>" and "<i>Chickamauga</i>."</p> <p>The "<i>Shenandoah</i>" at sea.</p>	<p>Bulloch buys the "Sphinx."</p> <p>Mexico.</p> <p>Porfirio Diaz shut up in Oajaca.</p>

CHAPTER XIII

THE FIRST HALF OF 1865. THE LAST STRUGGLES

GENERAL POSITION AND PLANS

(Continued from p. 331.) The North's business was to close the War as quickly as possible, for there was nothing to prevent them. There was now no danger of *Kirby Smith* forcing the Mississippi, and Steele, who had been watching him in Arkansas, was brought over to Pensacola and joined Canby before Mobile, while Sherman could clearly make head against any possible combination without Grant's aid. Grant had originally thought of sending Hancock with the force of veterans, the new 1st Corps, which he was organizing, through the Valley or the west side of Virginia to about Lynchburg: then with Sherman coming up from the south, Thomas' command in Tennessee, and Meade's round Richmond, *Lee's* army could be completely cut off, whether he moved or not. This was, however, before Sherman had got to Savannah, and when it was thought best to bring him north by sea on account of the swampy ground in his front, but when he reached that place, and proposed to march up through North and South Carolina and break up the only two remaining Confederate States, Grant agreed at once and altered his plans to support him. Schofield and the XXIIIrd Corps were brought east from Thomas' army to march up from New Berne or Wilmington

and meet Sherman, this being an addition to the plan of taking Fort Fisher: Thomas was to send a Corps into the mountains east of Knoxville to block *Lee's* retreat in that direction, to strike south into Alabama with the rest of his army, and at Selma to join Canby, who would march northwards after taking Mobile. Grant, however, could not get Thomas to move, and was much dissatisfied with his slowness.

On the Confederate side, it is difficult to see why their *Government* kept up the War at all, since there was now no prospect of success and every day of war increased the exhaustion and ruin of the country. The one chance of replenishing their armies was by the enlistment of negroes, but this was only authorized by the Confederate *Legislature* at the end of March, about a fortnight before *Lee's* surrender. Many of the best soldiers in the Confederacy realized the situation, but as soldiers kept on fighting till the politicians made peace. *Lee*, who well knew the fallacy of staying at Petersburg, wanted to withdraw behind the line of the Staunton River, calling in all detachments, which would have given him a stronger army and made Grant's communications very long. He could do no good where he was unless he was at once reinforced by 25,000 men, but these troops were not to be had in the Confederacy. He was not allowed however to try to carry out his plan, and in any case his enemies would soon have surrounded him, for Grant was not his only enemy, and also *Lee* was not in a position to have struck at his communications, as of old. *Beauregard* had asked to be relieved of his District command after Nashville, in order to look after the Gulf States. He suggested that Charleston might have to be abandoned in order to concentrate against Sherman, but it was so important, both politically and sentimentally, that the Confederate authorities hesitated, and Sherman moved too quickly for them to recover the lost time. When *Hood* resigned his command in

January, *Beauregard* succeeded him, but was soon moved east, leaving *Taylor* in command in the South. *Hardee's* December plan of opposing Sherman was the only feasible one, had it been carried out then, which it was not, and it was soon clear that the Confederacy was doomed if no force was sent to protect *Lee's* rear from him. *Taylor* therefore suggested in January that *Hood's* army be brought up at once for this purpose, but it was done by dribblets, and anyhow would have been too late.

In Mexico, the strong man of the Republic, Porfirio Diaz, was shut up in Oajaca, where he soon had to surrender, but in the North-West the Republic was beginning to revive, while the Mexican Empire did not get stronger. Though outwardly cordial, Maximilian distrusted Bazaine, Bazaine and his second in command were at loggerheads, Maximilian's entourage hated the French, the French Government complained that the pay of the Mexican troops was thrown on them in addition to that of their own men, a direct breach of agreement, Maximilian and the Liberals blocked the access of the French to the Sonora mines, the Clericals and a strong section of the Liberals, while opposing each other, both bitterly attacked Maximilian, and the finances were in worse confusion than ever, Maximilian using them at Court as if the Empire were wealthy, and meeting all difficulties or complaints with highflown edicts which no one carried out. The Confederacy was breaking up, and so the United States, which gained strength every day, were proportionately able to disregard Napoleon's schemes as factors in the military or political situation, though they still required watching. The French generals had their hands more than full, as the chance of war with America was becoming a very serious risk, though Napoleon thought that America would not declare war on France without including Great Britain, and that this would be his safeguard.

THE EAST

(Continued from p. 341.) In February,¹ Mr. Blair arrived in Richmond unofficially, to propose a Peace Commission to consider the possibility of a settlement, in consequence of which, *Vice-President Stephens* and Messrs. *Hunter* and *Campbell* met President Lincoln and Mr. Seward on a man-of-war in Hampton Roads. It was suggested that combination could be managed on the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine against the "usurpation" of empire by Maximilian in Mexico under the protection of France. Earlier in the War this might have had some effect, but Lincoln was now in a position to ignore it and talk of Confederate surrender pure and simple, as a necessary preliminary to anything else. *Stephens* would not or could not deal with this, and the meeting ended, but it enabled *Jefferson Davis* to make a last great appeal to the patriotism of his people, to which they gallantly responded.

Round Petersburg, the Confederate works were now thirty-seven miles long, with only 35,000 men to man them, the greater portion of the lines being merely watched. The winter was very severe and little could be done in the way of military operations, but in February there was some fighting for the lines of road by which *Lee's* supplies came, the main result being that the Union works were extended to the Vaughan road, with the Vth Corps in rear of the left flank.

In January and February there had been some smart cavalry raiding in and about the Valley, *McNeill*

¹ S.E. Fort Fisher taken, January 13th.

S.E. The "Patapsco" sunk off Charleston, January 16th.

S.E. Kirk's Raid in North Carolina, January.

S.E. Charleston evacuated, February 18th.

S.E. Wilmington taken, February 22nd.

Mexico. Bazaine takes Oajaca, February 9th.

Europe. The "*Stonewall*" at Ferrol, February 28th : *Barron* resigns.

Australia. The "*Shenandoah*" leaves Melbourne, February 18th.

took Crook prisoner, and *Rosser* took Beverly in West Virginia, but his brigade was disbanded for want of subsistence.

In February, Sheridan started from the Valley to interrupt and destroy the lines of supply through central Virginia, and then either join Sherman, return to the Valley, or go to the army before Richmond. He started on the 27th with two good cavalry divisions, and marched to Staunton almost without opposition. On March 2nd he encountered *Early* near Waynesboro and totally defeated him, taking all his guns and train and most of the command, *Early* himself barely escaping with a few men. Sheridan did not attempt to take Lynchburg, which was strongly held, but went on and destroyed the Virginia railway for miles and the James River Canal as well, reaching White House on the Pamunkey on March 19th. He had completely done his work in the Valley and wrecked the Confederate power there, but on his march through Virginia the astonishing *Early*, who had succeeded in rallying a few men, struck him in flank and rear near Gordonsville, but was not strong enough to do much.

Grant, having seen signs that *Lee* was likely to abandon his works and try to unite with *Johnston*, even before he was ready to follow, ordered the armies before Richmond on March 24th to move to the left on the 29th, to destroy the Danville and Southside railways, turn *Lee's* right, and force him from his lines.

On the other side, *Lee* had begun preparing for the inevitable evacuation early in spring, by sending back all surplus stores and making a new base at Amelia Court House. He had been made *Commander-in-Chief* on February 6th, at least two years too late, and began by appointing *Johnston* to command the force operating against Sherman, which *Jefferson Davis* did not like at all, but he had to acquiesce. He had at last seen that Richmond must be abandoned, and had arranged

with *Lee* that it be done as soon as the condition of the roads would permit, the plan being to move on Danville, unite with *Johnston*, and attack Sherman, but to do this successfully Grant and Sheridan had to be deceived, shaken off, or beaten. *Lee's* first object was to attack Grant's centre and make him concentrate and draw in his wings, and he therefore struck at Fort Stedman with almost half his army, under *Gordon*: this operation if successful would have given a choice of several great advantages, according to the measure of success. The fort and some adjoining works were taken by a night attack, but recovered after daylight, the Confederate supports not being properly in touch: artillery could then be used with effect, and the net result was that the Confederates lost more than they gained, for they had concentrated so many men for the attack that great portions of their lines were almost deserted, and the Union IInd and VIth Corps, seeing this, attacked and seized them, making the whole Confederate position most insecure: in fact this day's work gave the VIth Corps the winning position, from which it was able to carry the main line of Confederate works a few days later. *Lee* is believed to have lost about 4,000 men to his opponents' 2,000.

At this time, March 27th,¹ Sherman came to see Grant from Goldsboro, and said that he would be ready to move by April 10th and co-operate with him. He proposed to seize the Roanoke River near Weldon, from which he could either occupy Burke's Junction and cut off *Lee's* retreat on either Danville or Lynchburg, or join the armies before Richmond, as seemed best. Grant told him to carry this out, and informed him of his own plans, for he was sure that the knowledge of his approach would make *Lee* move. Ord now commanded the Army of the James,

¹ S. Canby besieges Mobile, March 26th.

S. Wilson's Raid in Alabama, March.

E & S.E. Stoneman's Raid, March.

and on the 27th moved to the extreme left of the Army of the Potomac with three infantry divisions and one of cavalry, leaving Weitzel with only three to the north of the Appomattox. *Lee* knew nothing of all this.

At this time the strength of the Armies was : Army of the Potomac, 69,000, with 243 guns ; Army of the James, 32,000, with 126 guns, and 1,700 cavalry ; and Sheridan's Cavalry Corps, 13,000 ; total, 115,700. Against this force *Lee* had some 57,000 men in all.

On March 28th, Sheridan was ordered to Dinwiddie Court House to manœuvre *Lee* out of his position, but not to attack it, and if he did not stir, to go and attack the lines at each side of Burke's Junction and then either return or join Sherman : the IInd and Vth Corps to take more ground to their left, the VIth to be ready to follow, and the IXth to take over their works. Sheridan was first to try to get in *Lee's* right rear and not mind the railways. *Lee* answered by sending his cavalry to Five Forks, supported by infantry under *Pickett*, and collected a strong force to attack the Vth Corps, but to do this he had to denude his lines in many places, which Grant saw, and hearing of *Pickett's* move, told the Vth Corps to support Sheridan, and Ord, Wright (VIth), and Parke (IXth), to attack the Confederate lines. The consequence was that when *Lee* attacked and drove back the Vth Corps on the 31st, the IInd came up, turned the tables, and took some Confederate works : there was some fighting at Dinwiddie Court House between the cavalry of the two sides, backed on the Union side by a division of the Vth Corps, and the next day Sheridan moved against *Pickett's* entrenched position at Five Forks, supported by the whole of the Vth Corps. *Pickett's* command was defeated and broken up, and *Lee* sent a force to cover its rally and close the line of approach by Sutherland Station : he might have done this with the co-operation of *Longstreet*, commanding at Richmond, but could not in any way

make head against Sheridan and at the same time hold the Petersburg lines. He had lost the Southside railway but not the Danville line, which might enable him to defer retreat till better weather. *Pickett* seems to have been put in a very exposed position, where a cavalry command would have had a better chance.

In these operations Warren's Vth Corps had been under Sheridan's command: speed being of vital importance to follow if *Lee* got away, Sheridan asked for his old and trusty subordinate Wright, with his VIth Corps, but it was too far off, and the Vth was the only one which could be sent in time. This was most unfortunate, for two men less fitted to work together than the fiery and autocratic Sheridan, and the brilliant, conceited, and argumentative Warren, could not have been found in the whole army. Warren was a fine soldier, whose quick and sure coup d'œil, promptness, and nerve, had saved the army at Gettysburg, but Grant, who admired his good qualities, was not blind to his military failings. He was apt to argue over his orders and suggest changes to suit his own notions: though he gave excellent orders, he could not delegate power, and generally superintended their execution; the consequence was that combined operations were badly done: his warmest apologists admit that he was not an executive officer. For these reasons Grant authorized Sheridan on April 1st to supersede him if necessary (cf. p. 437), which he did after the battle of Five Forks, where he had been much annoyed by the delays caused by his personal superintendence. Griffin succeeded to the command of the Corps.

On April 2nd,¹ the VIth, IXth, and IInd Corps carried the Confederate works in their front, the occupants being driven back on Amelia Court House, and two important works, practically the keys of the position, were taken later on. On this day the Confederates lost the gallant *General A. P. Hill*, who was

¹ S. Wilson beats *Forrest* at Selma, April 2nd.

killed while moving between his divisions in action. *Lee* at once notified *President Davis* that he would be obliged to retire in the night, and would try to reach Danville, but events moved so fast that he had to start at 8 p.m., and on the morning of the 3rd the Confederate lines were found empty, and Richmond surrendered to General Weitzel.

Grant, seeing that *Lee* must move on either Danville or Lynchburg, told Sheridan to keep south of the Appomattox, and strike the Danville line at Burke's Junction, Meade to take the IInd and VIth Corps to Amelia Court House, and Ord, with the XXIVth, XXVth, and IXth, to follow the Southside line to Burke's Junction. (NOTE.—A new Xth Corps had been formed, for service against Fort Fisher (cf. p. 388), by taking troops from the XXIVth and XXVth Corps, so that these numbers represent what remained to them.)

FitzHugh Lee's cavalry turned to bay at Deep Creek, delaying the pursuit till dark, and on the 4th, Sheridan was to reach the line Burke's Junction-Jetersville: *Lee* was then at Amelia Court House, but was not able to collect his army there till next day, when he sent away his spare artillery and trains by a road to his right, and himself moved towards Jetersville. That night he made a great march round the Union army to Rice's Station, and the attempt to surround him only came up with his rear troops, but Sheridan's cavalry took and destroyed some of his trains and spare guns, and took a train on the railway containing rations, another being carelessly sent on to Richmond. In these operations the Headquarters papers of *Lee's* army were destroyed, a great loss.

On the 8th, Meade had to change his direction of march and lost time, but the Confederate columns were encumbered with too much baggage, and Sheridan's cavalry came up with the retreat at Sailor's Creek: he used some units to attack the march in flank and retard it, while with the rest he pressed

forward and headed it off, portion by portion, till the infantry came up and finished the work. *Ewell's* and *Anderson's* commands were broken up and captured, but *Gordon*, taking another road, kept up a running fight and got away, though with the loss of a great part of his trains. The day's loss to the Confederates was about 8,000 men, and the retreat was now covered by *Longstreet's* Corps, *Rosser's* cavalry defeating a Union force near Farmville and destroying the bridge, which delayed the pursuit at that point and enabled *Lee* to take up a strong position, covering the roads to Lynchburg. The delay here, though, gave time for *Sheridan's* cavalry to post themselves across his path at Appomattox Court House, closely followed by *Ord* with two Corps: but for this, *Lee* could have got well away on his road to Lynchburg, and have reached that place on the 9th.

Grant wrote to *Lee* on the 7th, pointing out that he had no chance, and that further loss of life was useless or worse, and advising him to surrender, but the pursuit went on just the same, and on the 9th¹ a sharp action opened, when *Lee*, finding that he was headed off in front and pressed in rear, surrendered. He had hoped to have forced his way through, for *Sheridan's* cavalry were being driven back, when *Ord's* infantry arrived in support and settled the matter.

At the interview for the surrender *Grant* exhibited in a marked degree his sound common sense and kindness of heart. His object now was to bring about not only peace but good feeling (cf. p. 444), and his terms were that the officers and men of *Lee's* army be paroled and unable to serve again till properly exchanged, and all arms and military stores become captured property, but added that the officers' swords, private horses, and baggage were not included. In conversation, as it turned out that most of the animals in

¹ S. Capture of Mobile, April 12th.

S. Wilson's Raid in Alabama, April.

the Confederate army belonged to the men, Grant said that his great object was to bring about a real settlement of the country, and that he would direct his officers to allow any Confederate who claimed to own an animal to take it away with him, so that they could work their small farms and get their crops in, which kind thought *Lee* gratefully acknowledged. A question next arose as to the feeding of the Confederate army, which was starving, and Grant ordered 25,000 rations to be sent over: 28,000 men actually surrendered, but there were not half that number in the ranks really effective.

The next thing was to send the news to all parts of both armies to stop further fighting, and then for a day or so more the two sides mingled freely as friends, especially the senior officers of the old army. Grant specially ordered that there be no cheering, no salutes, nothing done, in fact, which would look like exultation over a fallen enemy.

The Army of the Potomac was brought to Washington for the great review and march past the President on May 22nd and 23rd, and then was disbanded.¹

On the James River there had been a Confederate flotilla during the siege of Petersburg, which was very active at first, but Grant had blocked the river and kept a powerful force to hold it in abeyance, in which were several monitors, and the late Confederate ironclad "*Atlanta*"; but when all the monitors but one were withdrawn for the attack on Fort Fisher in January, 1865, the Confederate commodore thought that he had a chance of success if he could pass the obstructions which Grant had laid down. His fleet included three ironclads, the "*Fredericksburg*," "*Richmond*," and "*Virginia*," the latter being said to be

¹ S.E. *Jefferson Davis* captured, May 10th.

W. *Thompson* surrenders, May 11th.

S.W. Sabine Pass surrenders, May 25th.

S.W. *Kirby Smith* surrenders, May 26th.

The "*Stonewall*" surrenders at Havana in May.

the most powerful vessel the Confederates ever had. The river being high and the passage feasible, he moved down with the three ironclads and some smaller vessels on January 23rd to attack the monitor "Onondaga" and her consorts and the land batteries, but had to retreat after a sharp action, two of his vessels getting aground for a time: that night they attacked again with the same result. In February, Semmes, of "*Alabama*" fame, succeeded to the command, but could do nothing, as both the Union fleet and the obstructions had been very much strengthened. When Petersburg became untenable, he blew up his ships and formed his men into a small naval brigade, which was sent to guard the communications at Danville, to which place *President Davis* brought his *Cabinet*, archives, and treasure on the evacuation of Richmond. On the 9th the *Government* was moved to Greensboro, North Carolina, and on the 18th to Charlotte, in the same State. On the 24th, *Davis* approved of the convention between *Johnston* and Sherman.

In January, Grant directed Thomas to tell Stoneman to repeat his raid of December and destroy the railway (Virginia Central) as far towards Lynchburg as possible. Stoneman started from Knoxville, but, greatly to Grant's annoyance, not till March 29th, with a cavalry division of three brigades, moved via Boone and Wilkesboro, North Carolina, into southwestern Virginia, and destroyed the line from Wytheville nearly to Lynchburg: on April 9th he crossed again into North Carolina, destroying the railway between Danville and Greensboro with one column, while he moved on Salisbury with the main column, which got there on the 12th. He seems not to have entered Greensboro, where he might have captured *Jefferson Davis* and several members of his *Government*. Stoneman then returned to Tennessee, leaving Gillem with the bulk of the force to scour North Carolina.

THE SOUTH-EAST

(Continued from p. 359.) In January¹ another attempt was made on Fort Fisher by a combined expedition under Admiral Porter and General Terry, who commanded the new Xth Corps (cf. p. 384). The Confederate *District* was under *Bragg*, but *General Whiting* commanded the troops at hand.

The attacking force sailed from Port Royal on January 12th, and the next morning the ironclads went close in to bombard the fort while the rest of the fleet was landing troops and stores. Terry landed on the spit above the fort, entrenching a line across it to protect himself from the covering force under *Hoke*, and then reconnoitred the fort. That afternoon the whole fleet stood in and opened a tremendous fire upon it, which dismounted a number of guns, and to which but little reply could be made. Next day, the 14th, the heavy gunboats supported the ironclads in the attack on the land face and kept up fire during the night. On the 15th, the fleet were to bombard the place in the morning, and the troops and a naval landing party to attack it in the afternoon. Again a crushing fire was opened, which for the time silenced nearly all the fort's guns, but the naval attack failed: the sailors and marines rallied, and supported Terry's attack on the land face, afterwards moving into the entrenchments to keep *Hoke* in check, supported by the fire of the gunboats. The land attack, with this support, and that of the heavy ships (especially of the "New Ironsides," which raked the land front), succeeded in getting in, but the fighting was most desperate, the works being taken piece by piece, and the resistance not ceasing till 10 p.m. *General Whiting*, who had come in with reinforcements, was mortally wounded. There were

¹ E. *Rosser* takes *Beverly*, W. Va., January 11th.
The "*Shenandoah*" reaches *Melbourne*, January 25th.
The "*Stonewall*" commissioned, January 30th.

elaborate arrangements for land mines, etc., but the electric wires were cut by the bombardment and they could not be fired. *Bragg* was much blamed for not coming to the assistance of the garrison, and also for having moved his command to Wilmington, which left the coast inadequately watched. The fort had been carefully strengthened since the attack in December, and the garrison numbered 1,800 men, the covering force, under *Hoke*, 6,000. The Confederates abandoned the other works at the mouth of the river, and the Union troops took 169 guns and 2,000 prisoners. *Hoke*, however, entrenched a good position and was supported by *Bragg* from Wilmington, thus holding *Terry* in check for the time.

Meanwhile *Schofield's* troops were being brought over from the West, and early in February *Grant* and he arrived at Fort Fisher. His task was now to take Wilmington, and not only close this last port to the enemy, but ensure a new base for *Sherman* if wanted. Even after his XXIIIrd Corps was landed *Hoke* held the whole command fast for some time, and an attempt to take him in rear by a landing from the fleet failed, so the XXIIIrd Corps was moved across the river to attack a fort which protected his flank by its fire, but the ground was swampy, and the Confederates had utilized it most ably, which caused delay: the fleet however bombarded the fort, which was abandoned, the garrison falling back to lines in rear, to which movement *Hoke* conformed. This was another very strong position just in front of Wilmington, behind a swamp which was only crossed by one causeway, but it was held in front by a demonstration while a landing was made in rear, when it fell. *Hoke* on his side held *Terry's* Corps in check all day. *Schofield* sent a division round to attack him, but he evacuated the town in the night and got away.

The next place in front of *Schofield* was New Berne, a much better base than Wilmington, being

connected to a better harbour at Morehead City by a short railway, in working order, which the Wilmington line was not, but this latter was soon repaired. The inland line to Kinston was but little damaged, but thence to Goldsboro wanted much repair. Several fresh divisions for Schofield were sent to New Berne, under Cox, who moved against Kinston, where *Hoke* was reported to be waiting for him, on the Neuse River, supported by an iron-clad. This position was also well protected by swamps in front.

Bragg now took command of the Confederates in the field, and brought reinforcements from *Hood's* old army, under orders from *Johnston*, now commanding the *District*, to join the troops he had assembled at Goldsboro and strike at Schofield's force, hoping to defeat it before Sherman could come up, and then to turn on Sherman in full force. Cox was therefore ordered to keep on the defensive till the army came up. On March 9th there was some fighting, and on the 10th, *Bragg*, who had between 8,000 and 10,000 men, attacked in earnest, but failed, and retreated to join *Johnston* at Goldsboro. Schofield then came up, set to work to repair the line, and sent Terry forward towards Goldsboro, where on the 20th he was in touch with Sherman, *Johnston* having fallen back.

Although Stoneman did not repeat his raid, as ordered, in January, a small cavalry force under Kirk raided into North Carolina from the westward.

Before Charleston, Fort Sumter was subjected to a most continuous and accurate fire, being only some 1,300 yards from the guns on Cumming's Point: 51 heavy guns were used up by the attack on it. During the last year, it had been transformed, *under fire*, from the shattered ruins of an old-type brick fort to a powerful earthwork, impregnable to assault, and able to take its full share in the defence of the place with six heavy guns to the end. In January the monitor "Patapsco" was destroyed by a submarine

mine off the harbour, and combined operations were undertaken in the neighbouring creeks and inner waters, with sharp fighting, till within a few hours of the evacuation. On February 18th,¹ Charleston and its forts were found to be evacuated: several ironclad rams were found by the Union troops, the best of which, the "*Columbia*," was aground, and there were also some torpedo-boats. The place was garrisoned by Foster's troops from Port Royal, which command also found the garrison for Savannah when Sherman marched out.

To return to Sherman and his great stroke northward from Savannah to give the death-blow to the Confederacy. His plan was much the same in detail as in the march through Georgia, to seem to be heading for important places on each side, so that troops were collected there to stop him, and then to pass between them: as he had no lines of communication, leaving forces of the enemy in his rear did not matter: he lived on the country, as before, and destroyed supplies and railways. He considered Charleston as lost when its rear communications were cut, and took no heed of it in his plans, but by threatening both it and Augusta he divided the Confederate troops, and concentrated his own to the front near Branchville, an important railway junction. Thence he moved on Columbia, the Capital of South Carolina, which the army reached on February 16th, and on the night of the 17th the town was almost burnt down, not by any orders of his, for he did his utmost to stop it, but probably by some drunken soldiers. As he had foreseen, Charleston was evacuated, and its garrison reinforced *Hardee*.

So far there had been little opposition from *Hardee*, commanding the defence, except from his cavalry, but this was continuous, and *Wade Hampton*, now commanding it, captured Kilpatrick's headquarters, some guns, and several hundred prisoners, but Kilpatrick,

¹ The "*Shenandoah*" leaves Melbourne, February 18th.

who escaped, soon attacked again and got his guns back. *Lee* wrote to the *Governor* of South Carolina in January, pointing out that the holding of places was of less importance than the stopping of the Union armies, even if Charleston were to fall, and suggesting how *Hardee's* force could be raised to some 33,000 men, but this was not done. On February 23rd he appointed *Johnston* to command the Confederate forces in the Carolinas, who had to begin by getting an army together in *Hardee's* rear, troops being brought from *Hood's* old army to reinforce him.

Sherman entered Cheraw on March 3rd, where there were enormous stores, much being private property sent from Charleston for safety, and at Fayetteville, which he took on the 10th, found that the U.S. Arsenal there had been very much enlarged and improved. From thence he wrote to Grant, proposing to drive *Hardee* beyond Goldsboro, and seize it to prevent *Johnston* concentrating there, expecting that he would more probably do so near Raleigh than attack Schofield near New Berne. He also wrote to Schofield and Terry re co-operation, the danger being that *Johnston* might catch one Corps isolated and destroy it. Schofield was to try to join him at Goldsboro. The communication between them was now assured, and gave Sherman a fresh line, which was most useful for sending to safety thousands of negro fugitives who encumbered the march and could not be kept away: they were a very serious embarrassment, especially as they had to be fed, like the army, entirely from the country. Arsenal and ironworks at Fayetteville were destroyed, and Slocum's column made touch with *Hardee's* rearguard on the 15th: next day *Hardee* was found in an entrenched position at Averysboro, which was attacked in front while the cavalry turned one flank and an infantry brigade the other, causing the Confederates to retreat to another line of works in rear with some loss: the Union force encamped in front of this second position, but *Hardee* retired in the

night. On the Union side, this battle was fought by the XXth Corps and Kilpatrick's cavalry. *Hardee* fought at Averysboro to give time for *Bragg's* command to join *Johnston*, and to catch *Slocum's* wing by itself, which he knew he could do, being well informed of Sherman's dispositions, but he failed to beat it.

(NOTE.—*Johnston's* army was estimated at this time at 37,000, viz. :

<i>Hardee</i> , including <i>Wheeler's</i> cavalry	. 18,000
(this was <i>Hardee's</i> strength in December)	
<i>Hoke</i> , strength in January	. . . 6,000
<i>Rhett</i> , late Charleston Garrison, say	5,000
<i>Wade Hampton's</i> cavalry	. . . " 3,000
<i>Bragg's</i> command	. . . " 5,000
	<hr/> 37,000 <hr/>

Sherman put it rather higher, but both were above the mark; unless the loss from desertion was enormous, *Johnston* must have had 30,000 men, for *Hoke's* and *Wheeler's* commands were the only ones which had lately seen much real fighting.)

From Averysboro the march turned eastwards towards Goldsboro, *Slocum's* command forming the left wing and Howard's the right, and the resistance became stubborn and continuous. On the morning of the 19th, Sherman said to *Slocum* that he thought *Hardee* had fallen back on Raleigh and that he (*Slocum*) could now easily reach the Neuse River, and then rode off to Howard's command; but *Slocum* soon after ran up against *Johnston's* whole army near Bentonville, for *Johnston*, knowing that Sherman's army was marching by wings, had moved suddenly, to strike *Slocum* with his whole force and beat him in detail. *Slocum* got the information just in time, and was able to take up and begin to entrench a position on which his advanced troops could fall back, which they soon had to do. He also sent at once to Sherman for help, having just before sent to say that he wanted

none. He managed to hold his own till dark, and on the 20th Logan's XVth Corps came up from Howard's command. *Johnston*, knowing that the rest of Sherman's army would soon follow, entrenched himself strongly in a position forming a salient, of which Slocum faced one side, while Howard's men moved against the other ; but Sherman, over-estimating his enemy's strength, did not attack, hoping that Schofield's command would soon arrive, and also being short of supplies. It seems that one of the causes of his over-estimate was the Confederate custom of retaining the names of units, however much they might be reduced, which has already been alluded to. On the 21st, Mower (XXth Corps) attacked and broke the Confederate line, but Sherman did not want to bring on a general action, and held him back, which he afterwards admitted was a mistake, as he could then have fought a general action with advantage and probably destroyed *Johnston's* army. On the 22nd, *Johnston* was gone, having retreated on Smithfield, and Sherman moved on Goldsboro. The really hard fighting at Bentonville was on the first day, the 19th. *Johnston* gives his strength in the battle as a little over 14,000, but, knowing that it was his object to crush Slocum with his whole weight, it seems curious that he had not more: the Union figures give Slocum 12,000, *Johnston* 22,000, numbers actually engaged. However this may be, the move which brought on the battle of Bentonville was a bold and able stroke on *Johnston's* part.

On the 22nd, also, Schofield's command joined Sherman, and in the next two days the whole army was assembled at Goldsboro. Sherman's old railway engineer, Colonel Wright, who had served him so well all the way to Atlanta, was again to the fore, and put the broken railways in working order almost as soon as the troops had reached their destinations.

This Campaign of the Carolinas was even a greater achievement in its way than the March to the Sea,

though less sensational, for the army had marched 425 miles and crossed five broad navigable rivers, at any one of which a comparatively small force could have delayed it seriously, in fifty days; the weather was bad, and the roads swamps, which had to be "corduroyed" as the army went along. Three important towns and depots had been destroyed, as well as the communications of South Carolina, and the evacuation of Charleston was brought about by its isolation. Now that Schofield's army had joined, it really did not matter whether *Lee* joined *Johnston* or not before Grant's armies could come up.

At Goldsboro, Sherman received Grant's answer to his report of March 16th. He then, for purposes of discipline, made Slocum's command from the old Army of the Cumberland, the "Army of Georgia," Schofield's retaining its old name of the Army of the Ohio. Grant wrote to Sherman about the next moves, detailing his own and Sheridan's plans with regard to *Lee*, and saying that Stoneman was to move on Lynchburg from Tennessee, and a Corps to go from Thomas to Bull's Gap on the Virginia border, while Canby marched for Mobile and the interior. After Charleston fell, Gillmore was ordered to seize all points that he could on the coast, and send any spare troops to Schofield, via Wilmington: Thomas to do the same. Sherman then went to see Grant, leaving Schofield in command, and there met President Lincoln, and ascertained his views on the terms for, and treatment of, the Confederates, when, as must soon happen, they had to surrender, and on other matters. This took place on March 27th and 28th, Sherman rejoining his army on the 30th.

He had agreed with Grant that he would be ready to advance on April 10th, and on the 5th¹ planned to place his army north of the Roanoke, facing west with its base at Norfolk, in full communication with Grant.

¹ S. Wilson beats *Forrest* at Selma, April 2nd.

S. Canby takes Mobile, April 12th.

This was practically a flank march across *Johnston's* front, and all were to keep ready to turn and fight towards the left flank if required. It had for its object the flanking of *Lee's* line of march if he attempted to join *Johnston*, and was based on the knowledge that the latter's army was not strong enough to prevent such a movement, though it might molest it. It was necessary to be at the assigned place *in time*, and therefore to provide against being delayed by *Johnston*. Schofield was to cover Wilmington and district, to prevent an attack on the sea base and on the operation of changing base by the Sounds, Sherman's original army being enough for the march.

On April 6th came the news of the fall of Richmond and *Lee's* retreat, which changed the whole problem. Sherman saw that his first plan would not now be in time to intercept a march by *Lee* to join *Johnston*, and that the only thing to do was to attack *Johnston* at once by moving on Raleigh, his base, he being then in front of it at Smithfield with probably over 30,000 men, covered by his cavalry. Grant's letters approved this plan, so on the day fixed, April 10th, Sherman started for Raleigh, 50 miles away, in several columns, but on reaching Smithfield next day, found it abandoned and the bridges burnt, which delayed him a day, and on the night of the 12th came the news of *Lee's* surrender. *Johnston* might surrender or disperse his army, for he could not be caught in that country, having more cavalry than Sherman, who had not enough to finish the work properly. As Sherman advanced, he was met by the citizens of Raleigh asking for protection, and heard that the Union cavalry raids were now breaking up the Confederacy in all directions: Stoneman was approaching Greensboro from east Tennessee, Wilson driving through Alabama, making for Georgia, and it was quite on the cards that Sheridan's Cavalry Corps would move on Raleigh from Appomattox. From Raleigh, Sherman proposed to move on Ashboro to cut off *Johnston's* best line of retreat, by Salisbury

and Charlotte, starting on April 14th, but a letter came from *Johnston*, asking for an armistice till the authorities could make arrangements to end the War. Sherman stopped the march, *Johnston's* troops also halting, and an appointment was made for the two commanders to meet on the 17th, but on that morning came the news of President Lincoln's assassination the night before. Sherman ordered the telegraph operator to keep it quiet, said nothing even to his own staff, and when he met *Johnston*, took him aside and shewed him the telegram privately. *Johnston* was much distressed and denounced the crime most vehemently, hoping that it would not be laid at the door of the Confederate *Government*, to which Sherman answered that though no one would ever think of connecting his name or *Lee's* with it, he would not say as much for *Jefferson Davis* or some of his politicians. It made the situation very delicate, owing to the furious indignation aroused in the North, but as to the policy which the dead President would have wished to be followed, it being taken for granted that this would be consistently carried out, Sherman had no doubt whatever, for he had met him not three weeks before, and had fully discussed this very situation. *Johnston* plainly said that further fighting would be MURDER, and thought that terms of surrender might be made which would embrace all the Confederate troops in the field, by consultation with *President Davis*. They then parted, Sherman to break the sad news to his men and keep them quiet, *Johnston* to arrange for a general surrender, to meet again the next day. Next morning, *Johnston* had authority for the surrender of all the Confederate armies on the same terms as his own, and brought with him *Breckinridge*, his *Secretary of War*, who confirmed it, but they said that their officers and men had great doubts about the restoration of their political rights afterwards, and asked for some assurance to that effect. Sherman quoted Lincoln's Proclamation of Amnesty of December 8th,

1863, for all below the rank of colonel, on taking the oath of allegiance, and added that Grant had extended this to all the officers of *Lee's* army, including *Lee* himself, but this did not satisfy them. Sherman wrote out terms of surrender on the lines of his conversation with President Lincoln, saying that he would submit them to President Johnson for ratification, *Johnston's* army to remain where it was in the meanwhile, and the armistice to be terminated by forty-eight hours' notice from either side (cf. p. 424). These terms provided for the dispersal of the Confederate armies in such a way as to prevent them from forming guerilla bands, while leaving the North free to maintain as many troops as might be necessary. The Confederate troops were to be disbanded at the Capitals of their respective States, to which their arms were to be surrendered (cf. p. 427): this proviso gave the States the power of keeping order. The United States to recognize the States of the late Confederacy, on their governments taking the proper oaths, the Federal Courts to be re-established, and the political rights of the people of all such States to be guaranteed. These terms were not approved at Washington, and Sherman was instructed by Grant, who came over, to give notice to *Johnston* to end the armistice, but he wrote a letter to him at the same time to the effect that he was empowered to deal with him and his army only, and offering him the same terms which had been offered to *Lee*: these were accepted and the surrender was carried out on April 26th.

Sherman's terms were disapproved because he had acted ultra vires in dealing with political matters, but had Grant's suggestion been accepted that President Johnson call a Council to consider them, and if approved adopt and promulgate them himself, matters would have been settled much sooner than they were, and much bloodshed and trouble saved, as well as the enormous cost of keeping armies in the field longer than necessary. Early in March, *Lee* had written to

Grant, suggesting that they should meet in order to "submit the subjects of controversy between the belligerents to a convention," which was forwarded to Stanton, who instructed Grant from the President to hold no communication with *Lee* except on military matters, and especially not to deal with politics, which the President reserved to himself absolutely, while any military advantages were to be pressed to the utmost: had Sherman been informed of this it would have saved all the trouble. Stanton, however, published a bulletin reflecting on his conduct, hinting that he knew of it and was conniving at the escape of *Davis* with the Confederate treasure. Grant was sent down to supersede him in command, though he did not do so, and Schofield was instructed to receive the surrender of *Johnston's* army at Greensboro. Soon afterwards Halleck was sent down and put over Sherman, whose army marched to Washington, where it passed the President in review on May 24th and 25th, and was then disbanded. Sherman resented the insult so keenly, that at the review he refused to shake hands with Stanton.

Johnston issued a farewell order to his troops, begging them to return to their homes and become good and peaceful citizens, so as to restore tranquillity to the country.

At the beginning of April, *General Echols* was in command of the Confederate *Department of South-Western Virginia*, and had under him some 6,000 men, of whom 2,200 were cavalry. He started to join *Lee* near Danville, and on the 10th reached Christiansburg, where he heard of the surrender at Appomattox. He then decided to send the cavalry to *Johnston* and "temporarily furlough," or disband, the infantry. Even here, though, the idea of going to join Maximilian in Mexico was mooted, for it was becoming very generally held in the Confederacy among the more irreconcilable spirits. After the cavalry had crossed into North Carolina, they heard that Stoneman's

command was close by, and the scouts soon got into touch with it : *Duke's* brigade was moving on parallel roads with Stoneman, to Lincolnton, but he turned off to Charlotte, where he found another Confederate cavalry brigade, and next day *President Davis* arrived there, with his family, *General Bragg*, some members of his *Cabinet*, and two more cavalry brigades. *General Breckinridge*, the *War Secretary*, soon joined them, expecting that the arrangement with Sherman, of which *Davis* approved, would be carried out, but when *Johnston* telegraphed to say that this was not so, and that he would take what terms he could get, *Davis* determined to march to join *Taylor* and *Forrest* in Alabama with all available troops. *Breckinridge* commanded the force, four cavalry brigades, and for some distance they were shadowed by Stoneman's men, who seem soon to have dropped off: another of *Echols'* cavalry brigades joined them, and at Abbeville, South Carolina, was held the last Confederate Council of War. *Davis* spoke of tiding over the temporary depression and did not seem to think the military situation hopeless, which was curious, seeing that he had consented to a general surrender, but his generals frankly told him that it was, that they were only in arms now to protect him personally, and would use them for that purpose, but not to continue the War. The general feeling was to try to get their *President* safely out of the country, and then to obtain the same terms which had been granted to *Johnston's* army, failing which they would strike out for the trans-Mississippi district. It was decided to start that night and march for Washington, Georgia, for they had with them the money of the Confederate Treasury, over 500,000 dollars in coin, which was transferred from the railway to waggons. At the Savannah River, *Davis* ordered that over 100,000 dollars be paid to the troops, being less than the pay actually due to them, the rest being turned over to an officer of the Confederate Treasury. *Davis* then left

with a small escort to help him to escape, and the greater part of the troops were given their discharge, their officers making arrangements for surrender. A body of some 350 men remained together, both to divert attention from *Davis'* movements and to help *Breckinridge* to escape, for the Northern feeling against him was very strong, he having been Vice-President of the United States just before the War. They were met by a strong Union force which advised them to surrender, and did not attack: after a parley, to give time to *Breckinridge* to escape, they surrendered, in which act *Jefferson Davis'* family, and several prominent Confederates, were included.

THE WEST

(Continued from p. 366.) In the West, the fighting was practically over, there being only a few skirmishes in various places in January: on the 2nd, some of *Hood's* trains were taken in the retreat from Nashville.

Grant thought that Thomas, after Schofield's Corps had gone, would still be able to strike south to Selma with his army, but he did not, and shewed himself so unenterprising that Grant sent Smith's XVth Corps away to Canby, telling Thomas to concentrate his army and prepare for a campaign towards Lynchburg, but intending to put a smarter man in command if a chance came, for he was quite out of patience with him. Stoneman had been ordered to start on his raid in January, but did not get away till March; Thomas was told to send another cavalry raid south into Mississippi in February, but this never started at all; and Wilson was also to be sent to raid south and co-operate with Canby, but did not start till long after he should have done: but he was to some extent stopped by bad weather. Gillem was also to go and hold the east end of the Holston Valley to block that route against *Lee*, which he eventually did: this force was afterwards increased to a whole Corps, the IVth.

On the Confederate side *Hood's* army, in retreat, passed out of this division, as we have taken them, for convenience, into the Southern.

THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-WEST

(Continued from pp. 352 and 376.) *Hood* took all responsibility for the Tennessee campaign, and resigned his command after he had brought back the army to Tupelo : he was succeeded by *Beauregard* on January 14th.

Grant ordered Canby first to move against and take Mobile, and then to strike inland towards Montgomery and Selma, where he would meet Thomas coming from the north, but neither would move, till Grant was in despair : both of them failed to carry out the parts assigned to them in time, thereby materially lengthening the War in the South. Grier-son was sent to take command of Canby's cavalry, and they were specially warned that their opponent would probably be the formidable *Forrest*.

Canby, instead of taking Mobile and marching into Alabama in February, did not move against the former place till March.¹ The fleet in the bay co-operated with him, and he invested it on the 27th. Several vessels were lost by submarine mines, the main fort surrendered on April 8th, the line of works being taken by assault next day, two other forts were occupied on the 11th, and the place was evacuated on the 12th. Steele had come from Pensacola at the beginning of the siege, and joined Canby, who then had 45,000 men, viz. Granger's (new) XIIIth Corps, Smith's XVIth, Steele's two divisions, and a cavalry brigade. *Maury* commanded the defence, consisting of 10,000 men and 5 gunboats : his troops retreated to Meridian. On May 4th, *Taylor* surrendered all the

¹ E. Fort Stedman, March 25th.

S.E. Bentonville, March 19th-21st.

Europe. The "*Stonewall*" leaves Ferrol, March 24th.

Confederate forces east of the Mississippi at Citronelle, and the gunboats were handed over to Admiral Thatcher, Farragut's successor.¹ On the 26th, *Kirby Smith* surrendered at Baton Rouge, and Sabine Pass and Galveston were given up on May 25th and June 3rd. The last of the Confederate gunboats on the Mississippi surrendered to the Mississippi squadron in June, which had now done its work and ceased to exist, most of the boats being sold.

On March 18th, Wilson started from the banks of the Tennessee, being sent by Thomas south towards Selma, to co-operate with Canby. He had a cavalry Corps of three divisions, 12,000 strong, and was opposed by *Forrest* with less than 8,000. Wilson marched in several columns, one of which, Croxton's, carried out an independent raid of its own. *Forrest* was therefore compelled to divide his smaller force to watch them. Wilson struck at Tuscaloosa, and at Montevallo had an action with the Confederate cavalry, which he drove back on March 31st. He then marched on Selma, and *Forrest* tried to concentrate, but Wilson struck him with greatly superior forces and totally defeated him, breaking up his command and taking Selma, on April 2nd.² Wilson's raids completely destroyed railways, ironworks, supplies, at Selma, Cahawba, and other places, and he reached Montgomery on the 12th, which surrendered. On the 16th the enemy was found strongly posted near Columbus, by a small force under General Upton, and after a severe fight was driven out. At this place were found a powerful ironclad, nearly completed, and a gunboat, which were destroyed. Another part of the command took West Point the same day. Macon surrendered to Wilson's force on April 20th.

On the 20th, Wilson had received a letter from *Beauregard*, telling him of the truce between Sherman

¹ S.E. *Jefferson Davis* captured, May 10th.

W. *Thompson* surrenders, May 11th.

² E. Fall of Petersburg, April 2nd.

and *Johnston*, and soon after came one from Sherman to the same effect. Croxton's brigade had left the main column on March 20th, and rejoined at Macon on May 1st. He had been most successful, destroying the last ironworks in the Confederacy, and breaking down all resistance. This raid of Wilson's was ordered for the purpose of keeping the Confederates in the Gulf States fully occupied, and to prevent them from sending troops away.

Wilson had been kept informed of *Jefferson Davis'* movements, and searched the country thoroughly for him, the capture being made on May 10th, by the 4th Michigan Cavalry of Minty's division, near Irwinsville, Georgia. After the capture of *President Davis*, *Forrest* surrendered, and manfully set an example of conforming peaceably to the new order of things.

THE BLOCKADE

(Continued from p. 366.) The very night that Fort Fisher fell, two blockade-runners came in, and a negro who knew the private signals told General Terry how to answer them, so that they came up and were taken, their officers walking unsuspectingly into the fort. While in Confederate hands, its guns had effectually protected any vessel running in.

Off Charleston, Admiral Dahlgren's flagship, the "Harvest Moon," was sunk by a submarine mine on March 1st. Both here and at Mobile the Blockading squadrons co-operated most usefully with the troops throughout. The Atlantic Squadron was put down at the end of the War, but the Gulf Squadron was kept up to watch the French designs in Mexico.

The tenders which *Bulloch* had bought in Europe, chiefly for the arming of cruisers at sea, had made useful blockade-runners, and finally sold well, so that they more than paid for themselves.

THE WAR AT SEA

(Continued from p. 369.) The "*Shenandoah*," which had partially recruited her crew from prizes, reached Melbourne on January 25th, where *Waddell* stayed for repairs till February 18th,¹ and sailed with a fairly strong crew : there seems no doubt that he enlisted men freely in Melbourne, which pointed to culpable laxity on the part of the Colonial authorities. On May 21st the ship entered the Sea of Okhotsk, but was caught in the ice and came out again, having made one prize, one of the officers of which joined her, proving a most useful pilot and guide. On June 13th she stood north for Behring's Straits, where she had a short and most effective cruise, completely breaking up the American whaling fleet between June 22nd and 28th, in which time she either destroyed or ransomed 24 vessels. *Waddell* then stood southward to get in the track of trade and find out something about the War, for he had taken April papers in his prizes containing both the correspondence between Grant and *Lee* before the surrender, and the proclamation of *President Davis*, stating that the War would be prosecuted with the utmost vigour. Meanwhile *Bulloch* had asked *Mr. Mason* the Confederate Commissioner to ask Lord John Russell to send round to the British Consuls at foreign ports to stop the "*Shenandoah*" from committing acts of war : he consented to this simply as a message, not in any way to cover the ship's actions. *Waddell* met H.M.S. "*Barracouta*" on August 2nd, and heard of the end of the War, on which he dismounted his guns and sailed for Liverpool, arriving there on November 6th, and surrendering to the British Government. Mr. Adams asked that the ship be handed over to the United States, which was done, but the officers and crew were not detained, as it was said that none were British subjects.

On January 30th,¹ the late Danish ironclad ram "Sphinx" was commissioned as the Confederate ship-of-war "*Stonewall*," off the French coast, but made bad weather, leaked, and put into Ferrol for repairs, leaving it on March 24th. The U.S. ships "Niagara" and "Sacramento" were waiting at Coruña, and the "*Stonewall*" lay off that port for them for some hours, but they declined the challenge, though the "Niagara" carried ten heavy rifled guns, and the "Sacramento" two 11-inch smooth-bores. She then made her way to Havana via the Canaries, and got there in May. The Confederacy being then at an end, *Captain Page* arranged with the Captain-General of Cuba to take possession of the ship for 16,000 dollars, with which he paid off his men. She was soon surrendered to the United States, and afterwards sold to Japan.

At the end of February, *Barron* resigned his post of senior Confederate naval officer in Europe, and turned over the "*Rappahannock*," lying at Calais, to *Bulloch*, who made a nominal sale to an English ship-broker, being only too glad to be rid of her, as he could give no legal title. He would not have been justified then in sending her to sea, even had he had the money to fit her out.

MEXICO

In Mexico, Bazaine took Oajaca on February 9th, but this did not really help Maximilian's unstable position. In April the Republicans defeated an Imperial force at Tacambaro, while the ending of the American Civil War, which put a large veteran army at the disposal of the United States for any service, their great irritation against Napoleon and his schemes, and the chaos in the country, made those on the Imperial side who wished to see stable government, look directly to France. They thought that there was a real danger of American intervention, in which case the great and increasing party of Moderates said

¹ S.E. Fort Fisher taken, January 13th.

plainly that they would infinitely prefer either annexation to France or a direct French protectorate, in the very likely event of Maximilian proving a failure as a ruler, for the Americans had made themselves thoroughly detested when in Mexico before. From the French point of view, Napoleon had been too slow, and had failed to get Mexico settled before the end of the Civil War.

Bazaine was making direct preparations to deal with American military interference, and the political question was complicated by the well-known desire of many prominent Confederates to take refuge in Mexico. It was not thought that this, if allowed, would really bring war, but the North were so excited, that it was judged wiser not to excite them further, and that if a part of the Confederate army crossed the border, they must be at once disarmed, and their arms surrendered to the North, if the latter would recognize the Mexican Empire. Anyhow, *Jefferson Davis* must not be given an asylum in the country. The financial situation was no better, and France was not yet getting any value from the Sonora mines concession.

SUMMARY

(Continued from p. 371.) The end of the half-year saw the surrender of the last Confederates, except *Captain Waddell* and the crew of the "*Shenandoah*," but they committed no act of war after June 28th.

The total of Confederate troops surrendered was 174,223, made up thus :

<i>Army of Northern Virginia, General Lee</i>	. 27,805
<i>Army of Tennessee, etc., General Johnston</i>	. 31,243
<i>Army of Missouri, General Thompson</i>	. 7,978
Miscellaneous, Department of Virginia, <i>Mosby, etc.</i> 9,072
Paroled at various Eastern stations	. . 9,377
Paroled in Alabama and Florida	. . 6,428
Carried forward	. . 91,903

Brought forward	91,903
<i>Army of Department of Alabama, General Taylor</i>	42,293
<i>Army of Trans-Mississippi Department, General Kirby Smith</i>	17,686
Paroled in Department of Washington	3,390
Paroled in various places	13,922
Surrendered at Nashville and Chattanooga	5,029
Total	<u>174,223</u>

On the Union side, recruiting for the army was stopped on April 13th, and on April 29th the mustering out began: this went on gradually till November, by the 15th of which month 800,963 officers and men had been discharged, and the forces of the United States were brought down to Sheridan's army (cf. p. 415), troops for the disaffected States, and a slightly larger Regular army.

An event of greater importance than even the end of the War was the assassination of the great and wise President Lincoln, part of a conspiracy against the chief men of the Union, for Seward was attacked and wounded the same night. Had Lincoln's guidance been retained at the head of affairs, the South would in all probability have been settled in half the time, with the minimum, not maximum, of friction and bitterness. The South lost their truest and best friend when he died, and many of them recognized it at the time. His successor was a man of very different nature, and before Lincoln was cold in his grave the old evil of political interference with military affairs broke out afresh, for President Johnson would not or could not control Stanton's officious meddling. This matter will come more into the next chapter.

Union Loss.—President Lincoln, assassinated.

Confederate Loss.—*General A. P. Hill*, killed in action.

SOME NOTICES

(Continued from p. 373.) In addition to the deaths of President Lincoln and *General A. P. Hill*, *General Hood* resigned, on the Confederate side.

Abraham Lincoln was born in Kentucky in 1809, of poor parents, and lost his mother, a good and pious woman, when quite young, but his step-mother, when his father married again, was another excellent woman, whom he loved devotedly. In 1830 the family moved to Illinois, and here occurred the sorrow of his life, the death of his fiancée in 1835, which for a time even endangered his reason, and tinged his whole character with a deep and abiding melancholy. He did not marry till 1842. He worked his way along, educating himself as best he could, for he never was six months at school in his life. After serving as a Volunteer in the Black Hawk Indian War of 1832, he took up the study of law and was admitted to the Bar in 1836, where his clear head, eloquence, and uncompromising honesty soon made him famous. In 1834 he had been elected to the State Legislature as a Whig, and two years later became the party leader, in opposition to the great Douglas, who led the Democrats. A strong opponent of slavery, though not an Abolitionist, he came to the front in 1854 in his opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and signally defeated Douglas in Debate. He was sent to Congress in the 'forties, and was a candidate for election to the Senate in 1855 and 1858, in the latter election being defeated by Douglas; but he had made such a mark that he was nominated for President in 1860.

As a politician, after he became President, he represented the principle of amalgamation and sinking of all minor interests for the maintenance of the Union, and in forming his Cabinet aimed at a coalition Union Ministry, even trying to include a member from a Southern State, but in this, probably fortunately, he failed. Mr. Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, and

Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War from 1862, were both political opponents in the ordinary sense.

Though a really strong man, he was lacking in self-assertion, modest, and diffident, in setting his own opinions against those of men who ought to have expert knowledge, wherever possible leaving military questions to military specialists, but he often had to make military decisions and give orders, because those who should have done so shirked the responsibility. He said to General Grant, when he appointed him Commander-in-Chief, that he was keenly conscious that these orders were very likely wrong, and hoped that he (Grant) would now take this burden of responsibility off his shoulders. This does not mean that he in any way surrendered control, or wished to do so, but that he should be left free for his broad general duties of supervision and advice.

Till he became President, the sobriquet of "Honest Abe" probably expressed him to the majority of people; but he was far more than that, good as it was. Strong, wise, dignified, kindly, a simple and humble Christian man, he united in himself all the real elements of greatness. A trained and acute lawyer and advocate, he was eloquent without rant, while his shrewdness and keen sense of humour enabled him to parry awkward questions while making his meaning clear, without committing himself or his Government, by means of the queer yarns for which he was famous. But the keynote of his character was his simple faith and trust in God, which was an integral part of his life. He was elected to maintain the Union, not to abolish slavery, and constantly reminded Abolitionists of this; but he felt the curse of slavery on the country as keenly as any one, and the series of disasters to the Union arms in the East so wrought on him that he is said to have exclaimed in the anguish of his heart, "If there is any one out of Hell more miserable than I am, I pity him." He looked on these defeats as the evidence of God's wrath on the

country, and after the battle of Manassas vowed to Heaven that if God vouchsafed a victory to the Union arms, he would proclaim the Emancipation of the slaves, well knowing the political rashness of his act. A few days afterwards came the strategical victory of the Antietam, and the Proclamation was issued. The concluding words of his second Inaugural speech, on his re-election as President, are so characteristic of the man that I venture to insert them here.

“The Almighty has His own purposes. ‘Woe to the world because of offences, for it must needs be that offences come: but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh.’ If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offences which, in the Providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offence came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue till all the wealth piled by the bondman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid with another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, ‘The judgments of the Lord are true, and righteous altogether.’ With malice towards none: with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in: to bind up the nation’s wounds: to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan: to do all which may achieve and cherish a lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.”

These were almost Lincoln’s last public words, for just a month later he was murdered: the world was

the poorer by the death of one of its greatest men, and the South lost its best friend.

General John B. Hood was an old West Point man whose early service was in the cavalry, mostly in the Pacific States: he had seen no real war service when the Civil War broke out. He was brave to rashness, and most energetic, being unsurpassed as a divisional commander, but when promoted to command a Corps he shewed a turbulent and insubordinate spirit, criticizing and intriguing against his superior officer, *General Johnston*, which action was not stopped by those to whom it was addressed, as it should have been. It was well said, that criticism of superiors is not in itself a proof of ability. In chief command he was more cunning than able, and apt to find a scapegoat for anything that went wrong, though, on reflection, he was willing to hear an explanation, and to take responsibility on himself, as in the case of the Tennessee Campaign, of which *President Davis* did not approve. It must be said for *Hood*, latterly, that he was so crippled by wounds that both health and temper were affected, and he had not the physical activity requisite for command in the field: the strain of the last campaign completely broke him down.

Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill was killed on April 2nd, when the Union troops broke the Confederate lines at Petersburg. He was an old West Point man, modest and unassuming, who never intrigued, and fought with distinction all through the War. It was said of him that "he had the best division, when he had a division, and one of the best Corps, when he had a Corps." Latterly, *Lee* trusted him with large commands, on semi-independent missions, and he proved his ability in every position in which he was placed. Both *Lee* and *Jackson* mentioned him in the delirium of death, and his loss was universally mourned by his many friends in both armies. Personally, he was a small, smart, well-groomed man, quiet, resolute, and courteous.

1865	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH
EAST	<p>Siege of Petersburg.</p> <p>11. Rosser takes Beverly, West Virginia.</p>	<p>6. Lee appointed Confederate Commander-in-Chief.</p> <p>27. Sheridan's Raid</p>	<p>25. Fort Stedman.</p> <p>31. Dinwiddie Court House.</p> <p>in Virginia, to 25.</p> <p>2. Action at Waynesboro.</p> <p>20. Stoneman's Raid, in South-West Virginia, and</p>
SOUTH-EAST	<p>1-14. Kirk's Raid in western North Carolina.</p> <p>13. Fort Fisher taken.</p>	<p>3-17. Operations near Charleston.</p> <p>18. Charleston evacuated.</p> <p>22. Wilmington taken.</p>	<p>North Carolina.</p> <p>10. Bragg repulsed at Kinston.</p> <p>16. Aversboro.</p> <p>19-21. Bentonville.</p>
WEST			
SOUTH			<p>18. Wilson's Raid in Alabama starts.</p> <p>27. Siege of Mobile.</p>
SOUTH-WEST, NAVAL, AND MEXICO	<p>16. Monitor "Patapsco" sunk by mine off Charleston.</p> <p>25. The "Shenandoah" reaches Melbourne.</p> <p>30. The "Sphinx" re-commissioned as the "Stonewall."</p>	<p>18. Sails for the Pacific.</p> <p>The "Stonewall" repairing at Ferrol, February and March.</p> <p>28. Barron resigns his post in Europe.</p> <p>9. Bazaine takes Oajaca, Mexico.</p>	<p>1. Flagship "Harvest Moon" sunk by mine off Charleston.</p> <p>The "Shenandoah" at sea.</p> <p>24. Puts to sea. "Niagara" and "Sacramento" decline action.</p> <p>Bulloch sells the "Rappahannock."</p>

1865	APRIL	MAY	JUNE
EAST	2. Fall of Petersburg. 3. Weitzel occupies Richmond. 1. Five Forks. <i>Lee's</i> Last March. 6. Sailor's Creek. 9. <i>Lee</i> surrenders. 16. President Lincoln assassinated. 17. <i>Mosby</i> surrenders.	The Great Review at Washington. 22, 23. March past of Grant's Armies. 24, 25. March past of Sherman's Armies.	
SOUTH-EAST	1-12. Stoneman's Raid in North Carolina. Flight of <i>Jefferson Davis</i> . 26. <i>Johnston</i> surrenders.	10. Capture of <i>Jefferson Davis</i> . <i>Jones</i> surrenders at Tallahassee.	
WEST		11. <i>Thompson</i> surrenders.	Last Confederate
SOUTH	2. Wilson beats <i>Forrest</i> at Selma. -20. Wilson's Raid in Alabama and Georgia. Croxton's Raid to 12. Canby takes Mobile.	Macon, to 1. 4. <i>Taylor</i> surrenders. 26. <i>Kirby Smith</i> surrenders.	gunboats on the Mississippi surrender.
SOUTH-WEST, NAVAL, AND MEXICO	The " <i>Stonewall</i> " at sea. . . . The " <i>Shenandoah</i> " at sea. . .	25. Sabine Pass surrenders. The " <i>Stonewall</i> " surrendered and paid off at Havana, in middle of month.	3. Galveston surrenders. 22-28. The " <i>Shenandoah</i> " destroys American Whaling fleet near Behring's Straits; disarms August 2; surrenders at Liverpool, November 6.

CHAPTER XIV

THE END OF THE MEXICAN COMPLICATION

AFTER the surrenders of *Lee* and *Johnston*, Sheridan was assigned to command the district west of the Mississippi, to force the surrender of *Kirby Smith* and garrison the country, for which purpose an army of over 50,000 men was put under his orders in case of another campaign (cf. p. 408): he was then to restore Texas and part of Louisiana to the Union as soon as possible. Grant told him personally that military control was the best till the political scheme had been thoroughly settled, but that the principal reason for giving him so strong a force, which was not put in writing, was that Secession would never be put down till Mexico was cleared of foreign troops, and that this Franco-Austrian adventure was looked on as part and parcel of the Civil War. He was to act carefully, since it was not desired to bring on a war with European powers. For the same reason also the East and West Gulf Squadrons were combined under Admiral Thatcher in July, and kept to watch the French squadron till May, 1867, when the abandonment of the Mexican Expedition rendered its further maintenance unnecessary.

Kirby Smith had surrendered before Sheridan arrived, but the work was not properly carried out, parts of his army marching off as organized and armed military bodies, intending to go to Mexico. Sheridan therefore arranged for the immediate occu-

pation of the Mexican frontier, Galveston, Brazos, Brownsville, and along the Rio Grande, and also for two cavalry columns to push right through Texas. A Confederate officer who had fought under Juarez in old days wanted to hand over some guns to him, but the Confederate commander, *General Slaughter*, had them put where the Imperialist Mejia could get them: Bazaine, however, ordered that they be handed over to the United States at once.

Sheridan made such a show of force as to impress the Imperialists very much, and believed that if his Government had not interfered in order to carry on political negotiations, they would have abandoned Northern Mexico at this time. Though very strong representations were made to Napoleon, military operations were not stopped thereby, and the Imperialists gained in strength till the cause of Juarez was at the last extremity. The position was, that the French and Imperial troops held a line through the centre of the country from Vera Cruz to Guadalajara, cutting off Juarez and General Escobedo in the North from the Republicans in the South. They had just taken Oajaca, General Diaz was a prisoner in their hands, and they were advancing northwards, holding their own in the South. At the end of September, Juarez and Escobedo, who had gained some successes, were forced back to the frontier, when, on a false report that they had taken refuge in the United States, Maximilian made the great mistake which ruined him and caused his death. On October 3rd he issued an Edict, in which, while complimenting Juarez on his plucky resistance, he took the ground that as the Republican Government had fled the country, it had thereby resigned its pretensions, that there was no Government left but his own, and no Republic for which to fight, and that therefore those who continued to offer armed resistance were mere brigands, to whom no quarter must be given.

Bazaine's troops had taken little or no part in this fighting, since Napoleon in a letter dated August 17th had warned him to be prepared for trouble with the United States, and to dispose his troops accordingly. He was told at the same time that the length of the French occupation might depend on the recognition of the Mexican Empire by the United States. He therefore made this his first consideration, and consulted Commodore Cloué as to the power of Vera Cruz to resist an American naval attack. The French and Maximilian relied much on the so-called flight of Juarez to persuade the United States to recognize the Empire, but the latter knew the exact situation, being, at all events unofficially, in communication with him.

In October, Juarez and Escobedo moved forward, while Diaz escaped from prison, took command again in the South, and more than held his own. About this time Maximilian made overtures to Diaz, saying that, much as he admired Juarez, it was useless to approach him, and hinting that he (Diaz) might have the command of the army: this was unconditionally refused. Bazaine, holding that his responsibility was now principally that of guarding against war with the United States, left the war more and more to Maximilian's army of Mexicans, stiffened with special Austrian and Belgian regiments. The retreat of the Imperialists and advance of the Republicans were largely due to the strong demonstrations made by Sheridan, and the careful circulation of reports that he intended to cross the border and support the latter. He openly encouraged them and supplied them with arms and ammunition, but in the autumn, in consequence of the representations of the French Government, he was ordered to observe a strict neutrality. The French Commodore Cloué also sent a very strong protest to General Weitzel, commanding on the Rio Grande, in November, on the breaches of neutrality committed by the United States in supply-

ing Juarez with help of all sorts, even with men, to which no satisfactory reply could be made. Sheridan took an active part in trying to unite conflicting factions among the Mexicans. It was well known to him that a so-called colonization scheme was on foot as a refuge for ex-Confederates in Mexico, headed by *Price*, *Magruder*, and others, which was favoured by Maximilian, so after waiting in vain for his Government to interfere he forbade any passengers to sail for Mexican ports without permits, in April, 1866, which, as the land frontier was well watched, soon caused its failure. To counteract this, Bazaine had offered to Americans, Confederates, or Sheridan's men who might think of joining Juarez, better terms, viz. to join the Imperialist Foreign Legion on the same conditions as those who enlisted in Europe.

In December occurred rather an awkward contretemps for the Republic, for Juarez' term of office as President came to an end, and as it was impossible to hold elections, General Ortega, the President of the Supreme Court, who had deserted Juarez, followed the Mexican custom of dealing with an interregnum, and assumed power, to split the Liberal party: his action was condemned and he fled to the United States, but was arrested by Sheridan's order, and handed over to Escobedo. Juarez, to solve the difficulty, prolonged his own term by proclamation till proper elections could be held.

Political negotiations in the latter part of 1865 brought things to a head. Napoleon saw plainly that the whole expedition to Mexico was a failure, and only sought for a reasonable pretext for withdrawal, but tried to get the United States to recognize the Mexican Empire, to "save face." At first Mr. Seward was quite willing to meet him by trying to find some third party, other than Maximilian or Juarez, whom both sides could recognize, and for that purpose went to see that old intriguer Santa Anna, then living in the West Indies, but nothing came of it. This course failing,

Napoleon's anxiety became so patent that Seward saw that he had the game in his hands and took a higher tone, telling him that the American people manifested a warm and rapidly increasing interest in the Mexican Republic and viewed with impatience the prolonged intervention of France, a plain hint that his troops must go.

In January, 1866, Napoleon wrote to Bazaine to say that all the troops must be back at the beginning of 1867: about this time Seward intimated that the United States contemplated armed intervention in favour of Juarez, giving Napoleon the choice of retreat or war, and it was arranged that the retirement be completed by November, 1867, at latest. In May, hearing that men were being enlisted at Trieste for an Austrian Legion for Maximilian's service, the Cabinet of Washington declared that it would not admit any interference by European powers in Mexican affairs and would withdraw its representatives from Vienna if a single transport sailed for Mexico. The Austrian Government yielded and disbanded the men. In July, the affairs of the Empire were hopeless; even Maximilian saw it, and thought of abdication, but the Empress persuaded him to wait till she had played her last card, to see Napoleon personally, and remind him of his guarantee to them, which he was proposing to ignore: when this failed, her reason broke down, and the news decided Maximilian on abdication, which Napoleon also recommended. At this juncture Maximilian unfortunately listened to his evil genius, the disreputable Father Fischer, his confessor, and is also said to have been influenced by a sneer of Bazaine's. Anyhow, he determined to stay by the Empire and brave his fate out, concentrated his troops in the towns of Mexico, Puebla, and Queretaro, and cut loose from the French. His troops were deserting to the Republicans, whose forces steadily increased and gained ground: in the North, Juarez controlled the country down to San

Luis Potosi by midsummer, and in the South, Diaz retook Oajaca on October 30th. At this time the United States appointed Mr. Campbell Minister to the Court of Juarez, General Sherman going with him. They reached Vera Cruz at the end of November, where everything pointed to the evacuation by the French very shortly, before the time fixed with Mr. Seward. They at last found Escobedo at Matamoros, and soon communicated with Juarez.

At the beginning of 1867, Escobedo was gaining the upper hand and advancing, and Maximilian moved his Government to Queretaro, just before his troops were defeated in the field and besieged in that town, in February. Bazaine, who took no part in these operations, sailed in March with the last French troops, having made a last effort to save French prestige, by a proposal to Diaz to help him to overthrow both Maximilian and Juarez, and seize the supreme power, which was contemptuously refused. Diaz took Puebla on April 2nd, and advanced to Mexico City, Queretaro falling on May 15th. Maximilian was tried and condemned to death for his Edict of October, 1865, under which numbers of Republican officers, some of high rank, had been shot as brigands: this sentence was carried out on June 19th.

So ended Napoleon's attempt to interfere with America, and the complications which it introduced. The success of Juarez was brought about by the action taken by Grant in sending Sheridan's strong force to overawe the Imperialists, since he rightly said that "the French invasion of Mexico was so closely related to the rebellion as to be essentially a part of it," but Maximilian's Government was impossible, it had already failed, and the French occupation must soon have ended of itself.

CHAPTER XV

RE-CONSTRUCTION

PREMATURE attempts at Re-construction were made even before the end of the War, for just after the fall of Vicksburg, Halleck wrote to Sherman suggesting that it would be as well to begin at once in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas, which Sherman answered at length, strongly against it (cf. p. 252). He said: "I would deem it very unwise at this time, or for years to come, to revive the State Governments of Louisiana, etc., or to institute in this quarter any civil government in which the local people have much to say. . . . I know, and you know, and civilians begin to recognize the fact, that reconciliation and re-construction will be easier through and by means of strong, well-equipped, and organized armies, than through any species of conventions which can be framed . . . therefore . . . push the War, pure and simple." This clear, sensible reasoning settled matters for the time, but there was always the craving of the politicians to begin their innings, when the War should have been prosecuted sternly. The Governments which it was desired to set up were sham ones, by no means representing the temper and opinions of the people, were worked by a small majority of Union sympathizers plus the few who took the oath of allegiance, and, even when nominally carried out, could neither rule, legislate, nor even exist, without a backing of bayonets. Banks was busied with the creation of a sham Government

in Louisiana when he should have been starting the Red River Expedition, which failed, and the inglorious Olustee Expedition in Florida was an attempt to get a bogus State vote for the Republican party at the Presidential Election of 1864. By both of these muddles the War was lengthened and pacification delayed.

All thinking Southerners considered the death of Lincoln as the greatest calamity that could have befallen them, for he was just and kind, there was no petty bitterness or spite in his nature, and his one desire was for unity again. He said to General Weitzel, commanding at Richmond after its capture, when going through the town with him: "If I were in your place, I'd let 'em up easy, let 'em up easy." His successor was a man of very different temper. Vice-President Andrew Johnson, like Lincoln, had begun life at the bottom of the ladder, and had fought his way up through poverty and trouble, educating himself as best he could, but with opposite results. The furnace of adversity had refined and strengthened the nobler nature of Lincoln, who was trusted and beloved by all who came in contact with him, while Johnson had emerged from it soured, vengeful, and suspicious, without a friend in the world. A Southerner, born in Tennessee, he resented bitterly the fact that he was looked down on by the Southern aristocracy, although he had worked his way up into prominence in the State and in Congress, and when he came into power his ideas of re-construction were those of revenge on his own and the Union's enemies. He was Military Governor of Tennessee from 1862 to the death of Lincoln; why called "military," it is difficult to say, for there was nothing military about him: he was simply a bitter politician, who carried intemperance so far that in 1861 General Thomas nearly arrested him for preaching insubordination in camp. He was then Senator for Tennessee, and a sort of political hanger-on of the army, but when made

"Military Governor" he at all events stopped in Nashville and did less harm.

Such was the man on whose shoulders was suddenly laid the burden of finishing the War and re-constituting the Nation. He openly hated the Southern gentlemen, and they returned his hate with interest, but soon his original feelings of revenge became tempered by responsibility, and he was anxious to deal justly; but, being Southern himself, everything he did for the South was looked on by the rabid section of Northern politicians as treachery: their disappointment and anger were the greater since from his earlier record they had expected him to see eye to eye with them, and he was freely called turncoat and renegade. Add to this his suspicion of everybody, and his position will be seen to have been nearly impossible.

It had taken all Lincoln's strength, tact, and charm to bring into and keep in line his turbulent and officious War Secretary, Stanton, but when these were removed, there was no one to control him: perhaps he thought that as the War was practically over, the politicians should now resume sway, and the soldiers return to the old routine of garrison duty. At first he and the new President worked together, with Halleck, and began by objecting to the terms of Grant's agreement with *Lee*, as protecting prominent Confederates from the punishment due to them; but Grant said that he had pledged his word that they should not be molested while they conformed to the laws of the country and lived peaceably, and insisted that the agreement be respected. These terms also covered other surrenders, and after Lincoln's death the South looked to Grant as their protector from political persecution.

The Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, a rabid anti-rebellion man, tried to carry things in the most high-handed way in Europe as soon as the War was over. He acted on the line that the Confederacy was not a proper Government, and would not acknowledge the

confederate officers, who were prepared to hand over property and accounts, thereby largely defeating his own ends. In England he had an army of spies and persecuted individuals to the utmost, but in France, when he prosecuted M. Arman the ship-builder, he not only lost his case with heavy costs, but subjected his country to the contemptuous treatment of being required to give substantial security for them.

Lincoln's carefully thought-out plan of Re-construction was based on allowing the seceded States to carry on with the existing *de facto* Government till a better could be provided. Much of it was embodied in Sherman's rejected agreement with *Breckinridge* and *Johnston* (cf. p. 398). When Johnson's bitter feelings toned down, his idea was to leave the matter as much as possible to these States, to re-construct themselves and return to the Union, under certain safeguards as to having loyal men as voters and in the principal offices. This sounds the stronger scheme, but Lincoln's was endorsed by the clear-headed Sherman, and success or failure really depended on the men who worked them, for Lincoln was trusted by both sides, Johnson by neither; Lincoln was exceedingly shrewd, while Johnson seemed easily gulled.

The President proclaimed an Amnesty for such Confederates as would take the Oath of Allegiance to the Union, and to conform to the Emancipation Acts, but there were many exceptions among the senior officials and officers of the *Army* and *Navy*. This did not violate Grant's terms to *Lee*, that those covered by them should not be molested, but meant that they did not regain civil and political rights while outside the Amnesty. He began Re-construction by sending a provisional Governor to North Carolina as an experiment (cf. p. 428, note), pending enquiries, but before his reports came in he did the same in all the other seceded States, in May and June. They were to take charge, see to the registration of voters on the new lines, and prepare for electing a proper State

Legislature to which they could hand over power. Needless to say, all had a military force at their backs. Tennessee was so completely under Union control that it was not dealt with, while in Texas the ex-Confederate *Governor Murrah* and his *Legislature* thought that by means of the farce of a nominal adherence to the Union the State would be free to go on in its own way: they therefore proceeded with their elections without imposing any test or qualification for voters, to do the work independently of the Union Government; but the advent of Mr. Hamilton, the provisional Governor, upset their schemes, for he promptly disfranchised most of the voters, who probably had no intention of taking the oath of allegiance, and called a convention of those who would do so, which roused bitter opposition. The fear of the immediate enfranchisement of the negroes started terrorism, which kept the troops busy all over the State (cf. p. 428). Mississippi was thinking of doing the same as Texas, but was stopped by the same cause, the arrival of the President's Governor. Louisiana had had a provisional Union Government for a year, and the Amnesty practically put the Confederate party in power. There was much friction here and in Texas, perhaps due to the fact that the military commander was General Sheridan, who had a large army to watch the French in Mexico, for his ruthless devastation of the Shenandoah Valley had made his name execrated by all Confederates, and he was by far the hardest and least sympathetic of the Union generals.

In Alabama the military commander had suspended the Bishop and clergy from their functions for refusing to restore the prayer for the President of the United States to their liturgy; but the President quashed this order. In other States there was little trouble, the principal business being the preparation of the new register for the conventions in autumn and winter, which met and passed the preliminary tests, viz. the Repeal of the Ordinance of Secession, the Repudiation

of the Confederate War Debt of the State, and the Recognition of the Freedom of the late slaves. Most of them accepted at this time the XIIIth Amendment (cf. p. 437) to the Constitution, and the provisional Governors retired in favour of the newly elected men. In December, Congress appointed a Committee of Fifteen to deal with all questions relating to the recognition of the late Confederate States. One of its duties was to scrutinize the names of all representatives from those States, and in many cases it prevented them from taking their seats. This sounds high-handed, but may have been necessary on account of the weakness of the President's scheme.

1866.—In February and March two Bills were vetoed by the President, sent back, and passed over his head. The first established the "Freedmen's Bureau," and also proposed to set up military jurisdiction in the South; the other was the Civil Rights Bill, declaring those born in the United States to be citizens, and providing for the protection of the negroes in their rights.

It may be well to quote here Bryce's clear description of the working of the Presidential Veto. The President, "when a Bill is presented to him, may sign it, and thereby make it law. If, however, he disapproves of it, he returns it within ten days to the House in which it originated, with a statement of his grounds of disapproval. If both Houses take up the Bill again and pass it by a two-thirds majority in each House, it becomes law forthwith without requiring the President's signature. If it fails to obtain this majority it drops."

In Florida the military control behind the new Governor was relaxed in April, and the civil authorities were really restored to power. In June the Committee of Fifteen presented their Report, recommending the famous XIVth Amendment (cf. p. 438) to the Constitution, which was soon made the test for the re-admission of a Southern State to the Union. Its

terms, however, were so stringent that it excluded from office the better-class people, and hindered what it was intended to bring about.

The new Governor of Texas persuaded the President to give him a free hand, which was used to nullify the laws for the protection of the negroes, and caused lawlessness and disorder. Local militia had been started in several States (cf. p. 398), and stopped by the generals commanding there, which action was disapproved by the President, but loyal men were so much endangered that this veto was soon withdrawn. In Louisiana matters were much the same as in Texas, but here an attempt was made to re-model the Constitution of the State, and a serious riot took place in New Orleans on July 30th. The President garbled Sheridan's report of it, Sheridan complained, Grant backed Sheridan, and the friction was acute. Both a military and a parliamentary Commission investigated the matter, and both approved of Sheridan's action, and blamed the Mayor of New Orleans and his party: they also directly accused the President of knowledge of the fact that New Orleans was controlled by disloyal persons. Friction between him and his advisers had been growing for some time, for he was roundly abused for beginning his administration by preaching revenge and stern repression, and then for going to the other extreme and allowing himself to be gulled by such transparent Secession and Anti-Emancipation men as these, enabling them to work their States on their own lines, and nullify the laws and the work of the War. The findings of these Commissions were a direct challenge, and Johnson took up the gauntlet at once, and answered vehemently: thenceforward the Union Government was divided against itself.

These differences made people discuss the question of who should be the next President, for Johnson was already impossible, and all eyes turned to Grant in the autumn, which caused much jealousy. Sherman was sent for to Washington, to command the Army

during Grant's absence while escorting the new Minister to the Mexican Republic to Mexico. Grant thought that this was merely an excuse to get rid of him, and said he would not go: Sherman then offered to go in his place, which compromise was accepted, probably preventing a serious quarrel.

Although Johnson's scheme was approved by the executive and judicial branches of the Government, Congress had never liked it, thinking the safeguards insufficient. It was not properly thought out, and resulted in elections being carried out by an electorate which did not represent the people at all, under whom there was danger of a return to something like slavery again. Schurz¹ said that the acceptance of free negro labour should have been made an indispensable preliminary to the recognition of any State Government. Congress objected that the negroes, as freemen, were left to the jurisdiction of their own States, and wished to make constitutional provision for their status, and give them security as American citizens by laws which should override State law. Again, State jurisdiction did not protect men who had always been loyal to the Union, and it was felt that the real safeguard was negro franchise, in spite of its many disadvantages (cf. p. 425). At last, in December, Congress said that they would take Re-construction out of the President's hands, for it was found that the Negro Franchise question was hanging fire, and the intention was to override the civil courts if necessary. They enacted that the late Confederate States, with the exception of Tennessee, be divided into five military districts, commanded by officers of suitable rank, with power to substitute a military for a civil court when it might seem advisable, and to be above all interference from any State authority, but with the proviso that no sentence of a military court be carried out without the consent of the Officer Commanding the District,

¹ Schurz had been the President's Commissioner to report on the conditions in the South, in May, 1865 (cf. p. 424).

and no sentence of death without that of the President. That when any late Confederate State formed a Constitution conforming to that of the United States, and made by persons having the requisite qualifications, which should be approved by Congress, and afterwards adopted the XIVth Amendment to the Constitution, it should be entitled to representation in Congress, and the first clause of this Act cease to apply to it: provided that no one excluded by the XIVth Amendment be eligible to vote or hold office. That until this be done, any Government of such States be deemed provisional only, and subject to the overriding authority of the United States, and that the provisions of the above-named Amendment apply to both voters and office-holders of such provisional Governments.

1867.—On March 2nd a supplementary Act was passed prescribing the oath for qualification and the details for carrying out the voting under the supervision of the Generals Commanding Districts; the President vetoed it, but it was passed over his head. Up to this time he and Stanton appear to have been acting together, but now they were at variance, for Johnson was another strong-willed man, who, when he disagreed with his Government, ruled without consulting them: Congress retaliated by passing resolutions to foil him at every turn, to which he retorted by veto, and then by attacking patronage. This was a home thrust, answered by the Tenure of Civil Office Bill, which would prevent the President from removing any official without the consent of the Senate, and was passed over his veto. On August 5th he requested Stanton to resign, which in consequence of this Act he refused to do: Johnson suspended him, and put Grant in his place.

Both the Re-construction Acts were passed over the veto, and in July a third one, passed in the same way, made the Military District Commanders subject to the disapproval of the Commander-in-Chief only,

and authorized them to remove any person from office. Their districts were :

1. Virginia, Major-General Schofield.
2. North and South Carolina, Major-General Sickles, who was soon succeeded by Canby.
3. Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, Major-General Pope.
4. Mississippi and Arkansas, Major-General Ord.
5. Louisiana and Texas, Major-General Sheridan.

The effect of these measures was to subordinate State control and State law to that of the central authority, till the States were formally re-admitted into the Union, on the lines prescribed by Congress. The principal trouble was from the State judges upholding State law against Congress law, for which some were removed. This may have been necessary in the national interest, but in justice to them we must remember that they were appointed on oath to maintain State law. Sometimes the President revised the decision and restored the civil authority. In some cases there was friction between the commanding general and the State Legislature, which the former used his new powers to over-rule, so as to prevent the carrying out of elections by those not qualified to do so under the Acts. In Louisiana, General Sheridan removed some notoriously disloyal men from office, in which he was supported by Grant, but the open war between President and Congress caused great difficulty in administration, and loyalists and freed negroes were not safe. Appeals were made to the President against the generals, thus playing off one authority against the other. Sheridan was removed in August, Grant protesting in vain, for Johnson had never forgiven the former for the affair in 1866. Hancock administered the district till the end of the year, under whom affairs ran smoothly, for, though strong, he had great courtesy and tact,

and soon became a *persona grata*, which Sheridan never was.

Several States vainly contested the legality of the Re-construction Acts, between December, 1866, and the end of 1867, and the XIVth Amendment was submitted to, and rejected by, every Southern State. The disqualifications in Mississippi were so numerous that the negroes had a large majority of votes. In September, Johnson extended the Amnesty a great deal so as to exclude only the principal Confederate officers and officials. The new Conventions met, mostly in November, to consider the measures required by Congress. At the end of the year Ord was succeeded by McDowell in No. 4 District, and Hancock by Buchanan in No. 5.

1868.—Most of the Southern States adopted the XIVth Amendment and other points required by Congress in the spring of this year, and in June an Act was passed to the effect that when this was done, and on condition that the State Constitutions should never be so altered as to deprive any citizen or class of the vote, who were so entitled by the votes then passed and recognized, except as a punishment for crime, etc., each of the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Louisiana, should be admitted to representation. All were admitted in July, but Georgia was put back because negroes had not been expressly given the right to hold office and had been turned out of the Legislature in consequence. Arkansas was also admitted in this year.

Though most of the routine ordinances were passed in Mississippi, the XIVth Amendment was not among them: the new State Constitution was also rejected, because one section disfranchised all who had served under the Confederacy (cf. p. 435). McDowell removed the Governor and put General Ames in his place. In Virginia a Bill of Rights was adopted which declared that the State "shall ever

remain a member of the United States of America, and all efforts to sever such union are to be resisted," and that the laws of Congress were those of the land, "anything in any State law notwithstanding," a great difference from the old reservation of the right of Secession. Congress now imposed a test oath, first propounded in July, 1862, for any one taking office, to the effect that he had never borne arms against the United States nor countenanced any other Government, in addition to the ordinary oath of allegiance. General Schofield opposed this on the ground that sufficient officers could not be obtained under it, and it caused a dead-lock. In December the Amnesty was made complete, all exceptions being removed, and the pardon was unconditional without the formality of an oath.

Grant had held the post of Secretary for War from August 5th, 1867, till January of this year, when the appointment came before the Senate for approval and was not confirmed. By the Tenure of Civil Office Bill he would have been liable in penalties had he held on: he therefore resigned it again to Stanton, but this did not legally re-instate the latter to the general satisfaction. A third party was proposed, to whom all could agree, but Johnson had his back up and would fight it out. Grant wanted him to take advantage of the situation and forbid the Secretary for War to give Army Orders, but this was not done, and work went on in the old ignorant and arbitrary fashion, so that the new Army Orders and Regulations which had been drafted by a Committee of Generals to embody the experiences of the War were pigeon-holed in favour of a cumbersome document which Sherman thought "would not stand the strain of a week's campaign in real war."

The Senate incurred much unpopularity by its action, the generals were unanimous that Stanton should resign, and the President again turned Stanton out to test the legality of the Civil Office Bill, and

in February made General Lorenzo Thomas Secretary for War ad interim, which was the immediate cause of his impeachment for disobeying the law. After the acquittal, Stanton resigned and was succeeded by General Schofield. Thus the control of the political side of the Army passed at last into the right hands, and a better tradition was established and maintained.

The President was impeached in March, but many other counts than the removal of Stanton were included, to make safe. The most bitter hostility characterized the proceedings, for the old Abolitionist party considered his honest though misguided attempts to bring re-construction by conciliation as treachery to the Nation, and he himself had practically no friends. He was declared acquitted because a two-thirds majority was not secured on any one count of the indictment. In this war between President and Congress, the strictly legal points were not always on the side of the latter, for Johnson was an able lawyer, and used to meet his opponents with constitutional objections at every turn, to which they retorted by acts which even their apologists can only justify on the ground that they served their purpose of defeating the enemy before their legality was tested, or rather their illegality exposed.

All this quarrelling among the rulers spelt misrule and misery to the wretched South, and strengthened the hands of its bitterest opponents, for in order to spite the President they bullied his so-called protégés, because the real South now supported him. Thus, as it was plain that the elections could only be made safe by the manufacture of votes, the negro franchise was worked in the sole interest of the Republican party, not as a safeguard against reactionary tendencies, and civil rule brought the "Carpet-bagger." The military rule, though severe, was just in the main and administered by men of high character and standing, but the new civil rulers could not be

described in such terms, for with few exceptions they were political adventurers and office-seekers, the dregs of the North. The best-class whites were disfranchised, the political power was in the hands of the low-class whites and negroes, while the military force was at the back of the new rulers. Between these and the Southern aristocracy there was war to the knife, and where they came, came trouble, for their ranting excited the negroes and a reign of terror arose. The secret organization of the "Ku-Klux-Klan" met one terror by another and exercised real power in places, removing some carpet-baggers, and being specially designed to work on the superstitious fears of the negroes; but after a while it died out, having practically disappeared in 1870. Most Southern outrages were manufactured for political purposes (cf. p. 436), being fewest, and administration and credit best, where the reverse should have been the case according to Northern politicians, in the few places managed by the better-class Southerners, even when in conjunction with the new negro electorate.

After the failure of the Impeachment came a lull, and things went on more quietly till the end of Johnson's term of office, when he retired into private life for some years. He left Re-construction at the stage of there being no disabilities remaining, but his rule had sowed little but hatred. A suspicious but gullible man, he was badly advised, and put many most unsuitable men in power, some even disloyal: the bitter opposition to them put his back up, and he then supported them with all the stiff-necked obstinacy of his nature. It has been said of him that "he never made a dollar by public office, abstained from quartering a horde of connections on the Treasury, refused to uphold rogues in high places, and had too just a conception of the dignity of a chief magistrate to accept presents." If vulgar, narrow, and unwise, he was at all events honest.

1869.—To Johnson as President succeeded General Grant, and great were the hopes of the rule of a man who was so strong, just, and kind, and had done so much to conciliate the late contending parties, but they were doomed to disappointment. Grant gave trust blindly, and was completely in the hands of his entourage; though he was personally above suspicion, his ring pulled the strings in his name, working for the aggrandisement of the Republican party, and using him to maintain their own patronage and its profits (cf. pp. 444, 480). They had over-sea projects, without regard to the wishes of the nation, and once an American Consul had to call in British naval aid to protect American interests against the President's agent.

In March, Congress repealed the Tenure of Civil Office Act, which had done its work, and soon passed an Act which required a State to accept the XVth Amendment (cf. p. 438) as well as the XIVth before re-admission, and left the impasse in Virginia to the discretion of President Grant. This State Legislature was re-constructed in July, and the requisite Amendments were adopted on October 5th. In Mississippi, Congress ordered the test oath of 1862 to be applied for holders of office, and sent the new State Constitution to a revised electoral register for adoption, with the power of voting separately on the obnoxious section, which was struck out, and the Constitution ratified without it in December (cf. p. 431).

1870.—Virginia was admitted into the Union in January, and in February Mississippi followed, having passed the Amendments: Georgia and Texas also came in during the year, the former on the adjustment of the difficulty about negroes holding office.

The state of the South was pitiful. Under the disastrous "Carpet-bag" régime, credit and business declined, and the indebtedness of the Southern States went up by leaps and bounds. The frauds and usurpations caused such disturbances that in the

middle seventies Committees appointed by Congress were kept travelling up and down to investigate them. The general corruption aroused strong political opposition to the Republican party (cf. p. 434), and whenever they wanted to counteract it they beat the big drum of sectional passion, of "danger from the solid South," which generally did the work. In some cases special powers were taken to deal with the "danger."

Grant's ring often made their own appointments. In New Orleans, in 1872, these burked the elections, and two Governors arose, while in the same town, in January, 1875, Governor Kellogg sent troops into the State Legislature and had five members ejected. In Arkansas, in April, 1874, two rival Governors contended for power with armed forces, and a battle was only stopped by the intervention of regular troops. It was an open question whether the State had a republican Government which the Nation could recognize. In December of the same year there was a serious riot at Vicksburg, caused by the frauds of officials. The Presidential Elections were watched by troops in the interest of the Republican party in 1876, and it was not till the next year that the last troops were withdrawn from the South by President Hayes.

During Grant's first term there was much trouble with the Indians on the plains, which began to be opened up when the railway was carried through to San Francisco, and it may be said that he had finished his work of re-construction when he left office in 1877, for the conditions in the South were nominally normal again, and the country at peace, united, and free to develop as it had never been before. He vetoed an Inflation Bill, and his financial policy was sound and honest, providing for a return to stable conditions as soon as possible, but his administration left behind it a legacy of corruption.

The last echoes of the War were the efforts of Major-Generals Warren and Porter to remove the cloud under which they had been placed, Warren

by removal from the command of the Vth Corps at Five Forks, which did not cost him his commission, Porter by the sentence of court-martial to be cashiered and incapable for ever of holding office, after Pope's report on the battle of Manassas (cf. pp. 162, 383).

After repeated applications, Warren got Sherman, who commanded the Army in 1879, to recommend a Court of Enquiry, which exonerated him from blame, and President Arthur directed this finding to be published in 1881.

Porter, after several ineffectual appeals to Johnson and Grant, was granted an Enquiry in 1878 by President Hayes, which, after considering the fresh evidence which he brought, reported that the sentence should be quashed and he be restored to his rank. This was laid before Congress, but Congress did nothing. President Arthur removed Porter's disqualification for office in 1882, but vetoed a Bill for restoring his rank as *ultra vires*: this was not passed and approved till 1886, under Cleveland. It is noticeable that Porter had to wait till the Democrats returned to power for the first time after the War, for his prosecution had evidently been political.

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRED
BY CONGRESS TO BE ACCEPTED BY STATES
AS A CONDITION OF RE-ADMISSION TO THE
UNION

AMENDMENT XIII

Section 1.—Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2.—Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Proposed by Congress February 1st, 1865, and

declared ratified by 27 out of 36 States, December 18th, 1865.

AMENDMENT XIV (Abstract)

Section 1.—Deals with the rights of citizens, born and naturalized. No State may infringe them, or interfere with the equal protection of the law for all.

Section 2.—Deals with details of voting and representation in Congress.

Section 3.—Disqualifies for office any officer or official who, after taking the oath to support the Constitution, has been in any way concerned in insurrection against it. "But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of either House, remove such disability."

Section 4.—The United States Debt, including that for the Civil War, is sanctioned, but the Confederate War Debt declared illegal, as also any claim for loss of slaves.

Section 5.—"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."

Proposed by Congress June 16th, 1866, declared ratified by 30 out of 36 States, July 28th, 1868.

AMENDMENT XV

Section 1.—The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude.

Section 2.—The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Proposed by Congress February 26th, 1869, and declared ratified by 29 out of 37 States, March 30th, 1870.

(BRYCE.)

CHAPTER XVI

SOME ACTORS IN THE WAR

IN this chapter it is sought to give some short sketches of the principal men in the War who were in their places at the end of it, but the selection of names must always be difficult. Here the main rule has been to take the commanders of separate armies, and the names have been grouped in pairs, mostly either of famous antagonists, or of men who filled much the same offices on the two sides, but no series would be complete without Hancock and *Longstreet*, the two great cavalry leaders, Wilson and *Forrest*, and the two politicians, Stanton and *Jefferson Davis*.

Two men tower above the rest of those whom the crucial test of the great Civil War brought to the front, morally and physically, the Great President, who prayerfully, faithfully, and wisely, piloted the Ship of State through the storm, but to whom it was not granted to bring it into port, and the Chivalrous Soul of the Lost Cause, *General Lee*. The one a true son of the people, rugged-featured and gaunt, the other strikingly handsome, and the highest type of aristocrat, two more diverse natures could hardly be found; but they had one thing in common, the humble and sincere Christianity by which alone their actions were guided. The question never was, with either of them, "What is expedient?" but "What is right?"

There are, however, others who had some special and surpassing power peculiar to themselves. As a leader of men in battle Sheridan may rank with even

Ney and Skobeleff; no man ever surpassed *Joseph Johnston* in his wonderful eye for a position, or in the almost miraculous intuition which enabled him to stay in it long after it had become untenable, and move away at the very last moment unmolested. "*Stonewall*" *Jackson* and *Stuart* are the Masters of Counter-stroke and of Cavalry Outposts respectively, *Longstreet* could handle an Army Corps like a battalion, and the indomitable *Early* stands alone in his way: *Semmes*, with one ship, ruined the foreign commerce of a great nation in less than two years, and *Mosby*, with twenty men, held up an army for some time, and almost besieged the enemy's strong capital. Truly, "there were giants in those days."

STANTON

Edwin Macy Stanton was born in Ohio in 1815, and, like so many men who rose to eminence, he was left the eldest of a family of orphans while quite a boy, which brought out the strength and self-reliance of his character. He studied hard, under many difficulties, and went to the Bar, where he rose rapidly and made a national reputation. He was just, but severe, inflexible, and so rude, that Lincoln would not act in the same cases with him. Though a Democrat in politics, he had no sympathy with disloyalty to the Union, and entered Buchanan's Cabinet in December, 1860, as Attorney-General, vice Black. He at once shewed himself the strong man in it, and within a week forced *Floyd* to resign, telling him in the plainest terms, before the President, what he thought of him. Rather more than a year later, on the resignation of the gentle old Mr. Cameron, the strangely chosen Secretary for War, from Lincoln's Cabinet, to which he was politically opposed, Stanton was asked to take his place on the broader basis of the maintenance of the Union, which he did at once. Lincoln soon recognized that his rudeness sprang entirely from his uncompromising

honesty of purpose, and refusal to have any dealings with Secession. He was masterful, officious, and interfering to the last degree, but not in the least through personal ambition. His theory was that even in war all decisions must lie with the politicians of the Cabinet: his jealousy was for this principle and for the due maintenance of political supremacy, especially of the President and War Secretary. He was always urging on Lincoln that he was not only the constitutional Commander-in-Chief, but that he could not, even by delegation, divest himself of this responsibility. He interpreted his own duty to include the giving of military orders and interfering with military plans and details, and his uncompromising character and want of tact and manner caused needless friction. Grant and Sherman, while generally on good terms with him personally, opposed his interference in military matters most vehemently, both during and after the War. He never questioned his own authority, but could not understand strategy, and, with all his hectoring, was very timid in council. His attack on Sherman at the end of the War was probably a clumsy rebuke for meddling with politics, and what he considered truckling to rebellion, as also was his bitter opposition to President Johnson, when he saw that he was not going to ride roughshod over the South, as had been hoped.

A strong, self-confident man was Stanton, in his prime, when he took up his great office in 1862: he spent his whole health, strength, and ability for the maintenance of the Union, till, in the summer of 1868, prematurely aged, and broken in mind, body, and estate, he laid his office down, and died on Christmas Eve. To his country he had given freely all he had, seeking nothing for himself.

JEFFERSON DAVIS

Jefferson Davis came of a Mississippi planter family, and there is nothing to add to the notices on

pp. 11 and 71 in the way of former services. A man of high character and great experience, he attempted to centre too much in himself; the *War Secretary* was a non-entity, for *Davis*, who was an old soldier, took too much military direction on himself, which he should have left to those who had kept up their soldiering. The Union generals said that his military interference was often of much use to them. The consequence was that he neglected politics, especially foreign relations, which should have been his particular care, and it is curious that he, the great upholder of State Sovereignty, should have ignored it in practice, for he ruled the Confederacy with a rod of iron, and made all fall into line: a stickler for Constitutional procedure in all things, his perverted ideas of it not only led him into Secession, but did the Confederacy a very bad turn when he opposed the appointment of *Lee* as *Commander-in-Chief* in 1862. After his capture, he was imprisoned in Fort Monroe for a long time, and then went to Memphis, where he was head of an Insurance Company in 1870. He died about 1893. A curious thing was that he was the idol of the negro population after the War, a paradox for the Abolitionists.

GRANT

Ulysses Simpson Grant was born in 1822 in the State of Ohio, of old American stock, his grandfather having fought in the War of Independence. His father was a farmer and tanner, comfortably off, but young Grant preferred the farm life, and was soon known as an excellent horseman, for which he was principally famous at West Point also. In 1843 he joined the 4th Infantry and served with credit in the Mexican War. Here he got to know the characters of many of his future opponents (cf. p. 127), which was afterwards of great use to him. In 1848 he married, and after a turn of duty in California left the army

as a captain. In civil life and business he was not a success, getting into low water, and even at one time falling to despair and drink, but his father took him back into business at Galena, Illinois, where he was living when the War broke out. As an old army man, he took an active part in the formation of the local Company, was soon appointed to command one of the new regiments, and soon afterwards brigadier-general. When forming his staff, he asked his friend John Rawlins, a rising local lawyer, to serve on it, and this was the beginning of a military connection which lasted till Rawlins, then Secretary for War, died in 1869. Rawlins was his Chief-of-Staff when he became a general, and remained so till the end of the War. His devotion to his chief was most touching, but he was a man of strong will and opinions, who sometimes took on himself to act independently in what he conceived to be Grant's best interests. Thus he opposed Sherman's March to the Sea with all his might, even going so far as to ask the President to forbid it, without Grant's knowledge (cf. p. 356). No notice of Grant would be complete without some mention of this devoted friend and follower.

Grant's history is henceforth that of the War, but he had many enemies who were jealous of the rise of this unknown man, and his fall in civil life was used, at least once, to try and induce the President to dismiss him, but that shrewd observer merely said, "I rather like the man: I think we'll try him a little longer."

Grant had never been much of a student, but his clear common-sense and iron resolution carried the country through a crisis where a weaker man would have failed, the terrible month of fighting in the summer of 1864, when he was advancing from the Rapidan to the James. He was so simple and unpretending that he had not at first been credited with much ability, but his bold assumption of responsibility and uniform success soon commanded attention.

No man was ever richer in saving common-sense, or carried out more thoroughly the sound maxim, "*Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.*" It was to his old friend *Simon Buckner* that he sent the stern message that no terms would be considered but the immediate and unconditional surrender of Fort Donelson, adding that he proposed to attack it at once ; but the moment the surrender was carried out, he is said to have taken him aside with "Look here, *Buckner*, I fear you may be short of money before you can communicate with your friends ; if so, let me be your banker, and repay me at your convenience." It was rather curious that most of his best Army friends were in the Confederate service, *Wilcox, Heth, Longstreet, Bragg*, etc., and when he came East he was a stranger in the Army of the Potomac. Contrast his curt and stern dealings at Donelson, when the Confederate power was dangerous and rising (cf. p. 385), with his method at Appomattox, when it was fought out and the whole country weary : his object then was to give liberal terms, and remove all bitterness, so that his opponents might become good citizens again as soon as possible, and he forbade all demonstrations of victory which might hurt their feelings.

He was a sincere Christian, pure in thought and conversation, but was not the sort of man to succeed in business, for he was so honourable that he suspected no guile, while his nature was so affectionate that where he gave trust it was given absolutely. It was, unfortunately, often misplaced, especially when he was President, for though he was above suspicion, his administration was one of the most corrupt on record. He could control an army, but not the politicians (cf. pp. 435, 480).

After his Presidential term was over, he travelled round the world, being made much of wherever he went, and then returned to civil life, where misfortune dogged his steps again. He was induced to become a sleeping partner in a bank with some relatives and

friends, whom he trusted too well. The bank broke, and he was ruined, and about this time symptoms of cancer appeared. He fought manfully as ever against his troubles, to pay his debts while he lived, and wrote his Memoirs for this purpose when he was a dying man, and knew it. Not even in the War had his bravery and resolution been so conspicuous as in this last fight. He died in July, 1885. It is singular that, though he detested war, he never succeeded in anything else.

LEE

Robert Edward Lee was born in 1807, the son of General Henry Lee, "Light Horse Harry," one of Washington's friends and captains in the War of Independence, and three times Governor of Virginia. One of his ancestors was the first Colonial-born Governor of Virginia at the end of the 17th century, whose father came over as Colonial Secretary in the time of Charles I, and did much to keep the Colony loyal.

Young *Lee* went to West Point, and passed out in 1829, going into the Engineers, with which branch of the service he was principally associated. In 1831 he married Miss Custis, the grand-daughter and heiress of Mrs. Washington, so that in more ways than one he may be said to have been the representative of "The Father of his Country." In the Mexican War of 1846 he served on the Staff of General Scott, where his skill and daring were so conspicuous that he rose from captain to brevet-colonel, and Scott said that he was the first soldier in America, it being generally thought that *Lee* would succeed him in command of the Army. After the Mexican War the Army was increased, and *Lee* was made lieutenant-colonel of the new 2nd Cavalry, being employed on the Indian frontier for some years against the Comanches. This regiment turned out more men who rose to high rank in the War than any other.

Though a large slave-owner, *Lee* detested slavery, as

being more harmful to the whites than to the blacks, and, when war became imminent, said openly that "Secession is nothing but Revolution," and that the notion of the Union being merely a compact between independent States was absurd, but added, "If the Union is dissolved and the Government disrupted, I shall return to my native State and share the miseries of my people, and, save in defence, will draw my sword on none." He was offered the command of the United States Army, declined it, and resigned his commission. Had he or *Sidney Johnston*, who also refused it, accepted, there might have been either no war at all or a much smaller one. Here seems to have been the weak point in a very great character, that *Lee* did not, like Thomas, Farragut, and other great Southerners, realize that the maintenance of the Union was the interest of all, and that it was his duty to take an active part, and help to secure it with all his power and great influence, to practise what he preached as to the fallacy of State Independence, not sit down and let things slide. Whether this narrowness of view was due to modesty or what does not appear, but his very horror of Civil War seems to have been a powerful factor in bringing it.

During the War, his doings fill the larger part of the conduct of it in the East, and when it was over, he retired to his house in Richmond, and lived there quietly. He used his influence to persuade those who had been fighting in the Confederate cause to settle down peaceably and become good citizens of the re-constructed country, and to this end Grant frankly sought his advice and co-operation, for this aim was uppermost in both their minds since they met as friends at Appomattox. During the War, *Lee* was never bitter or unjust, and tried to influence others in the same way. He was ruined by the War, and in August, 1865, was offered the post of President of Washington College at Lexington, Virginia, which he only accepted when assured that his doing

so would not injure the institution. Under his wise guidance it prospered exceedingly. During these last years he was offered tokens of love and respect from all sides, but accepted very few. In October, 1869, he began to suffer from the illness, rheumatism of the heart-sac, which he had contracted in the campaign of 1863: it grew steadily worse, and he died on October 12th, 1870. As a soldier, perhaps his strongest point was his use of the holding power of a comparatively small force, to mass superior numbers at the decisive point, even with a smaller army, his weakest the use of cavalry; but his power was gained by his excellence in all respects.

Lee was, above all, a sincere and earnest Christian, a man of the noblest and most elevated character, and had such dignity that it carried command with it. He did everything thoroughly, and had the peculiarity of retaining his breadth of view of the largest matters, while missing no detail, however small.

SHERMAN

William Tecumseh Sherman, who came of an old Colonial family, was born at Lancaster, Ohio, in 1820, his father being a barrister in good practice, who soon became a judge. Young Sherman was sent to West Point, graduating in 1840, and got his first commission in the Artillery. He first saw service against the Seminoles in Florida, and then was sent to Marietta, Georgia, in 1844, gaining a knowledge of the country which was of great use to him twenty years later. Much of his earlier service was in the Southern States. He never went to the front in the Mexican War, but during part of that time was sent to California, held by the United States under military law, while it lasted. In 1850 he was sent to St. Louis, and married, leaving the army in 1853; he was a banker in San Francisco till 1857, and then went to a bank in New York for a time. He next

tried law, with little success, and in 1859 was made head of a military college in Louisiana, where he got to know well several of his future antagonists, *Bragg*, *Taylor*, and *Beauregard*. *Bragg* he had known in the army. In January, 1861, he resigned this post and got an appointment in St. Louis, on account of which he declined both a post in the War Office and that of brigadier-general in Missouri, which was then given to *Lyon*. The War, however, was on them, and events moved fast. He was brought back to the Army as Colonel of the new 13th Infantry, but sent to Washington on staff duty: in June he got command of a brigade in *Tyler's* division, which fought at Bull Run, from which time he rose steadily till he became second only to *Grant*.

In June, 1865, he was given command of the 2nd Military District, Headquarters, St. Louis. Here his principal interest soon became the opening up of the West, by the construction of the Union and Kansas Pacific Railways, and the controlling of the Indians, who were powerful and very hostile, for they clearly saw what railway construction meant for them. But for the troops, *Sherman* thinks that these railways could not have been made. In July, 1867, he was made head of the Indian Peace Commission, and adopted the policy of removing the plains Indians to reservations far away from the railway lines.

The re-construction of the Army on a peace establishment was taken in hand in 1865, and early the next year *Grant* was made General, *Sherman* Lieutenant-General. *Sherman* was head of the Committee appointed to remodel the Articles of War and Army Regulations in the light of war experience, but their Report did not suit the political heads of the Army, and was pigeon-holed. He stayed at St. Louis and carefully kept out of the quarrel between President *Johnson* and Congress, refusing any appointment which would bring him to Washington. When *Grant* became President, *Sherman* was promoted to General

and Commander-in-Chief. He took a year's leave, and went to Europe in 1871. On his return, he moved Headquarters to St. Louis to avoid the political interference of the Secretary for War, but when Mr. Taft succeeded General Belknap in this post, they were brought back. In November, 1883, being near the age for retirement, 64, he resigned the Command, and retired to his home in St. Louis.

Sherman's was the clearest intellect brought to bear on the War, and at first it got him into trouble; he saw at once that there was no middle course, that the North must "whip, or get whipped," also the force and time required to finish the War. For this estimate, which was below the mark, he was howled at as a maniac, all the papers attacked him, and he was removed from command for a time, but his judgment was soon vindicated: his conduct at Shiloh brought him to the front and he never looked back. He was absolutely above all jealousy and had the rare power of forming an unbiassed comparison of his own powers and those of others. For instance, he said that he knew himself to be an abler soldier than Grant, but that they were rightly placed, since he lacked Grant's iron nerve. He always spoke his mind freely, but accepted his superiors' judgment on the matter, and was most loyal in his friendship for, and support of, General Grant.

JOSEPH JOHNSTON

General Joseph Johnston was a Virginian, whose father had fought with *Lee's* father under Washington in the War of Independence, and the two sons, who were at West Point together, were fast friends throughout their lives. Both were in the Engineers and distinguished themselves in the Mexican War, and at the outbreak of the Civil War *Johnston* had seen as much service with troops as any officer in the Army. He was Quartermaster-General in

Buchanan's Cabinet, which carried the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, and was much aggrieved at his seniority in the Confederate Army being only that of Colonel: he attacked *Jefferson Davis* bitterly, for the supposed slight, and the friction between them was a serious injury to their cause. He was not great enough to be above jealousy of others' fame, though this always excepted that of his old friend, *Lee*. He was a magnificent soldier and had the confidence of his men, but cannot be called a lucky commander, though there were few, if any, abler ones. He was, however, essentially an Engineer, and not given to the offensive, whereby he lost many chances; *Seven Pines* and *Bentonville* were exceptions. In some respects, however, he has never been surpassed. No one ever had a truer eye for a position, or could fortify it better, while not Marshal Ney himself could judge as well as *Johnston* exactly how long to remain in a position and bluff the enemy, after it had become untenable, in which most delicate operation he never made a mistake. Another peculiarity was his power of retreating swiftly and secretly with a large army, leaving nothing behind. With the exception that he did not use the offensive, he was the greatest master of defensive strategy and tactics.

HALLECK

Henry Wager Halleck was born in New York State in 1814, and was educated at West Point, receiving his commission in the Engineers. During the Mexican War he and Sherman were both quartered in California, where they took their share in settling its unruly residents and immigrants, and in 1854 Halleck retired, and went into civil life as a lawyer in San Francisco, where he did well, becoming one of its most prominent citizens.

He was brought in at the beginning of the War as one

of the four new Major-Generals, next in rank to General Scott, and his first active service was when he was sent to Missouri to succeed General Hunter in November, 1861, from which time he took a prominent part in the War throughout, rather than a distinguished one. He was an able man in his way, but slow and ponderous of intellect, and more of a bookworm than a man of action. He was a close student of military matters and translated several works from other languages, but in war was pedantic and obstinate. He had two chances of ending the War in the West, one after the capture of Fort Donelson, the other after Shiloh, but lost both by his over-caution and slowness, though in the latter case his plans were good. As Commander-in-Chief his influence was baleful, for he did not trust the man on the spot, and insisted on his own cumbrous plans being carried out, and thus thwarted and quarrelled with the Union Commanders, of whom Sherman seemed the only one with whom he could get on at all: he persistently snubbed Grant, when a subordinate. He seems to have been jealous and vindictive, and most difficult to work with, for though interfering to the last degree, he would take no responsibility, and was helpless in emergency. A weak man, he fell quite under the influence of the masterful Secretary for War, Stanton, especially after Grant succeeded him in command, when he was called the Chief-of-Staff, query, to the Cabinet, certainly not to Grant. At the end of the War he had a short period of administrative command in Virginia, and then disappears from the scene. Whoever trusted to Halleck's action, support, or promises, in war, was disappointed (cf. pp. 152, 162).

BRAGG

General Braxton Bragg was a native of North Carolina, was educated at West Point, and went into the Artillery in 1837. He served with credit in Mexico,

gaining the brevet of lieutenant-colonel while a captain. He left the Army in 1855 or '56, owing to a quarrel with *Jefferson Davis*, then Secretary for War, married and settled in Louisiana, and joined the forces of that State, in which he was a brigadier-general when the War broke out. He joined the Confederate service, and is said to have been dissatisfied with his rank at first. From March, 1861, to January, 1862, he commanded the coast of West Florida and Alabama, headquarters, Pensacola, and then was sent to join *Sidney Johnston's* army in Kentucky. He succeeded *Beauregard* in command of it after the retreat from Corinth, and Sherman considered him a much abler man, of greater powers of organization, of action, and of discipline, but severe and exacting, and not liked by his command. He has been called the best disciplinarian on the Confederate side. After Chattanooga he went to Richmond as *Davis' Chief-of-Staff*, his duties being to conduct military operations in the armies of the Confederacy under the direction of the *President*, but at the very end of the War he was put in command again, to resist Sherman in the Campaign of the Carolinas: it was then, however, too late to do any good.

Like *Lee*, he committed the fatal mistake, but to a greater extent, of dabbling in politics when he should have been striking a decisive blow, in his invasion of Kentucky in 1862. He could both plan and strike, being a good strategist and tactician: e.g. the masterly way in which he out-manœuvred Buell, driving him back from before Chattanooga to Louisville, his use of cavalry to paralyze Grant and isolate Rosecrans, before Stone's River, his plan of action at Chickamauga, etc. But he had a most irritable temper, largely the result of ill-health, and was often at loggerheads with his subordinates, which was a principal reason for his failure to crush Rosecrans at Chickamauga. He was not a lucky general, and did not keep the confidence of his men. Grant thought much of him, both personally and professionally, as a man of the highest character

and conduct, but said that his cantankerous temper was always getting him into trouble.

He died at Galveston, in September, 1876, of heart disease.

SHERIDAN

Philip Henry Sheridan was the son of an Irish farmer who emigrated from Ireland in 1830, the year before his famous son was born in New York State, but the family soon moved to Ohio. At West Point, young Sheridan was rather known for his independent disposition than for anything else, and joined the 1st Infantry in 1853. His first service was all against the Indians, in Texas, California, and Oregon, and at the beginning of the War he was gazetted captain in Sherman's new 13th Infantry. When Halleck took command in Missouri he sent for Sheridan, needing his departmental experience, and he was soon made Commissary and Chief Quartermaster to General Curtis' Army of South-West Missouri. He had difficult work with the undisciplined units of those days, and left after the battle of Pea Ridge, this time on remount duty, and then became quartermaster to Halleck's headquarters after Shiloh. Soon a regular commander was wanted for a Michigan cavalry regiment, and Sheridan was named, for though an Infantryman, most of his real service had been with the cavalry, and he was known as an energetic and efficient officer. *Beauregard* was just then evacuating Corinth, and Sheridan's able handling of his regiment in the pursuit brought him the command of the brigade in a very short time. From this time he never looked back. Grant, when looking for a commander to manage the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac better than Pleasonton had done, tried Sheridan: but had Grant not been in chief command, he would not have had the free hand that he wanted, for Meade's notions of the use of cavalry were rudimentary, and only Grant's interference saved the situation.

Sheridan's ability in command of an independent cavalry force pointed him out as an energetic commander of an army for secondary operations, and his great campaign in the Shenandoah Valley was the result: as a leader of men in battle he has never been surpassed. He has been execrated for his exact carrying out of Grant's stern order to devastate the Valley, but was the best man for the work, for he knew that to try to wage war with rose-water is not only not humane, but the very reverse, and that ending it quickly is best for all concerned.

He was fiery and autocratic, and though he trusted his subordinates, and delegated power wisely, he never hesitated to remove from command any one who failed him: though severe and exacting, he was in the main just, but may have been mistaken about General Warren. One of the principal causes of his uniform success was the care and clearness with which his orders were drawn up, a most important point, in which he was far in advance of any other commander in the War, working on the plan which the Germans have reduced to a system, not by correspondence.

After the War he went with a large army to Texas to watch the French, and here his boldness of character shewed itself: when on the frontier he supported Escobedo morally, and a good deal more, for though he could not interfere directly, he once helped him out of a difficulty by giving leave of absence to a whole brigade: the French were furious, but took the hint.

As military commander in Louisiana, he ruled with a strong hand, removing disloyal officials. When Sherman took command of the Army, he became Lieutenant-General, and went west in September, 1867, Indian-fighting again. He went to Europe in 1870, where he saw a good deal of the Franco-German War, and succeeded Sherman in the rank of General, and Command of the Army, in November, 1883.

EARLY

The name of *Lieutenant-General Jubal Early*, Sheridan's great opponent in the Valley, may well follow his. *Early* was a Virginian, educated as a soldier, who left the army for the law, before the Mexican War, but served in it as a Volunteer with his State troops. He was a Representative at the Virginia State Convention to discuss the question of Secession, which he opposed with all his might, but when decided on, took part with his State in the War, in which there was no harder fighter. At Bull Run he commanded a brigade, and rose steadily in the service, winning a position at Gettysburg which would probably have decided the battle, had *Rodes* supported him, on the evening of the second day. He took up the rôle of *Jackson* in frightening the Washington politicians; but in his Valley Campaign, unlike *Jackson*, who was confronted by a number of mediocre commanders, whom he bewildered and beat in detail, *Early* had to deal with a large army under a better general, against which, however, he gained some minor successes, and nearly one victory, and, by deliberately accepting tactical defeat, carried out his strategical orders, to detain Sheridan's army. Nothing daunted or stopped him: a heavy defeat was but a temporary check, he rallied and attacked again at once: to carry out his orders, without considering the consequences to himself, was his only thought, and right well he did it: he finally escaped to Richmond after the break-up of his army, with a single orderly, the last man to give up the struggle. Of all the remarkable acts of the War, *Early's* deliberate acceptance of a hopeless position was perhaps the most so. Sheridan nearly captured him when crossing the Mississippi on his way to Mexico, after the surrenders, but at this time there was no desire to hunt down prominent Confederates, in accordance with Lincoln's wish. He soon came back, and was living in Virginia in 1870.

Early was one of the most curious and original figures of the War, being brusque and outspoken to a degree which many considered to verge on indiscipline, but no man was more really loyal. *Jackson* once asked him sternly why he had seen so many stragglers from his division. "Probably because you rode behind it," said *Early*.

MEADE

George G. Meade was a Pennsylvanian, who joined the Artillery from West Point in 1835, but left the next year. He rejoined in 1842, getting a commission in the Engineers, and served with credit in Mexico. He was a captain when the War broke out, and after the battle of Bull Run got a brigade in the Vth Corps, which he afterwards commanded. When appointed to command the Army of the Potomac, three days before Gettysburg, his grasp of the scattered situation was instant and masterly, and he shewed both judgment and nerve, when he heard of the death of Reynolds and the desperate state of affairs, in choosing Hancock, the junior Corps Commander, to go at once, take command of the three Corps on the ground, and hold on while he brought up the army. He was an excellent handler of large forces, and a great army commander, but not great in independent command, for he did not understand the use of cavalry, and, like most Engineers, his offensive was weak. He was a gallant soldier and a modest and loyal man, but was troubled with a most irritable temper, and was often very difficult to deal with.

After the War he had the command of a military District in the South, but in the consequent re-arrangement of the Army on a peace footing there was not enough room left for the principal officers, and when Sherman was made General, Sheridan became Lieutenant-General over Meade's head, being chosen for his special fitness for active service, in bringing the

hostile Indians of the plains to terms. Sherman says that there should have been three Lieutenant-Generals, to provide for both Meade and Thomas. Meade was much hurt, and died not long after, feeling that he had been neglected and ill-treated, after his great services to his country.

BEAUREGARD

General Gustave Beauregard was a Louisianian, educated at West Point, who went into the Engineers and served with credit in the Mexican War. He was one of the senior Confederate generals, and commanded the army which faced McDowell's at Bull Run, but in the battle was second to *Joseph Johnston*, who came up from the Valley. He differed with *Jefferson Davis* over several things, and they seem not to have worked cordially together, which is little to the credit of either, but *Beauregard*, on his own showing, appears querulous and touchy. However this may be, he seems to have had few important commands in the field for a man of his standing and ability, but to have been kept to defence, for which as an Engineer he was well fitted. Latterly, he had command of a large district. His health, though, was none of the best. Though a good handler of troops in action, he seems to have been little of a strategist. After the War he retired to his home in Louisiana.

BANKS

Nathaniel P. Banks, a politician who had been Speaker of the House of Representatives, was one of the four new Major-Generals appointed when the War first broke out. Though a political, he never intrigued, and was a most useful man, doing his duty simply to the best of his ability wherever he was sent. A great commander in the field he was not; when pitted against some of the good generals of the South he was completely over-matched, and was not equal

to the command of the Red River Expedition. He was, however, a brave man and a good administrator, an excellent military governor of a disturbed district, and well able to conduct minor operations against irregular forces. After the battle of Manassas he was put in command at Washington, brought order out of chaos, restored confidence, and freed McClellan for the Maryland Campaign. Thence he was sent to command at New Orleans, and at the siege of Port Hudson rose to a high level, both in his conduct of the siege and when he refused to be drawn away by the alarmist reports of General Emory of the danger to New Orleans. A weaker man might have lost the one without saving the other, had it been really attacked, but Banks had the clearness of view and resolution which made him carry out the main strategical work, to open the Mississippi, the success of which would make the other only a temporary setback. Here he remained till the end of the War.

PRICE

General Sterling Price had served with credit as a militia general in the Mexican War, so, though not a professional soldier, he had war experience. He was one of the Legislature elected in the autumn of 1860 in Missouri, and voted against Secession, but was so enraged at the bogey of coercion, that Blair and Lyon should use force to maintain the Union and defeat its avowed enemies, that he entered the Confederate service. This was a serious blow to the Union cause in Missouri, for *Price* was deservedly one of the most influential men in all that country. He was of noble and unselfish character, so much so as to resign command to a turbulent junior officer, *McCulloch*, by no means his equal in ability or experience, rather than work at cross-purposes. Though *Jefferson Davis* treated him with great harshness on one occasion it did not affect his whole-hearted loyalty

to the cause in the least, or cause friction, and he was one of those who, at the very last, tried to arrange for Confederate emigration to Mexico. As a general in the field he was reliable and respectable, rather than brilliant.

THOMAS

Major-General George H. Thomas was a Virginian, who was at West Point with Sherman, and was also gazetted to the Artillery. In 1845 he was in *Bragg's* battery, of whom the other officers were Reynolds, the Pennsylvanian, killed at Gettysburg, and *D. H. Hill*, who records that Thomas was the most enthusiastic Southerner of the three. He served in the Mexican War, and was for a time in the 2nd Cavalry, under *Sidney Johnston* and *Lee*. At the outset of the Civil War he was looked on with suspicion on the Union side, being a Southerner, but his army friends vouched for his absolute loyalty, and never was confidence more worthily bestowed.

Practically all his service was in the West, as he was one of the officers sent by Lincoln, at the very first, to organize Union troops in Kentucky, and there was hardly an important battle between the Alleghanies and Mississippi in which he did not take his full share. As a soldier he was slow but sure, absolutely reliable, and as firm as a rock: Grant says that he could not be driven from any position that he had been given to hold. He was, however, too slow for independent command, but the combination of Rosecrans, a high-spirited, brilliant man, with the indomitable Thomas as second, was ideal. He was called "The Rock of Chickamauga" after that battle. His delays before Nashville seemed inexcusable to Grant, who sent the most imperative orders, but Thomas moved not; partly because the weather made movement impossible, partly because he would not allow his hand to be forced when he saw his way. Grant was also much annoyed with his slowness in the spring of

1865, but it would appear that his health was not what it had been.

As a man, Thomas was most lovable, and even *Bragg*, at the time when he twice shattered his army against his old subaltern's iron resistance, spoke of "Old Tom" with the greatest affection. Sherman, who knew him as well as any man, says that the popular idea of him as the impersonation of strength, calm and imperturbable, was a mistake, and that he was most touchy about fancied slights or wrongs. He was much hurt at Grant's impatience before Nashville, and again at the promotion of Sheridan to Lieutenant-General, and the fancied favouring of Meade in the choice of stations. Both he and Meade well merited the higher rank for their great services. As it was, Thomas, whose health had been broken by the strain of the War, took the command at San Francisco, feeling that he had been badly treated, and died there in 1870 of heart disease.

TAYLOR

Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor was the son of General Zachary Taylor, who commanded in the first phase of the Mexican War, and was afterwards President. *Jefferson Davis'* first wife was his sister. Before the War he was a Senator for Louisiana, where Sherman knew him well. On the outbreak of war he soon got a brigade, and served in the East, at Bull Run, and in the Valley, under *Jackson*. He afterwards went back to his own district, where, though his command was nominally independent, he seemed much under orders, and would probably have done better with a freer hand, for he was an able soldier. He put great pressure on his enemies in Louisiana with a small force in July, 1863, by threatening New Orleans and taking several Union posts, and managed the early part of the resistance to Banks' Red River Expedition well: but for *Kirby Smith*, under whose

command he came at the crisis, he would probably have turned the Union failure into disaster. He afterwards commanded the Southern part of the Confederacy, when Sherman cut it in two and Canby attacked Mobile, but, though he had many troops under his orders, they could not be united for common action. He surrendered a larger force than any other Confederate general.

After the War, he was able to be of use to his side by his friendship with prominent Union politicians who had known his father.

SCHOFIELD

General John McAllister Schofield was born in New York State in 1831, and joined the Artillery from West Point in 1853, returning there as a Professor a few years later. Being in St. Louis on leave when the War broke out, he was ordered to muster the Missouri troops, and was given a Volunteer commission as major. He served on Lyon's staff at Booneville and Wilson's Creek. In November, 1861, he raised and took command of the Missouri militia, waging a continual fight with the roving Confederate bands. In 1862 he was given the command of the Department of Missouri and Kansas, and formed an army of better troops which was called the "Army of the Frontier," to meet the army which was being collected by *Hindman* in Arkansas in the autumn. With this he drove the Confederates out of Missouri and across Arkansas, and held his own against all comers till he succeeded Foster in command of the Department and Army of the Ohio, at Knoxville, in February, 1864. In May, he took his place in Grant's great plan and joined Sherman's army, to drive back *Johnston*. Thenceforward he had his full share in the main operations of the War, and made a name as a sound and successful commander, and a brilliant handler of troops. He had again an independent command in

the operations against Wilmington, and the march inland to join Sherman, where he added to his reputation. In Re-construction times he commanded the military District of Virginia, afterwards serving a term as Secretary for War, and finally rising to full General, and the Chief Command of the Army. Schofield was perhaps the youngest man who was trusted with a Department, and the military command of a large and important district, in which he had to raise and train most of his troops, and in which the fighting, though in itself secondary, was almost continuous for a time, and required the management of large forces, spread over great areas.

HARDEE

Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee was a major in the old service when the War broke out, and was known as a careful student of war: he had translated a French work on Tactics, which became much sought after by both sides for the training of all the new officers and men. *Hardee* was one of the great soldiers who had served in that great school of soldiers, the 2nd Cavalry, and learned his trade under *Sidney Johnston* and *Lee*. In the War, his service was in the West till nearly the end. In the summer of 1861 he was sent to Arkansas, to raise troops and take command, joining *Sidney Johnston* in Kentucky the next year. He remained with this main army, under different commanders, till July, 1863, when he was sent to take command of the *District of Mississippi and Alabama*, but was back again, under *Bragg*, at the battle of Chattanooga. On September 28th, 1864, he was given the *Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida*, and had the impossible task of opposing Sherman's advance from Atlanta. All that could be done with the small force at his disposal he did, in the hindrance to the advance and the defence of Savannah, till he came under *Johnston's* command in North Carolina in February, 1865.

Hardee, like Sheridan and some others, never found his limit, and the modesty which made him steadily refuse supreme command was almost a disaster to the Confederate cause, for no side has so many really first-rate men that in its hour of need it can dispense with any of them. *Hardee* was excellent at every point; his great night march, and attack of Logan at Atlanta, is a model of a most difficult operation, being equal to anything done by *Jackson* himself, and his strategical advice at all times was the very best of all. Had it been taken, Sherman would have had a much harder task, when he advanced from Savannah in 1865, though nothing would have averted the break-up of the Confederacy.

HANCOCK

Of all the officers on the Union side who did not rise to the command of an army, Winfield Scott Hancock was by far the most distinguished. Born in Pennsylvania in 1824, he joined the 6th Infantry from West Point in 1844, and served through the Mexican War with credit. He was in the Utah Expedition, and, when the Civil War broke out, was sent for from California, and made brigadier-general of Volunteers in September, 1861; his next campaign was in the Peninsula. Here he made his mark, and all his subsequent service was with the Army of the Potomac. He was a magnificent Corps Commander, and when the appointment of Sheridan to command the Valley army made probable a shuffling of commands, which would have given Meade a military District, Grant proposed that Hancock should succeed him in command of the Army of the Potomac. This was not done, but at the end of 1864, when enterprises were required which took a force of several Corps on detached service, Grant gave the command to him, and he always exercised it with conspicuous success. Grant says that "his name was never mentioned as

having committed in battle a blunder for which he was responsible," while Sheridan speaks with admiration of his rare military judgment, and correct appreciation of a difficult position.

He was strikingly handsome, tall and powerful, and of majestic presence, and, like *Stuart*, fully appreciated the showy side of soldiering, of which he made good use. Of courteous manners and remarkable tact, he made himself a persona grata in Louisiana as military governor in 1867, after Sheridan's uncompromising methods had caused friction, and matters there ran smoothly during his term, but he never allowed the "suaviter in modo" to weaken the "fortiter in re." He afterwards succeeded to the rank of full General, and the Command of the United States Army. He was the Democratic candidate for the Presidency in 1880, but was beaten by Garfield.

LONGSTREET

Lieutenant-General James Longstreet was at West Point with Grant; they served in the same regiment in Mexico, and Grant married his cousin. On joining the Confederate service he soon got a division, then a Corps, and after *Jackson's* death was *Lee's* right-hand man. His power of handling an Army Corps in attack as a whole was most remarkable, but though a fine soldier, he was sometimes a difficult subordinate, being disputatious and obstinate, and used to worry *Lee* with his own schemes, as against his orders, notably at Gettysburg, where by waiting to complete some units for attack as a whole, when every minute was of consequence, he let the great chance slip. Unless *Hardee* be excepted, he was the greatest Corps Commander in the Confederate service, but this was his limit, for he never did much in independent command. Grant, however, thought highly of him as a soldier, and *Lee* called him his old war-horse. He fought to the very end of the War, and lived for many years afterwards.

WILSON

James Harrison Wilson was a lieutenant of Engineers at the beginning of the War, and served at first in the operations on the South-East coast under General Gillmore: we hear of him as doing good work before Fort Pulaski in the spring of 1862. The next year he was a colonel of Engineers on Grant's staff before Vicksburg, and seems to have impressed Grant with his offensive power, because, when he went East to take up the Chief Command, and a Cavalry Corps was formed under Sheridan, Wilson was given the command of one of the divisions. Here he soon shewed that he was in his right place, and rose rapidly, being entrusted with the conduct of difficult and dangerous independent operations, a sure proof of Grant's confidence. Though badly beaten at Ream's Station, Grant did not blame him, for he had risked everything to carry out his orders, and done all that a man could do. Shortly afterwards, Grant sent him as Cavalry Commander to Sherman, and when Thomas' army was formed to resist *Hood's* invasion of Tennessee, Sherman, probably considering Thomas' constitutional peculiarity of extreme deliberation in all things, and that some real driving power could be advantageously added to this command, suggested that his cavalry service would be better if Wilson came to take command of it (cf. p. 362). Here again Wilson abundantly justified the selection, and at the battle of Nashville gave a striking instance of the power of a well-handled cavalry force in general action. In the beginning of 1865, the largest cavalry force used in the War was put under him, over 13,500 men, and he drove through Alabama much as Sherman had done through Georgia, breaking up and scattering the inferior force with which his old antagonist, *Forrest*, sought to stop him, and utterly destroying the numerous and invaluable ironworks and machine shops, on which the Confederates now

depended. It is an entire misnomer to call this great operation of war a raid, as is commonly done, for Wilson's force did not depend for safety on time or mobility, but was intended to fight anything which could be brought against it.

Wilson never reached the end of his military tether, as did so many others, for *General Taylor*, then commanding the Southern *District* of the Confederacy, says that this march was the very best managed operation which came within his cognizance during the War. It seems a pity that Wilson did not get his chance sooner.

FORREST

Nathan Bedford Forrest was the son of a small trader in negroes and mules; he was only fifteen when his father died and left him the sole support of his mother and the younger children: this brought out the strength of his character, and he manfully fulfilled his trust. He had no time for education, and could hardly read or write. He first comes into notice as the commander of the Confederate cavalry brigade which cut its way out of Fort Donelson before the surrender, then as a redoubtable partisan leader, developing into a great cavalry officer. He worked out his tactics for himself, and his stern character maintained discipline, while his personal leadership in action was brilliant. He had the breadth of mind which could understand strategy, and in the last year of the War Grant looked on him as the best man on either side for wide-ranging, independent action. Once when asked how he had managed to do so well, he replied, "Well, I got there first with the most men," almost putting the complete Art of War into a nutshell. He was unjustly blamed for the massacre of the coloured troops at Fort Pillow by his command, for he stopped it as soon as he came up: he was always markedly kind to his negro prisoners, and

they used to speak of "*Mass' Forrest*" with gratitude. A truly great man, he shone most in adversity, and no finer work was done in the War than his, of covering the retreat of *Hood's* beaten army from Nashville.

When the War was over, he, like *Lee*, used all his influence to persuade the late Confederate soldiers to settle down quietly, and become good citizens of the re-constituted Union, and to precept he added example, for, seeing that well-planned railways would be one of the best means of restoring trade and prosperity to the South, he interested himself in them, and in 1870 was the president of an important line between Selma and Memphis, the construction of which he pushed with all his energy. He died in 1879.

REFERENCES TO PERSONAL NOTICES ELSEWHERE IN BOOK

Ashby, p. 142; *Buchanan*, p. 16; *Buell*, p. 183; *Jefferson Davis*, p. 71; *Dupont*, p. 276; *Farragut*, p. 373; *Frémont*, p. 17; *A. P. Hill*, p. 412; *Hood*, p. 412; *Hooker*, p. 371; *Jackson*, p. 237; *Andrew Johnson*, p. 422; *Sidney Johnston*, p. 142; *Lincoln*, p. 409; *Lyon*, p. 99; *McClellan*, p. 180; *McClernand*, p. 240; *McDowell*, p. 183; *McPherson*, p. 372; *John Morgan*, p. 373; *Pemberton*, p. 239; *Pleasanton*, p. 322; *Polk*, p. 320; *Pope*, p. 181; *Reynolds*, p. 239; *Rosecrans*, p. 276; *Sedgwick*, p. 321; *Semmes*, p. 322; *J. E. B. Stuart*, p. 321; *Van Dorn*, p. 240; *Warren*, p. 383.

CHAPTER XVII

RESULTS AND LESSONS OF THE WAR

THE year 1870 saw the finish of the Re-construction period in its legal and constitutional sense, which left the individual States in a very different position to the Nation than they had been at the beginning of the War, for they had not only ratified the Amendments to the Constitution, which largely restricted their powers of internal legislation, but most if not all of the ex-Confederate States made new State Constitutions, by which they unconditionally adhered to the Union, and abandoned the "Sovereign and Independent" status, under which they had claimed to leave it at will. Although Amendments to the Constitution were passed to regulate the "domestic institutions" of the ex-Confederate States before re-admission, nothing was done about the Territory of Utah, whose "domestic institutions" were much worse, and which might soon claim to come in, and did so, on conditions, in 1896. Since these did not include the acceptance of an Amendment to the Constitution, dealing with the evil, the Mormons, as soon as they got their State recognition, might alter any State Constitution prohibiting polygamy, as the National Government would then be unable to interfere in their private affairs. In 1880 they planned to form a block of six new States, in and around Utah, and owing to the balance of parties had a real chance of success. Their avowed object then was to set up

a Mormon Government, and defy that of the United States: though that attempt did not succeed, the national position has never been made safe. It has been freely stated that the War settled for ever the question of State Independence; but will this bear examination?

Though the stern ordeal of war for national existence impresses on all that union is strength, and that minor interests must be subordinated to the common weal, this lesson is only remembered by those who have learnt it by personal experience, for after peace has reigned for a generation, local and petty interests again assert the supremacy, and sap the wholesome discipline. The lesson was beginning to be forgotten even before the end of Washington's Presidency, after the War of Independence, and was soon reversed in practice. What has happened before is happening again. None of the Amendments to the Constitution really deal with the main question, but only with details of internal policy and administration, and except for the precedent, the Nation is no stronger than it was before, being guaranteed by the individual States, not vice versâ. There has always been so great a reluctance to interfere with the several States that laws which Congress has the power to pass have not been passed (cf. p. 39), even though needed by the Nation: this was markedly brought out when some Italians were lynched at New Orleans in 1891, causing serious complications with the Italian Government, which recalled its Ambassador from Washington, complaining that its subjects did not get the protection to which they were entitled by treaty. It was then found that the National Government had never taken the measures requisite to cause its treaties to be observed by the various States, and was unable of itself to grant redress, but had to refer the matter back to the State of Louisiana. Another case occurred in 1906, the State of California refusing to admit the children of Japanese residents to her

schools, or to accept either ruling or advice from President Roosevelt, which caused a serious difficulty with Japan. Other causes of friction arose, and on December 12th, 1906, in the Senate, Mr. Rayner of Maryland spoke for an hour in support of the contention that the rights of individual States are above treaties concluded by the Federal Government. It was not till February 3rd, 1909, that the Californian House of Representatives threw out the Drew Bill, which prohibited aliens from owning land: this was regarded as foreshadowing the defeat of all measures tending to embarrass the Federal Government in its relations with Japan. Thus, since the close of the Civil War, the resurrection of the doctrine of State Sovereignty has twice brought the country within measurable distance of Foreign War, but it is to be hoped that California's sensible decision will be taken as a precedent.

As a slave, the negro had his place and his market value, and was on the whole well treated. During the War, the planters' families and estates were mostly left in the power of their slaves, and not one single outrage was committed: to-day it is unwise for a lady to walk alone, even close to Washington, on account of the negroes. The slave found himself pitchforked into freedom, which he had never been taught to use, for years he was merely a political shuttlecock, and even now his theoretical "equality" is ridiculed, and a race hatred has grown up in some States, marked by acts of fiendish brutality, against which he is practically unprotected. Though where suddenly befooled with sham power, or pampered by a communistic system of *métayage*, the black man deteriorated rapidly, yet, where less exposed to agitators, and paid regular wages, he as rapidly improved, both materially and socially, principally in the Cotton States, but, even there, only up to a certain point. The old régime was understood and respected, the new one is not so, and the future of the two races, more distinct than ever,

and living side by side, in some places in antagonism, is a serious problem, which sudden Emancipation has complicated, not solved, so that an outsider may well ask whether its blessings have not been rather theoretical than practical.

During Grant's Presidency the long-standing dispute with the British Government over the "*Alabama*" and other Confederate cruisers was brought to a head and settled. During the building of the "*Alabama*," especially, the American Ambassador, Mr. Adams, complained bitterly to Lord John Russell, the Foreign Minister, who wanted proper proofs of breach of the Foreign Enlistment Act, while the volumes of wild gossip and rumour on which the American complaints were founded did their cause more harm than good, and only within a few hours of the ship's sailing were proofs sent in which justified the law officers of the Crown in telegraphing to stop her at Liverpool and Queenstown, but she had gone. If a breach of neutrality was established which justified such an order to these two places, it should have been sent round to all other British ports, on finding that she had gone, and the neglect to do this seems the crucial mistake of the whole business.

After leaving England, the "*Florida*" was seized on suspicion at Nassau, but released, as all was declared in order (cf. p. 141). Soon afterwards, she was armed from her tender in the neighbourhood (cf. p. 177); the Americans allege that this was done in British territorial waters, which, if proved, would certainly be a breach of neutrality according to the existing Act.

The Foreign Enlistment Act of that day threw all the onus of proof on the prosecution, the builder need know no more than he was told, the real offence consisting in manning or equipping, within British jurisdiction. The words "equip" and "arm" seem held to be synonymous, but why? (cf. pp. 76, 486). The American Ambassador tried a test case, and got the British Government to seize the "*Alexandra*,"

fitting for sea at Birkenhead, but which there had been no attempt to arm. The verdict was given for the defendants, and, though the judgment was appealed against, it was never reversed.

It was claimed that England should return the friendly acts of the United States, which had taken powers to strengthen her Neutrality Act in the Canadian rebellion of 1837 (cf. p. 76), and had refused to fit out vessels against her in the Crimean War. To this it was answered that the United States Government did not stop American interference in the Canadian rebellion, or the supplying of a man-of-war to Russia, which fought against England at Petropaulovsk, and was still in Russian service; that they had also had recruiting stations in Canada during the Mexican War; that in 1861 and 1862 the North had shipped over 300,000 rifles (cf. p. 76), and had made overtures to Laird's to build ironclads for them. Mr. Laird, in Parliament, offered to shew this correspondence to the Speaker or Premier. It was also claimed on the British side that what England had done was in strict accordance with the practice of the United States and the principles laid down by their best judges, that the destruction of prizes at sea, now called piracy, was ordered by Congress in the War of 1812, and that Mr. Seward himself had said that contraband of war for Mexico, complained of by France, must take its risk, within the very time covered by the American complaints. The Solicitor-General said that the country must be the interpreter of her own laws, which must not be enforced just to please the United States, but in English fashion, on proper evidence, not mere suspicion; and the Premier, Lord Palmerston, that, on international law, belligerents have no right to complain of, nor the Government to interfere with, the mercantile transactions of supplying warlike stores, arms, and ships, which latter are on no different footing (Debate in the House of Commons, March 27th, 1863). To this standpoint the British

Government adhered throughout, and that they had maintained an honest neutrality.

Individual members of the Government, however, injured their case by the most indiscreet speeches at different times. Mr. Gladstone said that *Jefferson Davis* had made a nation and an army, and was making a navy: this was seized on to shew that the Government knew what was going on, and took no steps to stop it. By this and stronger sayings he offended the North, and aroused hopes of recognition in the South, and, though he afterwards said that he never meant his words to bear such a construction, it was that which every one put upon them. Lord John Russell admitted to Mr. Adams that "the cases of the '*Alabama*' and '*Oreto*' ('*Florida*') were a scandal"; and the Solicitor-General said that he had "strained the law" for Mr. Adams, whose Government took care that he should continue to do so.

Actual negotiations ran somewhat as follows: In 1863, Lord John Russell refused to seize the turret-ships building at Laird's, but when Mr. Adams replied with a veiled threat, he did so. In October, Mr. Adams, for the United States, agreed to the principle of arbitration which he proposed. Nothing was done in 1864. In August, 1865, Lord John Russell acknowledged a communication from Mr. Adams, "that the Government of the United States is ready to agree to any form of arbitration," saying that the only questions were, Whether the British Government had acted in good faith in maintaining neutrality, and Whether they were rightly advised in declining to detain the "*Alabama*" and others, under the Foreign Enlistment Act. He declined to submit such points to a third party, to admit bad faith, or to allow a foreign Government to interpret English law, but said that the Government would agree to a Commission, to which all claims which the Powers may agree to refer shall be referred. He would not admit any violation of British law, or any default in the performance of neutral duties, which

would render them liable to a claim for compensation from the United States.

When Lord Palmerston died in November, 1865, Lord John Russell became Premier, and was succeeded at the Foreign Office by Lord Clarendon, to whom Mr. Adams wrote to say that the United States declined the proposal, as England would not admit their war claims. He therefore answered, closing the controversy.

In 1866 the Conservatives came in, with Lord Stanley as Foreign Minister, and Mr. Seward reopened the question, making the wildest statements and claims, which Lord Stanley criticized sharply, reminding the United States that they had closed the matter by declining arbitration: he accepted his predecessors' standpoint. He, however, enquired whether they would accept the principle, and on what points, which would be considered in the most friendly spirit to end the ill-feeling. With Mr. Reverdy Johnson, Mr. Adams' successor, he worked out fresh proposals, that four Commissioners should meet in London, appoint an arbitrator, and judge the matter on the official correspondence, but that there be power to ask for argument or further evidence, if necessary. This, however, was not approved by Mr. Seward.

The Liberals then came in, with Mr. Gladstone as Premier, and Lord Clarendon as Foreign Minister. The United States had now got their old opponents, who had been in power all through the War. A new Convention was signed in London in January, 1869, providing for Commissioners, to examine documents, and hear one person on each side on every claim, but this was rejected in America, after some very violent speeches. Lord Clarendon was told that it only dealt with the claims of individuals, not with the relations of the two Governments, that it laid down no principle and settled no question, and that it would be better to let things cool down. Mr. Fish,

however, Mr. Seward's successor, suddenly re-opened it, making claims direct and indirect, but said that he would leave the method of settling the matter to Her Majesty's Government.

Messrs. Seward and Fish had thus, by vehemence and persistence, gained point after point against the Liberal Government; but against other Governments, who had allowed Confederate cruisers to use their ports, and who resisted them firmly, they went no further.

Early in 1871 President Grant made another step forward. He said to Congress that England seemed unwilling to allow that the United States had any just cause of complaint, and proposed to the House to buy up the private claims of American citizens, so that the nation might own and control all such demands against Great Britain. It is significant that after this time the British Government agreed to everything.

Lord Clarendon had proposed a Joint High Commission, to sit at Washington, "to treat of and discuss the mode of settling all questions which had reference to the fisheries and to Her Majesty's possessions in America." The President thought that it would fail to establish the friendship between the two countries unless the differences caused by the acts of the Confederate cruisers were included, but if this were accepted, he would be glad to appoint Commissioners to meet those of England. The Liberals at once gave way on this crucial point and sent their representatives over: they seemed worn out with American persistence, though they continued to assert their honest neutrality. No new evidence had been brought in to alter the situation.

The British Commissioners sailed in February, with authority to make this amazing climb-down: "For the escape of the '*Alabama*' and consequent injury to the commerce of the United States, Her Majesty's Government authorize you to express their regret in such

terms as would be agreeable to the United States, and not inconsistent with the position hitherto maintained by Her Majesty's Government as to the international obligations of neutral nations." Even after this, they still maintained that Great Britain was not responsible. When settling the subjects for discussion, the United States took the practical line of proposing to begin by accepting this Plea of Guilty at its real value, and proceeding to deal at once with questions of damages, but the British wanted to submit all questions of law and fact to arbitration. The United States demurred to this, unless the principles on which the Arbitrators were to work were settled beforehand, and made certain propositions to this effect. The matter was referred home, and the British Government answered that "though the proposed rules did not represent international law at the time the claims arose, yet they were so anxious to strengthen the friendly feeling that the arbitrators could assume that they had undertaken to act on the principles of the rules proposed by the United States." They thus consented to a verdict for the United States, for which purpose the rules were framed, and the only object in going to arbitration on points of law and fact was the poor one of trying to "save face": before giving their consent, they did not consider the effect or even the proper interpretation of these rules, which caused endless trouble and jangling at the trial itself. The treaty for the settlement was signed May 8th, 1871.

The Rules for the Arbitrators run as follows, from Article VI of the Treaty. A neutral Government is bound—

First.—To use diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace: and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above,

such vessel being specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use.

Secondly.—Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.

Thirdly.—To exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties.

The Court was composed of a member nominated by each of the following: the Queen of England, the President of the United States, the King of Italy, the Swiss Confederation, and the Emperor of Brazil. The principal difficulty was to deal with the construction of vague new rules, and their possible effect in the future, for, Great Britain having practically abandoned the main points, there was little to do as between the principals but assess damages.

The American Case was verbose and begged the question, making all sorts of assertions, alleging animus on the part of Great Britain, which was more resentment at Mr. Seward's overbearing ways than anything else, for, if Mr. Adams had not been a very different man, matters would have been serious, but he was both tactful and firm, and was about the only person who came out of the affair with credit. Such astounding claims were made, both in numbers and amount, that he sensibly dropped many of them, electing to stand on a few of the strongest.

Great Britain was adjudged to have broken the new rules, which were retrospective, in the cases of the "*Alabama*" and "*Florida*," and their commissioned prizes, and in that of the "*Shenandoah*," after recruiting at Melbourne, which was certainly a breach of neutrality, as was also the bringing in of the "*Tuscaloosa*" to Capetown. It will be noticed that all these vessels were charged with breaches of the old Foreign Enlistment Act also, which looks as if the same result

could have been obtained with a fraction of the trouble, or as if the Court hesitated to convict on the new rules alone. The damages were assessed at 15,500,000 dollars, or over £3,000,000, and proved to be so extravagant that the Government of the United States could not find claimants for nearly half the money, and it was actually proposed in Congress that the surplus be returned.

A nation which merely yields to pressure cannot claim to have found out a new and better way of settling disputes, and in this case neither side approached the matter in the right spirit. The Americans used much the same methods as in the impeachment of President Johnson, jeopardizing a strong case, which was saved by Mr. Adams' clear common-sense. A great chance was lost, for nothing was settled about International Law, the finding only bound the two parties to the Treaty, and the proposal to exempt private property from capture was not even discussed. The Geneva Arbitration may have been a great step in principle, but, like many first attempts, it was rather clumsy in practice.

The friction of the last few years had caused the British Government to appoint a Commission to examine the Neutrality Laws in 1867, the result of which was the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, a very different affair in principle from the old one (cf. p. 76), for it shifted the onus of proof from the prosecution to the defence, laying it, in a case of shipbuilding, entirely on the builder, and also prohibited British subjects from leaving the country to take service elsewhere. The old Act, in force during the War, was passed in 1819, on account of the complaints of Spain of the open help given by Englishmen to the revolted Spanish colonies in South America. The Rules for the Geneva Arbitrators are the main principles of the Act of 1870, in a more vague and elastic form, and made applicable to Governments, not individuals. So ended this extraordinary episode.

There were other disputes as to the Rights of Neutrals at sea, but, where only between the United States and the British Government, were easily settled, for Mr. Seward did not hesitate either to acknowledge or apologize for a proved offence against ordinary international law, of which in the heat of war there were several cases, but where the Confederacy was concerned he seemed quite rabid, and though his own Government acknowledged the Confederates as belligerents, at first in practice, then formally, he never did so, and much of his bitter indictment against Great Britain was based on this line of argument. The United States had not been parties to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, signed, after the Crimean War, by the Powers concerned, Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey. It declared that—

1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.
2. The neutral flag covers an enemy's goods, except contraband of war.
3. Neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

The United States were invited to assent to these proposals at the time, but declined to agree to No. 3 unless all private property was exempted from capture on the high seas. After the War broke out, they approached the British Government and proposed to accept the Declaration unconditionally, but this was refused while the War lasted. During the War the traditional attitudes of the two nations were reversed, for now it was the United States which contended for the right of search, and England which denied it.

The American mercantile marine and sea-borne trade seemed to have disappeared, and shewed no signs of returning : the feeling against England on

this account was very bitter for years after the War, but the reasons for its non-recovery were entirely American. One was that the spirit of adventure had been diverted from the sea to the opening up of the Great West, and Americans lost their taste for the sea, on which they had been so conspicuous; another was that the Civil War occurred just as the era of wooden ships was passing away, in the building of which America had been pre-eminent, and iron ships, against which they could not compete, had come to stay. While others were founding works, and learning to build iron ships, they were at war, and peace found them with their ironworks almost in an embryo condition. Their protective laws forbade them to recover their carrying trade with bought iron ships, till they were able to build for themselves, and so others seized and kept it.

An evil legacy of the War, or rather of the period of re-construction which followed it, is the widespread and deep-rooted corruption pervading American politics. President Johnson, an honest but obstinate man, tried to re-construct on the lines of ordinary civil law, which were not sufficient; he then quarrelled with Congress, which seized the management, and worked things very differently, not hesitating to use very questionable means to gain the mastery, and control all patronage. The "spoils to the victor" policy was carried out in its worst form, and as it became necessary to look ahead to the next Presidential election, the evil increased. Re-construction was worked in the interests of one political party only, and those of the nation ignored, so that when Grant came into power, and tried to put things right, the evil was too strong for him: he was clearly shewn that he must not interfere with political patronage (cf. pp. 435, 444). By the end of his second term the country was hopelessly infected with the canker of "the management of elections," from which it has never recovered, despite

the earnest efforts of good and strong men like Garfield, Cleveland, and others, the first of whom was shot by a disappointed place-hunter.

Were the American politician the real representative of the great and sensible American nation, her case would indeed have been hopeless, for his cowardice in danger was as amazing as his arrogance when it was not present. Politicians created the rancour which brought the War, and needlessly kept it up for years after the War was ended. Time and again the interference of their conceit and cowardice brought defeat and needless loss of life: the general in command must have a free hand in army movements, to adapt his strategy to the political situation, and it is here that he meets his War Minister, the political intermediary between him and his Government, but he must not be badgered by Congress or Parliament. Even though this lesson be learnt by bitter experience, it is soon forgotten in peace, since all Constitutional power is normally political, which forgetfulness invariably brings disaster, when trouble comes again, as it must do sooner or later.

Whoever depends on the military aid, after the outbreak of war, of those who will not rise to uphold their principles in the first instance, will surely be disappointed (cf. p. 150): promises to rise en masse, to second the army, if it will only come and enable the people to do so, are merely so much wind, and it is amazing that men of the ability and experience of *Lee* and *Bragg* should each have made the fatal mistake of believing them in 1862. When war is imminent, preparation for war is everything, political organization out of date. Contrast the action of Lincoln and of *Governor Magoffin* in Kentucky (cf. p. 77), whose political organizing gave the North the chance to raise troops, and whose State Proclamation of Neutrality gave them time to train them. This attempt at neutrality, where neutrality was impossible, subjected Kentucky, and Missouri, another divided State, to

the curse of guerilla warfare more than any others. Political organization is also worse than premature till the country is settled after the War, of which there were many cases.

In America, everything pertaining to so-called "Freedom" runs riot, till the sense is lost in the sound, and in nothing so much as in the Freedom of the Press. It was carried to such a pitch on the Northern side that Grant estimated its value to the enemy at 100,000 men, and when he saw confidential plans and orders given away in the papers, to the injury of the cause which they professed to support, he envied the stern control which the other side was able to exercise. Sherman was nearly hounded out of the army at a critical time, because he clearly foresaw the magnitude of the struggle, and the position of General Cox in West Virginia was made almost impossible, because he would not betray the trust reposed in him, to provide copy. When will the Anglo-Saxon race learn that the methods of peace are not suited to war time?

On both sides preparation for war was neglected, with disastrous results on its duration and severity. To shew your enemy that you are in earnest is more likely to make him pause than go forward, while he is encouraged by lack of preparation, and war generally follows. This happened here: the South said scornfully that the Yanks dared not fight, which, while it hastened war, made their own preparation somewhat careless. Steady preparation is the most likely way to make political negotiations successful. Though the South began with the best moves, they had no plan of action generally, but everything was done piecemeal, and in trying to be strong everywhere they were weak everywhere. One reason of this was probably that the Southern States did not all secede at once, and the sides were not exactly known, till war actually broke out. Grant considers that the South had a great advantage in possessing no army,

but a number of excellent officers who could raise one, and that General Scott made a great mistake in keeping the Regular Regiments intact, and not breaking them up to supply cadres for the national army. The ridiculous mistake was made of calling men out for three months only ; it is hardly too much to say that this was responsible for the loss of the Bull Run campaign. On the Northern side, too, the army was kept up by the raising of new regiments by the different States, rather than by sending strong drafts to existing ones, whose officers knew their business. This was due to the curse of political patronage at home, in great measure. One State only, Wisconsin, adopted the right course, and it is recorded that towards the end of the War a Wisconsin battalion was considered the equivalent of a brigade from any other State. The South gave their generals proper seniority, and thus were but little troubled with the intriguing and jealousy which were the curse of the Union side, where all were Major-Generals, and were put up and down without reference to seniority, creating a distinction without a difference. In the lower ranks, especially in the Republican North, the insane practice prevailed, at first, of the men electing their officers, for they resented orders as an infringement of equality. Though this was soon stopped, it cost the country dear, for it is hardly too much to say that many of these officers were chosen for their military incapacity. For years the country had looked on War as an anachronism, and now had to pay for its folly. Discipline was thus a weak point, for though latterly it was excellent among those present for duty, yet the general lack of it was shewn by the fact that the difference between effective and paper strength was something like 30 per cent. of the latter. The system of appointing political generals went on longer, and few of these were worth their salt : even Logan and Blair, the best of them, absented them-

selves from their commands at a critical time, to look after their own elections to Congress. They would probably have found that stricter attention to the country's service was the best political ticket. This War provided another illustration of the old adage, "Youth will be served," for, magnificent soldiers as they were, *Lee*, *Joseph Johnston*, and *Bragg* had not the vitality and drive of their younger days. *Lee's* health broke down in 1863, and he was never the same man again. The first two were each about 54 in 1861, *Bragg* close on 50, while Grant was 39, Sherman 41, and Sheridan 30.

Perhaps the principal military lesson is in the use of Cavalry. The problem of getting Cavalry to fight well on foot, without losing its Cavalry Spirit, is often spoken of now-a-days as a sort of ideal to be approached rather than attained; but Sheridan, *Stuart*, and *Forrest* all solved it to perfection, using mounted and dismounted action indifferently, though the two latter had few real cavalry in proportion to the size of their commands. Compare Buford's fine handling at Gettysburg. Strategically, *Bragg's* use of cavalry to paralyze Grant, and isolate Rosecrans, in December, 1862, and, on a smaller scale, *Ashby's*, when he bewildered and paralyzed the large forces surrounding *Jackson*, before the battle of McDowell, and *Munford's*, screening *Jackson's* march to the Peninsula, are models in their way. *Lee*, great general as he was, did not get the full use of his cavalry, for he allowed it to be away when he fought his two most important battles, *Sharpsburg* and Gettysburg: Hooker and *Hood* both made the same mistake. Much has been said about Raids, but on a large scale they are two-edged weapons: they seem of little use in an enemy's country, while his armies are unbroken, and must not be undertaken just before an important battle: a small body will see as much or more, run less risk, and incapacitate fewer horses.

The most able and daring move in the whole War

was probably *Evans'* defence of the Confederate left at Bull Run, when he divined Tyler's orders from his hesitation, and McDowell's whole plan, and dared to mask this strong division with four companies, while he took the rest of his tiny force to the decisive point, and gained the time and ground which saved the battle. For a night march and daybreak attack, so much in vogue now, there is no better example anywhere than *Hardee's* attack at Atlanta.

The disbandment of the armies at the end of the War had an excellent effect, for thousands of men, in the best condition, set to work on the huge task of opening out the Great West, which turned their energies into a useful channel. America has never looked back. This result of what is usually a most critical and dangerous period may be looked on as unique.

The Northern Navy was, at first, both weak and inefficient, not ready for war, and ships were improvised and run up in such haste, that many were almost useless. On the Southern side, it is hardly too much to say that if they could have built an efficient marine engine, they might have broken the blockade, and perhaps turned the tide in their own favour. Though this was quite patent, they did nothing beforehand to remedy the deficiency. At sea, *Semmes'* strategy consisted in striking at the trade routes, and in calculating how long he could stay in any locality before a more powerful vessel came to drive him away. This he carried out with such marvellous accuracy and success, that no one vessel ever did so much harm to an enemy as did the little "*Alabama*."

NOTE. SOME PRINCIPAL POINTS IN THE FOREIGN
ENLISTMENT ACT, 1870

This Act, Section 8, 1 (cf. p. 76), makes it an offence if any one "builds, agrees to build, or causes to be built, a ship with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe," etc., etc., or

(Section 8, 4) "despatches, or causes or allows to be despatched, any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe," etc., etc. "Provided that he shall not be liable if on proclamation of neutrality he furnishes the Secretary of State with particulars of the contract, and gives security that the ship be not despatched without Her Majesty's license before the end of the war."

Section 9. The onus of proof, in a disputed case, lies on the builder, that he could not have known that the ship was intended to be used against a friendly State. (The conditions to satisfy this Clause are very stringent.)

Section 21. Customs and other local officers may seize and detain ships liable to seizure and detention, without prejudice to the overriding authority of the Court of Admiralty.

Section 30. "Equipping" includes "fitting or adapting for sea or for naval service," using the words "any tackle, apparel," etc., besides "arms," etc. (Cf. pp. 76, 471.)

There are also stringent provisions, forbidding Her Majesty's subjects to leave the country for the purpose of taking service with either side, or inducing or allowing any one else to do so.

MAP INDEX

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND BATTLE MAPS IN BRACKETS

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
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